Relationships between the state and civil society and their importance for sustainable urban development

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ABSTRACT
This paper draws on a range of case studies in Mozambique, Pakistan, China, the Philippines, Costa Rica, South Africa and the UK and uses an institutionalist analytical framework to identify:

- Different relationships between the state, market and civil society in the case studies
- The global and local context which affect these; and
- The institutional structure (mental models and organizational forms) that are embedded with them.

Key questions addressed are:

1. What are the relative roles and interests of the state, market and civil society in the countries studied and how are these changing?
2. How do institutions promote or constrain the greater legitimacy of the state and a greater responsiveness to civil society through providing ‘spaces for negotiation’? and
3. How can local institutions act within a global perspective and how can global forces adjust (be adjusted) to local needs?

Based on this analysis an overview of the possible relationships between the state and civil society is discussed, seen as an alternative to the currently dominant focus on state-market partnerships. This focuses on the role of intermediate urban social movements and leads to conclusions on the possible role of civil society in sustainable urban development.
INTRODUCTION

This paper draws on a series of country case studies presented in the book Urban Development and Civil Society: the role of communities in sustainable cities (Carley, Jenkins & Smith, 2001). Based on an analysis of

- the relationships between the state, market and civil society;
- the local and global context for these; and
- the institutional structure (mental models and organization)

an overview of the state–civil society relationships in the case studies is sketched out, as a background to understand the intermediary role of urban social movements and subsequently serve as a basis for general recommendations on the role of civil society in sustainable urban development.

The analysis is structured around three implicit questions:

1. What are the relative roles and interests of the state, market and civil society in the case studies, and how are these changing?

2. How do institutions (mental models and organizational forms) promote or constrain the greater legitimacy of the state and a greater responsiveness to civil society through providing spaces for negotiation?

3. How can local institutions act within a global perspective and how can global forces adjust to local needs?

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE STUDIES

Mozambique

The Mozambican case study describes a nation-state where local forms of governance have been dominated by the central state since the beginning of the colonial period – some 100 years ago – but which recently embarked on a new era. However, whether new, legally but not financially, autonomous local governments will be able to resist the pressures of the still relatively strong central government (albeit weakened from 15 years of structural adjustment) is open to question. More importantly, will local government be able to deal with the demands of global and regional market forces – which are re-entering the national and local economy – as well as be more responsive to local communities’ needs? This is particularly important due to the weak level of organizational capacity within communities after decades of repression and the continuing low level of negotiation between the state and civil society, leading to a perceived level of illegitimacy of the state.

The relationship between the state and the market in Mozambique has been a stormy one in the past 25 years, changing from the colonial situation where a corporatist state intervened heavily in the national and local economy, although subordinated to regional and global market forces, to one where the central state dominated economic activity with market forces extremely limited at all levels. The failure of this attempt at economic self-reliance, due to global and regional pressures as well as the social and economic isolation of the majority of citizens from the state, was followed by a rapid restructuring of the state in parallel with an opening to market activity. The weakened state has attempted to regulate global and regional market forces vis-à-vis national economic actors, but has been limited in this due to external pressure and weak
national economic response. The resulting ‘wild west’ market economy has grown rapidly in the most recent past, but only in restricted sectors and with low labour engagement. The majority of the urban population therefore still do not have access to the formal economy and the state has not as yet provided any real context for more adequate local economic development.

Concerning state relations with civil society, only in the past decade or so have independent vertical organizations in civil society begun to develop, and these as yet have not focused on urban development in any significant way. Urban development has traditionally been a low priority for central government (before and after independence), and while this is of greater interest to local government, local elites to date dominate access to social and economic facilities, with increasing marginalization of the poor majority. International agencies have had some impact on the central state and may continue to do so at local government level, where they have latterly supported the activities of NGOs. However, the scale of these activities in relation to the impact of global and regional economic forces is very limited. Physical urban development and human resources remain highly underdeveloped in parallel with the local urban economy. The result of current trends is likely to be more inefficient and more inequitable urban areas.

Despite this general context, the fact that communities have actually managed so much of their own affairs fairly independent of the state or formal market is, perhaps, the key to a more sustainable form of urban development. To date this is based on mental models and organizational forms which are generally modified from traditional rural situations. While these have served fairly well so far in the light of relative protection from market forces, this is in danger of fragmentation in the current economic context. As such there is an urgent need to modify and strengthen the horizontal forms of civil society, at the same time as build vertical spaces for negotiation with the state, to allow both resolution of immediate urban problems as well as a more sustainable basis for future urban development in the medium term. Local governments can potentially play a key role here, but also can see a strengthened civil society as opposition. Some of the other case studies illustrate ways in which this could be developed.

Pakistan

Pakistan represents a country with a much more established and complex form of government than Mozambique, with decentralization in government to established federal and metropolitan levels, but one where state legitimacy is equally queried by the majority of the urban population. Despite its level of establishment, the state has very poor levels of coordination, definition of powers and capacity to act. In addition there is a very weak sense of government service and public morality, leading to high levels of corruption. This affects all areas of life – social services such as transport and productive activities such as industry, as illustrated in the case studies.

The nature of the legal system tends to support this status quo for the benefit of the social and economic elite and the bureaucracy rather than wider society. There is a close relationship between the state and key economic actors, which exert strong political pressure given the newly industrializing status of the country. However, this relationship is not explicit and the level of accountability between the state and society is thus undermined. In this situation the state both intervenes to restrict market forces (as in the case study examining transport services), and withdraws to allow market forces free reign (as in the case study examining industry). The nature of this dualistic position is presumably grounded on the balance between demands of dominant market sectors and important social sectors.
The acceptance of the situation of state corruption by the majority is (as in Mozambique) underpinned by a mental model with a low level of expectation of the state within civil society. Thus, while communities at times mobilize at local level round issues such as industrial pollution, there do not seem to exist many channels for vertical negotiation with the state to make a significant impact. The intermediate role of NGOs or social companies, such as in the example of public transport in Faisalabad, may represent a way to circumvent the actual political economic reality of the current state regime. However, the unique nature of this quasi-state body, based almost entirely on an elite of non-corrupt government employees and acceptance of its almost paternal authority, militates against its replication in a wider way. In addition, it is not clear how this innovation can benefit the majority of the urban poor, and indeed the local impact of macroeconomic changes may well threaten its continuity.

Steps taken more recently by the military government in Pakistan appear to offer a way to challenge this institutional status quo of self-serving government at all levels. It remains to be seen, however, if the ‘accountability courts’ and independent tribunals can break the deadlock. Of crucial importance here is the attitude of the population and its interest and capacity to take direct action. Thus, despite these recent self-imposed changes within the state (and in the case of industrial pollution, of international regulation), it has been suggested that there is a need for international support to strengthen the role of intermediaries between the state and the community, such as through NGO structures, in order to promote higher levels of perception and organization, whether in industrial and public transport regulation. While this may be a necessary first step in introducing new mental models, the sustainability of the approach must be based in a genuine strengthening of the role of civil society to negotiate with the state more adequately. In addition, in the present political context it does not seem likely that any state-promoted form of community self-development can have any major impact. Again other case studies illustrate models of how civil society has engaged with the state in different situations.

**China**

Despite its superficial similarity to Mozambique in terms of a socialist political orientation, China is less like the Mozambican case study than the previous Pakistani one. This is mainly due to the nature and level of state capacity and its dominant role in development, continuing even today despite market reforms. There has been a very long tradition of state paternalism and control in China, linked to relatively effective redistribution and state capacity at various levels, which existed long before socialism. This allowed the widespread control of production and location in space, limiting urban development to ‘manageable’ proportions, which in turn allowed a concentration of resources in urban productive activities and social distribution of differential benefits through state controlled economic units.

While the opening to market processes remains tightly controlled by the state, as does urban development in the formal sector, the impact of market forces also has allowed ambiguities to be exploited by a growing informal sector – for instance on the urban fringes and inner urban areas. Here the long tradition of passive acceptance of state control of production and reproduction has been bypassed by dynamic forms of socio-economic interchange based on a mix of market and traditional structures. This form of local economic engagement has proved ideal for the demand for more flexible labour, and hence is implicitly accepted by the state, which still retains control of the formal economic system. It remains to be seen, however, how the deeper penetration of global market forces will be controlled by the state and how this will impact on the wider population in China, such as in widening urban–rural disparities.
Concerning state–civil society relations, it is unclear whether the urban village model developing in the peri-urban areas of Beijing is a transitional and isolated phenomenon, or whether it is the model for wider application in future. At any rate the state restructuring and market reform are still in fairly early stages for China in general, but already there are signs of growing social problems of wider rural–urban migration and under-employment. The revitalization and modification of traditional power structures in the urban villages can be seen as the result of weak autonomous associational structures in civil society (horizontal and vertical) due to years of repression, such as in Mozambique. However, the degree of social acceptance of the new forms of social control is unclear, as these seem to be coercive, based on powerful individuals. It will thus be of interest to see how these embryonic structures within civil society develop and how they develop relationships with the state, which is itself in a process of changing relations with the market.

**Philippines**

Unlike various other case studies in the book, in Manila there is a clear definition of relationships and powers between national, metropolitan, local and neighbourhood forms of governance. However, implementation in practice has its difficulties. In governance terms these are related to the nature of metropolitan authority vis-à-vis fairly autonomous local governments, as well as the stability of national government support for the neighbourhood level. In terms of urban development, another issue is the nature of the national legal system with weak regulatory powers, for example over land use and transport planning. In general, however, the nested institutional relationships, while complex, allow negotiation by local government and communities, albeit limited on more fundamental issues of national policy. In this respect market forces have stronger lobbying powers, especially at a local level as their interests can fit well with the revenue earning interests of the local state.

While more recently threatened in terms of the national resource base, the neighbourhood barangays seem to represent a fairly stable focal point for both community self-development and social control – reminiscent of the Grupos Dinamizadores in Mozambique. However, unlike in Mozambique, the barangays have a clearer institutional and legal context within which to work and access to resources and political leverage, although this is highly dependent on central and local government respectively. The barangays developed from traditional social structures (such as are embryonic in Chinese urban villages), but were transformed by the state as a means for low level administration. While the case study does not elaborate on this, it would appear that in general the wider population accept the role of the barangays as being representative, despite their reliance on a fairly elite leadership. Certainly, the space for self-development within neighbourhoods afforded by state support for barangays has raised levels of self-reliance and fostered direct action. The system does, however, rely on political patronage.

It is at the wider political and economic level that the mental models and organizational context for community-led development would appear to be limited in the Philippines case study, as the barangay system is constrained in the extent to which it can raise issues such as those affecting environmental management, land use and transport at city level, in turn influenced by national policy. Here the strong influence of the mental model of individualistic freedom over land use has led to a weak regulatory role for the state vis-à-vis the market and individual, preferentially benefiting the higher income groups, as in land access and transport. Thus, despite the usefulness of the model in relationships between the local and metropolitan levels of government, the degree of independent negotiation that the barangay system can allow is limited at national levels. Hence, while this is a useful model for structuring state–civil society
relations, the lack of autonomy limits the extension of bargaining power to change the basic ‘rules of engagement’ established by the state.

Costa Rica

The state in Costa Rica displays characteristics rather more similar to that of the United Kingdom than some of the other case studies in developing and transitional economies, although its form of interaction with civil society is rather different. Costa Rica has a relatively long tradition of a highly centralized state with weak local government and few intermediate levels. Despite frequent changes of political leadership an overall regime of social democratic welfare has dominated in the last 50 years, providing a high level of stability for international and national economic activity. This, however, has been fundamentally challenged by the changes in macroeconomic structure, to a great extent induced by global economic changes, with an undermining of the social welfare approach and greater decentralization of the state promoted by market forces and international agencies.

One of the means for obtaining political economic stability in the past has been the continuing ability of the central state to dominate negotiation with civil society. Whether with trade unions, peasant movements or urban based community organizations and their consolidated fronts, the state has managed to co-opt these through complex systems of patronage and clientelism. The most recent manifestation of this was during the period of macroeconomic stabilization and subsequent economic restructuring, when the resulting socio-economic crises led to broad social mobilization. In this transitional period, it is arguable that the social movements created had a more effective bargaining position than before or since, through the state sponsored system of community development. In addition, despite the overall level of stability achieved, the result has, however, been growing instability in social redistribution at local level.

Generally speaking, the adoption of an official community development approach by the state to social and welfare issues has stood the state in good stead throughout the last decades, and it has received international support and acclaim. However, it is within this context that the state is renegotiating a new approach in the face of global economic pressure, with a change from welfare based on rights to a definition of inevitable poverty which needs to be contained, and which is to be serviced through market mechanisms. In parallel, the labour market is being forced to become more flexible, with the creation of intermediate non-state structures to provide non-unionized labour protection. In this trend towards deregulated labour markets, Costa Rica is not dissimilar to more developed welfare states, including in fact that of China.

Other means by which the state has initiated this new approach includes the promotion of greater decentralization within government and a devolved role for civil society within the new ‘assistentalist’ approach. This includes new forms of state support for organizations within civil society through capacity building. However, to what extent this will create a new model of state–civil society partnership at local level is queried as the relationship between local government and civil society has been traditionally weak. In addition, it is not clear to what extent this model can provide a channel for greater negotiation between communities and the state at a general level, as opposed to another form of co-option and channelling political opposition, especially as the role of the state vis-à-vis the market is changing so markedly. Thus, again, while the model seems to work for the relationship between the central state and civil society, it is proving less effective at local government level and has little impact at supranational level, where the stresses increasingly originate.
South Africa

Probably the most conflictive situation between the state and civil society in the case study chapters is represented in South Africa. Here paternalism and control were used to socially, economically and politically segregate society on the basis of race to permit the preferential benefit for one group, which otherwise might have been subject to different class and/or indigenous nationalist pressures. While this process began under a relatively decentralized political system, it was highly centralized during the 40 or so years of the apartheid era, when a corporatist state structure maintained its position through on-going negotiation with key economic actors (not unlike in Costa Rica, but within a very different social context). The result of this subjugation was widespread social exclusion and a relatively low level of engagement in the economy by the poorly skilled majority – legacies which now constrain the countries repositioning in the global economy.

The situation of political and economic hegemony by a state–market partnership was radically threatened through political opposition, including a very strong protest role within civil society, which was in itself based on a long tradition of community based alternatives. These alternatives were often (as in China and Mozambique) based on traditional social structures, and were quite often coercive. However, they permitted the development of an alternative mental model to one of relative resignation to state domination that pervades other situations described in this book, such as Pakistan. The essential difference in South Africa was the alliance of these community level actions to political opposition in broader urban social movements, as indeed happened also in Costa Rica. Similarly to Central America this relationship proved difficult, as it was open to co-option.

In South Africa, however, it can be argued that the level of co-option was limited before the new political dispensation, and continued so afterwards, as the degree to which the urban social movement was consolidated was itself limited. Hence there is still the opportunity to consolidate this level of activity within civil society. This is relevant due to the fact that the new state has substantially continued to implement essentially corporatist structures in the face of global economic and political forces (as well as federal opposition). There is thus growing dissatisfaction with the relative inability of the new central state to change the social and economic status quo – to a great extent due to these external pressures. However, to what extent the resources exist within civil society to do this without the support of strong vertical associations such as trade unions or opposition political parties remains to be seen. Nevertheless the model of autonomous urban social movements is strongest in this case study, with the capacity to operate from a local to national level.

United Kingdom

As a ‘developed’ country, it might be thought that the UK represents potentially a different analytical outcome from the other case studies. However, on the contrary, despite the contextual differences, many of the same forces are at work, with not dissimilar reactions. As in all the other case studies the forces of economic globalization have impacted heavily on the capacity of the nation-state – and eventually the local state – to control its relationship with the economy and society. Despite the vast resource differences there are thus parallels to be drawn and lessons to be learned.

The state in the UK has been increasingly centralized over the past 25 years, substituting strong local government and changing its relationships with civil society and the economy. In addition, from a position of hegemony in paternalistic control in the public interest through forms of
Fordism – permitting strong management of markets and redistribution based on socially rational principles – the state has been weakened in both regulatory and redistributive power through the pressures of global market forces and political neo-liberalism. Restructuring the state and market relations has led to a integration of the state's redistribution within a market context – such as in the case study description of housing allocation in the face of low demand.

While this process has created more flexible and dynamic markets, potentially providing greater individual choice, it has also created regional and class inequalities with the social and economic exclusion of large social groups from the dominant formal economy, who tend to become concentrated in certain regions and urban areas. While not repressed as such, the context for community organization around social reproductive issues which are an essential element of urban development was predominantly subordinated to the negotiation between the state and the market via trade unions and representative democratic institutions.

During the economic restructuring this was seen as insufficient and direct action by organized groups within civil society at community and other levels grew in importance. However, with the fragmentation of communities (both geographic and communities of interest) through the commodification of housing, the impact of this movement has been muted, although apparent. The ensuing social and economic exclusion has again recently been taken up by government as it represents a growing political issue. Whether the new approaches promoted by the state to reduce exclusion can change the structural context or not is open to question, and these can be seen as attempts by the state to co-opt or head off political opposition, as in Costa Rica. However, there is the possibility that civil society can develop its own momentum within this context, as happened in Costa Rica and South Africa in transitional periods – and has in fact happened on other broad social issues worldwide, as elaborated on below.

**GENERAL OBSERVATIONS FROM THE CASE STUDIES**

There are very marked differences in the case studies of the relationships between the state, market and civil society, reflecting historic development, the actual political economy, and the institutional capacities within each sector of urban development studied. In general, however, the move to a weakening of the role of the state is evident, with a growth of market dominance in many sectors. In parallel there are changes in civil society which affect communities, often expressed as a growing individualism, which is more frequently constraining than supportive of relationships between the state and civil society. To a great extent this is seen as due to globalization of market forces, with the result that communities are prone to additional stresses and fragmentation.

Concerning state–civil society relations, three main situations are illustrated in the case studies:

a) limited community relationships with the state (Mozambique, Pakistan and China);

b) community action in urban development promoted by the state (Costa Rica, Philippines, at times South Africa, and latterly UK), and

c) independent community action negotiating with the state (South Africa and at times Costa Rica).

Despite the trend for economic forces to threaten community cohesion, there is, on the other hand, a wide range of organizational forms within civil society which challenge this, although these often are not consolidated beyond the local or intermediate level. This is partly due to the prevailing mental models whereby many communities and organizations within civil society
withdraw from negotiating with the state, as this negotiation does not in itself produce results since the state is itself increasingly constrained by global forces outside of its control. It is noticeable that in various circumstances it is traditional vertical power structures within civil society which have been the basis for community level activity: in China, the Philippines and at times South Africa. In contrast in Mozambique it is modified forms of traditional horizontal structures which dominate, while in Pakistan, Costa Rica, the more recent period in South Africa and the UK there seems to be a reliance on formal (modern, vertical) political structures.

The attributes of the models developed for state–civil society negotiation in the case studies can be summarized in the following table.

### Table 1 Attributes of state–civil society negotiation in the case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>traditional horizontal structures</th>
<th>traditional vertical structures</th>
<th>modern vertical structures</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>weak relationship Mozambique</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Pakistan. UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adapted kinship structures survive in the urban areas after traditional vertical structures of governance used in the colonial period were substituted by state sponsored neighbourhood level organisations, which were then discontinued during the retraction of state activities associated with structural adjustment.</td>
<td>Traditional village based governance structures re-activated in new role in urban setting, outside of state control, but providing form of socio-economic organisation as well as political basis for (limited) negotiation with the state. The 'strongman' leadership, however, seems to act in coercive ways.</td>
<td>Representative democratic systems of local government, supported or paralleled by trade unions (in the UK) provide the only route for communities to engage with the state. However, these are open to marginalization (UK) and corruption (Pakistan), and are seen by many as being ineffective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state induced relationship</td>
<td>Philippines, pre-transition South Africa</td>
<td>Costa Rica, recent UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional governance structures deliberately re-activated in urban setting in Philippines as basis for local level organization, subordinated and linked into local government system. In South Africa, local 'warlords' provide protection from the state in squatter areas and later negotiate with the state vis-à-vis urban consolidation, albeit in coercive manner.</td>
<td>The welfare state approach changes in the current period of ‘slimmed down’ government to promote activity within civil society organisations as an alternative to state and market supply of services. However this can imply a relinquishing of state responsibility for lower income, less politically influential citizens.</td>
<td>Independent urban social movements developed before and during periods of political transition, playing important political role alongside other</td>
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<tr>
<td>independent relationship Costa Rica &amp; South Africa</td>
<td>Costa Rica &amp; South Africa</td>
<td>Costa Rica &amp; South Africa</td>
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The most effective proactive models would appear to be those where the state invests in community development, such as in the Philippines and Costa Rica; however, there are distinct limits to the wider effectiveness of these as the state negotiates with other interest groups (increasingly including international capital). In these situations at times more autonomous models have arisen, such as the urban social movements in Costa Rica and South Africa. Given the trends outlined above of economic globalization, withdrawal of the state, and the tendency to fragmentation within civil society, the capacity for organizations within civil society to organize and create mutually beneficial relationships with the state and economic forces is thus potentially growing more important. So too is the capacity to take this one step further to permit independent negotiation where mutual benefit is not identified.

Relating this to the wider political economic context, today’s governments cannot ignore the needs of significant parts of the urban population in any sustainable future, even if this is what is required by the dictates of a global market economy. As such, in situations where inadequate means or levels of negotiation between civil society and the state occur, independent social movements will continue to rise from community direct action, and demand negotiation with the state on social issues such as urban development. However, the fact that negotiation on these issues cannot necessarily be resolved within nation–states in the current global economic context, highlights the need for the creation of mechanisms to transcend national borders. Social movements can also, however, transcend these boundaries, as has happened for global issues such as women’s liberation, civil rights and environmental movements. The next part of this paper therefore looks at these ‘new social movements’ and what can be learnt from these in creating a more sustainable urban future.

**THE ROLE OF THE NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN SUSTAINABLE URBAN DEVELOPMENT**

**What are new social movements?**

In many cities across the world local level interest groups unite to improve their physical environment. When community based organizations organize in broad based associations they can form a social movement which has influence far beyond that of the individual organizations. However, defining what constitutes an ‘urban social movement’ is not so easy, as aims and consciousness, as well as scales and methods of operation, can all be combined in various ways in different political, economic, social and cultural contexts.

Manuel Castells, in his *The city and the grassroots*, defines urban social movements as social entities working collectively to attain the following goals: raising the standard of collective
consumption, furthering community culture and reaching for political self-management, thereby changing ‘urban meaning’ or mental models. By influencing the conception of ‘urban meaning’, urban social movements can bring about fundamental structural social change (Castells, 1983). Examples of major urban social movements across the world provided by Castells include peace and civil rights movements, women's liberation, ecological groups and regional separatist movements. These essentially cut across class lines and work with high levels of autonomy from the state and have at times achieved significant global impact.

These social movements are generally labelled as new – why is this? Part of the definition of ‘new’ social movements has been the distinction of these from ‘traditional’ social movements, such as organized labour and peasant movements. These latter draw on wide constituencies but essentially develop conflict along the lines of social class. New social movements, however, encompass protest across social class lines, lobbying and pressurizing government agencies over development and social issues, and tend to be organized on an ad hoc basis (Saschikonye, 1995). In other words, while the objective of the former – perhaps more aptly called ‘political’ movements – is the capture of state power, the latter are issue based and often content to influence policy, or resolve specific circumstances. The recent growth of new social movements is thus seen as being linked to failures (and perceived failures) of state regimes to reflect the demands of wide – and increasingly diversified - constituencies, and hence often tend to be developed as alternatives to the existing political process.

To what extent are these social movements truly global? Schuurman argues that in the ‘developing world’ the role of the state and the objectives of urban social movements vis-à-vis the state concerning collective consumption are qualitatively as well as quantitatively different from those in the post-industrial ‘developed’ world, and this needs to be reflected in the definition of the term. He proposes a wider definition of an urban social movement, with particular reference to the developing world, as a social organization with a territorially based identity, which strives for emancipation by way of collective action – emancipation being seen as ‘liberation from hierarchical dependency relations... [these being those] in which the power structure is such that one of the actors has a dominant role and extracts more value from the interaction than the other actor(s), which leads to marginalization processes’ (Schuurman, 1989, p21). This definition thus does not insist on societal reform as an aim, as does that of Castells, but does not exclude this. However, as McCarney indicates, urban social movements in the developing world increasingly aspire to change policy as well as local circumstances (McCarney, 1996).

Urban social movements in the developing world thus tend to be formed round basic issues of survival and struggles to gain access to the basics of collective consumption, and less around broader issues such as state power and the basic underlying economic structures. The capacity of these movements to effect fundamental change thus is questioned by those who see this as the prerogative of the state. As we have seen in the Costa Rica and South Africa case studies, the dilemma for many social movements is whether to become involved in the institutionalized political process and remain key agents of transformation within this, or assert autonomy and pressure from without, which may permit under-represented sections of society a voice not possible within the political process, but may not effect fundamental change.

Referring to the developed world, Canel (1997) indicates that new social movement theorists explain the emergence of these movements in a context of structural transformations and significant cultural and political change related to late capitalism. There have been two basic approaches within this theoretical context. One approach stresses that the changing role of the state in the context of late capitalism has become contradictory as it attempts to ensure both the
continuation of the conditions for capital accumulation and, at the same time, political hegemony and legitimacy while widening the scope of democratic governance. The state thus broadens its role in both economic and social regulation, but in the process becomes a central source of inequality and power differentials. In this context the inability of formal political actors (political parties, trade unions, etc) to articulate multiple demands of widening numbers of interest groups leads to the emergence of new collective actors. New social movements are thus seen as broadening political articulation by social agents, while maintaining relative autonomy from the political system per se.

The other main approach focuses on the crisis of ‘meaning’ that the increasing ‘intrusion’ of the state and market into society has created, with new social movements being seen as defending lifestyles. This stresses the cultural orientations of social relations – i.e. the set of cultural models which guide social practice – with hegemony over these being contested and negotiated by different social groups. In this analysis, conflict in post-industrial societies focuses on the production of ‘meaning’ – as opposed to the means of production (industry based societies) or civil and political rights (commerce based societies). The transformation to the post-industrial context has brought new roles for the state – e.g. the bureaucratization of social life – and the establishment of mass culture. New social movements thus focus on collective control over the redefinition of social roles and consumption – e.g. around issues such as gender, ethnicity, age, neighbourhood, environment and peace. In this view, social movements are not seen as essentially based on economic issues, but rather on ideological, cultural and political issues. Changes in societal type in this approach are thus seen as taking place within the political system, with a central role for the state, in contrast to the alternative approach above (Canel, 1997).

What can be the role of new social movements in sustainable urban development?

Summarizing, in broad terms we can distinguish the general consciousness and aims of new social movements as:

- raising standards of collective consumption
- furthering community culture, changing ‘meaning’ and definition of social roles and
- effecting societal change through new socio-political actors, representing a wider range of interest groups, without necessarily participating in the formal political system

with the proviso that in the developing world their actions may be more issue based, oriented to resolving ad hoc circumstances with possible intentions to influence policy, rather than focused on societal change per se. However, if the aims of the social movement correspond closely to more general aims of improving collective consumption, there is a strong likelihood of it becoming co-opted by a class based political movement (such as organized labour or political parties), or it may be co-opted by the state itself.

The case studies identified constraints on civil society–state relations in challenging the actions of nation-states when co-opted by the state, and the difficulties in widening the impact of urban social movements autonomously from the state or established political actors. It also identified the problems associated with the local, or national, focus for action of these movements. What permits a movement to transcend these boundaries and achieve a broader impact? This is partly the organizational structure which can be created, which is essentially locally based but ‘networked’, as opposed to any hierarchical system, but is also the definition of meaning and associated mental models.
Concerning organizational constraints, a critical factor in determining the potential for urban social movements has been identified as the resources it can mobilize – funds, human resources, ‘facilities’ (e.g. offices, equipment) and legitimacy. In fact, as noted by Sachikonye (1995), the growth of some social movements is tied to state resources such as public sector investment in tertiary education which increases the scope of the intelligentsia, or capital investment growth which increases formal employment and permits wider unionization. At times, mobilizing basic resources can become the dominant aim of the movement to even survive. This, however, does not mean that urban social movements cannot emerge in resource starved environments; on the contrary, in these situations human resources can at times be mobilized much more successfully due to higher degrees of legitimacy within these movements compared to the state.

Perhaps the most important issue in the growth of wider organizational forms within civil society is the form of collective ‘consciousness’ – or the mental models – that shape perceptions and record experience. An urban social movement generally arises from activities across a wide number of territorially based organizations which have some form of collective feature, thus permitting a collective consciousness to be created. However, as the urban social movement begins to confront its opponents – often the state – there comes a crucial period when it has to operate in non-territorially defined ways. It is at this point that many urban social movements in the developing world fail in making a wider impact, either because they do not mobilize sufficient resources to transcend the local space, they do not maintain adequate legitimacy as they do this, or they become co-opted by other institutions. Despite these difficulties, when large numbers of the population of a community, town, region, state, or even at a global level, begin to conceive of common needs, truly powerful changes can occur, as can be seen concerning the civil rights, environmental, gender and regional separatist issues mentioned above.

In general therefore there would appear to be considerable scope for social movements to develop in the realm of urban development. As we have seen above, the relative withdrawal of the state and ‘marketization’ of many factors of urban development has led to fragmentation of community capacity, but also increased the need, and space for operation, of this. Key to developing beyond the isolated community level activity is the establishment of mental models which stimulate collective action, and the strengthening of organizational forms which can channel this. A crucial aspect here is access to resources. To achieve these may mean an incipient social movement allying itself with the state, or with other stronger more ‘traditional’ structures, such as opposition political parties, trade unions and the church. In this the social movements run the risk of being submerged or co-opted and not being able to negotiate fundamental issues which may be beyond the scope of the nation-state anyway.

On the other hand, in recent times effective global social movements based on strong mental models in dealing with social and cultural issues have developed and had a significant impact. Perhaps what is needed is to learn something from these global movements about their development and operation, and apply this to the urban development sector. In as much as sustainability has been a mental model championed within this context, the social organizational base for sustainable urban development would appear to have the cultural basis partially in place to build on. Clearer understanding of the pros and cons of urban social movements’ relationship to other institutions, especially the state, is an essential part of this.

This section of this paper has focused on state–civil society relationships. As noted in a wide overview of urban research undertaken across the major regions of the world (McCarney et al in Stren, 1995), this relationship is the basis for new forms of ‘governance’, which is perhaps the most important issue in sustainable urban development. The dominant message is that new
forms of governance through new relationships between the state and civil society need to be formed to permit more sustainable urban futures. These will evolve and be negotiated in different ways in different places. In addition, the strengthening of organizational forms within civil society will permit stronger links and negotiation between economic forces – predominantly market oriented – and civil society, and through these two linkages, civil society can condition the links between the state and the market, as illustrated in Figure 1.

**Figure 1 Links between state, market and civil society**

**CONCLUSIONS**

This paper set out to examine the relationships between the state, the market and civil society and what form of institutions (mental models and organizations) operated in a set of case studies in various sectors of urban development, mostly in the South. In this it has focused more specifically on the state–civil society nexus, and has reinforced this with a short review of the potential for new social movements to contribute to sustainable urban development – whether autonomously or in cooperation with the state and economic forces. The third main theme of the paper is the relationship between local and global, and here again the potential for social movements to transcend the local to the national level – and beyond to have global influence – has been discussed.

It is argued that there is a need for new relationships between the state, the market and civil society at the international, or global, level, as well as at the local and national level. The globalization of market forces requires this. To a great extent we are living in a period where the economy (driven increasingly by global market forces) is not regulated adequately by the nation-state or social forces, creating widespread social and political imbalances across the world and within countries and even communities. As noted by Karl Polanyi many years ago, the economy needs to be embedded in, and controlled by, society, or else severe disequilibria are created, such as has happened in the past at times of rapid social, political and economic change. Rather than the market creating equilibrium, it is society and its organizations which do this – assuming the state is essentially meant to be a socially representative organism. The fact that the state (or specific groups who dominate state power, including the state bureaucracies) often does not adequately represent the wider society is evidenced in the need for wider forms of governance and broader relations between the state and civil society that has been stressed above.

Hence there is a need for a reconstitution of socially responsive state power to counteract that which is essentially subordinating itself to the new global market forces. This cannot take place
within one nation-state – or arguably even within any macro-regional power bloc – but requires a broader acceptance. The model for such supra-national governance of the past half century – the United Nations and its various related organizations – has never developed effectively in this, as it is hamstrung by individual nation’s actions, whether economic or political veto. These organizations essentially reflect the realpolitik of the immediate post Second World War period, which is demonstrably outdated in today’s fast changing economic and political context.

How could some broader form of supra-national state power develop? There would appear to be three options: it could be promoted by existing nation-states, or power blocs of these; by trans-national economic actors; or by international social institutions. The first option is indeed on the agenda, as UN reform is continuously invoked. However, it is difficult to see nation-states – which have managed to squabble over supra-national regulation so effectively for the past 50 years – resolving this themselves. The second option is also on the agenda, as, although resistant to global economic controls, trans-national economic actors do encounter the difficulties of operating across such wide political and social disparities, and potentially can gain from more stability. That they will act as promoters of broad social equity is, however, not likely without regulation. Lastly, new social movements have already shown their potential in changing mental models, institutions and actions of economic and state actors, although there are many areas where their efforts have not been successful as yet.

In conclusion, it is suggested that a combination of the three main forces reviewed above is needed to create new forms of socially relevant urban development across the world, benefiting from new economic opportunities and not resisting these per se. While the slow move to macro-regional power blocs is perhaps a step in the right direction, as is the negotiation between these and trans-national economic actors, there is also a need for counterpart movements within civil society, at macro-regional and international level, to build on (and support) urban social movements which develop at local and national level. In this way local institutions can more effectively begin to act within a global perspective, as well as ensuring that global forces begin to take on board local needs. Only as appropriate mental models and organizational forms within civil society at all levels are created and strengthened will it be possible to be more positive of creating a sustainable urban future across the globe.

REFERENCES
McCarney, P L (1996) ‘Considerations on the Notion of “Governance” – New Directions for Cities in the Developing World’ in McCarney, P L (ed.) Cities and Governance: New Directions in Latin America, Asia and Africa, University of Toronto, Toronto


NOTES

1 These include:

- The role of civil society in shelter at the periphery: the experience of peri-urban communities in Maputo, Mozambique (Jenkins, P)
- The state, business and the community: abating industrial nuisance in Lahore, Pakistan (Hameed, R & Raemaekers, J)
- Urban public transport: the development of a regulatory role for NGOs in Pakistan (Russel, J & Anjum, G A)
- Informal development: the market socialist city: the case of the floating population of Beijing (Throp R)
- Urban management and community development in metro Manila, Philippines (Carley, M & Bautista, J R)
- When community development becomes a political bargaining tool: the case for structural change in low-income provision in Costa Rica (Smith, H)
- Community-based organisations and the struggle for land and housing in South Africa: urban social movements in transition (Jenkins, P)

2 Schuurman also argues that in developing countries many are still engaged in what are essentially non-capitalist forms of production (albeit subordinated in various ways to the dominant capitalist mode); there is a high degree of class heterogeneity; and the disarticulation between production and consumption has been the predominant situation since capitalist penetration, with growing levels in recent times due to urbanization without corresponding capital accumulation. To this can be added the argument that the role of the state in the developing world is as much focused on controlling the factors of social reproduction as those of production, much of which it has limited control over (Simon, 1992). This puts the state in the developing world in a rather different position vis-à-vis urban social movements when it negotiates between the demands of global economic forces and local social groups.

3 In periods of repression and/or corruption within political systems, urban social movements are also formed in the developing world round issues of state power, but in an ad hoc way.

4 ‘New Social Movement’ theory is to a great extent thus a critique of the reductionism of Marxism concerning the role of the working class in social change and stresses the sociocultural nature of these movements, which it locates primarily within civil society. It criticizes the theoretical primacy awarded to economic factors of Marxism, with politics and ideology seen as secondary, as well as the assumptions concerning class as the fundamental defining agent for identification (Canel, 1997).

5 Resource Mobilization theory – in counterpoint to New Social Movement Theory – focuses on these ‘micro’ processes of resources, organizational dynamics and political change that create the parameters for macro processes to operate. This theoretical position is very different from that derived from ‘relative deprivation’ and the functionalist view that collective action arises in the abnormal conditions of rapid social change. An essential difference between New Social Movement and Resource Mobilization theories is that the former stresses discontinuity with previous social movements, while the latter sees contemporary social movements as not essentially different from these – or indeed from other types of formal organization. See Canel (1997) for more detail.

6 The availability of resources can also lead to the professionalization of social movements and more hierarchical structures being created to achieve more effective institutional change. These, however, have more difficulty in grassroots mobilization.

7 Polanyi was basically an economic historian, although his studies touched on many areas, including anthropology. Polanyi’s studies concentrated on: a) the relation of the economy to society in ‘primitive and archaic systems’ and b) the origin, growth and transformation of 19th century capitalism (see Dalton, 1971, for an overview of Polanyi’s work).