17th N-AERUS Conference:
2016 Gothenburg (Sweden)

GOVERNING, PLANNING AND MANAGING THE CITY IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON EVERYDAY PRACTICES

Full papers In conference presentation order

Organizing committee
Björn Möller, Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy (ICLD)
Eva Maria Jernsand, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg
Henrietta Palmer, Chalmers University of Technology and Mistra Urban Futures
Jenny Stenberg, Department of Architecture, Chalmers University of Technology
Maria José Zapata Campos, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg
Marie Thynell, School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg
Misty Rawls, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg
Patrik Zapata, School of Public Administration, University of Gothenburg
Petra Adolfsson, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg
Robin Bildduph, of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg
Everyday practices in planning the city  
Chair: Michael Oloko & Javier Martínez

Urban Planning Translation: Colonial Urban Planning Systems Versus Post Colonial Reality, Dr. Wolfgang Scholz, Technical University of Dortmund, Faculty of Spatial Planning, Germany

Is The UK’s Development Cooperation Midwifing Fragmented and Top-Bottom Urban Governance? Critical Perspectives on DFID Urban Interventions in Nigeria, Aliyu Barau, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Bayero University, Kano, Nigeria

Scalogram and centrality analyses as tools for regional planning: the case of Southwestern portion of Batangas province, Philippines, Edgar M. Reyes. Faculty of Spatial Planning, TU Dortmund & University of the Philippines Los Banos

The Ice Cream, The Tuna and The Chair: Monuments in southern urban space and the desire for recognition and economic positioning, Alejandra Espinosa, Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis, The Netherlands.

Building the city from below: informal economy
Chair: Petra Adolfsson & María José Zapata

Towards a conceptualization of ‘mobile urbanism’ through the mukhero practice. Paola Piscitelli. University IUAV of Venice, Italy.

Exploring social, spatial and political drivers of the informal economy in a divided city: Karachi, Pakistan. Naja Zaidi. Cardiff University, UK.

Housing as a capital for securing livelihood of the urban poor; Reflections from Mumbai and Dhaka. Md. Ashiq Ur Rahman. Urban and Rural Planning Discipline, Khulna University, Bangladesh

Creating new urbanism in Africa – urban-to-rural migration in Angola and Mozambique, Cristina Udelsmann Rodrigues. Nordic Africa Institute

Building the city from below: citizen participation
Chair: Håkan Magnusson & Björn Möller

Degree of citizen participation in participatory local governance: A case of Pune. Kavina Patel and Sejal Patel, Faculty of Planning, Centre for Environmental Planning and Technology University, Ahmedabad, India

Attempts at Participatory Governance in Urban Management in Kampala City, Uganda, Pamela MBabazi, Uganda National Council of Science & Technology.

Our city, Our Development, Our Plan Campaign, Mumbai: Citizen’s Campaign for a Participatory Development Plan. Maggie Paul, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, India.

Mobility, segregation and integration
Chair: Ester Barinaga & Henrietta Palmer

International mobility and resources in a metropolitan context: Central Americans trajectories in Mexico City. Laurent Faret, CESSMA – Université Paris Diderot

100 % uncertain. How urban planning in Germany is challenged by providing accommodation for refugees. Katrin Gliemann, TU Dortmund University, Faculty of Spatial Planning, Department International Planning Studies, Germany.

A Right to the 'World-Class City'? Processes of spatial exclusion of Romanian Roma migrants in Stockholm. Josh Levy and Ilda Lindell, Department of Human Geography, Stockholm University, Sweden.
Building the city from below: infrastructures and critical services  
Chair: Cecilia Cabrera & Mariano Scheinsohn

The emerging geographies of waste governance in the privatization milieu. Of NIMBY and progressive city dynamics in Amritsar city, India. Kiran Sandhu, School of Urban and Regional Planning, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, India.

System-D in Bujumbura. The resourcefulness of users in daily practices of urban water provision, Anaïs De Keijser. Technical University Darmstadt

Where the skip used to be. Informal settlements, the city, and waste management in Kisumu, Kenya. Michael Oloko, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga University, Kenya, Jaan-Henrik Kain, Chalmers University of Technology, Patrik Zapata & Maria José Zapata Campos, University of Gothenburg.

Building the city from below: grassroots movements  
Chair: Enrico Michelutti & Alexandra Linden

Tres experiencias de exclusión y resistencia. Estrategias comparadas en Senegal, España y Argentina. Eva Álvarez de Andrés, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Cecilia Cabrera Universidad de Buenos Aires, Harry Smith, Heriot-Watt University Edinburgh, UK.
A critical starting point for cities: Data that is inclusive. Smruti Srinivas Jukur, Praveen Yadav, Maria Lobo, Sheela Patel. Society for the promotion of area resource centers, Mumbai, India.

Everyday practices in planning environmental sustainability  
Chair: Wolfgang Scholz & Jenny Stenberg

An integrated inter-disciplinary approach to well-being, air quality management and city development in Nairobi, Johan Boman, Department of chemistry and molecular biology, Marie Thynell, School of Global studies, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden

Strategic Master Plan of the City of São Paulo (Brazil) and the decentralised energy management. F.M.A. Colaço, R.B.C. Cruz, K.R.C.C. Marins and C. Bermann, University of Sao Paulo.

Producing critical and dynamic tools to evaluate how urban water services are (co)produced, managed and governed. Comparing three Ethiopian case studies. J-F Pinet, C Dobre, L Moretto, M Ranzato, Fac. of Architecture of the Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium.

Everyday practices meet best practices in housing planning  
Chair: Luisa Moretto & Enrico Michelutti


Interrogating innovative practices in city planning and management: alternative approaches to housing and habitat in Medellín. H Smith, Heriot-Watt University, Soledad Garcia Ferrari, Helena Rivera, University of Edinburg.


Assumed qualities of compact cities: Divergences between the Global North and the Global South in the research discourse. Jaan-Henrik Kain, Jenny Stenberg, Marco Adelfio, Liane
Building the city from below: bodies and everyday practices of security, livelihood and morality

Chair: Adolfsson & Marie Thynell

The Ideals and Realities of Urbanization: The Ghettoization and Abjection of Sex Workers in the Mumbai Industrial Agglomeration. Rajat Shubhro Mukherjee, University of Nottingham

Unboxing the urban sociability and the political common sense in Colombia. A geographical ethnography for peace building in a deeply divided society. Luis Berneth Peña, Universidad Externado of Colombia.

Disjunctive infrastructures and fractured subjectivities in Maputo’s periphery. Ilda Lindell, Dpmt of Human Geography, Stockholm University.


Building the city from below: grassroots movements Chair: Harry Smith & María José Zapata

Insurgent urbanism in a colonial town. Heidi Moksnes, Department of Social Anthropology, Stockholm University, Sweden.

Trapped in another field: Mission drift when expanding a social initiative into a new city. Ester Barinaga, Copenhagen Business School. Denmark.

Urban commons in the neoliberal global order: commoning as counteraction. Henrietta Palmer Chalmers Technological University, Gothenburg, Solano da Silva, BITS-Pilani, K K Birla Goa Campus, Iain Low, University of Cape Town.

Everyday practices in planning transportation and bottom-up practices

Chair: Marie Thynell & Michael Oloko

Everyday practices and policies in Nairobi’s public transport. Nadine Appelhans, TU Dortmund University

Understanding transport exclusion in the Global South: The case of cycling in Kisumu, Kenya. Walter Alando, Technische Universität Dortmund, Faculty of Spatial Planning, Department of Transport Planning

Everyday practices in planning the city
Chair: Michael Oloko & Javier Martínez

Urban Planning Translation: Colonial Urban Planning Systems Versus Post Colonial Reality, Dr. Wolfgang Scholz, Technical University of Dortmund, Faculty of Spatial Planning, Germany

Is The UK’s Development Cooperation Midwifing Fragmented and Top-Bottom Urban Governance? Critical Perspectives on DFID Urban Interventions in Nigeria, Aliyu Barau, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Bayero University, Kano, Nigeria

Scalogram and centrality analyses as tools for regional planning: the case of Southwestern portion of Batangas province, Philippines, Edgar M. Reyes. Faculty of Spatial Planning, TU Dortmund & University of the Philippines Los Banos

The Ice Cream, The Tuna and The Chair: Monuments in southern urban space and the desire for recognition and economic positioning, Alejandra Espinosa, Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis, The Netherlands.
URBAN PLANNING TRANSLATION: COLONIAL URBAN PLANNING SYSTEMS VERSUS POST COLONIAL REALITY

Dr. Wolfgang Scholz

Technical University of Dortmund, Faculty of Spatial Planning, Germany
wolfgang.scholz@tu-dortmund.de

ABSTRACT (Max. 300 words):
In Sub-Saharan Africa urbanization is progressing at a rate unprecedented in human history. In most countries, the state is not in a position to apply a responsive legal framework and to mobilize adequate resources to guide urbanization. A major obstacle are the outdated legal framework, its institutional set-up and the inappropriate planning concepts inherited from colonial governments which often contradict post-colonial policies and are unsuitable to respond to rapid urban growth.

The paper will present results of a joint research analysing empirically factors on space standards and land use in prevalent types of formally planned and informal settlements in Dar es Salaam as well as the stakeholders involved in planning decision. To understand the current urbanisation there is the need to understand its history: The paper will analyse the historical development of urban planning, its legislation and the physical outcomes as settlement pattern on the ground.

In Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, now informal settlements cover more than 70% of the city areas because the statutory system cannot provide sufficient building land and settlers have to find plots on the informal land market. It shows the need for a new approach to statutory planning in order to guide urban development effectively, to create more functional settlements, to assist the urban poor to access affordable plots with basic services. Or with other words, there is a need to rethink urban planning for a weak institutional environment and develop an idea and a model for urbanization Africa under poverty.

KEY WORDS
informal urban development, planning standards, Tanzania
INTRODUCTION

Dar es Salaam in Tanzania is among the fastest growing cities in Africa with 70% informal settlements. They have emerged because the statutory system cannot provide sufficient buildable land due to inappropriate inherited planning standards from colonial times and inefficient land allocation procedures. The author poses the hypothesis that a residential plot provides income and employment generation which can be supported or hindered by planning regulations. The study examines the land use changes taking place in both planned and informal urban settlements in Dar es Salaam. Its aim is to learn to what extent the formal planning regulations are applied and efficient; which current development processes are on-going; how these processes impact on the livelihood strategies of the residents; and which land use conflicts typically take place due to the lack of development control.

THE PLANNING SYSTEM

In Tanzania, as in many other former British colonies, the British Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 was adopted in 1956 as Town and Country Planning Act. It is still the main legislation for urban planning in Tanzania and deals with the use of land and buildings, the intensity of use of land, the size, and form and construction materials of buildings. For public land uses it manages e.g. roads reserves and the protection of natural resources. The land use plans assign separate land uses (i.e. residential, commercial, educational, etc.) for an ordered physical development, as perceived by the statutory planning. The land use categories are a mean of territorialisation of urban land to create distinguish land use pattern by the separation of activities following a principle of order.

The planning legislation as well as its land use categories did not follow a process of translation and appropriation into local reality but rather reflect still an imported planning ideal of a small green city with limited growth in Tanzania since colonial time without much dispute. Similarly, the three still existing different plot size standards (named today low, medium and high density areas) for residential areas thus resonate the former colonial principle of racial segregation by zones (zone 1 for Europeans, zones 2 for Asians and zone 3 for Africans) and even use still the same parameters (Scholz et. al 2015). The former racial segregation continues today as territorialisation principle along income groups in the three zones.

The planning system is organised on different levels and scales with regional and district plans and on urban level with General Planning Schemes and detailed layout and regularisation plans (for upgrading of informal settlements) on the neighbourhood level. Therefore, it can be assumed that the Town and Country Planning Act in Tanzania provides a statutory institutional framework to fully control and manage urban development and thus the production of space similar to European countries where it actually is coming from.

Local government units (district council, town authorities and Mtaa (Sub-ward) governments) have a full mandate for land use planning in their areas following procedures legitimised by the political power of the central Government over space. The central Government finally controls and approves local planning schemes (Scholz et. al. 2015). This final step guaranties the territorialisation of urban land by the Central Government.
A similar process of adaptation of colonial principles can be observed in the planning approaches still following mainly the standardised top down master plan approach aiming at a determined controlled urban development over decades. This approach favours a strong Government. It can be therefore interpreted that both planning legislation and planning approaches are used as a mean to territorialize urban land under control of the Government and follow the principle of an ordered and controlled urban development.

Another factor shaping the urban fabric is the land tenure system. During the socialist period of independent Tanzania, land became public in 1967. Actually, it can be said land became under the control of the Government respectively the ruling party in the then one party system (Kironde 1995). When land is needed for public purposes, including residential areas, it can be acquired by the President. If an agreement to acquire the land from the current land holder fails, then compulsory acquisition should take place. Originally the compensation was made on unexhausted improvements on land only, but since 1995 land has officially a value (Kironde 2006). However, the value of land is often under dispute between land holders’ expectation and actual compensation paid by the state. Land holders expect compensation based on future land value after being planned and developed while the Government pays only a compensation based on the current value as e.g. agricultural land. The expectation of the higher price is fuelled by the option of the land holder to sell the land on the informal land market for residential purposes to individuals. Also often valuation surveyors estimate total different prices for similar neighbouring plots which lead to mistrust of the compensation model (Mollel et. al. 2007: 6).

All these three issues, the planning legislation, the planning plot size standards and the land tenure system support the centralised power over land by the Government. However, actually they led to a loss of power of the planning machinery. Four interconnected reasons can be observed. The first is the current high urban growth rate which overstretches the capacity of the planning administration to produce new building land and to provide an ordered urban development according to its own ideals. Second, the inherited urban plot size planning standards require large plot sizes for housing (official minimum plot size is 400-800 m² for high density areas). These standards are today too expensive for the Government to acquire and to service the areas with infrastructure and unaffordable by most social groups, especially the urban poor. (Scholz et. al. 2013). Thirdly, the inherited top down master planning concept which has been the main planning procedure from colonial to post-colonial times has come in contestation in the early 1990s due to its negligible impact on urban development control and the lack of participation. And forth, the mentioned above option of land holders to sell land on the informal market by by-passing the official procedure to acquire land for planned areas by the Government.

The high urban growth rate at about 5% in combination with the low rate of new statutory planned housing areas leads to a serious shortage of building land. Today, the unmet demand for affordable building land is largely covered by the informal land market offering also smaller plot sizes but no infrastructure services. Informally developed areas do not follow any planning scheme or building regulations. This creates a balance on the land market according to supply and demand but creates disorder in the urban structure at least in the view of the planning administration (Kombe and Kreibich 2007, Kironde 2006, Lupala 2002). In the informal land market, land under customary land tenure (former village farm land at the then periphery of the town but now part of the urban area) is
subdivided and sold to dwellers at market prices and not at the lower official compensation rate. This system works well for both sides because it meets the expectation of a higher price for the land holders and provides access to land for residents. Security of tenure is provided by local officials and witnesses during the selling process (Kironde 1995: 81) undermining the power of statutory planning. It can thus be argued that the statutory planning machinery, the official procedure and loop-holes in the land tenure system and land management contribute to the problems of growing informal settlements (Scholz et al. 2015). This informal urbanization leads to new forms and actors of territorialisation beyond the public domain.

The lack of building land provided by the formal system has also increased the development pressure on existing settlements. This applies to residential but also to commercial land uses. The growing commercial and service sector in the current market-led economy in Tanzania has given rise to land use changes towards commercial activities and redevelopment of residential plots towards multi-storey buildings in residential areas. An unguided development of commercial activities can cause land use conflicts among neighbours as described later in the case studies.

**DAR ES SALAAM**

Dar es Salaam in Tanzania serves as the case study area for these processes. It is among the fastest growing urban agglomerations in Africa, with about 150,000 new inhabitants per year and a total 4.3 million population (National Bureau of Statistics 2012). Dar es Salaam is characterised by low density informal settlements with mainly single storey houses shaping the urban fabric. Between 70 per cent and 80 per cent of the built-up areas of the city are informally developed residential settlements. Fig. 1 displays the different settlement types in the urban fabric. It was prepared by analysing satellite images and maps over the period of the last 20 years. Most of the urban development is informal (red) spreading into the hinterland along trunk roads and around existing villages under transformation (dark red) on former farm land under customary land tenure. Informal urbanisation is therefore the main factor of territorialisation of urban expansion. During the 1980s, some planned residential areas following the neighbourhood unit concept and developed as Site-and-Service-Scheme (among those the first case study of Sinza, orange, see below) were established. Only a few new housing areas under the 20,000 plot development scheme at the mainly unserviced periphery (orange) were established recently but not able to cover the demand. Inner city planned areas as well as informal settlements close to the centre face today a development pressure towards a vertical and horizontal densification as well as land use changes towards commercial activities (see case study one).

The following case study of the planned neighbourhood of Sinza in Dar es Salaam will display the outcomes and contestation of these densification and land use change processes (case study 1) while the second case of the informal settlement of Sandali displays unguided land uses changes (case study 2).
SINZA

Sinza is a planned area developed in the 1980s with the support of the World Bank as Site-and-Service-Project. It is located about 10 km from the city centre at the then urban fringe. Sinza is subdivided into smaller neighbourhood units all well organised with a central open space in the middle of mainly small residential plots of 288 sqm. In Sinza tenants represent today a significant number of the residents. In the planning scheme, developed during the socialist period with restricted commercial activities, only a few areas were designated for commercial land uses (Fig. 2). The layout plan for Sinza, designed by foreign experts, follows the neighbourhood unit concept with clear ordering elements (standardised plot sizes, strict land uses categories, clear demarcation of private plots and public land for roads and open spaces) to have control over urban space by public authorities. Sinza can be seen as example to create order in the urban fabric.
However, the planning scheme came under contestation when new economic activities in the current market led economy came back to the stage and these actors demand their territory of urban space creating disorder. Sinza displays today, however, a high density due to extension of buildings and high percentage of commercial activities due to the central location in the urban fabric and good accessibility of the areas between two trunk roads. This reflects the development pressure on the settlement and the tendency to more commercial uses in the purely residential area. (Authors fieldwork)

The former planned residential area has become now a rather mixed use area. The planned order of a purely residential area is under contestation towards disorder of land use conflicts. About 10% of the current building stock are new buildings or extensions of existing buildings in the last decade (2002-2012, see Fig. 3) and one third of the plots are turned into commercial. A growing number of commercial activities are today mainly located along main roads at the fringe of the neighbourhoods. Locational preferences of the operators of commercial activities along the main roads are based on the need to ensure accessibility and proximity to the major consumer flow channels. They follow their own logic and order of space due to economic forces. This causes severe negative impacts on the functionality of the settlements since plot sizes, parking areas and set backs of the former planned residential area are not designed for such commercial activities and their spatial and functional needs. Fig. 4 displays the recently developed commercial plots (blue) which has been originally designed and used as residential plots.
Fig. 3 Change in the building stock 2002-2012. Source: Wolfgang Scholz 2012. Cartography Ines Standfuss.

Fig. 4 Land use distribution in one neighbourhood in Sinza. Source: Wolfgang Scholz 2012. Cartography Ines Standfuss.
The following three examples represent cases of the contestation of urban space and how different actors try to achieve control over urban space in a situation where the layout plan and building regulations are either outdated or not enforced.

Sinza is increasingly becoming an area for hotels, bars and beer gardens (see also Mollol 2007: 3) which often disturb the residents. “Sinza is the beer garden of the entire city”, an old resident complained. “Just behind me there is a bar which most of times play music up to midnight, so you can’t do anything at night.”

A bar in Sinza along the main road was playing loud music after midnight. Most of the visitors of the bar and the owner himself are not coming from Sinza. Adjoining settlers won a court case on noise reduction; however, it was only successful for a short time and music after midnight started again. “We have problems here especially with the noise which come from the bars around here at night. I heard that the local government stopped them to play music without being sound proof, they stopped once but then they have started again” a resident complained and another one added: “We have tried to report them, they stopped only for few months but now the problem is the same.” The manager of the bar, however, is rather ignorant about complains from the neighbours: “There are always problems when you run a business like this.” This example clearly displays land use conflicts caused by the change of land use and contestation over territory.

However, the outcomes of this land use changes towards more commercial activities are not always negative. There is a planned open space inside Sinza. It was planned in the 1980s as the green heart of the neighbourhood. Huge trees provide shade and the temperature is comfortable. However, it is not the green area for leisure activities as intended. It is now used for commercial activities such as repair workshops and canteens for labourers. The area is full of waste and the material of the workshops, construction and repairs are going on, the place is busy and loud. In one corner an open-air canteen is preparing lunch for the workers.

The fieldwork revealed that neither the residents, nor the operators, nor the local authorities were fully informed about regulations that existed to protect the open green space. However, the operators were aware of the fragile legal status of their presence. They had received only a temporary permit issued by the local authorities to use the space. They know about the disturbances they cause and try to avoid open confrontation with their neighbours. They have started informal negotiations and made agreements to ensure co-existence with the surrounding residents. “No, we have no certificate for land-use changes. We got authority to change the use from the local government but only a temporary permit,” one worker stated and a resident added: “During the day when they come to collect with lorries, they make a lot of noise, but it is for a short time and usually we are informed, so it is fine with us.”

The operators of businesses and workshops are aware of the disturbances they cause (such as deliveries which block entrances for a period of time) and recognise the need to negotiate arrangements with the neighbours. (see Fig. 5) Therefore, they try to avoid open confrontation with their neighbours unlike the operator of the bar above. Although, their activities are examples of disorder in the residential settlement, they try to re-establish order by negotiations over territory.
Another example goes even further. Surrounded by old single-storey constructions, there is one multi-storey building made of steel and glass in the planned settlement of Sinza. It looks like it comes from another world. What is the story behind it? First, I asked neighbours: “It is now a new function hall. There was one open hall before. But the old hall produced a lot of solid wastes and liquid wastes,” a neighbour explained. “The waste came onto the streets but now with the new building the problem is solved,” another added. “Also there was a lot of noise from the hall during the functions and it disturbed us at night time,” another resident complained, and a shopkeeper from the other side of the road stated: “Cars of the people visiting the hall parked up to my front door. Sometimes they broke the walls of my house so it was really a problem.”

The owner of the large function hall realised that his business could only run smoothly if the neighbours did not complain. He therefore reconstructed his premises to accommodate parking on the ground floor and an air-conditioned soundproofed hall on the first floor. “Yes, we faced problems with neighbours due to noise pollution from our former open hall. We were forced by them to reconstruct a soundproof hall.” Although this involved high investment costs for the entire construction, it nevertheless made sense to him, since he will no longer face complaints from the neighbours and can run the business without problems. Officially the planning authorities never asked the owner to make changes. He did so proactively to ensure a good relationship to the neighbours. The direct complaints of the neighbours to the owner worked well without involving governmental officials.

The disturbances for residents by the activities on the open space are lower since they operate during daytime when residents are out at work while the bars and beer garden operate mostly at night and weekends.
SANDALI

The informal settlement of Sandali is taking after an upgrading program introducing storm water drainage and basic access roads a similar path of land use distribution and new commercial activities (see Fig. 6). It is interesting to note that the amount of change (about 12% new buildings, of which 5% were new structures replacing old buildings and 5% were extensions) is similar to that in the planned area of Sinza, as were the range of mixed uses (Fig. 7).

Fig. 6 Land use distribution in one neighbourhood in Sandali. Source: Wolfgang Scholz 2012. Cartography Ines Standfuss.
Besides bars there is another example in Sandali displaying the limits of local decisions. Workshops for used oil recycling are operating in a residential backyard. The workers are covered in the black oil that stands in huge barrels. The surrounding residents have complained about the pollution caused by this dangerous activity: “Our area looks very dirty due to dirty oil produced by our neighbours. It also produces a bad smell which is disturbing us all the time.” But the complaints did not produce any reaction from the operators. So the neighbours went to their local administration. The sub-ward leader replied: “I am not able to stop these activities since the operators are only tenants, and the landlord is living outside the settlement and therefore not accessible to me.” Only after termination of the current valid rental contract would he be able to direct new activities on the plot, was his excuse. This case shows the limitation of local regulatory systems with limited power to execute rules when economic activities of potentially greater influence are involved and when the issue extends beyond the mandate or power of the officer. enforce (authors’ fieldwork, 2011).
FINDINGS

CONFLICTING LAND USES

The fieldwork revealed that disturbances for residents, both in planned and informal settlements, caused by conflicting land uses are mostly related to noise from bars, music halls and religious buildings, less from commercial activities like workshops or repair workshops. The main reason is that the latter operate during daytime when residents are out at work while the first ones also operate at night and weekends. Income generating activities such as shops, pharmacies, tailoring shops are generally more tolerated, while leisure activities, such as bars, and places of worship are less tolerated by residents because of their potential to cause disturbances. Problems in the settlements are mainly related to uncontrolled changes of the land use and the tendency toward mixed uses.

PLANNING REGULATIONS AND DECISION-MAKING

The interviews in the case study settlements, both planned and informal, revealed that there is hardly any sensitivity or adherence to planning regulations and land use categories among the residents. Only plot boundaries of neighbours are respected. Developers are only aware that structures can be demolished if built on the road reserves; however temporary encroachments, like the tables and chairs of bars, are common.

Most respondents state that they lack knowledge about planning regulations and the potential positive or negative impacts of the regulations. This is a contradictory finding since, in Sandali, planning
Instruments and urban layout plans were used during the formal regularisation process. In that process, intensive surveys, consultation with residents were undertaken and demolition of buildings executed to facilitate the expansion and construction of access roads and storm water drainage.

There is also lack of awareness of planning regulations at the institutions at the grassroots level of the Government (Mtaa, ward level). For instance, in the sub-ward office (Mtaa) of Sinza the copy of the land use and layout plan was missing. It seems that in the understanding of residents as well as local leaders, planning only focuses on the change of land use at the plot level approved individually by the local leaders and not according to the general planning scheme. Thus individual decisions do not correlate to the existing plans (Sinza) or general regulations (Sandali). Permission to build, extend or to change the use of a building are issued by local leaders based on the political influence of the applicant overruling a planner’s technical statement and thus in disregard of public interests. Therefore, conflicting land uses easily emerge. Such permissions focus only on the plot itself, and ignore the neighbours’ plot and the construction on it (concerning size, height, setbacks and land use).

**DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PLANNED SETTLEMENTS AND INFORMALLY DEVELOPED AREAS**

There seems to be little difference between planned and informally developed settlements in terms of adherence to planning and building regulations. Uncontrolled building construction, extension, in-fills and change of land use persist. The land uses are likely to be similar because of processes of gentrification and the pressure of the real estate market on these settlements which are often located in attractive areas of the city. Therefore, the distinction between informal and planned settlements is becoming rather an administrative term only, with less relevance on the ground. However, the planning authorities both at national as well as at local levels still consider informally developed areas as areas where no regulations can be enforced.

Horizontal densification is seen as one of the key future challenges in Sinza, especially because many individuals would like to build multi-storey buildings on the same plot that is today occupied by a single storey house. In Sandali the new, modern buildings which are replacing the old structures made of rather poor building materials are seen as a symbol of a better future. Most new buildings are fenced like in Sinza, which will create a higher “visible” density, may block footpaths since former shared space between the buildings is becoming private space behind walls and can hinder ventilation. Both planned and informally developed settlements undergo processes of land use changes, densification and potential gentrification following the rules of the real estate market and seek more economic land use.

**LAND USE CATEGORIES DO NOT SUPPORT RESIDENTS’ LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES**

The majority of the residents in Dar es Salaam are poor. However, as noted earlier there are no newly planned areas dedicated to low income residents. The rigid land zoning concept and land use categories (residential, commercial, and residential cum commercial etc.) does not reflect the reality of the residents’ need for a flexible livelihood including changing employment and income generating activities.
Commercial uses are necessary in settlements to provide income and services for residents. However, there is a need to regulate and designate them in specific suitable areas in advance before they emerge uncontrolled.

There is no clear concept for the distribution and localisation of the emerging commercial and service related activities. They are spread haphazardly throughout settlements without a proper planning concept. This calls for the re-view of the current zoning concept which provides space for retail business in the centre of a neighbourhood regardless of the predominant traffic flow which is along the main roads between neighbourhoods. Thus, planning should consider locating disruptive uses like bars, warehouses, workshops along the main roads at the fringe of the neighbourhood on the one hand, and restricting the centre to purely residential uses. This means the spatial reversal of the neighbourhood design concept used in Tanzania and the development of new land use categories (disruptive/non-disruptive commercial activities) in combination with plot coverage rules and increasing setbacks according to the height of the building (authors’ fieldwork).

CONCLUSIONS

Both planned and informally developed settlements undergo numerous transformations such as densifications and increases in commercial activities. This leads to problems in the settlements, mainly related to uncontrolled changes of land use. Some of the uses have a negative impact on neighbours (e.g. bars) while small corner shops or small-scale workshops have little or no significant negative impact.

The examples above also reveal that there is hardly any sensitivity or adherence to planning regulations and land-use categories among the residents, local leaders and operators. Most interlocutors stated that they lack knowledge about planning legislations and the potentially positive or negative impacts of regulations. It seems that residents, like many local leaders, understand planning only as focusing on changes of land use at the plot level and not as dealing with public interests or neighbours' rights. A resident from Sinza stated: “If regulations are followed they are good, but people don’t follow. That’s why you find more complaints to the government. Also the government hasn’t provided enough education concerning those regulations.” Thus, it is at the individual decision-making level where compliance with existing plans or general regulations fails. Permission to build, extend or change the use of a building is issued by local leaders and is often based on the political influence of the applicant, in many cases in disregard of public interests. So conflicting land uses easily emerge.

Titus Musoga, from the National Land Commission, Nairobi, Kenya summarized in an interview in 2013 the situation of urban planning in African cities: “The perception of (urban planning) laws is that they only apply to the former colonial core city and not to the recent post-colonial expansions. Land-use regulations are perceived to be only applicable in the colonial city since they are a colonial construct.”
REFERENCES


IS THE UK’S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION MIDWIFING FRAGMENTED AND TOP-BOTTOM URBAN GOVERNANCE?

CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON DFID URBAN INTERVENTIONS IN NIGERIA

Aliyu Barau

Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Bayero University, Kano - Nigeria
asbarau.urp@buk.edu.ng

ABSTRACT:

In June 2015, the European Development Days - the Europe’s biggest development cooperation forum – observed that sustainable urbanisation is at the core of social and economic development in the global south. For more than half of a century, European development agencies have been intervening in various sectors of urban development in the south. Indeed, there is a need for a more comprehensive, innovative, and inclusive partnerships in the urban millennium. This paper takes a critical look at the DFID’s interventions in urban areas of northern Nigeria. It identifies fragmentations and top-bottom dimensions in the DFID interventions and implications of that on local urban governance. The paper reveals that the DFID interventions in urban governance and infrastructure development are fragmented and lack focus on existing challenges associated with rapid urbanisation in Nigeria. It also finds that DFID interventions do not prioritise urbanisation as it becomes evident that none of its current 43 active projects in Nigeria is specifically designed to address urbanisation and its challenges. Thus, it is highly recommended that the DFID should review its interventions in Nigeria by focussing on urbanisation. One message that comes out clearly from this paper is that the contributions of the developed countries in improving cities and their dwellers in the south deserve to be appreciated. However, the countries of the North and their institutions that serve as vehicles for delivering such development partnerships should not be dictating and determining the experts and organisations to deliver the projects and programmes. Local people, local governments, and representatives of development partners should undertake needs assessments and identify priorities for southern interventions cities and municipalities.

KEY WORDS

Sustainable Urbanisation, Colonialism, Path dependency; Institutions; Public Participation, Development
INTRODUCTION

Based on the recent projection that African urban areas will house about 1.3 billion people by 2050 (Cobbinah et al. 2015), it becomes important for researchers and policymakers to investigate the ramifications of the rapid African urbanisation. Indeed, another statistics has indicated that the number of African cities with population of one million and above has increased from 80 to 533 within fifty years (Zhang, 2016). Such oft-repeated statistics and projections have elicited attention and interests of international development stakeholders. For example, the European Development Days - the Europe’s biggest development cooperation forum has recognised the critical role of finance, legislation and urban planning in achieving sustainable urbanisation in the global south (UN Habitat, 2015). For some decades now, many cities in Africa have benefitted from rounds of development assistance from their former European colonial powers.

However, critical scholars have expressed the need to rethink the political geography of African development in the 21st century. In the case of Europe during the last two centuries, its leading philosophers such as John Stuart Mill believed and propagated the idea that it was Europe’s ethical and moral burden to civilise the uncivilised (Habibi, 1999; Bell, 2010). Such views have come under severe criticisms in the postcolonial era, for example, Mercer et al. (2003) observed that racialised knowledge dictates how or why the West has continuously constructed Africa in its imaginations and also through claiming responsibility for a continued sense of stewardship towards the African development process. The authors merely re-echoed Edward Said’s Orientalism and in particular the ways and manners the former colonial masters design policies and strategies to help Africa to develop or overcome development challenges. Using examples from Nigeria and Ugandan cities, Jones (2011) observed that during the colonial era, there was a fusion of scientific, cultural and racial supremacy theories and that influenced the way the British planned and developed African urban spaces.

Scholars have also criticised Eurocentric views on the African city and consider that as an inadequacy of neo-imperialism (Grant and Njiman, 2004). A recent study by Craggs and Neate (2016) stimulates the need for understanding the enduring nature of urban policy relations between colonial and colonised territories. The authors argued that in the case of Nigeria and the UK, careering is central to connecting distant urban development projects, intersections between urban development transformations, proliferation of ideas, experiences, skills, affiliations, and practices, and urban policy mobility. In other words, the historic relations between colonial and postcolonial policies would continue affect current and future development pathways of the cities in the former colonies. Social scientist refer to this role of history as path dependence. According to Ebbinghaus (2005), the concept of path dependence is crucial to understanding institutions because it involves a non-linear process where sequence of events and decisions are not (entirely) independent from those that occurred in the past. In a related vein, Power (2009) observe that the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) established in 1997 was one of the key tools for extending and mainstreaming the British sense of morality and responsibility towards Africa’s development. Hence, the interventions of the agencies of the British government such as the DFID are not unconnected with the British sense of responsibility towards addressing multidimensional challenges of African underdevelopment.

The experience of older colonies such as India has shown that the DFID’s interventions in urban sector were very ambitious although their effectiveness were difficult to establish (Amis, 2001). In some instances, the DFID interventions in some African cities have improved decentralisation pf
development and involvement of grassroots and civil society (Kiyaga-Nsubuga, 2001). Another good side of the DFID is its culture of supporting research works on critical urban issues in developing countries. Examples of its sponsored studies are not limited to access to urban land for housing and issues of inequity and the roles of land governance in the Nigerian urban areas (Ikejiofor, 2005; 2006; Lamond et al. 2015). However, it was observed that in some instances, there are certain flawed and failed assumptions made by researchers in respect of interventions in urban development in developing countries (Verma, 2000). Some of the critics are worried that what researchers reported on paper is often contradicted by real world experiences of the people. The interest of this paper on the DFID and this is born out of the fact that, it is one single UK development assistance organisation that was conceived with Africa at the centre of its programmes and agenda and has sought to explain Africa’s development challenges through an integrated viewpoint and direct financing of project (Porteous, 2005). As such, it is imperative to review the effectiveness of direct financing of programmes in urban sector of developing countries.

For many countries in sub Saharan Africa, colonialism is seen as a force that started, altered and accelerated growth of urban areas (Mukoko, 1996). In this regard, Barau (2011) argued that the process of development of African city carries in it the DNA of colonialism which makes it possible to create permanent changes in African urban areas. In the case of Nigerian cities, this has been expressed in older works such as Mabogunje (1967; 1982), which recognised that the British colonial economic interests had a cause and effect on the decline, disappearance and prosperity of many Nigeria’s new and pre-colonial towns and cities. However, the nature of current challenges in the cities of the global south make them unfit for the types of planning discourses and frameworks applicable to Northern cities (Essex, 2016). This is because, planning practices and weak institutions undermine the effective of urban planning system in developing countries.

Indeed, if not for the sake of review, it will be a big mistake to blame the problems of African urbanisation on the past European interventions. Many African urban areas in African countries are facing complex, complicated, and volatile issues relating to urban governance issues. Perhaps, one of the good theories to explain the current and future situation of African cities is VUCA, an acronym for volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. According to Mitchell (2017), the VUCA concept has its origin in the US military establishment. VUCA conditions make changes to unfolding so rapidly that leaders are challenged to respond urgently (Chermack, 2011). Indeed, policymakers and public administrators need to understand that strategic planning could be rendered futile by VUCA conditions (Bennet & Lemoine (2014). By implication, since the urban age is associated with uncertainties, all initiatives designed for responding towards the challenges African urbanisation should be geared towards promoting an integrated approach for attaining sustainable development.

According to the DFID Nigeria (2012), the UK government is determined to use the DFID vehicle to deepen democracy in Nigeria, reduce inequalities, tackle extreme poverty, reduce conflicts and violence, foster good governance, improve child and maternal healthcare etc. Thus, the key areas for the DFID intervention in Nigeria are: governance, wealth creation, health, education, water and sanitation, infrastructure, poverty and vulnerability. These key areas also represent the key issues or nodes for addressing the challenges confronting most urban areas in Nigeria. In view of the fact that Nigeria is witnessing unprecedented urbanisation that is characterised with intermittent crises, it is expected that results from the seven key areas of the DFID many not bear optimum result due to the inherent fragmentation of sectors of intervention as well as lack of focus and integration with the realities of the challenges of the new urban age in Nigeria. What may support this view is based on
one of the DFID community based urban development projects in South Africa where the weaknesses of NGOs – beneficiaries of direct funding - came to limelight (Terry, 2009).

Against this backdrop, this paper is poised to critically examine the DFID’s multi-sectoral interventions particularly in the urban areas of northern Nigeria. It is expected that the paper will identify the nature of fragmentations in the DFID interventions and implications of that on sustainable urban governance and development. The main research question driving the study is in the title of this paper: is the UK’s development cooperation midwifing fragmented and top-bottom urban governance? To answer this research question, this paper relied on review of relevant literature to analyse important issues related to the issues of interest to the DFID interventions in Northern Nigeria.

AN OVERVIEW OF INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES ON URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

Institutions are those shared and adopted concepts and practices used by humans and guided by rules, norms, and strategies (Ostrom, 2010). In the case of cities and towns, the nature of functioning of institutions determine the dynamics of urban growth in any given country. Thus, urban planning is not satisfactory in many African cities because of poor institutional arrangement and reliance on foreign expertise (Parnell et al. 2009, Parnell and Simon, 2010). Most studies on African urbanisation have not focused their enquiries on historical dimensions of changing policies and institutions. This section reviews some of the enduring challenges of urban sector through historical lens – path dependency and institutions. This section narrows essentially on the experience of Kano, Northern Nigeria’s largest city to demonstrate how urban development responds to changing policy and institutional arrangements in an ancient African city (Figure 1).

Fig 1: A sketch of Kano city in 1826 showing built-up, wet and green areas as mapped by Dixon Denham. Credit – Wikipedia commons.
Kano city has been recognised as a very important pre-colonial city with resilient morphology, green and open spaces and vibrant local and transnational economy (Barau et al. 2015) and as portrayed in Figure 1 above. Indeed, as can be observed from the said figure, the pre-colonial institutions were responsible for the urban form and morphology of Kano city in that time. The main institution that was responsible for the city governance was the sarauta system (kingship) under Sarki (the Emir of Kano) served as the head of state in the pre-colonial period. The sarki allocates land to individuals and groups for the good of the public interest. Nevertheless, the change in institutions of urban land governance over time has undermined the city’s inherent and enduring resilience and traits of urban sustainability. One of the most remarkable changes that affect urban governance and configuration was colonial rule. In the case of Kano, the British colonised the in 1903 and soon created their new township outside the olden city (Liman and Adamu, 2003). This act of land development and grabbing around traditional cities was emboldened through the 1907 public lands ordinance which stripped many commoners of land ownership mainly for the purpose of consolidating colonial economic interests (Goshit, 2001; Pierce, 2005). This denotes the emergence of colonial institutions of urban governance in a typical African city.

Thus, one of the earliest implications of colonial rule is its ability to institutionalise fragmentation of African urban settlements along ethnic and racial divides and particularly the creation of the sense of otherness between people and this became inadvertently a feature of colonial urban planning legacy. This assertion may be true in respect of the 1923 Segregation and Town Planning Memorandum of the colonial government which clearly emphasised the needed for the segregation of settlements along the lines of racial and the British social and economic interests (Nwaka, 1989). For town planning proper, the British introduced the Township Ordinance No. 29 of 1917 to establish urban land use orderliness in Nigerian city and subsequently in 1924 town planning committees were developed for the purpose of establishing planning schemes across Nigeria (Ola, 2011). Similarly, the 1946 Town and Country Planning Ordinance was developed for a country wide physical planning within the span of Colonial Government’s ten year development plan (1946-1956) for Nigeria. However, at the eve of the country’s independence, it was obvious that the colonial government had failed to develop Nigerian cities along the provisions of the 1946 Town and County Planning Ordinance (Nwaka, 2005).

In most cases, colonial urban planning strategies aimed at serving the administrative and economic conveniences of the colonial masters (Mabogunje, 1967; 1982). According to Ejumudo (2013), urban policies should in an ideal situation focus on strengthening public institutions to help in delivering urban services such as sanitation, transportation, healthcare, education, and job creation in an integrated and equitable manner. The evidence of colonial urban planning in Kano city can be seen in Figure 2. The old walled city and adjacent to it is Fagge were pre-colonial settlements while Waje (meaning outside in Hausa) is the new township which comprises –the European residential quarters, the central business district, southern Nigerians’ neighbourhoods, and industrial areas. It is obvious that the new areas have outgrown the pre-colonial settlements. This implies that changing institutions do significantly affect the nature of urban form and particularly the speed of transformation of the urban form as can be seen clearly in Figure 2.
Soon after Nigeria attained independence in 1960 the signs of weaknesses of colonial planning laws and practices appeared. Many researchers realised that the legacy of colonial planning laws originated the plights and frustrations of Kano urban poor’s (Famariyo, 1987). The Government of Kano Province sought the expertise of expatriates to develop a master plan for urban Kano known as Travellion Plan or the Greater Kano Master Plan (Liman and Adamu, 2003). This ambitious master plan was taken by events – the Nigerian civil war of 1966-1979; the creation of states and several rounds of military interventions through coups and counter coups. This lack of articulation leads to no meaningful and sustainable development in the city. Meanwhile, during the late 1960s and through early and mid of 1970s, the population of Kano grew rapidly and pressure was increasing on urban space. This necessitated for intervention from Kano State Government which for the first time created the Urban Development Board (UDB) in 1976. The edict establishing the agency mandated it with the full responsibilities of planning, controlling and designing towns and in Kano State. Following the 1989 review of the Kano State planning edict, the government created the Kano State Environmental Protection and Planning Agency (KASEPPA) to replace the UDB. The need for the review was as a result of increasing environmental quality degradation and industrial pollution in urban Kano.

The patterns of rapid urbanisation that Kano experienced in the mid-1980s through the 1990s elicited interventions from national and international stakeholders. One of such interventions came through the UN Habitat which in 1996 selected Kano as one of the beneficiaries of its Sustainable Cities Project in Nigeria. The Sustainable Kano Project (SKP) was initiated by the UN Habitat in collaboration with UNEP and Kano State government. Its priority areas include water supply, waste management, flood control and capacity building in the area of sustainable development (Alkali, 2005; UN Habitat/UNEP, 2008). One of the criticism made against the SKP is that it was laid on a skeletal foundation (Olujimi, 2009). As such, it failed to achieve the very objectives it was set tackle. In 2004, the Kano State Government created additional agencies such as Refuse Management and Sanitation
Board (REMASAB) to tackle the seemingly inexorable problem of solid waste. Again, the Kano State Government created the Kano Urban Planning and Development Authority (KNUPDA) to replace KASEPPA. KNUPDA is set to concentrate on addressing the huge challenges of planning and urban development challenges in urban Kano. In recent years, KNUPDA has collaborated with some foreign development organisation interested in contributing towards realising sustainable urbanisation in Kano. ICF International (2015) has identified with KNUPDA as one of the partners for NIAF urban sector intervention in Nigeria. Based on 2016 image of Kano city (Figure 3), it is evident that unprecedented urbanisation has intensified in Kano and more innovative strategies are needed to address issues associated with this kind of rapid growth.

Fig 3: Distribution of planned and unplanned (old city) built up areas shows high and intensified urbanisation that Kano experiences in the 21st century. Rapid population growth and high density have become common features of the planned and unplanned parts of Kano city.

The role of changing institutions on the nature of urban form during pre-colonial, colonial, and postcolonial periods can be perceived from pictures shown above. At the moment, it is inarguable that innovations and interventions may be needed from other parts of the world and institutions. Nevertheless, interventions in African city needs in African urban sector need to be anchored to inherent challenges on ground.

**DFID INTERVENTIONS IN NIGERIA**

The DFID has built on the past experiences of other UK international development organisations and principally the ODA whose many interventions in Nigeria continue to have some impacts in Nigerian cities. In order to identify projects that were specifically designed for interventions in the urban sector, we used the DFID projects tracking portal (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk) to select such projects that are of interest to the current study. As at the time of writing this paper (October 2016), the development tracking portal for Nigeria (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/countries/NG/projects) has documented some 43 active projects being implemented directly or indirectly by the DFID in Nigeria. These projects are expected to run from October 2006 until April 2021 (Table 1).
Table 1: A selection of DFID projects that are of value to urban development in Nigeria (emphasis mine). Created based on DFID projects tracking portal (https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Started</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partnership for Transforming Health Systems 2</td>
<td>August 2008</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Pro-poor health services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal and Newborn Child Health Programme</td>
<td>August 2013</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Safe delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls Education Project (GEP) Phase 3</td>
<td>May 2012</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Improve opportunities for girls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIAF 2 - Nigeria Infrastructure Advisory Facility Phase 2</td>
<td>August 2011</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Enhance infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership to Engage, Reform and Learn (PERL)</td>
<td>August 2015</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Public sector accountability and anticorruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation, Hygiene &amp; Water in Nigeria, Phase 2</td>
<td>September 2013</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>To scale up water saturation and hygiene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working to Improving Nutrition in Northern Nigeria (WINNN)</td>
<td>July 2011</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Treatment of malnutrition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solar Nigeria Programme</td>
<td>October 2014</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>To improve solar power electrification of public institutions, such as schools and hospitals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Stability and Security Fund 2015 - Safe Schools Initiative in Nigeria</td>
<td>March 2016</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Protection of schools against attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing Economic Opportunities for Marginalised Youth in Northern Nigeria</td>
<td>October 2014</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Increase economic opportunities for marginalised groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As at the time of writing this paper, the budget for these projects stand at £176,924,028. It is noticeable that none of the identified projects’ titles contains any word such as ‘urban’ or ‘urbanisation’. However, this does not mean the DFID does not have interest in Nigeria’s urbanisation challenges. As in the case of India and Uganda a few years ago, the DFID has commissioned a study entitled Urbanisation Research Nigeria (URN) Framework and Plan. The team of researchers for the said project also stressed the need for an integrated approach to link up with existing relevant DFID projects (Bloch and Papachrisodoulou, 2014). Since there is no single project to help us evaluate the DFID interventions in the Nigerian urban sector, we resolve to select any project that focuses on activities that have a direct bearing on Nigeria multifaceted of the challenges of urbanisation. NIAF 2
Is UK’s development cooperation midwifing fragmented and top-bottom urban governance

appears to be one project that is multifaceted and enjoys support and commitments of policymakers including those with deep interest in addressing urban development challenges in Nigerian cities.

NIAF PHASE 2 AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES IN NIGERIAN CITY

According to the NIAF project website (http://niafng.org/about-2/), the project is “designed to implement projects in power, transport, major infrastructure, climate change and cities (urban planning and development).” NIAF -2 was conceived to be a continuation of it predecessor NIAF 1 which registered success in many areas of its interventions. NIAF 2 appears to be one of the most interesting DFID interventions that address many critical issues confronting Nigerian cities. As shown in Table 2, NIAF 2 has a specific intervention programme for cities – Effective Cities. As such, it is important to use this project to examine the nature of DFID interventions in the Nigerian urban sector. The NIAF -2 comprises the following sub sectors: public finance management, transport policy and administrative management, privatisation, environmental policy and administrative management, and other sectors. Examples of goals, benefitting urban areas and types of achievements under Effective Cities sector of NIAF 2 are given in Table 3.

Table 2: A selection of NIAF intervention projects that have direct impact to urban development in Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Clients</th>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>Delivery consortium</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>The Office of the Vice-President</td>
<td>The World Bank, Adam Smith International,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Projects,</td>
<td>Federal Government Line Ministries</td>
<td>The African Development Bank, Max Lock Centre,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads &amp; Rail,</td>
<td>State Governments- Kano, Kaduna, Abuja</td>
<td>Transport Research Laboratory,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Growth,</td>
<td>The Central Bank of Nigeria</td>
<td>International Centre for Energy, Environment and Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate Change,</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of Environment, Jigawa and Niger states</td>
<td>Adam Smith International</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Cities</td>
<td>Kano, Kaduna, and Lagos</td>
<td>Adam Smith International</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: A selection of NIAF intervention projects under Effective Cities sector and places of intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interventions</th>
<th>Target city/town</th>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formation of City Development Authority</td>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>Kaduna State Government</td>
<td>-Support city-specific management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-improve productive capacity of cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Resilient Cities Network</td>
<td>States</td>
<td>State Governments</td>
<td>Improve economic potentials and capacity of smaller cities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Boost interactions between cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Mass Transport</td>
<td>Abuja, Kaduna, Kano, Suleja</td>
<td></td>
<td>-Provide accessible, sustainable, affordable, reliable and comfortable public transport services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Providetechnical support to fast track options for delivering urban mass transit (bus and rail)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solid Waste Management</td>
<td>Kano Metropolis</td>
<td></td>
<td>-Empowering women and disadvantaged children through waste management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Involvement of private sector in solid waste management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-formation of stakeholder committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securing Climate Finance</td>
<td>Nigeria (Federal ministries, departments and agencies)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-To raise awareness of accessing climate finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- To build capacity of the Federal Ministry of Environment by establishing Climate Finance Unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DISCUSSION

Having outlined the role of institutions and how they eventually determined the nature of urban form in Kano in the 21st century. It is obvious Kano city like most Nigerian cities grapples with enormous challenges of poor planning, looming land crises, potential conflicts between the poor and the rich housing and crises and decaying and overstretched infrastructure. All these challenges are either presently or in the future closely related to issues packed in the acronym VUCA-vulnerability, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. These problems could be found in a typical large size Nigerian city particularly those in Northern Nigeria which currently grapple with terror attacks and dwindling oil revenues sequel to the global oil price crisis. In this type of situation, urban development
projects should be designed in the best ways possible to ease tensions and suffering of the poor members of the society. The interventions of foreign development partners is informed by the magnitude of challenges that Nigerian cities face. The DFID has initiated some projects that could play important role in achieving sustainable urbanisation in Nigeria. Thus, the main research question developed for this study reads: is the UK’s development cooperation midwifing fragmented and top-bottom urban governance? This study answers this question using examples of the implications of DFID interventions in Nigeria.

Firstly, when we look at Table 2 which documents some of the key DFID interventions most relevant to urban development sector, some element of top-bottom approach can be seen in respect of project clients and delivering consortiums. It is possible to see the role of the project delivering consortiums to be leading to top-bottom approach because they will most likely export into Nigerian cities the ideas of sustainable urbanisation as conceived and applicable to western cities. Indeed, in this respect, Essex (2016) argued that adoption of western planning ideas and imposing them on southern cities is a mistake. Indeed, Craggs and Neate (2016) have recently examined the role of careering in the urban sector and how it influences thoughts of individuals trained in the north to conceptualise and problematise the southern city. In this regard, the DFID interventions in Nigerian cities are top-bottom because the project brainbox and to ranking experts come from Europe and determine solutions for Nigerian cities in ways that are most likely western. Again, the UK’s sense of continued responsibility is conceptualised based on inherent and historic sense of imperialism (Grant and Njiman, 2004; Bell, 2010; Jones, 2011). Hence, such conceptualisation is challenged in the times of uncertainties particularly as cities become more vulnerable. In many cases, Western experts living in African cities are forced to leave at times of crises and eventually the projects they run will flounder.

Secondly, fragmentation of the DFID’s intervention could be perceived easily by looking at Tables 1 -3. The problems of urbanisation in the south is very well known to the DFID. Yet, it surprising that there is no single project initiated to address the challenges of urbanisation in Nigeria. Nigeria being the most populous country in Africa and also home of fast urbanising large and small cities deserve an urbanisation standalone intervention from the DFID. Indeed, because of the dynamic nature of African urbanisation, most of the other DFID projects are relevant and needed in Nigerian cities. However, this fragmentation does not help budget planning and policymaking for the urban sector which needs and integrated approach and synchronisation of efforts –regional and international.

Thirdly, having raised issue of fragmentation of the DFID interventions, we have to recognise other issues associated with NIAF 2 under whose auspices is the Effective Cities intervention. It is widely held that the urban mass transit interventions influenced the proposal made by Kano State Government to invite investment for the proposed Kano LRT project. The aim here is to demonstrate how DFID technical advice can in the long run lead to some faulty decision-making. Based on the experience of Kano, the government has bought in the proposal for the LRT project and announce it to the public. This kind of decision-making is what Susskind and Thomas-Larmer (1999) called decide-announce-depend (DAD). This kind of decision-making undermines genuine understanding and reconciliation in resolving crises and uncertainties in urban projects delivery. Indeed, the experiences of German planners in Egypt, has added to our understanding that for cities in developing countries, besides planning standards and procedures, it is imperative for planners to be armed with negotiation skills as a means of engaging the public more (Voigt, 2006).
The NIAF has involved itself with design of other urban mass transport schemes in several Nigerian cities. However, the experience of some advanced democracies has shown that such projects need informal, formal consultations and engagement with members of the public. Following the experience of Stuttgart 21 project in Germany, Friesecke (2011) observed that right from their conception, such projects encounter mass protests despite employment of formal and democratic procedures of engaging and informing the public. The author remarked that public acceptance of planning process and planned projects should identify innovative strategies that would ameliorate public distrust on large scale projects, corporations and politics. Indeed, the NIAF-2 compendium of projects stressed the need for citizen participation in urban planning and development (Adam Smith, 2016). However, none of the NIAF-2 or other DFID project demonstrate tangible examples of public engagement and or participation. This is understandable because in most case, the DFID project clients are public agencies.

Another perspective is in relation to fragmentation of sustainability of the DFID projects. It is obvious that, foreign direct investment (FDI) and some local investments are needed for urban mass transit projects (in particular urban rail projects) to reach their logical conclusions. It is understandable that environmental impact assessments and good compensation procedures could have been outlined at the time of conception. However, an aspect that seems to be ignored is measuring the acceptability of the project in the eyes of the public. Be it Kano, Kaduna or Abuja, such proposed project would pass through lands and spaces of livelihoods of some members of the population. What strategies are being used to make sure that such projects are acceptable to people? Recently social scientist have opined that in order to avoid project stillbirth or tensions with host community, it crucial to use the concept of SLO - social license to operate (Hall et al. 2015; Ehrnström-Fuentes and Kröger, 2017). The SLO helps business to identify possible fault lines in their relations with people and environment where they operate.

Although NIAF is the only DFID project that identifies with sustainable cities, nevertheless, the project has excluded local governments from the list of its clients and this can count as drawback and weakness of the project. Indeed, local governments are closest to the people and any development project that targets sustainability should aim at involving them in order to achieve effective and meaningful results. Again, local governments have a constitutional role under recurrent responsibilities to provide and maintain infrastructure. Hence, it amounts to fragmentation of urban governance and encouraging top-bottom approach to ignore the roles of local governments. Furthermore, looking at Effective Cities sector of NIAF intervention, it is important to add that by ignoring the local government, the NIAF is missing great opportunity to synthesise and consolidate sustainable urban governance. This is because in the case of major Nigerian urban centres, one of the most pressing challenges is the balkanisation of large cities such as Kano, Lagos, Ibadan and Kaduna into different local government areas. Urban planners and other experts believe this situation is undermining effective citywide governance (NBS-National Bureau of Statistics, 2012).in other words, NIAF Effective City projects would be more successful and impactful if they identify with urban based local government areas. Considering this challenge, the NIAF project with its strong focus on policy should have involved the urban local government areas through strengthening their capacity to work as a team and collaborate with NGOs, state and national governments in order to realise the objectives of achieving sustainable urbanisation in Nigeria. This lack of exclusion of urban based local government counts as an example of top bottom approach of the DFID projects in Nigeria.
Nigeria Solar Energy project is another standalone DFID project that should have been under the umbrella of NIAF of not for the inherent fragmentation of the DFID projects. As a tropical country, Nigerian cities stand to benefit immensely from adoption of solar energy technology. This technology can also be integrated into various urban development sectors such as healthcare delivery, sanitation, education, urban security and urban transport sector. For instance, solar energy can be used to support primary healthcare centres lighting, refrigeration and storage system, support electrification of hospital in patient’s wards, and support urban security and surveillance in the age of terror. However, this fragmentation of projects means loss of effective and linear relations between projects and targets of urban sustainability in Nigeria.

In relation to this, another criticism of the DFID intervention by this study is its inability to intervene in ways that will effectively incorporate small energy development projects that are closer to yielding benefits to the urban poor. For instance, NIAF 2 has deeply involved itself with big national electricity projects and programmes which have characteristically and persistently failed to be effective for decades due to monumental corruption and lack of genuine political will. Such big projects have hardly been able to justify the huge public and private investments being sunk into them. But, this is a typical example of supporting top-bottom approach through electricity interventions in Nigeria.

Any organisation with keen interest in urban transport sector would have realised the critical role of uncertainty and vulnerability of northern Nigerian cities and the consequences of that on the urban transport sector. The series of attacks on Northern Nigerian cities by the members of Boko Haram sect had created a chance for the state government to ban commercial motorcycle as a means of public transport. Indeed, this has opened windows of opportunity for the government to regulate the nuisance of commercial motorcycles and to replace that with tricycles buses, and taxis. NIAF has failed to integrate this opportunity or recognise it in proposing other project such as the urban mass transit schemes. Understandably, any proposal for intra-city transport project should look for complementarities between the existing system and the proposed. Otherwise, there is fragmentation between the NIAF urban transport interventions and the traditional African urban transport system seen in various Nigerian cities. In other words, NIAF has failed in its ability to effectively advise on how urban mass transit schemes that it supports are different from previous ones. NIAF intervention in urban transit is fragmented in that it has ignored the role of existing urban transport schemes. Parnell and Robinson (2006) opined that city development strategy in Africa, which is one of the NIAF guiding conceptual frameworks for its urban interventions stresses the need for broader integration of issues such as democracy, international development cooperation, and commitment not to overlook stakeholders and their interests.

CONCLUSION

Urbanisation is a key development challenge in Africa. As more people live in cities issues to be continually addressed by governments include infrastructure, ecology, poverty, security, governance, urban planning and financing. However, going by the nature of these challenges, not many governments particularly in Africa can overcome all of them at once. This is because of the long term impacts of changing institutions and how they affect the development process of African cities which varied with time. Partnership for development is being strengthened by a number of international institutions and government of the richer countries of the North. This study singles out the UK’s
international development organ namely DFID to explain its contributions towards addressing urban development challenges in Nigeria. It is very obvious that people and government need and welcome interventions by the DFID.

However, this study finds that DFID interventions do not prioritise urbanisation as none of its current 43 active projects in Nigeria is designed to address such issues. Thus, it is highly recommended that the DFID should review its interventions in Nigeria by focussing on urbanisation. This is in view of the fact that in spite of the problems of urbanisation, there are also ample opportunities for fast urbanising cities to provide jobs, fight poverty, manage climate change, and potentials for supporting innovation, entrepreneurship and creativity. Indeed, cities provide us with good opportunities of implementing and fast tracking efforts towards achieving the sustainable development goals on time. One message that comes out clearly from this paper is that the contributions of the developed countries in improving cities and their dwellers in the south deserve to be appreciated. However, the countries of the North and their institutions that serve as vehicles for delivering such development partnerships should not be dictating and determining the experts and organisations to deliver the projects and programmes. Local people, local governments, and representatives of development partners should undertake needs assessments and identify priorities for southern interventions cities and municipalities. In Nigeria, the DFID has partnered with federal and state governments on projects that they almost have capacity to deliver but refuse to deliver. Finally, by using the DFID as focus of its analysis, this paper is re-echoing the 2015 European Development Day which recognises that urbanisation in the south is a key issue that Europe should pay more attention to.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to express my sincere thanks to N-AERUS for selecting my paper for its 2016 meeting and also for funding my travel expenses to attend the meeting in Gothenburg, Sweden.

REFERENCES


Barau, Aliyu (2011) The good, the bad, the ugly: colonial linkages and postcolonial dilemmas of African Muslim city. Urban Spaces Panel: International Graduate Conference on Colonial legacies, postcolonial contestations: decolonizing the social sciences and the humanities 16th-18th June 2011, Goethe University Frankfurt.


Chermack, T.J. (2011) Scenario Planning in Organizations: How to Create, Use and Assess Scenarios, Berrett-Koehler. San Francisco,
Is UK’s development cooperation midwifing fragmented and top-bottom urban governance


SCALOGRAM AND CENTRALITY ANALYSES AS TOOLS FOR REGIONAL PLANNING: THE CASE OF SOUTHWESTERN PORTION OF BATANGAS PROVINCE, PHILIPPINES

Edgar M. Reyes, Jr\textsuperscript{1}

\textsuperscript{1}PhD Candidate, Department of Landscape Ecology and Landscape Planning, Faculty of Spatial Planning, TU Dortmund/ Faculty Member, Department of Community and Environmental Resource Planning, College of Human Ecology, University of the Philippines Los Banos
emreyes0719@gmail.com

ABSTRACT
The research explored the local economic activities of the municipalities of Bauan, Mabini, Tingloy and San Pascual in the province of Batangas, Philippines. The analyses serve as possible bases for improving the local economic development planning fostering a healthy competition through livelihoods complementation. Tingloy serves as a rural (island) municipality providing raw materials (fisheries resources and ecotourism) that were economically linked with the mainland municipalities of Mabini, Bauan and San Pascual. Competitive economic activities in the mainland municipalities further limit the positive development of Tingloy island municipality. Thus, upon the assessment of the economic drivers of all the municipalities done through centrality and scalogram analyses, the complementation of economic activities to promote inclusive development was recommended. As such, the grassroots assessment of local livelihoods viewed to a larger network of municipalities can provide inclusive local development through regional planning. Local and regional planning and policy formulation to show a road map for inclusive development of municipalities can be further explored to address the widening regional disparity among the municipalities. Supplemented by retooling of planning professionals to start local and think globally in addressing prevailing issues on local economic activities.

KEY WORDS
Scalogram Analysis, Livelihoods Complementation, Regional Planning, Inclusive Development
LOCAL, RURAL AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Local development has been tackled in the development arena for decades to augment the continuing issues on poverty and inequality. Approaches to address the persistent problems of depressed and underdeveloped areas can be done by supporting locally-based, bottom-up approaches that complement mainstream national programs (OECD, 2001). Several success stories were evident during the late 80s up to early 90s as many developing countries crafted its version of decentralization policies. However, decentralization, can also lead to regional inequalities and differences, therefore, appropriate decentralization measures (capacity building of central governments and improvement of laws and financial management among others) should be done (Nambu and Ishibashi, 2002). In this context, several practitioners see rural development as a safer and more pragmatic way on solving similar problems. Rural development connotes a process of rural transformation that looks into a form of state intervention considered simply as one of the forces although the one which has become of increasing importance. Thus, rural development refers to a distinct approach to interventions by the state (Harries, 1982).

With the emergence of sustainable development definition by the Bruntland Commission in 1987, the core of such concept is the belief that long term, social, economic and environmental objectives should be complementary and interdependent in the development process (OECD, 2001). Local endogenous development on another hand- tries to connote this in the context of participation, communication, partnership and complementation. As such, only by highlighting the linkages of the settlements will provide a larger possibility of sustained development through partnership and complementarity.

Measuring centrality and hierarchy of settlements are among the basic analytical tools in regional planning. It has been tested to work on several planning endeavour and to provide probable explanations through indicative spatial patterns (Ragragio, 1981), but its optimal application has never been brought up into the center of local decision-making process. However, coordination in rural areas is a particularly tough challenge because of the relatively dispersed nature of rural populations, associated communications problems, and the uncertainties that are associated with dependence upon relatively unpredictable natural processes (Ellis and Biggs, 2001) adding to lack of good political will.

Thus, this paper will deal with the characterization of human settlements based from the basic economic activities through scalogram and centrality analysis. With this, basic economic sector strengths and weaknesses of each municipality can be interpreted and ordered. Suggestions for the complementation of these economic activities for the larger regional economic environment and long term sustainability were laid out.

SCALOGRAM AND CENTRALITY MEASURES AS REGIONAL PLANNING METHODS

Scalogram analysis provides the basic comparison among human settlements wherein decisions can be made to allow complementary local development to occur. The reason for the failure of this tool decades ago is the lack of extensive data sets to accrue to the comprehensiveness of the results it may provide. However, with the advent of current technology and local data collection mandates, such data gaps that was then a problem is now solved. Nonetheless, the use of simple scalogram and centrality analysis as a decision-making tool has been termed as obsolete if not for a very limited function in local development.

The focus, however, is the collection and processing of available data inputs, such as the list of registered business establishments in 2013, commonly underutilized. These data were tabulated and categorized based from the Philippine Standard Industrial Classification (PSIC) of the National
Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB). The results were plotted in the scalogram chart and the corresponding centrality measure for each municipality in the region was computed. This is done by identifying the weights from each industry present in the region multiplied to the actual number of industries present in each municipality, then finally adding each weighted scores from the present industries in each municipality. Diversity is a key component of centrality as provided by other empirical studies showing that the presence of nested hierarchy in real urban systems (Berry and Garrison, 1958) is consistent with spatial interaction models. As such, the value of economic activities' diversity in the region, as a crucial factor in analyzing the urban functional structure, was not sacrificed. Other spatial interaction models were not applied to maintain the simplicity direct utility for LGUs.

SOUTHWESTERN BATANGAS REGIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

The vibrancy of this region supplements the function of Batangas City, a neighboring international port city. The South Western portion of the province consists most of the second congressional district of Batangas- the municipalities of Bauan, San Pascual, and Mabini in the mainland and the island municipality of Tingloy (Figure 1). The region has a total population of 220,637. In 2013, Bauan has the largest population (87,657) followed by San Pascual (65,271), Mabini (48,504) and Tingloy (19,205).

![Figure 1. The Southwestern Portion of Batangas](image)

*Economic activities in the region.* The economic activities in the region, being adjacent to the capital port city of Batangas province, make it very relevant in the economic development of the whole province. The region provides access to international trading and manufacturing through its international ports and it functions for wholesale and retail trades and some administrative functions.
Also, its ecotourism sector is a reliable source of income among the people in the region and agriculture and fisheries still play a role for the survival of the people especially in Tingloy. The region, including Batangas City and other coastal municipalities contribute largely to the supply of fishery resources and products requirements of Luzon and Metro Manila. It also supports the manufacturing and processing of goods that is very much required in the province. Furthermore, the coastal waters, forming part of the mainland is blessed with the Balayan bay and the Batangas Bay. Batangas bay focuses on international transport and maritime activities while Balayan bay serves as an ecotourism hub of the country. In addition, Balayan bay, provides income for the region through ecotourism, fisheries and other coastal and aquatic resources activities. These coastal waters form part of the coral triangle as an important key marine biodiversity spot (ADB, 2014).

**Centrality values in the region.** With the region's livelihoods, the urban centrality falls on the prime municipality of Bauan controlling the majority of economic services in the area. It has a total centrality weight of 9.2044 that forms about 51.14% of the total economic activities happening significantly in the region. The centralization of services indicates that a lot of population is being serviced and that it is a strategic location to allow the services to flourish. This is in support for the recent results in the panel discussions among OECD countries that increasing population density and urbanization were associated with higher centralization (Stegarescu, 2005). Bauan's economic activities holds half of the region's that even surpasses the economic activities of the other two municipalities in the mainland and the island municipality combined (Table 1). On the other end, Tingloy lacks majority of the economic services offered by the other three (3) municipalities accumulating a total centrality of only 0.2197 or only 1.22% of all the economic activities in the region. This is attributed to the major economic activity of Tingloy—subsistence fishing. The rest of the economic services are being communicated back to the mainland.

Table 1. Scalogram and Centrality Analyses of the Southwestern Portion of Batangas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>K</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>Q</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>FUNCTIONS SHARING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bauan</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>2880</td>
<td>0.5577</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malabon</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>1.1867</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Pascual</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1095</td>
<td>2.1910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tingloy</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>0.6466</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Number of Facilit. | 43 | 15 | 29 | 21 | 90 | 72 | 2707 | 79 | 500 | 15 | 234 | 48 | 83 | 603 | 57 | 80 | 84 | 148 | 9814 |
| Total Centrality | 0.0233 | 0.0667 | 0.0033 | 0.0476 | 0.0102 | 0.0139 | 0.0044 | 0.0127 | 0.0320 | 0.0667 | 0.0043 | 0.0222 | 0.0120 | 0.0075 | 0.0175 | 0.0015 | 0.0160 | 0.0008 |

**Hierarchy of Settlements.** Among the three mainland municipalities, two serves as large municipalities (Bauan and San Pascual) that cater for provincial services and administration and
international production (PPDO, 2010). The other municipality (Mabini) serves for a small and agro-processing and also services medium and large industries including ecotourism. The lone island municipality (Tingloy) serves as a settlement providing rural services and agro-processing including the provision of raw material goods required by the larger adjacent settlements. Bauan acts as a primary urban center, as validated from the centrality index, on the region delivering economic services to the province as supported by San Pascual as a secondary urban area. Mabini, on the other hand, acts as a peri-urban area that links the urban center to the rural hinterland.

Table 2. Settlements Ranking for the Southwestern Batangas based from Centrality Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Existing Settlement Ranking*</th>
<th>Centrality Index</th>
<th>Settlement Ranking based from computed Centrality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bauan</td>
<td>Large Municipality</td>
<td>51.14</td>
<td>Primary Urban Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mabini</td>
<td>Medium Municipality</td>
<td>22.21</td>
<td>Secondary Urban Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Pascual</td>
<td>Large Municipality</td>
<td>25.46</td>
<td>Secondary Urban Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tingloy</td>
<td>Small Municipality</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>Tertiary Urban Area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*based from the Batangas Provincial Development and Physical Framework Plan

CONCERNS IN LOCAL UNCOORDINATED DEVELOPMENT

Among the issues in regional economy is the lack of linkages between the village and the district involved in natural resource management (Woodhouse, Howlett and Rigby, 2000). Similarly, this phenomenon is basically the problem of the south-western portion of Batangas province as no collective efforts are being tackled to potentially create a lasting development for the municipalities. Duplication and unnecessary competition occurs instead of complementation and healthy competition. Japan's success at adaptive research and development is rooted in technology management practices as old as its history wherein a culture of "complementary competition" evolved, encouraging competition among units but unification against outside threats (Yamamoto, 1994) which is not embodied in the southwestern portion of Batangas.

Primary production. As per the fishery resources of Tingloy, the primary economic activity of the islanders, the lack of complementarity among local development initiatives in the region only creates a wash-down effect in the regional economy. Clearly, there is very limited support from other municipalities in the region in terms of the local economic linkage resulting to vulnerability of the local products of Tingloy to sudden market changes in the region. This situation fully supports, though negatively, the results of DESA-ECOSOC in 2008 which demonstrate that the inclusion of linkages between rural and urban labor markets is necessary to understand the impact of agricultural prices on the poor. Small scale fishing activities, commonly run by families, is survival employment in nature and is not a registered income generating activity in Tingloy. Although the island municipality offers raw material economic products, the services to support and further grow the industry is still being held at the mainland, but uncoordinated, making it hard for the community to reap most of the benefits they should have in their primary economic activity.

Manufacturing and Trading. Wholesale and retail trade of goods and services ranks first in the listing of registered economic activities in the region. As a comparative advantage, using the access of the region to ports, this sector of the economy could have spurred development in the region. However, due to the existence of the prime port city of Batangas, the role taken by the region only accounts as a support arm of the port city. Expanding this economic sector of the region, as what the Brazilian economic strategy (Rocha, Magacho and Marconi, 2015) could enlarge the regional market and also boost the primary production of the region. Delivery of goods and services and manufacturing
industry formation is unfortunately not driven by the strengths of the local economy but as a support to the prime port city of Batangas. Bauan and San Pascual municipalities provide transport and trucking services, manpower and construction and building services in support for the growing/increasing needs of Batangas City (the capital city) and the international port. The ports can also provide a good venue to spur the flourishing ecotourism in the area.

Services Provision. Administrative works and service sector of the economy, especially in ecotourism, are also buzzing in the region. Information communication technology (ICT) also exists but contributes little in the local economy. This unmanaged value chain of economic activities is further aggravated by the fact that few quarrying and highly industrial activities happen simultaneously in the mainland, especially in San Pascual and Mabini. Mining and quarrying could impact the surviving fishing industry of Tingloy and the ecotourism initiatives of Mabini. ICT is a backbone for a sustained local and regional economy, its fundamental roles in modern economic growth and development include reducing transaction costs thereby improving productivity, immediate connectivity, increasing choices and access to previously unavailable goods and services, enlarging the market scope and channeling information across to name a few (Kramer, Jerkins and Katz, 2007). Mabini and Tingloy, and to a lesser extent, the municipality of Bauan, propels the ecotourism in the region. Mabini, the leader in dive and underwater tourism in the region and the country as well, provides most of the ecotourism services wherein Tingloy island municipality forms allegiance for several years already. Bauan, on the other hand, has its own mechanisms to independently conduct ecotourism activities in the region. Moreover, this sector, given proper attention and launched at the regional level, could spur tremendous coordinated growth.

Complementation is not just a practical move for LGUs of the southwestern portion of Batangas but also a solution for a long term sustainable local development. In support to this, development-oriented organizations such as IFAD maintains a strategy of working closely with national, regional and local government agencies, thus ensuring that development-related activities are consistent with and supportive of government policies making it more sustainable and long term (Tango International, 2009). This task is left on the province level, however, given so much responsibilities and the individual municipalities having the last decision, the ideal case of coordination does not significantly happen.

REGIONAL PLANNING FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH?

The Philippine national government, in its national framework policy guidelines, provided the following: (a) Formulate individual town or city plans within the context of a national hierarchical network of settlements where there will always be differences in the level and scale of activities. Despite such differences, however, opportunities for economic growth and improving the delivery of services and the overall quality of life relative to other settlements can be locally initiated; (b) Guide the formulation of physical plans by the close relationships between local economic growth and production efficiency, market access, and the provision of basic services; and (c) Establish and maintain external linkages to increase inter and intra-regional integration that leads to improvements in local production and market access. (NFPP, 2001-2030). This is in support of the national government in defining a role-specific hierarchy for settlements. Problems in local development can be addressed by linking them into the larger region. Alongside this new hierarchy of urban systems are increasing urban-rural linkages facilitating larger flows of goods, services, and other resources (Porio, 2009). The factual gaps on these assumptions can be gained from the results of centrality and scalogram analyses. Creation of a more equitable development pattern requires increasing the linkages among rural settlements and between them and urban centres within regions. Among the most
important linkages are farm-to-market roads and all-weather arterials between market centres and larger towns and cities (Ruddle and Rondinelli, 1983). Some suggestions for proper regional integration and planning among LGUs are as follows:

**Primary Products Evaluation.** The primary production of the region varies from crop (coconut, corn, *palay* or rice, fruits and vegetables) livestock (meat and poultry) and fishery resources. With such, the region only produces the raw material goods. Manufactured goods circulate the region and to a lesser extent exit the region as domestic export consumed primarily in the province of Batangas through land transportation. Inter-island and international export is limited to the municipality of Bauan offering the manufactured, refined fuel and other mining and quarrying goods. The limits are imposed by the city of Batangas, being the industrial hub of the province and the south of Luzon. In terms of fishery resources, only marine fishery products are being harvested in the region which is being exported domestically within the province, while freshwater fishery resources are being provided by the lakeside municipalities of Batangas. Tingloy, as the primary source of fishery resources in the region, still gives sufficient supply of fishery goods, but, such supply is being affected by unbearable coastal environmental conditions and seasonality. Effective monitoring of these resources must be held paramount among the coastal municipalities by providing monitoring schemes to potentially record and analyze the status of natural resources and decide exactly when and where each species can be fished, and how many may be taken (GIZ, 2013).

**Raw Material Products Value Chain.** Diversification of goods through the processing of raw materials into high commercial products is still a challenge for the region. Another aspect of product diversification is to look further on the possible crops, livelihood and services related to ecotourism that could offer additional products and services to the region. Small-scale fisheries in the region now require dynamic partnership approach that will require traditional skills, indigenous knowledge, local institutional arrangements and resource stewardship. These elements can be complemented with national governments, providing an enabling environment: scientific advice, legislation, monitoring, control and surveillance and other assistance (Neiland and Bene, 2004). The lack of locally available physical infrastructure (electricity, cold storage facilities, processing facilities, etc) can be dealt at the regional scale to facilitate the exchange and valuation of goods and services with greater ease.

**Strategic Local Economies Complementation.** Since the municipality of Bauan and Mabini, on a lesser extent, acts as ports serving both international and domestic navigation, the export and import of goods and services is very visible. The common export and import of goods ranges from gas and other fuel, raw material goods among others. In terms of export, the mainland municipalities and the island municipality only deal with domestic export of raw material goods. Often, these goods go directly to Batangas City or for the consumption at the province level. However, only a few import goods are processed in the region. Strategic complementation can run on the prime agricultural products of the region- fisheries resources. Fisheries sector can also be linked to ecotourism as what other success stories in European countries started (FARNET, 2013). Moreover, value addition can be an option for other primary goods through processing and diversification. The existing administrative and support services can be expanded to fully support a more efficient movement of goods and services within the region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Livelihood Strength</th>
<th>Regional Complementary Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bauan</td>
<td>Service (Manufacture) industry</td>
<td>Valuation and Branding of goods and services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mabini</td>
<td>Dive Tourism</td>
<td>Ecotourism services and other related cottage industries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Regional Branding. Like the regional branding of EIFEL in Europe that rose from dangers of ongoing changes in the structure of the agricultural sector and was created by the support of a relatively pronounced environmental conscience and regional identity (Martin, 2014), the southwestern portion of Batangas can initiate a similar endeavour highlighting the coastal and marine resources being a part of the world renowned coral triangle. Regional branding is one of several ways to promote rural regions and support development of socially, culturally and environmentally oriented economies in areas that are interesting due to their natural and cultural heritage (ARZ, 2010). This will improve the marketing of local products and also the ecotourism initiatives of the region. However, the contribution of various stakeholders such as locals, private sector (businessmen, entrepreneurs), local governments and NGOs are important. Also, an indigenous regional body is crucial for this undertaking. As like in the Caribbean states wherein a regional fisheries body play a vital role in advancing the work on fisheries subsidies, promoting the orderly development, conservation and management of the fisheries resources (Haughton, 2004). Also, drawing a monitoring database may set similar regulations, at the regional level, for boats and establish closed seasons so that people can make a living by fishing without jeopardizing fish stocks like the sustainable management of fisheries resources in Mauritania (GIZ, 2013). Locally initiated inter-LGU alliance must be formed to enforce these activities to strengthen and protect the regional resources.

Regional Policy Framework Building. Integrating all these suggestions into a framework that will address the local and regional challenges can be set up to properly implement measures. The regional framework can provide strategic directions for the control, proper marketing and management of its resources. Equally important to note are the sanctions and the sustainability measures it could provide that captures the protection of local communities and equitable delivery of services across all sectors. Programs for conservation and protection of cultural heritage and natural resources can also be integrated in the framework. Ultimately, this policy framework will guide the stakeholders and the local governments in achieving sustained local development.

Conclusion
Simple scalogram and centrality analyses using the latent business information among municipalities could provide a guiding framework for decision makers to have a lasting development in complementation with the regional economic environment. Also, the methods may provide the existing economic capacities and urban spatial structures of settlements, however, caution must be highlighted as it may mislead in providing sustained local economic growth. Local development, in order to be sustained must incorporate complementary competition among other settlements thus attaining better regional outlook.
REFERENCES


SCALOGRAM AND CENTRALITY ANALYSES AS TOOLS FOR REGIONAL PLANNING

EMReyes, Jr.

N-AERUS XVII
Göteborg, 16th – 19th November 2016


THE ICE CREAM, THE TUNA AND THE CHAIR

Monuments in southern urban space and the desire for recognition and economic positioning

Alejandra Espinosa Andrade
Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis
alejaespinosa@gmail.com

ABSTRACT (Max. 300 words):
A monument suspends the quotidian activity, it is a reminder of the past and also a projection towards the future, in that sense, it is supposed to be the physical artifact that survives living bodies and replaces short temporality (Hui, 2009, p.21-22), a work of art that have achieved an eminence that elevates them beyond their historical context (Assmann, 2009). Apart of being a reminder of the past, as a material manifestation, monuments express also the relation between the State and the space, the citizens and the space. This paper analyzes the construction of monuments and its significance in Ecuadorian urban space. Taking as a case study three monuments located in two Ecuadorian cities I analyze a) the process of local monuments planning and production, b) the relation between monuments and the urban space, and their role in identity formation. The methodology of study comprises: a) interviews with local authorities and people related to the construction of the monuments and the management of public spaces; b) analysis of secondary sources such as newspaper articles related to the monuments; c) field observation (which took place in December 2015 and January 2016); and d) theoretical review. The analysis reveals the following: First, the production of monuments uncovers different feelings of the authorities in relation with the sense of belonging and its origins, and at the end, what they reflect is a persistence of a conception of identity that is a reflection of the **enlightenment subject** (Hall, 1996). Second, monuments function as objects that create and reinforce a multi-faceted identity that interacts with different temporalities. Third, monuments are perceived as part of economic/cultural strategies; rather than being primarily expressions of identity they represent mainly what the authorities think will work as a marketing instrument to attract tourists and trade.

KEY WORDS
Ecuadorian Monuments; Identity; City branding, Urban Space
INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The present paper analyzes the planning process and construction of three eye-catching monuments located in Ecuador: The Ice Cream, the Tuna and the Manteña Chair. Unlike the conventional and traditional material monuments like busts of national heroes or representations of valiant battles, these monuments, using striking colors and showing aesthetics mostly defined as “folkloric” or “popular”, represent objects and local characters that have a significance in the city where they are placed. This significance is closely linked with the imaginaries about identity shared by the authorities in charge of public spaces, which express an ideal of experience of being that fluctuates between the past, the present and the future. The Ice Cream is located in the city of Salcedo and was constructed by municipal authorities; the Monument to The Tuna is located in Manta city and was constructed by the Chamber of Commerce; the last one, The Manteña Chair, is also located in Manta and responds to an initiative of a group of entrepreneurs. Located in strategical spaces, each of these monuments establishes new connections between local identities and the global context, and raises discussions and questions about why and which identity deserves, according to the local authorities, to be projected in the urban space. As a result, these monuments reveal how, simultaneously, local identities are being constructed combining elements from the past and the present in an attempt to find uniqueness but are also, at the same time, geared towards attracting future tourists and business, in other words, trying to annihilate the distance and establish connections with the global trend.

The questions I try to respond in the following pages are related with three aspects: the planning of monuments, their relation with the space and their role in the process of identity formation. By whom, why and with what objectives are these monuments been constructed? Are they related with the local, national or global space? What kind of identity do the monuments reinforce? Does it compete with other identities? Monuments, apart from being reminders of the past, are expressions of the relation between the local government, local citizens and local space, as well as storytellers, objects intentionally placed to send a message to passers-by, to make a statement about a particular period of time, a person or an event considered relevant by the authorities and the citizenry. In the case of Ecuador, the monuments placed in small cities have a particular aesthetic; with their striking colors and forms, they are a material provocation to the eye of the passerby. Nevertheless, despite their strong
visual impact in the landscape, generally they are not considered as an important element of urban planning, at least in the Ecuadorian context. The purpose of my analysis is not to develop a new approach to understanding monuments, but to explore their role and importance in local spaces.

To achieve the objectives previously described, the methodology of study comprises: a) interviews with local authorities and people related to the construction of the monuments and the management of public spaces; b) analysis of secondary sources such as newspaper articles related to the construction of the monuments; c) field observation (which took place in December 2015 and January 2016); and d) theoretical review about monuments, space and identity construction.

In the first part of the paper I will briefly describe the general functions of monuments as defined in existing scholarship and, more specifically, their role in relation to identity construction; in the second part I will describe and analyze the case of the Monument of the Ice Cream, highlighting the disputes around the installation of this monument in the public space in relation with the construction of local identity. In the third part of the text I will describe the monuments of the Tuna Fish and the Manteña Chair, focusing the analysis on their role as anchors for the consolidation of the city’s identity and also as elements that contribute to city branding.

**MONUMENTS AND IDENTITY FORMATION**

Deriving from the word *manere* which means “to remind”, by definition, the word *monument* signified a human artifact created to last (Oxford Latin Dictionary). According to Riegl, “A monument in its oldest and most original sense is a human creation, erected for the specific purpose of keeping single human deeds or events… alive in the minds of future generations” (Alois Riegl in Vidler. 1992, pag.177). A *monument* suspends the quotidian activity, it is a reminder of the past and it also projects a trajectory towards the future, in that sense: “…it is meant to endure and remind future generations of its legacy”, it is supposed to be the physical artifact that survives living bodies and replaces short temporality (Hui, 2009, p.21-22).

The symbolic dimension of public monuments and their connections with social memory and identity are crucial. Even if identity construction could be perceived as a traditional interpretation of the monument’s role in the space (Krzyzanowska, 2015), it doesn’t minimize its importance when understanding their role in the configuration in the local context. As Marschall (2009, pag. 340) expresses: “Monuments always represent and to some extent construct group identities. They can represent existing communities, but they also have the potential to introduce new discourses and forge new group identities around them (Marschall, 2009, pag.340)”. In the urban space, monuments have
become part of the city landscape, spatial points of reference or elements founding identity of a place (Caves 2005 in Krzyzanowska, 2015) and therefore its inhabitants. Identity is understood as the sense of recognition, identification and belonging, a social construction that involves a sense of time and the conscious of being part of a narrative. In that sense, the practice of erecting monuments becomes fundamental; beyond the power and ideological dimensions involved in its construction (who has the right to place monuments, why and where?) monuments are the link between the past and the present, a practice of individual and collective recognition, and also a step towards a desired future. In relation with past time, they are reminders of remarkable events that allow communities to construct collective memory, which at the same time allows them to understand the present.

Monuments, memory and identity converge, changing the spatial dimension monuments mark and deviate the sense of time, are structures that question and reconfigure the sense of belonging, therefore identity. As I will try to show in this paper, the monuments presented trigger different ideas about identity which wave between two of the three conceptions of identity mentioned by Stuart Hall (1996): the enlightenment subject (identity as a fixed essence of a unified individual with a center) and what Hall calls the post-modern subject. The post-modern subject has no fixed identity, identity becomes something moveable which is continuously transformed according with the surrounding systems (Hall, 19987 in Hall, 1996). In the cases presented in this analysis, together with a monistic idea of identity, the monuments activate notions of identity as a unity composed “not of a single, but of several, sometimes contradictory or unresolved, identities” (Hall, 1996, pag.598).

In the case of Ecuador, we can see how the search for identity has come together with the production of monuments. Seeking to consolidate itself as a modern nation-state, during the 19 and 20th centuries the Ecuadorian State, the Church and the Army put additional efforts into the construction of meanings related with national identity (Andrade, 2011). The construction of monuments reached a summit during 19th and 20th centuries, period where they were constructed mainly to commemorate national heroes. On the other side of the spectrum, nowadays a completely different kind of monument is being constructed in smaller Ecuadorian cities. The aesthetics of these monuments are characterized by the replication of quotidian objects (such as a hut, an airplane and a pitcher, among others), animals or ordinary citizens, who are aggrandized and placed in central spaces of the city or village. The use of strong, striking colors and grand proportions are common characteristics of these constructions. Similarly, to the definition of Young (1992) who defines counter monuments as memorial spaces which challenge the very premise of a monument, these Ecuadorian monuments go against the traditional didactic function of monuments. They represent an object of the present and future rather than a person of fame or national heroes evoking the past. As counter monuments they mirror a particular relationship with events (Young, 1992), namely the current experience of the locality where
these structures are placed. As I will show in the next pages, these monuments can be a reminder of the past but they also function (at the same time) as elements of advertisement, marks of a desirable future, collective aspirations of an identity that does not exist yet and wants to be inscribed in global economies, as a reminder of what the people related with the structure want to be in the future.

2. THE ICE CREAM AND THE PRINCE: THE PAST VS THE PRESENT IDENTITY

In this section I describe and analyze the Monument of the Ice Cream (Figure 1), its origin and the reasons that motivated its construction. I will highlight how the installation of this structure raised disputes about the construction of local identity and its meaning. As a result, the structure reflects the tensions between an identity perceived as configured by elements of the past (mainly pre-Columbian) and a present identity, which orients itself towards the future, (global) commerce and economic development.

Figure 1. Monument to the Ice Cream. Photo taken by the author. January, 2016.

The monument is a seven meters high structure, welcoming the visitors, is located at the entrance of Salcedo city, which is a small city (58,000 inhabitants according to INEC, 2010) located in Cotopaxi province, in the center of Ecuador. As has been analyzed by other scholars, the site is a contextual factor impacting on the meaning of any commemorative marker (Marschall, 2009), in this case (and also the others presented in this paper) we see that the Ice Cream has been installed in a well-protected green area surrounded by a fence. This area is located at the main entrance to the city, reflecting the importance of the Ice Cream as an image that deserves to be the one welcoming visitors. The structure is made of reinforced concrete and
is covered with ceramic tiles. In addition to the monument, when walking in the streets of the urban area, the icon of the Ice Cream is everywhere and it can also be seen in videos, touristic guides and pictures related with Salcedo.

![Ice Cream Shop](image)

**Figures 2-3. Ice Cream Shop. Photo taken by the author. January, 2016**

The relation between the city and the production of ice cream started in the 1950s when the Franciscan Nuns decided to prepare home-made ice cream due to the difficult economic situation their order was passing through in Salcedo during those years. Later on, some families with access to the nuns’ recipe continued with the elaboration and commercialization of the product (Asociación, 2016). The following years the number of shops and families elaborating ice cream increased together with the fame of Salcedo, which started to be called the city of Ice Cream. The ice cream monument was constructed in 1998 and was commanded by the Municipality of Salcedo, specifically by the then Mayor Mr. Guillermo Pacheco. About the reasons to install and aggrandize the figure of an Ice Cream, Mr. Pacheco expresses:

> I did it – the monument – because Salcedo is the land of ice cream so (...) [it] was made to make the city more attractive so people can identify Salcedo as the land of ice cream. That was the objective, the aspiration, [to make it] for all the people that work in this industry.

(Interview EC-04, 2016)

According to the architect Edison Carrillo, who was in charge of the design, ice cream production is a tradition in Salcedo, so they wanted to take advantage of it and to give an identity to the city representing the daily life of a Salcedense. So what is possible to see is that the monument was designed to function both, as a monument to honor the people working in the Salcedo ice cream industry and to forge an image of Salcedo as a city closely linked to the ice cream production, image constructed mainly for the eyes of foreign people, functioning as a sort of marketing or city branding instrument.
City branding refers to the process of creating and image in order to catch the attention of relevant stakeholders, in this process a chosen vision, mission and identity play a role (Eurib, 2009), or as Aronczyk (2008, pag. 43) mentions “…corporate branding is a demonstrably effective way to assign unique identification by consciously highlighting certain meanings and myths while ignoring others”, according to the author, this mechanism is used by governments to promote national identity (in this case would be local identity) while encouraging the economic benefits necessary to compete in a modern globalized world (Aronczyk, 2008). In Salcedo, however, there is a tension between the monument as a marker of cultural identity and the monument’s commercial/branding function. In the case of Salcedo, when translating the particular (a local product) to a monument, there is a desire of economic benefit, but the commerciality of the product clashes with the idea of a local identity, also because the ice cream industry is in fact not the biggest industry in Salcedo, in other words, the relevance of the sale of ice cream to the canton’s economy is low. According to the statistics, in Salcedo the 49.3% of the population is involved in activities related with agriculture and livestock, and only 12.5% in commerce and food services (INEC, 2010). Apart from that fact, 78.5% of the canton population lives in rural areas (INEC, 2010), and ice cream is a product produced and sold mainly in the urban area. Despite these numbers, the current administration (2014-2017), with the idea of fostering the economy of the canton and the production of ice cream, is thinking about constructing a new monument and planning to organize a national exhibition and to design the park of the ice cream (Clever Zapata, director of social development and culture of Salcedo’s Municipality). In that sense, the idea of Salcedo as a “city of Ice Cream”, and therefore the monument, represent mainly an aspiration rather than a fact, a strategic move to construct a future where, not necessarily the production of this item is perceived as the main economic source, but where the image of the ice cream is exploited in order to be recognized and appreciated by tourists. In that sense, the image of the ice cream is perceived as strength, the object becomes a fundamental element which is used as a base to construct an identity which is partially made-up and has a specific and strategical purpose.

The monument was installed without any special ceremony, only some authorities of the municipality and people from the neighborhood attended the event. Once the monument was placed in the city some sectors of the population felt marginalized and discussions about its purpose started inside and outside the Municipality. This discussion was mainly between the people interested on the identity of the canton (Interview EC-03, 2016; Interview EC-06, 2016). According to the historian and current General Secretary of the Municipality Wilmo Gualpa the construction of the ice cream reflected a lack of common sense, arguing that instead of an ice cream, is important to recognize Salcedo for its role in history, pointing out events that took place during the Inca Empire, before the Spanish conquest, asking: “How is it possible that we...
simplify in such a manner all our traditions and our historical and cultural richness erecting the figure of an ice cream?” (Interview EC-03, 2016).

In this sense, the Ice Cream triggers a discussion about what kind of local identity should be reflected and reinforced in a public structure. The arguments swing between an identity based on the past and other based on the present, one based in historical events and other in commercial products, and also between an identity faithful with the feelings of the locals or one more attractive for the tourists and city branding. As the testimony above shows, through the Ice Cream the identity of the city is put in question mainly because it incarnates a contrast with other activities considered as traditional, principally those that were realized by indigenous people before the conquest, such as for example –and the most important one- the festivity of Inti Raymi made in honor to the god sun, which was forbidden (as any other indigenous manifestation) during the colonial times. In that sense, the monument is perceived as a construction that should reflect the identity of the locality, this identity is understood as something built mainly from the past, specifically from the pre-Columbian past traditions and heroes.

Patricio Amaya, lawyer, former General Secretary of the municipality and current councilor, goes further with his critics. For him, the discussion and polemic around the ice cream was originated because “other cultural values exist”. He expresses that it is necessary to construct monuments more relevant and consistent with Salcedo history, “at least” one worthy monument to father Salcedo, the priest from whom Salcedo took its name (Interview EC-06, 2016). For him, the ice cream “is an attempt against history, against everything! (…) we are falling into folklorism” (Interview EC-06, 2016). Other important relations between monuments and identity merge from this testimony: a clear opposition between the monument and folklore is reaffirmed, expressing the term folklore with a negative connotation. It seems like for him, the ice cream would be a traditional element located in a different level, one opposed to enlightened values, which would be better represented by national heroes or local prominent people. He makes clear that the representation of the ice cream and its positive valuation would be an anti-identity that is preferable to avoid.

In conclusion, multiple competing ideas about identity are opened with the installation of this monument, and they do not agree with each other: for some, identity or the sense of belonging to the region is perceived as an element that is built on traditions and the past instead of something that derives from the present, in this sense, the monument has to unquestionably emulate the pre-Columbian past or/and prominent people that have done something positive for the region in the past. It is interesting to see how in this discussion, the reflections of Stuart Hall
in relation with identity are clearly visible, for him, identities are about questions of using the resources of history, language and culture in the process of becoming rather than being, what we might become and how we might represent ourselves. In that sense, according to him, identities are related to the invention of tradition as much as tradition itself (Hall, 1996b). In the case presented, behind the discussion is possible to see, that the figure of the Ice Cream would be creating a sense of belonging based in an element that is not in the same level as other traditions, and this difference is perceived by the actors as a sort of anti-historical action in which history (and with it, positive values as if those two terms were naturally connected) is invisibilized and erased rather than memorialized, action that would be against identity, a sort of anti-identity.

To focus the gaze on the spatial context and other monuments of Salcedo makes it possible to understand more in depth the discussion about identity that the Ice Cream raises. Together with the ice cream, sharing the same space, it is possible to see a giant image of the archangel San Miguel. Approximately two years after the construction of the ice cream and due mainly to traffic problems, the municipality decided to construct a roundabout and to install on it an image of the archangel San Miguel (The Prince, as he is called and known in Salcedo), as the first image of Salcedo, its identity.

![Figure 4. Monument to the Prince– Salcedo, Ecuador. Photo downloaded from http://milindosalcedoundestino.blogspot.nl/](http://milindosalcedoundestino.blogspot.nl/)

The archangel San Miguel is one of the emblematic symbols of Salcedo and as the Director of Social Development of the Municipality mentions: “The prince…that one is 100% Salcedo…the prince San Miguel is our patron, that is our religious faith….” (Interview EC-02, 2016). Even if catholic religion and its figures such as San Miguel were brought to South America by colonialism and, together
with it, local and indigenous traditions were eliminated in a violent way for being considered pagan, it is interesting to see how his figure nowadays evokes only a positive memory, one side of the past. The monument of the Prince is perceived as an optimistic reaffirmation of identity, embedded in faith and catholic values.

***

As has been possible to see during the description and analysis of the origin and construction of the Ice Cream Monument, its main role in the space so far has been to trigger a discussion and offer an alternative and controversial model for the identity of Salcedo’s inhabitants. In one side, the identity of the city is perceived as one that should be linked to the past, a past incarnated in different elements: indigenous traditions, prominent events such as battles or heroic events. Under this perspective, the Ice Cream, representing a commercial product, becomes an offense, assuming both aspects as incompatibles. Contrasting with the archangel, the ice cream represents a current situation that is not in the realm of the past, religion or a heroic event. In the other side, for those who promoted the monument, the ice cream is a reflection of a present identity, even though it represents an economic activity which, objectively, is not the most relevant of the canton. In that sense, the Ice Cream becomes a possibility of an imagined and future identity, an element that reinforces an image functional to commercial branding: To be recognized as the city of Ice Cream has an economic benefit, it attracts tourists. As a result, the symbolic power of the Ice Cream is double: First, it questions the sense of recognition/identity of the inhabitants in the space and it also functions as a commercial branding, therefore is perceived as a main element for economic development.

To finalize, either sustaining the arguments of an identity based on the past or one based on the present-future, it is interesting to see that it is assumed per se that the role of the monument is to be a mirror of the identity of the space, putting aside the possibility of a multi-faceted identity. Nevertheless, this multi-faceted and multi-temporal identity at the end comes up when analyzing the proliferation of monuments at the site of the entrance to the city: the Ice Cream, the Prince and the General, each one with a different rationale, live together in the same space, welcoming the visitors and passers-by.

3. TO BE, TO PRODUCE: THE MONUMENT TO THE TUNA (AND ITS CAN)

In this section I will continue my analysis exploring the role of the Monument to the Tuna, its origins and reason d’être. As a result, I will show how the origin and process of construction of this monument has similarities and differences with the construction of the Ice Cream, but at the end, is basically accomplishing a similar purpose as in the previous case, it is perceived as an anchor to establish an identity which, contrary to this perception, is multifaceted and in continuous tension between a precolonial / colonial past, a commercial present and a tourism-oriented future.
On Friday 4th of May, 2007 the Yacht Club of Manta was filled with authorities and Mantense personalities, all of them were congregated to inaugurate the Monument to the Tuna Fish. There was Ms. Marcia Chávez who was the representative of Manta’s Mayor, Mr. Bernardo Buehs Bowen, which apart of being the mentor of the monument is a successful businessman owner of the enterprise Fresh Fish (among others companies); there was also Mr. Freddy Platón by then President of the Ecuadorian-American Chamber of Commerce, who motivated the sector enterprises to finance the project; and Tamara Campo, Cuban artist who materialized the figure of the most important Manta fish in a big scale. The inauguration took place in the afternoon, during the sunset the string was cut and the Tuna, a 9.2-meter-long fiberglass structure, was officially introduced as the new Mantense monument.

The fish is placed on a pedestal, which stands twelve meters from the ground. Below the pedestal there is a tuna can with the words Manta Capital of The Tuna written on it. In the original model there were three boats located under the fish (See Figure 5), nevertheless, in the last years the boats were removed to be repaired and never came back to their original place. The monument is located in a roundabout; it is a strategic position because it is close to Manta’s harbor, in front of the seacoast and next to the Yacht Club.

About the origin of this monument, it was an initiative of the Ecuadorian-American Chamber of Commerce in Manta, that is the reason why in the plaque placed next to the monument is possible to see the list of the names of the twenty-six companies and people that financed the construction of the monument, almost all of them companies related with tuna commerce. According to Freddy Platón, who was the promoter of the construction of the Monument and at the time President of the Chamber of Commerce the installation of the Tuna did not generate any criticism.

Apart from tuna being one of the main national products, this acceptance can be explained by the historical role of the fish and of commerce in general in the region. The city of Manta has its origins in
the Manteña Culture, which flourished during the period 1000-1526/1535 A.C. (Hidrovo, 2005). It was the main center of the Manteña Confederation, which was composed by different lordships and hosted around 500,000 inhabitants. Known as the first society of sailors, the Manteña Confederation was a society based on the commerce of products, such as spondylus shells, fish (which was its main source of food), fabric, emeralds, ceramic and objects made by gold and silver, among others (Salazar, 2008). By then the name of the main lordship was Cancebí and its center (nowadays Manta) was called Jocay, which means *house or entrance of the fishes*, it was also called *golden door* because the interchange of products was made using as a currency little fishes made of gold (Palma, 2012). Jocay (with approximately 20,000 inhabitants) was the main center of the Manteña Confederation from which, the products and merchandises were deliver to diverse regions inside an outside of Ecuador to faraway places like Baja California and Chile. Fishery, commerce and the seaport were the three main elements of this Confederation (Hidrovo, 2005). Due to epidemics, battles with the Inca Empire and afterwards mainly by the Spanish conquest, the confederation and the system of commerce were dismantled and Jocay and other villages part of the Manteña Confederation disappeared (Salazar, 2008; Palma, 2012). In the following years in order to be articulated to the colonial market, the Spanish utilized the old sea routes to commerce tropical products between Quito and Lima (Hidrovo, 2005). The centers of the colonial power in the coastal region were established in Guayaquil and Portoviejo.

Nowadays Manta has the biggest fishing fleet in Ecuador having as first product the tuna. The big industries located in Manta export fish and derived products around the world representing the 7% of the national GDP, becoming the third main national product after oil and bananas (GAD, 2015). Given this succession of historical events, and the importance of fishery in Manta and the commerce in general, it is not a surprise to see that the promoters of the Tuna Monument were a group of
entrepreneurs. The construction was coordinated with the Municipality, which was in charge of the public tender. The Cuban artist Tamara campo won the tender and her project was constructed.

What is interesting to see in relation with the installation of this monument is that, apart from expressing gratitude towards the industrial sector that has contributed to the city’s growth as is mentioned by Miguel Camino, former planning director at Manta Municipality and current rector of Eloy Alfaro University (Interview, January 2016), the tuna is also characterized as a basic element of the identity of the city (Interview with Cedenio H. Dean of the Architecture Faculty. Eloy Alfaro University, January 2016). According to Elizabeth Medranda, by the moment of the inauguration executive director of the Chamber of Commerce, “the purpose [of the tuna] is to give an identity to Manta, which is characterized by fishery” (El Diario, May 4, 2007). As they say, the monument represents “the capture of the fish which feeds us, the tuna industry [is represented] by the can, and in the ground [represented with the small boats] are the artisan fisherman who contribute to the development of Manta city” (Interview EC-018, 2016).

This last testimony, which links the “fishery identity” with the historical development of the city, reveals how the Monument of the Tuna fish represents also an economic dimension, as an important element for the development of the city (Interview, EC-017-2016). Apart of mirroring this “present” identity of Manta, the image of the Tuna is meant to function as a magnet and a lure for tourists. For the municipality a monument like the Tuna is important to reinforce the image of Manta at an international level. As the vice mayor of the city, Eduardo Velásquez, argues: “It is important to highlight elements that for the tourists are striking, such as for example the figure of the fisherman or the tuna (…) to create an impact not only at local level but also internationally (…)” (Interview EC-016, 2016). The argument sustaining this affirmation is that, due to the increasing competence in the fish industry, the future of the city needs to be placed in the development of tourism and culture and one key step for doing so is making explicit and promoting this identity of the city to tourists. This branding includes for example the construction of monuments, the maintenance of patrimonial houses, among others (Interview EC-016, 2016). That is the reason why the municipality has the plan of constructing monuments in the city roundabouts, monuments representing the industrial and commercial fishery together with monuments representing ancestral characters such as the Manteña Chair –already placed- and the Goddess Umiña (Interview EC-016, 2016).
This effort towards the reinforcement of a local branding follows the same principles as nation branding, a communication process that allows governments to control the image they project in order to attract investment, tourism and trade, competing with national and international contenders in an environment where “a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention” (Herbert Simon, qtd. in Aronczyk, 2008, p. 42). Following this logic, it could be said that Through the Tuna, Manta represents an identity knowing that is a representation is constructed from a lack (Manta nowadays is not in the global market place yet), Manta wants to project this image to not fall into oblivion in the global marketplace, as a strategy to survive and receive recognition.

About critics or oppositions in relation with the monument, Miguel Camino, Architect, former planning director at Manta Municipality and current rector of Eloy Alfaro University expresses that the idea of the tuna is good, but it reflects mainly an industrial dimension, fact that for some people can generate conflict depending their preferences and perspectives (Interview, EC-020-2016); for some people for example the main concern is the installation of the tuna can because for them the tuna sector involves also artisan fishery, not only big companies. For Analía Navarrete, director of the Municipality’s Culture Department, to think that the Tuna monument represents only the industrial sector is a misunderstanding: “Some people say that the tuna is a botched work, they do not appreciate the history of the tuna, they do not know the real meaning. [The monument] even has the can, and the
can is the representation of what happens with the tuna when it is exported. (…) We need to appreciate what we have” (Interview EC-016, 2016). It is interesting to see in this testimony how the monument is perceived as a structure that has one “real” meaning instead of diverse interpretations. Despite of these critics it could be said that the Tuna Monument is very well accepted, since it has been historically the main product of the city, it is perceived as an accurate representation of the city’s identity.

In conclusion, when analyzing the reasons that led to the installation of the monument, two are the functions that the promoters expect from it: to give a present identity to Manta’s inhabitants reinforcing the role of the Tuna in the economic development of the city (past and present) and to promote this identity to tourists, which is perceived as helpful to stimulate future economic development based on tourism and commerce. In the next section, I will describe the monument of the Manteña Chair which is also placed in Manta city.

THE MANTEÑA CHAIR: THE POWER OF THE ANCESTORS

As was described in previous pages, the Manteña Confederation (1000-1526/1535 A.C) was the origin of Manta city. It is described as a very well organized society, which was recognized by its commercial relations and its advanced navigation system. One of the artifacts that represent the most the Manteña Confederation is the Manteña Chair, which had religious and political purposes (Museo Arquelógico, 2016).

Approximately 60 cm high, this chair had a U form and was made from a gray stone called andesita. Holding the chair there was a human or animal figure (mainly a puma). The Manteña chairs had a political and religious purpose and were indistinctly used by priests and Caciques (Hidrovo, 2005). The Manteño Cacique or boss, as in other pre-Columbian Latin American societies, was the mediator between men and gods (In the case of the Manteños, their main deity was Umiña, a goddess represented by an emerald and had curative powers).

Figure 8. Manteña Chair. Photo retrieved from http://www.andes.info.ec/fr/node/2372
The Cacique had also political power, he was the head of the Council of notables, which was formed by the heads of each town part of the Confederation (Palma, 2012). In that sense, to be sitting on the Manteña Chair meant to have control and authority over the space.

There are at least two important monuments representing the Manteña chair in Manta, one of them is located in the main park of the city and could be characterized as a traditional representation of the chair (see Figure 9), meaning that it is a replication of the original design made in stone. The other monument is a contemporary representation of the chair (See Figures 10), with a cost of 56,000 dollars this monument was inaugurated by the municipality –Mayor Jorge Zambrano- in February 13th, 2015. Apart from these monuments, around the city it is possible to see different representations and uses of the symbol of the chair.

For example, the chair appears painted in the walls in different parts of the city (Figures 11 and 12), always accompanied by the figure of the Cacique (the main chief of Manta’s previous settlement).

The Chair appears also in a double representation, painted and sculpted (Figure 12) forming a kind of main altar in Manta’s shore promenade.
The Manteña chair appears also as a decorative object, adorning shops, restaurants, hotels, among others.

Figure 13. Manteña Chair in Hotel. Photo taken by the author. January, 2016.

Taking these multiple forms, the symbol of the Manteña Chair can be seen around the city and it is interesting to see the multiple afterlives of this symbol in the space. Taking the words of Deborah Cherry in The Afterlife of Monuments, “the term afterlives suggest the restless multiplicity of co-existing versions, representations, imag(in)ings, and interactions taking place in widely distributed circuits of use, replication and interpretation” (Cherry, 2013, p. 3). According to Cherry (2013) “In the afterlife monuments emerge as extraordinarily mobile, marked by material change, put to new uses and interpretations, and travelling through collection of texts, images and objects” (Cherry, 2013, p.4), this reinvention is crucial to guarantee memory and in each afterlife the monument and the space where it is located, is transformed and re-interpreted and “Where visible and material traces of revision and/or erasure remain, afterlives multiply, with claims and counter-claims over the site’s identity, history, and belonging” (Cherry, 2013, p. 7). How the object Manteña Chair has been remodeled, reused and re-sited as a monument is fundamental when trying to understand the relation between monuments and the space. In this case, in a magic act of space and time re-location the Manteña Chair which originally embodied a masculine and ancestral power, re appears. The caciques are not there anymore in flesh and blood, but they are in the wall paintings and the Chair is placed in the public space, surrounded by pedestrians, cars, highways, and stores to project this legacy to the future with different meanings and different intentions.

To understand the position of this element in the city it is necessary to come back again to the economic context of Manta. The strategically position of the city, the increment of the industrial sector and the seacoast attracted, since the Spanish conquest, migrants from different parts of Ecuador and
from abroad. Since the beginning of 21st century the real state and tourist sector rapidly expanded and that expansion carried with it the necessity of regulating and developing a more organized and better urban planning (Interview, EC-017-2016; EC-017-2016). In that sense, Manta has been the territory of pre-Hispanic cultures, then the colonists and afterwards migrants from abroad, mainly Europe. That is the reason why nowadays the city in terms of urban development represents a mixture of cultures and is perceived as a space still in a construction and growing process.

In 2014, after a survey process that rated the Silla Manteña as an accurate image to represent the significance of the history of Manta, the Manteña Chair became a symbol utilized by the Municipality to represent the city. Nevertheless, when analyzing the role of this monument in the space, different opinions and perceptions about its significance appear. During the inauguration of a modern version of the chair (See Figures 10), Analía Navarrete, Director of Culture in the Municipality, expressed that the Manteña Chair “is the maximum representation of the city and has a very important cultural significance” (El Diario, February 18th, 2015), the monument is also perceived as an element to honor the “cultural roots” and to show part of the Mantense identity (Menéndez, 2014). These testimonies imply that the Manteña Chair represents a basic element of the Mantense identity which would be mainly located in the past -the roots, nevertheless the testimonies also leave a door open (with the use of the words part of) to consider identity as something that includes other elements, or in Stuart Hall’s words, other routes, meaning the different elements or ¨the different points by which they have come to be now¨ (Hall, 1999, pag.2).

In this sense, it looks like the monuments of the Manteña Chair (and maybe the Tuna?) are seen as an antidote to forgetting and as an antidote against the possible homogenization of culture that the authorities foreseen as inevitable coming with globalization. What is intended with the chair is to remembering and keeping alive in a new form, this afterlife of the chair appears reflected in the new version of the chair, in which new colors and a new material is used (metal instead of stone) for its construction (See Figure 14).

Figure 14. Inauguration of the Monument to the Manteña Chair, February 2015. Photo downloaded from Facebook Page from the Municipality of Manta -Turismo GAD Manta-. 
However, alongside with these perceptions about the significance of the chair mainly attached to the past and with it a reaffirmation of an identity more essentialist or past rooted, other discourses, triggered by the same image, move the discussion to a more multi-faceted notion of identity. According to Miguel Camino, former director of urban planning in the municipality and rector of Manta University, it is necessary to install in public spaces symbolic representations of the ancestral culture (as is the symbol of the chair) but combined with a modern and contemporary scenario. Camino interprets identity as a pending matter because, according to him, it is necessary to consolidate a *global* identity, integrating ancestral elements and characteristics of all the other cultures that nowadays are part of Manta. Manta is perceived as a city that is in a process of growing and together with it, it is necessary to incorporate its ancestral roots and to assume the population diversity, instead of having isolated representations. For him, what should be desirable is an image capable of condensing all these temporalities that conform the current Mantense identity.

Together with Camino’s ideas is possible to find other use and meaning of the chair, which is related again, as in the case of the Ice Cream, to city branding. The symbol of the Manteña Chair is perceived as an icon of the city that permits to create a distinction between Manta and other cities, which contributes to tourism increment. According to the authorities, tourism together with the industry sector, is the future of the city and it is towards it that the efforts should be directed. In this sense, the chair represents the “local” and “authentic” appreciated by tourists (Vice mayor Eduardo Velásquez, interview, 2016) The Manteña Chair refers to the indigenous tradition which would be attractive for tourists and therefore an important element for city branding, therefore, for this function it is worth to be represented. The Chair representing the power of the cacique becomes an object for marketing the city, at the same level of, for example, the giant words placed in the same city to attract tourists. Through the big letters, strategy that can also be seen in cities like Amsterdam or Toronto (See Figures 15 and 16), even if the Manta sign has some details in the design that makes it more local (it incorporates for example the Manteña chair) it is a mark that reveals that Manta is part of the tourism “global trend”. The Chair becomes (or aspires to) become a tourist attraction, an element to create a visual imaginary of the city that gains authority through tourist consumption.
What is behind the Chair? In conclusion, as Dasgupta reflects when analyzing the slum in New Delhi as an example of monument, it could be said that the use of the chair is an example of how "The contentious politics around the restoration of monuments is but one indication that the temporalities monuments embody and the meanings they accrue and lose are far from fixed. The restoration of monuments of the past threatens the very claims to the pastness they embody" (Dasgupta, 2013, pag.149). In the case of the Chair, indigenous culture is referenced to brand the city, to fit into the new trend of city branding more than implying a deeper commitment to promote indigenous culture. When translated in different scales and versions the chair becomes a simplified symbol of the past nurturing the idea that the inhabitants have something in common. For the people related with the monument (authorities and intellectuals), in the other side, the Manteña Chair allows the re invention reaffirmation of an identity which is in risk of disappearance in a global context, it is used as a strategy to survive and thrive in the globalized present. At the same time, and in relation to this effort of surviving in the global context, the symbol of the Manteña Chair plays an important role as an element of city branding. In this context, the power of the cacique and his chair has mutated, now is not the power of taking political decisions or presiding religious ceremonies, now the power of the object is to confer identity to a present space and its inhabitants, or at least, an illusion of identity, with is shaped taking elements from the past and desires about the future rather than the present.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this paper was to analyze the production of a specific type of Ecuadorian monuments, monuments that show a particular aesthetic representing objects and local characters that have a significance in the city where they are placed in. Unfolding the discussions and arguments sustaining the installation of these constructions, what came out from it is the important role they play
involving memory, identity and space considering their position in the local and every day space. About this, two main reflections emerge:

First, in the cases analyzed a monument is perceived as a structure that has to have one “real” meaning and to reflect “one identity” instead of diverse interpretations. The monuments uncover different feelings of the authorities in relation with the sense of belonging and its origins, and at the end, what they reflect is a persistence of a conception of identity that is a reflection of the enlightenment subject mentioned at the beginning of this paper: identity is conceived as a fixed essence of a unified individual with a center (Hall, 1996). In that sense, the critics and source of conflicts about the monuments are based on different and monistic ideas of identity that each of the actors claim as “the one”. Nevertheless, what is possible to see in the case of the monuments analyzed in this paper, is that they function as objects that create and reinforce a multi-faceted identity that interacts with different temporalities. The pluralization of identities is visible mainly when are analyzed not only as particular objects but also in relation with the site in which they are located. As has been explored by other scholars, the site is contextual factor impacting on the meaning of any commemorative marker (Marschall, 2009). In this case is possible to see that the Ice cream is located in the main entrance of the city, the Tuna is in front of the Yacht Club and the port, and one of the most important representation of the Manteña Chair is in the central park of Manta. Since they occupy a central location in the city with great concurrence of people, all of them are considered privileged places, fact highlighting the monuments importance. The Ice Cream coexists with the General and the Prince and the Tuna and its can is located less than one kilometer away from the Manteña Chair. This coexistence is a mirror of the presence of “not a single, but of several, sometimes contradictory or unresolved identities” (Hall, 1996), characteristics given by Hall to the post-modern subject. Nevertheless, together with it, as is described below, ultimately the monuments stand in service of the present and the future, even when (as with the chair) they seem to refer to the past.

Second, and most importantly, what has become clear through the three cases is that the structures analyzed do not so much shape the identity of the inhabitants but to present a city identity to people from outside, in that sense, identity becomes something moveable which is continuously transformed according with the surrounding systems –in this case, the globalized context-, another characteristic given by Hall to the post-modern subject (Hall, 1987 in Hall, 1996). Either evoking the past or representing a desire of what the people living in the space expect to be in the future, they interplay between the past, present and future. They stimulate memory and aspirations but also the anxiety of permanence and recognition in the gaze of others (which are people from abroad, the tourists). These monuments are part of economic/cultural strategies; rather than being primarily expressions of identity they represent mainly what the authorities think will work as a marketing
instrument to attract tourists and trade. What is possible to see is that the line between the monuments as representation/reinforcement of a local identity and the monuments as branding strategy is extremely blurred. In the case of the ice cream, even if it is not perceived as an element that reflects the desires, history and main characteristic of the territory, the image is used as a symbol to consolidate the economy of the city, in that sense, it plays a role of advertisement and an element for city branding that gives an opportunity to the inhabitants to be recognized out of the borders of the canton. Placed in the same city, the Tuna and the Manteña Chair are monuments that seem to represent different temporalities (past and present) but at the end, both represent a present feeling about needing to assert an identity for the city in order to thrive in the globalized present. The Manteña Chair and its multiple representations and relocations suggest that the past is highly valued mainly because is seen as most likely to please tourists. Even if the figures of the Cacique or the power of the ancient Manteña Confederation are not there anymore, they are re called to the present to construct the ideal present and future of the city. With the continuous replications of the Manteña Chair and the figure of the Cacique, history and heritage simplified in the chair are used to create new meanings and a narrative in the present to forge an identity functional for city branding, a local identity attractive for tourists and investors.

To finalize, the blurred line between the monuments as representation/reinforcement of a local identity and the monuments as branding strategy raise some questions. Local or city branding is originated by a necessity and desire of legitimacy in an economic globalized context represented by the tourism sector and since monuments are mainly managed by local authorities, they have the power to create the frame of identity according to (or what is perceived as) the economic necessity of the region. Under this situation, by using monuments partially as branding marks and partially as representations of symbols perceived as necessary to reinforce identity, these monuments become a link between structural changes (mainly global economy) and local changes and different temporalities. It is important to be aware of the blurred limit between the functionality of monuments as reminders of the past and its imagined values and their potential commodification and exploitation. The installation of an object in the public space needs to be carefully thought mainly when are placed in cities or villages in a process of growing in a context of structural changes. Through monuments the urban environment can be reshaped, and with it, the self-image of the inhabitants, their sense of belonging and future perspectives about how they want to be seen. The monuments analyzed on this paper are primarily built for the present and future generations so, in the future, would be important to include the citizens in their construction, in order to reflect in the urban landscape a meaningful and coherent image and self-image of the space and its inhabitants.
REFERENCES


Asociación de Productores y Comercializadores de Helados de Salcedo, 2016. Historia del Helado de Salcedo [History of Salcedo’s Ice Cream], document courtesy of the Association.


TOWARDS A CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ‘MOBILE URBANISM’ THROUGH THE MUKHERO PRACTICE

Paola Piscitelli

University Iuav of Venice
p.piscitelli@stud.iuav.it

ABSTRACT:

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between mobility and urban space in Sub-Saharan Africa through the lens of the mukhero practice, name given to the informal trades which span Mozambican borders. Born as a traditional survival practice, the mukhero is today well-blended with global logics and has a relevant, as underestimated role in shaping spaces and urbanity. Mukheristas (i.e. the people doing the mukhero) deploy movement as a livelihood strategy to carve out space in the everyday life of the city, in so connecting heterogeneous spaces and networks across transnational distances and translocal geographies.

The paper reports the findings of a multi-situated ethnographic exploration on the tracks of mukheristas between Johannesburg and Maputo, with the aim of unveiling the socio-spatial agency implicit in the practice and its epistemological relevance for conceptualizing the notion of ‘mobile urbanism’. Meant as the urbanity constituted by movement and mobile practices, ‘mobile urbanism’ is proposed here as a heuristic device to unfold important processes pertaining contemporary urban life, as well as possible policy research avenues to govern them.

KEY WORDS

Mobility; Cross-border Traders; African Urbanity; Informality; Agency
**Building the city from below: informal economy**

**Chair: Petra Adolfsson & María José Zapata**

*Towards a conceptualization of ‘mobile urbanism’ through the mukhero practice.* Paola Piscitelli. University Iuav of Venice, Italy.

*Exploring social, spatial and political drivers of the informal economy in a divided city: Karachi, Pakistan.* Najia Zaidi. Cardiff University, UK.

*Housing as a capital for securing livelihood of the urban poor; Reflections from Mumbai and Dhaka.* Md. Ashiq Ur Rahman. Urban and Rural Planning Discipline, Khulna University, Bangladesh

*Creating new urbanism in Africa – urban-to-rural migration in Angola and Mozambique,* Cristina Udelsmann Rodrigues. Nordic Africa Institute
THE ROLE OF MOBILITY IN THE GLOBAL ‘URBAN QUESTION’

Within the still ‘burning’ as ever ‘urban question’ (Lefebvre, 1970; Castells, 1972), the relationship between mobility and urbanity is an issue that has just started to be worked out.

Globalisation has been unfolding rapid urban transformations and new forms of urbanity, which challenge any inherited conception of the urban as a fixed and bounded settlement type (Brenner and Schmid, 2015). Conversely, the debate arisen in the last years about the need of examining the intersection between migration/movement and life in cities argues for a relational-territorial conceptualization of cities in the ‘constantly changing geographies of globalization’ (Collins, 2011). Such a relational-territorial approach reverses the study of the territories as enclosed within cartographically drawn boundaries with an attention to the making and re-making of places and territories by flows - including people on-the-move - through the borders themselves (Collins, 2011; Hannam et al., 2006). Thus, the production of space is seen as related to the production of mobilities, in a way that seizes the opportunity of using mobility as an ‘analyser’ (Bourdin, 2005) for contemporary society.

This perspective shares the same focus of the ‘new mobilities paradigm’, i.e. the analysis of mobility, but deviates from it. If in the ‘new mobility paradigm’ mobility is the object of investigation, here mobility constitutes the angle from which to interpret the socio-spatial realm of the urban life (Bourdin, 2005; Pucci, 2016). Mobility, as a key aspect of the contemporary urban condition, becomes the lens for reading the latter. In so doing, the mobility and the spatial turn are welded together, producing a different understanding both of mobility and of the city. Mobility applied to the urban space proves not to be occurring in a isotropic global space, nor along frictionless routes, but to rather have spatial moorings and be subjected to power relationships. On the other hand, the city studied through the mobility lens discloses its distanced and spatially extended nature, which establishes a different understanding of urbanity (Amin and Thrift, 2005).

Consequently, the claim of ensuing a generalized and total view of urbanity has to be abandoned in favour of a phenomenological interpretation of cities as crossroads of heterogeneous populations, performing diverse practices in the urban space (Pasqui, 2008). Heterogeneous, though repetitive actions, done by people in the space and as part of the space, generate the space itself as a becoming. Among these practices, stands out the motley group of the ‘mobile practices’, i.e. the everyday ‘embodied and habitualized’ experience of people-on-the-move (Miller and Ponto, 2016). The ‘everyday’ (Lefebvre, 1971, 1991) thus becomes a kind of ‘augmented reality’, as it is affected by translocal relationships and extended, criss-crossing networks. By following different, but repetitive trajectories, rhythms and routines, the practice of mobility shape ‘circular’ or ‘translocal’ territories (Tarrius, 1992; Brickell and Datta, 2011).

\[1\] The ‘new mobilities paradigm’ was proclaimed by John Urry and Mimi Sheller in a namesake paper published in 2006, in which they affirmed the occurrence of a ‘mobility turn’, “spreading into and transforming the social sciences” (2006). The two authors claimed that mobility, become the main organizer of the social world, should replace society as the object of study for sociologists and that the ‘social as society’ should be restructured into the ‘social as mobility’ (2002).
The attention to the urban dwellers’ practice, be they more or less mobile, relies within a functionalist approach to the territorial studies, which defines territory according to the way in which human populations use it (Crosta, 2010) and the city as the way people live and act their urban, everyday life (Donald, 1995). It doesn’t mean to endorse the juxtaposition between the ‘built city’ and the ‘lived city’, but rather to show, through people’s ability of ‘maneuvering’ space, how the two ones constitute a continuum that must be accounted for as a whole in any theoretical discussion upon urban life.

The observation of everyday practices, including the mobile ones, represents an insightful entry point to interpret the interplay between individual action and social structures, by highlighting the tactics deployed by people to carve out their space in the city against binding rules (Pasqui, 2008).

Thus, the perspective offered by practices permits to integrate the analysis of socio-political ‘structures’ with the concept of human agency, meaning by the latter the everyday engagement of individuals in their environment, in a way that ‘both reproduces and transforms [the] structures in interactive response to the problems posed by challenging situations’ (Morawska, 2007).

Furthermore, the perspective offered by the ‘mobile practices’, in particular, allows to read the city through the everyday life experiences of mobile subjects, in terms of their concrete social and place-making practices as well as of their appropriation of space in different and distant cities.

Selecting precisely this perspective, the following paper reports what emerged2 from a close-up observation of a peculiar mobile practice in Sub-Saharan Africa, namely the mukhero, a kind of informal cross-border trade common in Mozambique. The mukhero falls under the numerous ‘mobile practices’ that have developed over time on the continent. Movement, in fact, is so much engrained in the African history, daily life and experiences of people (de Bruijn, van Dijk and Foeken, 2001; Simone 2011), that the expression ‘Africa-on-the-move’ sounds almost as a cliché. Nevertheless, the crucial role played by mobility in reshaping livelihoods and territories in the continent results barely acknowledged - if not intentionally ignored - both by diffused representations of African urban life and by policy agendas.

The present paper, instead, tries to make a contribution to the ‘unpacking’ of the relationship between mobility and urbanity in Africa, by delving into the trans-local, mobile practices of people doing the mukhero between Johannesburg and Maputo. It selects a ‘view from below’ in order to propose a representation of the Africa urban life as close as possible to its real essence and dwellers’ direct experience, rather to the predominantly normative visions proposed by Western-style policies and regional planning. In this way, the works tries also to push forward the research hitherto produced by the mobility turn, anchored in a Western, ‘male, middleclass perception of the world’ (Simonsen, 2004), by extending the focus to a chiefly female, low-class practice of mobility common in territories ‘off-the-map’ (Robinson 2006).

**A RESEARCH ON-THE-MOVE**

Investigating practices of mobile subjects requires unavoidably to follow ‘the object of the study across sites and scales in order to map the relationships between different actors, locations and levels’

---

2 The exploration is part of my (still ongoing) doctoral research.
Towards a Conceptualization of ‘Mobile Urbanism’ through the Mukhero Practice

P. Piscitelli

N-AERUS XVII
Göteborg, 16th – 19th November 2016

(Marcus, 1995). Consistently with the new mobilities paradigm’s call for new research methods ‘on the move’ and able to simulate intermittent mobilities (Sheller and Urry, 2006), I carried out ethnographic explorations on the mukheristas’ tracks, in the attempt of retracing their practices between South Africa and Mozambique. Ethnography enabled me to better understand the situational conditions experienced by the subjects on the move I observed, which otherwise would have been hard, given the limited datasets available. The empirical approach that I selected allowed me to capture the contextualized reality and multiple rationalities underlying mobile, informal practices.

In order to engage with women informal traders, not easily approachable given the nature of their job, I had to experiment new forms of engagement and deploy inventiveness. I had to use an incremental and dynamic method and to be prompt to adapt it to the circumstances. Thus, I attended the diverse spaces related to mukheristas’ professional and private life, sometimes I even assisted them in their work and travelled with them, both in their urban and cross-border journeys. Thereby, I conducted multi-situated ethnographic explorations in Johannesburg, Maputo and along the corridor between the two cities. These multi-situated ethnographic explorations came only after a preliminary phase of semi-structured interviews, participant observations and narrative inquiry, which I accomplished initially in Johannesburg and afterwards in Maputo, in order to approach the field. I interviewed not only cross-border traders, but also drivers, station staff, owners of informal bus and mini-busses companies, hoteliers, receptionists, business intermediaries, customs officials, street vendors and dealers, met at train and bus stations in Johannesburg, in the shops and the stores where mukheristas buy and deposit the goods, as well as in some of the hotels and taverns where they rest and refresh in breaks from the business.

This gradual approaching to the multiplicity of subjects and places connected to mukhero was as puzzling, as unavoidable to understand the complexity of the practice and to try to unravel the power relations underlying it. Informal cross-border traders, in fact, are only a part - albeit vital - of a composite architecture that conveys goods and stirs flows of money between different social and spatial networks across trans-local geographies. Each component of this architecture implements a different function. The selection of the observation fields has therefore to be diversified in order to recompose the multiplicity of actions included in the ‘macro-structure’. For this reason, in Maputo I decided to focus on the informal markets of the city and the headquarters of the Association of Mukheristas³, where I could collect work histories/life stories of mukheristas and observe their everyday practices in Maputo. Finally, the border town of Koomatiport and the Ressano Garcia border post were important explorative stops along my travels⁴.

Through these multi-sited explorations, I found two persons who let me follow them along theirs cross-border journeys: E., a guy and former mukhero, whom I travelled with by bus between Maputo

³ The Association of Mukheristas (or Associação das mukheristas) was founded 15 years ago and for the advocacy of cross-border traders’ rights. The headquarters of the association has a protected location in the heart of the popular Xipamanene bazaar, just out of the planned city centre of Maputo. The association meets once a week to discuss the problems of its members. I attended all the meetings which took place during my stay in Maputo and this was an opportunity to engage with the most active members of the associations.

⁴ The border would have deserved a much longer and more stationary phase of investigation, that unfortunately was not possible due to budget and time constraints.
and Johannesburg and I met subsequently in Johannesburg and in Maputo, and A., a woman mukherista, with whom I did several travels between Maputo, Koomatiport and Johannesburg and I could observe the most private and everyday spaces of her life.

The countless hours spent either on the tracks of mukheristas or talking, working and traveling with them allowed me to reconstruct the practice both with regard to its daily dynamics and to its history.

THE MUKHERO, NOT JUST AN INFORMAL PRACTICE

«My name is S. C. and I am a mukherista, I do the mukhero. Many women in Africa, in Mozambique are doing this business. (...) We cross the border to go to another country to buy some stuff and sell here and sometimes we buy here and sell outside the country. It depends on the kind of business the person is doing. It is not only our job, it is our way of living!»

(S. C., a Mozambican mukherista- Maputo, July 2014)

As it emerges from these words, the mukhero gives not only a job, but also a sense of identity to thousands of people in Mozambique.

The term is a Portuguese-Anglo-Bantu neologism composed by the particle "mu", which marks the singular or individual in the local language, the English verb "carry" and the Portuguese termination "o". It comes from the corrupted English phrase «May-you-carry this bag to the other side?», referring to the procedures at border facilities, that in Shangana and Ronga Mozambican national languages sounds precisely like ‘mukhero’ (Chivangue, 2007; Raimundo, 2005).

The mukhero is only one of the many informal business practices that often span borders in Mozambique (Baptista-Lundin and Taylor, 2003) and that “flourished after the abandonment of the socialist project and the gradual disappearance of the old safety net provided by the state in Mozambique” (Söderbaum and Taylor, 2008).

Through it, a variety of goods are brought in not only from South Africa but also from other regions of Mozambique and the neighbouring countries, in order to supply the local market. Initially, the mukhero involved were mainly agricultural products, acquired abroad in order to supply the Mozambican market in need. Afterwards, it gradually incorporated other products, so that nowadays a variety of goods, from vegetables and fruits to clothes and household small furniture and electrical appliances, is traded through the mukhero.

If all the countries bordering Mozambique are involved in the lively cross-border interactions made up by the mukhero, the relationship with South Africa is particularly intense, due to its long-term course. Since before the formation of national states, the region between southern Mozambique and eastern South Africa has always been crossed by flows of people and exchanges, which, during the apartheid, assumed the configuration of white South African capital exploitation of Mozambican black labour (Söderbaum and Taylor, 2009). The bonds between the two countries have changed over time, yet, the asymmetrical relationship between them endures. Today, trade, impelled by the dramatic situation of poverty, food insecurity and inadequancy of socio-physical infrastructure in Mozambique, has become the primary motivator for entry in South Africa (Peberdy and Crush, 2015). Between 2004 and 2013, cross-border traffic from Mozambique to South African border towns and great cities has increased from around 400,000 to nearly 1.8 million documented entries per annum, also eased by the simpler procedures to access the country (ibid.). South Africa is the main source of supply for a country unable to produce on its own like Mozambique. Hence, the twentieth century social figure of this ‘historical
Towards a Conceptualization of ‘Mobile Urbanism’ through the Mukhero Practice

P. Piscitelli

transnational space’ (Vidal, 2010), personified by the Mozambican young male adventurer working in the South African mines, has been replaced by the informal cross-border trade, the mukherista, indeed.

However, many people ‘do not like the word mukherista. They feel offended by it because it is a calão standing for 'malaria', a person who illegally carries goods across the border. Personally, I prefer 'business woman' or 'mulher negociante' (from a conversation with A., November 2015). The disparaging use of the word, “frequent and intentional, when engaging with the state” (Peberdy, interview October 2015) overshadows the actually value of the practice.

Trades in the mukhero are surely performed outside ‘formality’, being carried out through full or partial evasion of trade-related regulations (Cruz and Silva, 2005) and encompassing sometimes even proper illegal practices, such as misclassification, under-invoicing and/or bribery of customs officials. However, its association to illegal economies is fallacious and misleading, since the smuggling concerns legitimately produced goods, ranging from staple food commodities to low quality consumer goods such as clothes and shoes to, finally, pieces of furniture and electronics. Neither do informal cross-border traders consider themselves as part of a virtual, illegal underclass, but rather as human agents legitimately resorting to their few resources to improve harsh starting conditions.

The practice of mukhero is a common job for many people in Mozambique and is comparable to other kinds of mobile and non-mobile, informal activities widespread on the continent. Therefore, it should be rather associated to a kind of import-export activity, that tries to meet a consistent demand by leveraging on economic differentials between Mozambique and the neighbouring countries. The informality of the practice must be interpreted as a dynamic interaction between modernity and tradition, that uses plugged-in practices as levers of attempted emancipation.

As such, it has been a legitimate response to the neoliberal discourse orientating political and economic policies in African (and not only). After the destruction of the national economy by the civil war in the 1980s and the failure of the FRELIMO’s socialist project, the informal economy, favoured by a laissez-faire attitude by the government, has represented the main source of livelihood for people in Mozambique. It has recast consuetudinary practices - usually arisen before being identified as ‘informal’ – and used them as meagre, but always vital resources against poverty and unemployment.

Also the mukhero arose far back in the past as a survival practice. Initially, it consisted in small-scale trades supported by analogous ethnic networks and has developed to the present day as an internationally spread institution, which links Mozambique not only to the neighbouring countries, but also to Brazil, Thailand, Hong Kong, Dubai and China. As E. explained to me: «The business in Brazil, China and India is about this artificial hair. They go to buy in those countries. They make big profits from this business. It’s usually the youngest ones who do this. They are between 20 and 35 years old, the young generation of mukheristas working on a global scale. They transport hair squeezed in backpacks. It’s cheap, easy and convenient. By doing this business for a few years, they manage to open saloons and buy houses in South Africa. » (extract from an interview done in June 2014, in Johannesburg).

Even when limited to the regional scale, the mukhero has developed the capacity of intercepting global flows and linking them to local networks.
On the base of what I could trace in-between Johannesburg and Maputo, *mukheristas* buy goods in wholesale stores in Johannesburg – in most of cases, in Dragon City, a huge area of Chinese shopping malls in the city centre, and in some other shopping centres in the ‘Town’ – to make resale at tripled or quadrupled prizes in Maputo. Here, they deliver the goods to merchants, mainly coming from Nigeria and Burundi, who work both in the wholesale and retail formal and informal markets (such as Estrela Vermelha market, Xipamanine market, Chikene market, Mandela market, Museu and Zimpeto market). The whole commercial system of the Maputo metropolitan area, including large supermarkets, is fuelled by *mukheristas* and this also happens in other provinces of the country.

Informal cross-border traders show, thence, a great adaptability to changes in time and society, which makes the practice a fundamental factor of economic dynamism. Despite the obsession of labelling it as informal or illegal, it has multiple thresholds of contact with both informal and formal economic activities and plays an important role in regional integration (Peberdy, 2002). In fact, if the income of individual, informal cross-border traders is often moderate, cumulatively, their activities contribute in a significant way to the origin and destination countries’ GDPs (Crush, Skinner and Chikanda, 2015).

Women dominate the sector. Aged from 25 to 50 years old - a time interval that implies the possibility of an intergenerational comparison, they represent the 70% of regional informal cross border traders between Mozambique and South Africa (Peberdy and Rogerson, 2000) and the 80-95% of applicants for visitor visas, actually used to trade and shop in SA (Peberdy and Crush, 1998). Female involvement in the practice started in colonial times, when women used to migrate with their husbands (Covane, 2002; Feliciano, 1998), and increased considerably during the civil war (1981-1994), when women, remained alone, used to go to the border zones in quest for food for their children and people (Covane, 2002; Feliciano, 1998). After the general peace agreements in 1992, women’s presence in the sector grew up to become predominant (Manganhela, 2006).

Women’s mobility has helped to scatter the rigid division of roles in the Mozambican society, marking the exit from their confinement within the household space, as well as the possibility of engaging with other socio-economic spheres. The *mukhero* represents an essential tool for women’s emancipation and empowerment, as well as a particular driving force of socio-cultural change, especially in the urban contexts. While the informal economy still presents a significant gender gap, with women earning on average less than men, the *mukhero* allows women to accumulate more capital than men and it is not rare that women employ other men, with implications on gender relationships (Barreau-Tran, 2011).

According to more than one of my interviewees, some *mukheristas* can earn up to $ 90,000 per month. Although such a conspicuously exaggerated figure is obviously hard to verify, given the unregistered character of the business, it outlines how the institution of *mukhero* encompasses a great variety of profiles, including both poor people and subjects out of the poverty threshold. Whereas for the formers cross-border trade is a hard and arduous way to earn a livelihood through risks and harassment, for the latters, having international connections, it represents a tool for getting profits and upward mobility (Desai, 2009). Several *mukheristas*, who started informal cross-border trades as a survival strategy ended up building viable, business enterprises, possessing trucks and managing large sums of money. They have become prominent in the local economy, with far-reaching impacts on the socio-spatial environment of their original community.
Towards a Conceptualization of ‘Mobile Urbanism’ through the Mukhero Practice
P. Piscitelli

This proves how mukheristas, far from being marginal subjects, are agents of the ‘globalization from below’. Although uncannily they do not appear in the analysis of global trades - which mainly focuses on transnational corporations, primarily male managers and investment bankers that move huge sums of money and goods across borders– they actually prove to be proactive social agents, able to constitute globalization, so much as they are impacted by it (Desai, 2009). Yet, mukheristas work as ‘logisticians’, savvy in identifying the loopholes of the economic system. By blending traditional survival practices with global logics, they can connect the international commercial offer to the national and local demand. This way, they convey a process of ‘glocalization’, that has a relevant, but still underexplored impact on the kind of urbanity that it has been forging in Mozambique and Southern Africa.

THE SOCIO-SPATIAL AGENCY OF MUKHERISTAS AND THE FORMATION OF ‘MOBILE URBANISM’

«You know, mukhero is like strategy (...). If you need ten boxes of inks, for example, you call a mukherista, who call the ink manufacturers for you. She says: <<My friend, I can’t pay you right now, but tomorrow morning ask your driver to send ten boxes of ink to Grand Hotel. You will find Carlota there. I spoke to her long time ago and she will be waiting for you. Carlota will give you the money.’ [...]. The day after, the mukherista meets her driver in the taxi rank in Maputo [...] and gives him the money for the journey. It’s 8 o’clock and on the other side Carlota is waiting for the delivery company from South Africa in the hotel. The company arrives, delivers the goods and takes the money. Carlota brings the goods to the store room. It’s 3 o’clock p.m. The driver from Maputo, [...] arrives, fetches the stuff and drives back to the mukherista. He knows everyone at the border so, even if that day they’re working hard there, he’s gonna cross with the whole stuff and without paying too much. You are still sleeping when the ink gets to Maputo. You didn’t move, but in return at least three other people did and, so, worked. »

(E., young mukherista – Maputo, October 2015)

Mukheristas act inside limited spaces of manoeuvre, at the interstices of the formal and the informal, using mobility as a way to navigate structural constraints and get better leaving conditions. In doing so, they perform a manifold ‘active agency’ (Kabeer, 2010), able to act on restrictive structures and initiate processes of change. Several scholars (Barreau-Tran 2011; Desai, 2009; Raimundo, 2009; et. al.) have shown how the agency of informal cross-border traders, especially women, consists in the capability to provide a resource in situation of marginality, produce financial independence, open up possibilities of womanhood’s re-invention and transmit hope of a better life to following generations.

Nevertheless, the present paper argues that the mukhero practice encompasses another form of agency, that is usually overlooked: the socio-spatial agency. Here, the two adjectives ‘social’ and ‘spatial’ are interchangeable, consistently with the Lefebvorean concept of space as social construct (1974) or ‘shared enterprise’ (Awan, Schneider and Till, 2011). In this sense, spatial production is a dynamic, evolving sequence, in which multiple actors partake and live out their lives (Awan, Schneider and Till 2011). Deploying movement as a multifaceted strategy of urban survival, cross-border traders readjust
to shifting contexts and shape spaces according to the evolution of their trajectories. In the hostile and xenophobic South African context, they deploy a range of ‘tactics of invisibility’ (Romania, 2004; Ostanel, 2011) in order not only to develop their informal business, but also to defend their rights as persons and citizens from risks or threats, avoiding control and surveillance. They commonly congregate in areas characterized by the presence of the ethnic group of origin or otherwise occupy silently liminal spaces in the city. In Maputo, in contrast, they have a much more tangible impact. Part of their earnings are used to open up new economic activities and to purchase plots of land on which to build new houses, thus contributing to Maputo urban expansion. In-between the two cities, they connect social networks are of several kinds: wholesalers, retailers, formal and informal transporters (including truck, bus and minibus drivers), hoteliers, warehousemen, porters and buyers from the most diverse socio-cultural backgrounds are linked together from one side to the other of the border through (in)visible interstitial spaces. The result is a complex architecture of social networks overlapping a structure of heterogeneous spaces created by mukheristas’ movements. Such spaces correspond to different ‘urban objects’ (going from the Chinese mall, to the warehouse in Johannesburg, to, finally, the Mozambican, formal and informal market areas), which are linked and activated by the movement of goods and people involved in the mukhero and, following various rhythms, become places of interaction, exchange and circulation.

Thence, despite its chiefly economic nature, the mukhero practice proves to be a territory-maker and it is so in reason of the mobility component on which it is based. Economically-oriented transactions connect worlds that otherwise would only coexist, without never interplay. Such a ‘transactional’ way of carving out space in the everyday life of the cities (Lefebvre, 1947, 1961 and 1981) set up a system of conjunctions and ‘assemblages’ (Simone, 2011, McFarlane, 2011; Farías and Bender, 2012), that is able to compose a range of heterogeneous needs and skills, as well as to circulate potentialities across geographical, physical and social boundaries. The mukheristas’ capability of exploiting the boundaries as opportunities and deploying spatially extended strategies realizes their wish for modernisation and a cosmopolitan, urban experience. Not only the urban experience of mukheristas is cosmopolitan, due to their crisscrossing movements between different urban spaces, but so is the city itself. It is a city whose external and internal borders are in constant flux, expanding and, on occasion, shrinking.

The result is a kind of urban life kept together by mobility and orchestrated modes of conviviality, founded on use, more than on ownership. The deriving urbanity is founded on new organizing principles, that are at once place-specific and trans-local. Such unforeseen model demands a reversed perspective on urbanism. We argue that this can be represented by the ‘mobile urbanism’ perspective, a view that starts from movement and mobile practices, identifies the resulting translocal urban spatialities and tries to govern them.

‘Mobile urbanism’ is proposed here as a programmatic, heuristic tool to keep investigating the constitution of the urban by mobile practices and consequently steer the policy design, drawing on a vision of planning as a sensible practice of knowing (Davoudi, 2015) and learning (McFarlane, 2011)

CONCLUSIONS... AND NEW OPENINGS

Reading the territory through the practice of the mukhero highlights relevant issues concerning the relationship between mobility, informality and urban spaces, which manifest a local peculiarity, but can also be extended beyond the local context.
Mobility acquires multiple manifestations that are not simply of ephemeral relevance to our understanding of cities, but rather constitutive of the process underpinning urban and regional formation.

Informal cross-border traders demonstrate how mobility is not only a way of life, but a form of capital, that builds connections and intersections between people and localities, so allowing the ‘circulation of possibilities’ (Simone, 2001). This inevitably brings about the need to rethink governance and development in order to promote such mobility capital.

Several avenues for policy design can be opened and followed on this purpose. The most elementary one concerns the fact that mukheristas, as well as informal economic actors in general, should be involved in the design and implementation of development policies, because of their deep understanding of how African markets actually work.

On the contrary, informal cross-border trade appear under-recognized by the formal policies and programmes implemented in the last fifteen years in the area, from which the Maputo Development Corridor (MDC) stands out.

The MDC was the mid-1990s government’s showpiece of regional development planning for the micro-region between western South Africa and southern Mozambique (Peberdy and Crush, 2001; Söderbaum and Taylor, 2008). As a Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) project, it fell within the job creation strategy of those years, consisting in identifying key geographical zones with proven economic potential for new investments and, thence, fast-tracking private sector capital formation and investment (Peberdy and Crush, 2001). The underpinned long-term vision aimed to value borderlands and transform borders from ‘barriers’ to ‘bridges’, by implementing several measures, such as the facilitation and speeding up of goods and people's circulation or the increase of bilateral cooperation agreements in tourism and industry between the border towns. However, the attempt of fostering regional development and economic cooperation in the borderland between South Africa and Mozambique simply ignored informal cross-border traders.

As reported in a 2001 paper by Peberdy and Crush, informal cross-border traders and their impact on regional trades were hardly mentioned in the official policy documents related to the SDI programme (Peberdy and Crush, 2001). My searches argue that, more than fifteen years later, the SDI still neglects informal cross-border traders. Huge financial resources have been devoted to large investment and infrastructure projects (such as the toll road between Maputo and Witbank) but only small amounts went to local development and community participation, none of which targets the informal economy itself. Informal cross-border traders seem to be invisible.

This issue leads to another, possible avenue for policy research, that is the necessity of incorporating the actual spatiality developed by informal cross-border traders in the project of regional integration. The documents produced by the SADC, instead, show a general ignorance of the spaces composing the functional regions produced by informal cross-border traders’ flows, thereby demonstrating a gap between the level of the policies written on papers and that of the practices developed in the reality. Such a detachment leaves room to the high degree of vulnerability to which informal cross-border traders are exposed. Informal cross-border traders, as real bodies acting in the space, experience a wide range of power relationship crossing gender, class and race dimensions. They, and especially women, face, insecurity, crime, xenophobia, abuses and harassment. All this happens during the travel but particularly at the border, where the sneaking corruption peaks. From what I could observe in Ressano Garcia, border officials tax the goods on a discretionary basis, bribe small informal cross-
border traders and have also the power to ruin the traders that laboriously succeed in overcoming the poverty threshold, if they want. This way, resources are controlled by small groups and élites for personal use, in a neo-patrimonialist way.

Only an explicit acknowledgment of such a negative dynamic by policies can reverse the tendency towards a collective redistribution of the resources produced by informal cross-border trades. However, this would be impossible without a perspective that identifies in (mobile) practices the new organizing principle of urbanism, meant both as a ‘way of life’ (Wirth, 1938) and as a way to understand the contemporary life.

REFERENCES

Barreau-Tran, Lea (2011), L’emergence économique des Mukheristas au Mozambique: quels impacts sur les relations de genre?, Master Thesis in Political Sciences at the University Sciences Po Bordeaux, Supervisor: Prof. Dominique Darbon.
Bourdin, Alain (2005), Les mobilités et le programme de la sociologie, Cahiers internationaux de Sociologie, 1(118): 5–21.
Castells, Manuel (1972), La question urbaine, François Maspero, Parigi.
Chabal, Patrick (2009), Africa. La politica del soffrire, :duepunti edizioni, Palermo.
Crosta, Pier Luigi (2010), Pratiche, il territorio è l’uso che se ne fa, FrancoAngeli, Milano.
Towards a Conceptualization of ‘Mobile Urbanism’ through the Makohero Practice
P. Piscitelli

Lefebvre, Henri (1977), Critica della vita quotidiana (Italian translation), Dedalo, Bari.
Mezzadra, Sandro and Neilson, Brett (2014), Confini e Frontiere. La moltiplicazione del lavoro nel mondo globale, il Mulino, Bologna.
Pasqui, Gabriele (2008), Città, popolazioni, politiche, Jaca Book, Milano.


Raimundo, Inês (2009), Gender, Choice and Migration Household Dynamics and Urbanisation in Mozambique, thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg Graduate School of Humanities Forced Migration Programme.

Towards a Conceptualization of ‘Mobile Urbanism’ through the Mukhero Practice

P. Piscitelli

EXPLORING SOCIAL, SPATIAL AND POLITICAL DRIVERS OF THE INFORMAL ECONOMY IN A DIVIDED CITY: KARACHI, PAKISTAN

1. Abstract

Informality has become integral to the dynamics of urbanization under neo-liberal policies in cities of the global South (Roy, 2009). Given the widespread acceptance of neo-liberal policies in the global South and the state’s incapacity and absence to ensure the just distribution of resources brings informality to centre stage of the broader politics of access to resources (employment, housing opportunities, etc.). Due to the industrial and political revolution of the eighteenth century mark the abstraction of space with the emphasis on the exchange value of spatial and monetary practice giving preference to the use value. This transition marked a fundamental re-orientation of the value of space. Cities used to be of intrinsic worth for their ‘use value’, representing the oeuvre or ‘work of art’ of city life – the benefits of urban living which accrued to all citizens. With the commodification of urban land, use value has been transformed into a monetised ‘exchange value’, which supplants social values in urban living, and dispossesses those who cannot afford the ‘exchange value’ of space (Harvey 2008; Smith 2008).

The economic sector biased policies towards the urban poor make informality as the prime mode to acquire resources and survive in the thriving market economy. Urban informalities do not only associate with the activities of the poor, or a particular status of labour, or marginality. Rather it is organised logic under the paradigm of neo-liberal policies in which formal authorities of the state withdraw/deregulate their powers (resources) in favour of powerful non-state actors to benefit personally or politically, creating a vacuum of formal powers. This broader politics around control over opportunities and resources brings multiple, formal and informal powers in the contest, which the poor has to negotiate to survive. Power struggles over the control of resources, including land, often lead to power contestation, political conflicts, violence and socio-spatial segregation by identity-based (social, political and religious) groupings in the city. The current discourse on informality primarily explains this process of spatial separation and division as largely related to housing and land. However, the implications of such divisions around power dynamics on the production of informal trading spaces remain an underexplored field in the literature. Studying the
impacts of such divisions on informal trading spaces is vital because any exclusion would limit the ability of the poor to engage in employment activity. This paper aims to investigate this research void in the context of cities of the global south by taking the case of Karachi, Pakistan.

Keywords:
Informal trading spaces, Contestation, Power Struggle, Socio-spatial segregation, Identity-based groupings

2. Conceptual Framework
Debates on defining and understanding informality are diverse and inconclusive. The complex and heterogeneous nature of urban informality is responsible for its various perspectives and interpretations throughout the history. Urban Informality under neo-liberal policies has become integral to the dynamics of urbanisation i.e. failure of economic policies to provide sufficient job growth to the expanding population leads the growth of informal sector to provide alternative or subsistence livelihood opportunities (Cross 1998; Roy 2009).

The discussion and analytical framework to study urban informality originated from the Latin American context, but its application in different regions added various facets over the years. Cathy Rakowski (1994) based on her study in Latin America categorises the urban informal sector into two main groups; structuralists and legalists which later modified by Roy and AlSayyad (2004) to analyse the cases from South Asia and the Middle East. Structuralists see the informal sector as subordinate to the formal capitalist system. Competition among formal firms under the capitalist system allows the formal sector to outsource work on low wages to reduce input and labour costs and thus to increase the competitiveness of large capitalists firms. Hence, the nature of capitalist development is the prime reason for the growth of the informal economy (Moser 1978; Portes et al. 1989). The legalists argue that the informal sector is an alternative and easy approach to complex and retributive legal processes that are difficult for micro-entrepreneurs, who, therefore, decide to operate informally to avoid complying with restrictive legal procedures. An influential proponent of legalist approach is the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto, who argued that over-regulation is itself accountable for the spurring of informal sector growth and is a consequence of excessive state regulation (de Soto 1989).

Various perspectives advanced over the years in the large and heterogeneous discourse of the informal economy. The two other perspectives; ‘Dualists’ and ‘Voluntarists’ are added in the above categorisation of the informal economy. The dualists see the informal sector as a distinct economic sector, not related to the formal sector. They argue that the existence of the informal sector is due to its exclusion from modern economic opportunities and limited opportunities within the formal economy to absorb excess labour due to rapid population growth (Hart 1973; Sethuraman 1976; Chen 2006). However, the divisions and groupings of micro-entrepreneurs that limit the economic opportunities and access to resources of certain groups over others are not well explained and explored in the above categorisation. The
voluntarists see the informal sector as more flexible and profitable than the formal sector. Unlike legalists, who find legal processes of formal systems cumbersome, the voluntarists argue that micro-entrepreneurs seek to maximise their incomes and flexibility by deliberately opting out of taxation and costly social protection in the formal economy (Levenson and Maloney 1998; Maloney 2004).

The unique experiences from diverse regions/contexts advance the debate on urban informality and added many facets to its interpretation. The models of the urban informal sector discussed above can be used as a framework to shape this research. However, these models are based on broad assumptions that consider the urban poor as a unified mass and do not address the lateral divisions within urban poverty; therefore it will be important to examine the working of these models in the context of this research, specifically in Karachi where identity-based divisions are predominant. Ethno-political and religious divisions and groupings among micro-entrepreneurs and their impact in shaping the spatial dynamics of informal trade is an underexplored area in literature, which this paper aims to examine.

Urban informality remains an uncertain and manifold concept in urban and development debates due to its multiple interpretations in variable contexts. Waibel and McFarlane (2012), based on the “Urban Planet” workshops series in Berlin, explain four general approaches to interpreting urban informality.

- First informality is seen as a ‘spatial categorisation’ used to describe informality as those territories outside the legal, political, economic, social and environmental margins of the city. This spatial criterion of informality is defined as being the marginal spaces in the city was later challenged by many authors, such as, Diken (2005) who argues that the favelas of Rio de Janeiro are far from being marginal spaces to the city, both in physical and conceptual terms. Informality is not confined to discrete physical or political boundaries, but as Roy and AlSayyad (2004) argue it is the central logic of urbanisation under neo-liberal policies.

- Second, informality is considered an ‘organisational form’, which sees informality as characterised by unorganised, non-structured, ineffective and unregulated labour. Although disorganisation sometimes characterises labour in the informal economy, in practice such labour is often highly organised and disciplined; for example in Brazilian favelas communities have developed innovative and structured forms of social, economic and political networks outside the formal sector developments (Arias 2004).

- Third, informality is categorised as a ‘government tool’. This approach explains how the formal-informal tension is often deployed by states as an organisational device that defines particular domains and forms of interventions as ‘formal’ or ‘informal’. Roy (2009a: 10) also explains this formal-informal dualism in relation to planning that “informality doesn’t lie beyond planning; rather it is planning that inscribes the informal by designating some activities as authorised and others as unauthorised, by demolishing slums and granting legal status to equally illegal suburban developments”.

- Fourth informality is explained as ‘negotiable value’– this approach places informality in the realm of the lived experience, the everyday struggle that is not opposed to the formal but constantly interacts with it producing an interface, a space of interaction in which people move from one
category to the other. Important proponents of this approach such as Roy and AlSayyad (2004) explain informality as negotiability of value, which does not exist in isolation from the formal city, as formal practices of the state have blurred the boundaries between formal and informal for political benefits. Thus, the state by placing itself outside the law uses informality as an instrument of accumulation of resources and power for elite urban development. Roy (2009b: 83) further the debate on informality as a negotiable value by seeing it as “a deregulated rather than unregulated system” and also that “informality lies within the scope of state rather than outside it” (Roy 2009a: 826).

The evolution of literature, reviewed above, suggests that an absolute division between formal and informal is not possible. Varley (2013), considers the earlier debates on informality as ‘binary thinking’ describing divisions that in practices do not exist. The boundaries between formal and informal domains are always blurred and vary with respect to the contextual realities (AlSayyad 2004). Yiftachel (2009, p. 89), also discounts the formal-informal dichotomy as a legal-illegal binary in spatial terms, considering the informal as “grey space – between the ‘whiteness’ of legality/approval/safety and the ‘blackness’ of eviction/destruction/death”. The formal-informal divide is a multifaceted process of naming, managing, governing and producing contemporary cities, in that informality and formality fold into one another and even its definition oscillates within the same context due to political reasons (McFarlane 2012).

The literature above, suggests a viable categorisation of the urban informal economy; it argues of blurring boundaries between legal and illegal domains to use as an organisation tool for socio-economic and political spaces of informal economy; this often leads to contested spatial zones with continual struggle among various actors. This concept will be useful to take forward in this research and apply in contexts such as Karachi where extreme multi-scale physical, ethno-political, and socio-economic divisions exist.

2.1 Conceptualising Informality in Spatial Realm.

Space has become an intensely debated issue in discussions on neo-liberal forms of development. The scarcity of space makes it a contentious domain with various parties seeking to gain access and control over urban space. This section will explore the debates around the social production of space to understand informal trading spaces (ITS).

The social production of space

The concept of space is in constant flux, and with new debates, the notion of space gets even more complicated due to the inherent complexity of space itself. Various concepts of space that have emerged over time have evolved from an understanding of space as a quantifiable/measurable entity (having immovable grids – absolute space), to a relative notion (of non-Euclidean geometries), then to spatio-temporality (impossible to understand space independent of time), to relational concepts (various processes shape the space, and space itself does not hold any meaning), and to representational space and spaces of representation (Jammer 1954; Lefebvre 1992; Massey 1994; Madanipour 1999; Harvey 2004). However, it is almost impossible to generalise the meaning of space in such a diverse range of applications and contexts. Therefore, this paper specifically seeks to examine the social facet of space and
argues that the production of informal trading spaces (ITS) falls under the larger debate of production of space.

Spaces are the representation of our daily experiential journey embedded in social and cultural realities of individual experiences (Harvey 2004). Madanipour (1999, p. 879) explains that “the spaces around us everywhere, from the spaces in which we take shelter to those where we cut across and travel through, are part of our everyday social reality”. Objects and people do not exist in isolation neither functioning independently, the force that ties ‘objects’ with ‘people’ or ‘people’ with ‘people’ is the social reality that assigns functions to human beings or symbolises the objects.

Lefebvre (1992, p. xx) emphasises the integral nature of space and social relationships suggesting that “space is a social and political construct, and it is in any meaningful sense, produced in and through human activities and the reproduction of social relations; thus it represents the spatial manifestation of social relations”. Carmona et al. (2010) also highlight the interrelationship between space and society, arguing that space without a social content and society without a spatial content cannot be envisioned. A similar concept of space as the fundamental notion of our social existence is discussed by Madanipour (1999), who argues that the spatial behaviour of human beings is defined by and defines the spaces around. Objects and materials in space only have a physical presence, and they can only be significant or meaningful if associated with groups or institutions to give them meanings in space (Madanipour 1999; Brown 2006).

Social space is subjected to diverse interpretations and meanings based on individual experiences and feelings that transform into images and symbols that surround the individual (Madanipour 1999). Each lives in their spatial web that derives its meaning from the cultural experiences and norms that thus define the nature of social space produced by them. So different groups give different meanings to space – space has thus become multilayered with distinctive combinations of individual symbolisms (Knox 1995; Madanipour 1999). Thus, social dimensions are essential to the conceptualisation and visualisation of space. Mass production and bureaucratically controlled mass consumption processes that aim for continuous capital surplus are important indicators of the use of space as the central mode of production in which human relations are in constant tension (Cross and Karides 2007).

**Production of Informal Trading Space - ITS**

There is relatively little in the literature about the production of space and power relations that frame ITS, but this section draws together those references within the street trading and informal economy literature which provide some useful pointers for this research paper. Whitson (2005) argues that informal work space is a space where multiple expressions of power are found, which thus negates the standard dichotomy of power and powerlessness in favour of a multiform, complex conceptualisation of power. Cresswell (2000), also explains the multiple expressions of power in space as “power that is not localised in a single institution or actor, rather is seen to be something that is exercised by everyone, that is potentially productive and at the heart of social relations” (p. 261).
A useful description of street trading recognising the heterogeneous and complex nature put forward by Brown et al. (2010) draws on this study which defines street trade as “including all trading activities undertaken on the streets or in other publicly accessible urban space but excluding those within the confines of formally provided shops, these activities falling outside existing legal, regulatory controls in some way but not including criminal activity”. However, this definition does not address multiple power expressions that are involved in the production of informal trading spaces.

Street traders see urban public space as a key asset for their livelihood, where they can avoid or minimise the overhead costs of rent and utilities that make their goods and services affordable to the target group (Cross 2000; Cross and Karides 2007). At the same time, urban public space is a contested domain that makes street traders are in constant struggle with city authorities and other actors for their existence in the urban public space (Setšabi and Leduka 2008). In the case of informal trading spaces, multiple and overlapping spaces of power come into play in which various actors – traders, city authorities, formal enterprises, ethnic trading groups, political affiliates, adjacent property owners or informal landlords, etc. – interact to shape certain kind of space, although the role of different actors and the interplay between them is not widely explored. Power relationships and hierarchies control and reflect the nature and kind of informal trading spaces so produced.

Therefore, this research defines production of ITS as a “space produced by street traders (social actors/claimants of the street) who are tied with different power relations within and among other social actors involved in the production of space that falls outside the legal, regulatory control. Their social relations are controlled by multiple power dynamics that are manifested in public spaces; thus public space becomes the visible expression of power to carry out the trading activities”. This definition of ITS will be referred in the later sections of the literature review.

2.2 Conceptualising Informality through Social Capital lens

Several authors suggest that the urban poor use multiple assets to overcome the livelihood vulnerabilities and thus mitigate the risks and shocks of limited access to urban resources. Moser (1998), categorises urban poor assets’ as ‘tangible’ such as labour, human capital and housing and essentially ‘intangible’ assets such as household relation and social capital. Urban poor use these assets strategically for their sustainable livelihood by making networks of social trust and connections (Lyons and Snoxell 2005; Lewandowski 2012). Furthermore, Moser (1998), argues the vulnerability of poor in terms of their ‘resilience’ to overcome the negative effects of the changing socio-economics and competitive market scenarios. Thus, the individuals, households or communities who are rich in building up the assets will be less vulnerable and more responsive to the negative trends and insecurity of the environment.

Thus, the building of an asset portfolio by the urban poor is an important poverty reduction strategy, which Moser (1998, p. 5) describes as the ‘asset vulnerability framework’. Rakodi and Lloyd-Jones (2002, p. 6) argue urban poor’s asset as the ‘poor survival strategy’, is a non-static view of the poor’s abilities to construct livelihoods. This concept recognises that people may be poor, but they have alternative non-material or non-monetary means to support their livelihood i.e. skills, labour, friends and family, experience in certain area/context, health, etc. which they can draw on or develop at different times.
In the context of street traders, these intangible and non-monetary resources become essential to form networks of trust and social relations. Empirical work on social capital from various contexts on informal trading see it as an important asset for active reciprocal support networks, family ties and bonding, network of social trust and connections to enable traders for collective actions and to access political spheres. For example Lyon (2007) in the case of Ghana’s street traders argues trust and family ties as the fundamental factors to build social relationships with others traders, buyers and wholesalers. Family ties initially helped the new street traders to access the network and with time to build connections and networks. Through repetitive interactions trust developed among street traders, and thus a formation strong network that helps them in developing credit relationships without the need of capital. Stillerman and Sundt (2007) similarly in their research on street traders in Santiago and Chile’s highlights the role of embedded networks (kin- and non-kin networks) in the reciprocal support to manage the risk in dealing with legally perilous and unfriendly context for street vendors.

However, in the context of Karachi where this research is situated, the notion of social capital involves a complex web of actors. Mechanisms of collaboration, social relations/networks and trust are dictated and controlled by multiple factors (Budhani et al. 2010). Political, religious, and ethnic heterogeneity categorises the poor, and both facilitates and restricts their abilities to form ties and networks. The factors that impact on the ‘asset vulnerability framework’ of the poor are multi-layered and multi-faceted and vary from power dynamics at the city level that shape macro level political processes to socio-political fragmentation at community/tribal scale that has a major impact on the production of space. These factors are important to investigate especially in the case of proposed research context. Detailed analysis of the impacts of social capital on the production of space generally, and informal trading spaces (ITS) specifically, will be examined in the later section of this research paper.

3. Context of Karachi

Karachi, the megacity and the provincial capital of Sindh, is the biggest city of Pakistan covering an area of 3,527 km², with a population of over 23 million people. The city is the revenue generating base for Pakistan which contributes substantially to the national exchequer and provincial revenues (almost 15% of national GDP, 25% of revenues and 62% of income tax for the country), with head offices of banks, insurance companies, large corporations, and the key financial and commodity markets located in the city(MPGO 2007). The strategic location of Karachi makes it important and distinct from other megacities in the global south: the location of the port had kept it at the centre stage for the world since the 18th century, when the British occupied the harbour to use it as a base to launch the Afghan wars and stem the Russian advance, then in world wars, more recently war with USSR in Afghanistan, and current unrest in Afghanistan. As all the inland supplies and trade used Karachi port, which has a substantial impact on the socio-political conditions of the city (Chishti 2011).

Karachi is also known as a “Mini-Pakistan” for being home and representation of all ethnic groups in Pakistan, making it a diverse multi-ethnic city (Budhani 2010). Historically, Karachi has been transformed from a fishing village in 1729 to a mega-city of diverse social groups (Hasan 1999). It has always been predominantly a city of migrants; 80% of the population of Karachi consists of people who either migrated themselves or are second or third generation descendants of migrants who arrived in the city after 1947 (Hasan 1999; Gazdar and Balbo 2005). Successive waves of migration to Karachi are responsible for the current diverse ethnic demography of
the city. After the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the city's indigenous Sindhi-Hindu population was outnumbered by Urdu-speaking Muslim refugees (Muhajirs). In the 1960s, the government's green revolution and industrialisation policies caused a wave of Pashto speakers (Pathan) to move in from Pakistan's Northern Province, and Punjabi professionals, businessmen and artisans to earn livelihoods in the city's expanding services sector (Hasan 1999).

Karachi has thus become a melting pot of diverse socio-economic, ethnic, religious and other groups from all over Pakistan. This diversity is also reflected in politics around ethnic and religious groups, claiming and controlling resources for the respective social group, leading to competition and contestation. Ethnicity has become synonymous with political affiliation, and people prefer to live with the same ethnic group in the background of ethno-political violence in the city that has divided the city into ethno-political enclaves (Hasan 2010). The population is increasing while budget allocations and formal goods and services are limited which has formed a major political agenda for the main ethno-political parties, resulting in increased tension amongst social groups. The last decade has seen ethnic violence unprecedented in the history of Karachi, just in last four years more than 1500 citizens were killed, and the majority of this infighting was linked with political contestation (Gayer 2014).

The failure of the state to provide basic survival resources due to the population explosion in Karachi is one of the major reasons, apart from many others directly or indirectly linked to it, responsible for spurring the growth of the informal sector (Hasan 2002). The informal sector in Karachi is dominant in serving the physical and social infrastructure needs of low and lower-middle income communities and settlements, and 75% of the working population in Karachi is employed in the informal sector (Hasan and Mohib 2003). For the vast majority of Karachites, the formal sector cannot serve their needs for jobs or services as its products are unaffordable and its organisational culture far away from their lifestyles (Hasan et al. 2013). The huge informal sector is dominated by low-income groups, many of whom are migrants and are in contestation with the other local social groups in the city.

The polarisation of ethnic and religious groups in Karachi is also reflected in space contestation. Land grabs and mechanisms to control land for political and personal gains have become the norm in the city (Hasan et al., 2013). Spatial segregation and enclavisation is thus a result of contestation amongst groups to maintain political power and control over resources, which is especially evident around enclavisation of housing that exacerbates violence in the city (Kaker 2014). Thus, focussing on informal trading, this research paper presents two propositions; ‘socio-political divisions in the city creates spatial division and contestation which is also reflected in informal trading areas’ – this seems to be hidden in the larger debates on land and housing in the city. And ‘the identity-based politics controls the social capital of the poor, results in tight control over defined spaces or where these are disputed, contest over the access in the spaces.’

To examine the above propositions, this paper will discuss one of the case study areas selected for this research in Karachi. The Orangi (Aligarh Bazaar, Bacha Khan Chowk and its precinct), is situated in one of the most violent towns of Karachi (ref. Map1 and Map 2). The area was always at the forefront in major ethnic riots of the city, the primary reason for its violent character is the fight over the changing demography of the constituencies. The many waves of migrations and the concomitant penetration of other ethnicities (predominantly Pakhtuns in the case of Orangi town) have instigated the turf war between the political parties.
Map 1: Eight most violent flashpoints in Karachi

Map 2: The main clusters of violence in Karachi

Sources: OpenStreetMap.org, The Herald, September 2011,
Demographic figures based on 1998 census projection

Published: Sep 04, 2013
The location of the case study area is one of the important indicators of being listed as the most dangerous part of the city in all violent events that occurred in Karachi (1985-1986 – ethnic riots, 1995, and 2011 Ref. Map 3 and 4). It is located at the border of the turfs between ‘Pakhtuns’ and ‘Muhajirs’ which are predominantly represented by the political parties ‘PTI (previously ANP)’ and ‘MQM’ respectively. The main intention of the either parties is to stretch/reclaim the turf to secure the political constituency and thus the financial gains from the huge informal trading activity in the area.

Map 3. Spatial distribution of killings in Karachi

Map 4: Spatial distribution of killings in Karachi (2011)

Sources: Dawn.com, openstreetmap.org
Death toll from January 2011 to July 2011
4. Discussion

The role of social capital is widely debated in the social sciences and development literature, few have endeavoured to link with spatial contestation. This section will look into some of the fundamental concepts of social capital in the light of this research to test the propositions presented in the preceding section.

One of the most discussed attributes of social capital is a network, which Castells (1996, p. 470), defines as a ‘set of interconnected nodes’; which are important institutions that informal actors are associated with to gain legitimacy. The significance of networks in social relations holds primary importance for the flow of information and building common interests. Thus, social relations are strengthened by the networks and the transfer or flow of material and non-material resources help in the extension of network and integrating new nodes in the existing. For example, in case study area, the networks formed on ethnic grounds were the primary source to gain people trust. However, the political and religious affiliations are integrated as new nodes under the ethnic patronage. This expansion of network with new resources forms a social network, which Meagher (2005), defines as the “capacity of social forces to provide a flexible regulatory framework embedded in popular relations of solidarity and trust” (p. 218).

Although there is no consent on the definition of ‘social networks’, considering the scope of this research the term here is stated as ‘informal organisational arrangements based on social ties’ (Meagher 2007, p. 219). In the case of fragile state and market, social networks have the capacity to negotiate the resources by informal means and are capable of filling the vacuum in formal institutions and regulatory bodies (Stiglitz and Dasgupta 2000). In the context of informal trading, the social networks perform organisational role by offering informal mechanisms of socio-economic and political coordination. The three distinct informal arrangements of networks emerged from the fieldwork are i) political affiliation ii) identity based and iii) gangs/mafia controlled. These networks play an important role in developing the social ties within and among the other networks in the socio-economic and political negotiations with formal power structures. This paper will examine the first two concepts of networks as the case study chosen for this paper contained political affiliation and identity-based networks.

In exploring the spatial influence of networks in ITS, the case study noted that the area was divided into two distinct zones; Pakhtuns and Muhajirs (Ref. Map 4). The stretch from Bacha Khan Chowk till the Aligarh Jama mosque junction is pre-dominantly Pakhtuns traders, while, the upper section is dominated by Urdu speaking (Muhajirs) traders. This ethnic division is reflected in the political constituency division as well; the councillor of the Pakhtuns dominated area belongs to PTI (Pakhtuns dominated political party) while the councillor office on the Muhajirs’ dominated territory is running by MQM member.
Therefore, the phenomenon of territorialisation and division is not only evident in housing, but the spatial fragmentation can also be seen in the ITS of Orangi case study area. The networks are formed on the basis of identity (Predominantly on ethnic division; Pashtu speaking and Urdu speaking) got the political patronage to control the excess of ‘outsiders’ (people from the opposite group) and give an excess claim to the members belong to the same groups. Portes (98, p18) argues the similar concept of social capital as ‘sociability cuts both ways’ i.e. social capital can be both inclusive and exclusion and not necessary that it will always be advantageous for all. However, the exclusion of some people due to their affiliation with other groups contradicts the Putnam et al. (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) concepts who consider social capital ‘for the public good’ which always benefit people (Putzel 1997, p. 941).

The nature of social relations and its linkages from other social networks and power structures is vital in the production of ITS. In the case of Orangi, the conflict and contestation in the social capital among Pakhtuns and Muhajirs divides ITS into two distinct territories within the larger informal market. This paper examines the two concepts of social networks by Meagher (2005). First, is the ‘political affiliation based social network - institutional perspective’ and second is the ‘identity-based social network – social capital perspective.’

Political Affiliation based Social Network – Institutional Perspective

Institutional perspective argues that social networks are not an absolute independent entity, rather they are shaped by the institutional practices ingrained in the particular context. Institutional perspective reconnects social networks with issues of history, power and institutional process (Meagher 2005). It emphasises that social networks are not defined by their autonomy from the state, but, in fact, are shaped
by the nature of their relationship with the state at the micro (area) and macro (city/national) level. Building on this perspective, the case study of Orangi suggests that the political affiliation based networks are augmented by the institutional practices of the state-driven processes.

The political constituencies play an important role in defining the turf of the networks/groups. The control of political parties in a particular territory is linked to their representation in the state offices; for example, the Urdu speaking traders in the upper section (Aligarh Bazaar side) of the market are associated with MQM political party which gives them the power to establish the turf. Members of the same group in the turf get the protection while victimises the opposition. The visible/invisible boundaries (turfs) created in the ITS have always got the support from state representatives/offices (MQM elected councillor in the case of Aligarh market). Thus, the spatial division in Orangi case study is not only controlled by individual groups (Pashtu/Urdu speaking) at the market scale, rather, but these divisions are also institutionalised at the macro scale (city/national) politics – to (re)define the political constituencies (turfs).

The informal networks at an area level gain their powers (legitimacy) from the city level politics. Grabher and Stark (1997) argue that the regulatory capacities of networks are formed by the connection with the wider society and state. The stronger the access to the state level politics the easier will be the control over the territory. In the case of Mumbai, as Weinstein (2008) argues, the state coalesces with informal networks (ghoondas/informal organised groups) to execute its development objectives.

The Orangi case study implies that state intentionally blurred the boundaries between the formal and informal processes for the economic benefits controlled by market driven forces. The ethnically dominated informal trading market of Orangi, traders from both ethnic groups trust their localised networks of power, so the state purposely blurs the boundaries between legitimacy and illicitness and, therefore, rely on these local social networks. Thus, the formality and informality are linked and interdependent, and the absolute dichotomy between formal-informal is not possible. Sayer (2001) argues that influence of power is as important as solidarity in the networks, this was also seen in the Orangi case study that the groups are associated with kinship networks, and their access to political negotiations with the state and formal institutions are governed by power dynamics within and among the groups.

**Identity-Based Social Networks – Social Capital Perspective**

This approach is also referred as ‘embeddedness approach’ that sees social networks more as a property of groups and communities than of individuals. Within a close bonded groups, relationships of kinship, friendship and ethnicity shape a compacted network of solidarity and cooperation that has the tendency to enhance economic efficiency through the mobilisation of cheap labour, training, information, etc. (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Granovetter 1995; Waldinger 1995). In the case study area of Orangi, it observed that informal market (or ITS) was divided into distinct Pashtuns and Muhajirs territories – the two competing groups of street traders in the case study areas of Karachi. The interface of the strategic boundaries created between the two groups becomes the conflicting zone in pursuit of extending the existing territorial boundaries. Gayer (2014, p. 45) argues this interface between the two separate networks/groups as ‘topographical ideological boundary’ that physically and symbolically demarcates ethnic communities.
Social networks are viewed as resources that allow marginalised groups to combat against the institutional constraints and forces of exclusion within a society (Lomnitz 1977; Long 2001). The marginalised group coalesce with the larger community (from the same ethnic group) to gain access to the resources. For example, the ‘Pakhtun Jirga’ in Karachi, is the city scale informal network which supports the Pakhtuns community to set up a business by lending them interest-free loans, help in getting an accommodation, and introduce to the established traders from the community.

Another important dimension within social capital perspective put forward by Ouchi (1980), Powell (1991) and Powell and Smith-Doerr (1994) is ‘governance approach’. In this approach, means of earning livelihoods or filling gaps in formal economy is not seen as informal, rather, as an innovative alternative to inaccessible market-based economic organisations. Social networks are considered as flexible and efficient under conditions of economic instability (Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994). For example, in Mumbai, India, the proliferations of informal social networks in formal governance system to provide urban goods and service are situated within the broader paradigm of an innovative alternative to urban poor against inaccessible neo-liberal market conditions (Weinstein 2008). In the same paper, citing an example of Dharavi – a squatter settlement in India, Weinstein argues that residents gained access to basic utilities and services by being the members of such social, informal network (Vardhabhai), while others were devoid of the facilities, although, these networks do not always have positive implications in the development processes. In exchange of the services provided by the informal networks, these organisations were able to strengthen their links to formal political institutions and community networks and which was later become a threat to city law and order and thus to safety and security.

The case study of Orangi evidenced a significant role of informal networks to ingress in the formal governance system. Local traders from the same identity (ethnic, kinship, etc.) background in the ITS form an alliance with powerful group/network (political party – in most of the cases) who guard their interest for their personal (political) benefits. The informal networks initially target to achieve the critical mass – filling their people to extend the territorial boundaries. In an interview, Hasan (2016) asserts that the survival in the complex city like Karachi, where multiple actors and forces are in a contest to get access to resources, is not possible except to associate to powerful groups/networks who promote and guard the gains of people. Since, these ‘networks’ of individuals/groups or ‘nobles’ can also be categorised as informality, in terms of livelihood etc. thus addresses the gap in literature on informality, and propose that informal ‘networks’ are one of the actors that fill the gap created by the failure of the state in the provision of urban resources impartially.

5. Conclusion

In conclusion, the contestation in social capital and related power dynamics among the multiple stakeholders involved in informal trading produced the divisive informal trading spaces – the contestation in the social relations of actors (producers/co-producers) also exacerbates contestation in the space.

The broader politics around control over resources, integrally linked with control over land, brings multiple, formal and informal powers in the contest, which the poor have to negotiate to survive. In the case of ITS, street traders ally with the political parties and other powerful networks to strengthen their
social capital. The alliance of the groups/stakeholders (involved in ITS) is steered by identity-based politics. These groups (represented by power intermediaries) negotiate informality through various forms of ‘spatial categorisation’, ‘organisational form’, ‘government tools’ and ‘negotiable values’ (or a combination of these at different scales), to gain access and control over the resources which limits the participation of certain groups, thus exacerbates divisions in the space. The division in the space extends beyond the vertical conflict in the social capital of various groups in the city — the political affiliation and identity-based lateral divisions within and among informal actors/networks define the respective turfs.

The social capital extends beyond individual agents to communal relations between and among agents/individuals, institutions and social sections/units. Social capital is important for the urban poor, as lacking income they need assets to become resilient against socio-economic hardships. The paper presented the ‘social networks’ as the most significant notions of social capital — it is portrayed as an alternative way to gain access to the negotiations with the formal actors for the attainment of livelihood resources. Social groupings formed on ethno-political and religious grounds in ITS controlled by political and state driven institution produced divided informal trading spaces in the city.

The approach in this paper challenges the customary perception of the enclavisation and spatial segregation that limits to land and housing generally, this paper suggests that the identity-based groupings equally impact the production of informal trading areas. The fragmentation and conflict in social relations within and among social networks (either formed in isolation or conjunction with formal institutions) by ethno-political and religious divisions and the consequential patterns of interaction and negotiations for spatial control (and dominance) results in divided spatial territories of informal trading. Furthermore, the struggles between different scales of social networking in ITS and the subsequent impact on the production of space holds primary importance in the morphology of the city.

6. References:


Stillerman, J. and Sundt, C. 2007. 11 Embeddedness and business strategies among Santiago, Chile’s street and flea market vendors.


HOUSING AS A CAPITAL FOR SECURING LIVELIHOOD OF THE URBAN POOR; REFLECTIONS FROM MUMBAI AND DHAKA

Md. Ashiq Ur Rahman

Urban and Rural Planning Discipline, Khulna University, Khulna 9208, Bangladesh
tuhin_urp@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT:
This paper is the reflection of the author, he learned from the infrastructure development project and its impact on the pavement dweller of Mumbai and the ongoing thirst of livelihood opportunities of the slum dwellers living in Dhaka city, Bangladesh. The paper is based on the findings of the field work conducted by the author and his team, while he was doing his MSc in Urban Development Planning in Development Planning Unit of University College London and this paper is also based on the findings of the PhD research of the author and his subsequent recent visit in Karail slum of Dhaka city, Bangladesh. Analysing the resettlement project of Mumbai, this paper identifies that there is a symbiotic relationship between housing and livelihood opportunity and any type of planned intervention affects such relationship. Understanding this grounded reality, this paper attempts to draw a theoretical illustration of such relationship and diagnoses the scenario of Karail slum of Dhaka city. The main argument the author poses is that, while the urban poor are involved in informal economy, the planned/formal intervention affects their livelihood opportunity in terms of their asset adaptations. This paper also argues that the interrelation of housing and urban poverty relies on the livelihood opportunity, considering the potentials of housing as a unit of production and self-actualisation rather than as a unit of consumption. This paper portrays that, in Bangladesh, the diversified use of labour, home based enterprise and accommodating the urban labour are the significant contributions of housing as capital in the micro level survival strategy of the urban poor. In addition, the location of urban poor settlements provides the opportunity to develop symbiotic relationship between the urban poor and the rest of the city dwellers (i.e. positive externalities like door to door services at lower prices, etc.). This symbiotic relation is the triggering force of employment opportunity and economic growth in the low income metropolitan cities of Bangladesh. Considering this context, this paper put forward the debate that, whether the formalisation is essential or not, and if essential, then how.

KEY WORDS:
Community; Network; Livelihood; Asset; Informality; Housing; Mumbai; Dhaka
1. INTRODUCTION

Housing is commonly identified as a basic need or item of household consumption. It is also an important productive asset (Moser, 1998; Tipple, 2005). In the urban context, housing is an important asset that generates income through, for instance, renting rooms and the use of its space for home-based production activities (Tipple, 2005). Housing insecurity, such as when squatter households lack formal legal title, creates an extreme sense of vulnerability; in contrast, tenure security and legal title give households the incentive to invest in upgrading their homes and the security to use this asset productively, particularly when other sources of income are reduced (Rakodi, 2002). Pro-poor housing provision enables the urban poor to deal with new income generating opportunities as the housing provision acts as a productive asset.

The role of housing in poverty eradication programmes is potentially significant because of the range and number of benefits that such investment can support (McLeod and Satterthwaite, 2001). Plenty of literature recognises housing as an asset through its productive nature as home-based enterprise can fundamentally assist poverty reduction strategies (Moser, 1998; Ghafur, 2001; Rakodi, 2002; Tipple, 2005). In the urban contexts of developing countries, where the poor are systematically excluded from formal sector jobs, and the capacity of macroeconomic growth strategies to generate additional jobs is limited, the removal of tenure-insecurity related obstacles that prevent or constrain households from using their housing effectively as a productive asset is possibly the single most critical poverty reduction intervention (Moser, 1998). The diversified use of labour in informal settlement creates the symbiotic relationship between the livelihood of the urban poor and the built environment, which changes with the housing structure and location of the urban poor.

2. THE INTERRELATION BETWEEN HOUSING AND URBAN POVERTY

Housing is a central aspect of urban poverty and well-being (Mitlin, 2003). The major interrelation between housing of the urban poor and poverty eradication relies on the potentials of housing as a unit of production and self-actualisation. Housing of the urban poor enables the immediate survival of the immigrant urban poor in to the cities. The house represents the address and identity of the urban poor as citizen. However, whether the slum can provide the dignity and right of citizenship is being always questioned. But many studies have suggested that housing is the determinant form of identity and self-actualisation, which establishes the confidence among the urban poor to act collectively for their survival in the cities from both the social and economic perspective (McLeod, 2001; Mitlin, 2001; Rakodi, 2002). Moreover, the level and diversification of assets and capabilities, determined in part by status and entitlements in a particular social context, protect households against risks from outside and enable them to adapt better when risks cannot be avoided (Chambers and Conway, 1992). In this paper, assets are not being simply considered as resources that people use to build livelihood but these assets give the capability to be and to act. Assets not only allow them to survive, adopt and alleviate poverty but are also the basis of agents” power to act and reproduce transformation of resources. Therefore the definition of Rakodi (1999) can be useful to define housing an asset as she argues that household well-being is multi-dimensional and directly linked to command over assets and livelihood strategies. In this context, this paper argues that, the role of housing as an asset has an important role for poverty alleviation, which may be analytically judged through the livelihood opportunities.
The theories to define the interrelation of housing and urban poverty have identified housing as an asset for addressing vulnerability and housing as a unit of production (Moser, 1998; Rakodi, 2002; Tipple, 2005). Chambers and Conway (1992) explained that an „urban livelihood framework” helps to define the role of housing by identifying the main factors affecting livelihoods and the relationships between them. In this framework poverty is characterised not only by a lack of assets and inability to accumulate a portfolio of them, but also by lack of choice with respect to alternative coping strategies (Rakodi, 2002). Vulnerable households are forced to adopt strategies which enable them to survive.

In urban areas households seek to mobilise resources and opportunities and to combine these into a livelihood strategy which is a mix of labour market involvement; savings; borrowing and investment; productive and reproductive activities; income, labour and asset pooling; and social networking (Rakodi, 2002). Assets available to poor individuals, households and communities can facilitate their asset adaptation strategies. The process by which the assets held by households and communities are protected or adapted does not take place in a vacuum (Moser and Stein, 2011). Thus the housing unit where they live remains at the centre of their livelihood strategy.

It has been observed that, autonomous adaptations to secure the livelihood opportunities of poor urban communities are often constrained, by a lack of secure tenure and household capacity, with most having neither the physical, nor the financial capacity to undertake large infrastructural projects (Banks, 2012). In this context, social sector approaches can support pro-poor livelihood strategies by scaling up asset-based planned adaptation through different programmatic interventions such as community based development initiatives, social protection, targeted asset transfers etc. In the core of these interventions secured tenure remains as the most important asset for enhancing livelihood opportunity of the urban poor (Mitlin, 2003). The theoretical explanation of the aforementioned issues state that the housing in urban low income settlements and the survival strategies of the urban poor are interrelated. This interrelation provides assets and capabilities, which can be individual and collective. Combining and transforming these assets and capabilities ensure different livelihood strategies. This livelihood strategy addresses vulnerability of the urban poor and creates the pathway for sustainable livelihood.

3. THE MUMBAI EXPERIENCE

The following section describes the relocation process of pavement dwellers of Mumbai, which is derived from the field report of 2009 of the group of students where the author participated under the field work of MSc in Urban Development Planning programme of Development Planning Unit of University College London. The quest to obtain the status of “World Class City” in Mumbai, redevelopment is a constant state of affairs as transportation corridors are expanded and informal structures are demolished to create space for residential and commercial zones. Under this vision of redevelopment the pavement dwellers of Mumbai were relocated in the urban fringe areas. This relocation process was based on two different approaches: „community-led” approach and „state-led” approach.

In 2006, after more than 20 years of collective action that included social mobilisation, land negotiations with the state, saving and credit schemes, house model exhibitions, and community-led surveys and enumerations, 76 of the 536 families who lived on the pavement in Byculla chose to be
relocated to Milan Nagar in the northeast suburb of Mankhurd. Throughout this community-led process, the pavement dwellers (PDs) were principle actors in the relocation thus transforming their own lives. The new residents of Milan Nagar participated in the design of their units, all of which included a mezzanine level.

In contrast to the active and voluntary relocation in the case of the Byculla PDs, those who lived along P.D. Mello Road in central Mumbai were forced to move as their informal structures were demolished to make way for a road widening project. In 2006, the PDs were relocated to four apartment blocks in Mankhurd and assigned single room units without regard to their former spatial and social structures. This was a state-led process negotiated by government bureaucrats and professionals with no significant participation of PDs.

The key findings derived from the field research conducted in 2009 drew upon the conceptual framework that explored the definition of transformation through focusing on the impacts of sustainable livelihoods of relocated pavement dwellers (PDs). The criterion indicated above address whether the community-led or state-led processes and strategies correlate to the emergent post-relocation challenges. In addition, the following findings are in a narrative form to extrapolate the experience, outcomes and aspirations of PDs reflecting their realities after relocation considering the time period as transitional.

From the perspective of human capital (skills, information, knowledge), the relocated PDs in both locations face challenges accessing training facilities for self-employment and they find it difficult to access services in their new location. Considering the social capital (networks, membership of groups) in the community-led relocation process of MN, social networks have been maintained as the families from the same area (Byculla) were relocated to the same building and women are still active in Mahila Milan (MM). In Laloobhai, social networks were dismantled because the PDs from P.D. Mello Road were dispersed into four different buildings. Moreover, these differences in social networks have an impact on the access to social support or financial assistance. However, in both locations the issue of security is a major concern for boys and girls due to the social disruptions and violence in the area whereas on the pavement (Byculla) the security issue was related to physical safety (e.g. road accidents).

In both MN and Laloobhai, the residents have experienced an increase in expenses with rising maintenance costs (200Rs), electricity (300-400Rs) and transport (150Rs) per month (DPU, 2009). In addition, the income generating opportunities have decreased (affecting women disproportionately) while men are forced to commute to central Mumbai to maintain employment. Moreover, women are finding it difficult to obtain and sustain commercial space for home-based business due to the high rent rates, the lack of available space, and the competition of vendors in the area. Therefore, it was observed that the procedures undertaken in both processes disregarded the impact of economic livelihoods for men and women.

In both locations there was a significant change of physical capital (housing, basic infrastructure: transport, water, energy) post-relocation (DPU, 2009). By obtaining physical shelter, PDs experience a sense of secure tenure and dignity whereby the threat of evictions, the harassment by other classes and the ability to claim ownership to their dwelling has a transformative impact. However, challenges have emerged; for example, the increasing cost of formalised service provision and lack of service
provision due to the affordability problem. The concluding finding of such relocation process is that it affected the symbiotic relationship of housing and livelihood opportunity. Thus it could be mentioned that without any comprehensive programme relocation transforms housing as a physical asset but not as a capital for enhancing livelihood opportunity of the urban poor.

4. BANGLADESH CONTEXT

Like other developing countries in the world, Bangladesh is facing increasing urban population since the post colonial era. Around 25 percent of Bangladesh’s population is living in urban areas and the projected urban population will be more than 40% by 2030 (CUS et al, 2006). In Dhaka around 35% of the people live below the poverty line, of whom around 20% were classified as hardcore poor (less than BDT 2500 =£25 per month) and lived in more than 4,000 informal settlements (BURT, 2005). Similar poverty levels have also been recorded in other cities. Poor quality of housing is a characteristic of these settlements; CUS et al (2006) described such housing in six major cities of Bangladesh as consisting of more than 99% of poor quality structures (temporary, dilapidated) and densely crowded (more than 1,000 persons per acre), with more than 95% of the houses (one room dwellings) having less than 150 square feet. In Bangladesh, slum settlements tend to be built on vacant government land or private vacant land. The informal settlement in Karail, considered being the biggest slum in Dhaka, also started to develop on the vacant public land.

Karail emerged during the 1960s as an open space of 0.23 sq km. with a few scattered huts accommodating local peasants. In the late 1960s the land was acquired by a government department, Telephone and Telecommunication (T&T). However, having not been able to introduce any public use, T&T transferred the land ownership to the Public Works Department (PWD) and the Ministry of Science and Technology. The original land owners therefore filed several cases in the court about the ownership of the land. In this situation, a few groups of local leaders, many of them T&T employees and their relatives, started building huts and renting them out mostly to migrants coming from different parts of Bangladesh. At present Karail covers an area of approximately 110 acres with an estimated population of over 100,000 (CUS et al., 2006). Because of its location near the high-end residential and commercial areas of Dhaka (Gulshan, Banani and Mohakhali), it attracted low income people engaged mostly in service jobs like cleaners, household helpers, rickshaw pullers as well as workers in readymade garments industries. Security of tenure is one of the major concerns for the area. Since two government organisations own most of the land, thus threat of eviction exists.

Karail is now the largest „slum” settlement with an estimated density of about 1,800 inhabitants per hectare (CUS et al., 2006). Families of four to seven members live in one or two rooms of about 8 to 12 sq. metres. Many such rooms facing narrow passageways at the same time are used for sleeping at night and as small businesses like grocery shops, fire wood trade, tea stalls and carpentry during the day. Most of the inhabitants do not own the huts they live in but rent from „owners” who acquired them in the early stage of settlement development. Land transactions are governed by social regulations that do not have any official validity. The major challenge perceived by the households in Karail is the lack of tenure security (Field Survey, 2012). Of course, people face a whole range of other challenges, depending on the economic profiles of the residents. The common challenges mostly relate to the broader socio-economic and environmental factors. The following table summarises the challenges and associated vulnerability in Karail. Table 1 lists challenges which cause vulnerability;
and these vulnerabilities are associated with the housing provision and housing condition of the urban poor.

Table 01: Vulnerability of the Households in Karail Slum of Dhaka City, Bangladesh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>Vulnerability</th>
<th>Exposure</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affordability</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Lack of formal employment opportunity</td>
<td>Lack of Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Higher Expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High unemployment among women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Skill and income underemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure</td>
<td>Politico-legal</td>
<td>Political and market driven displacement</td>
<td>Poor quality and temporary dwellings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Poor augmentation of productive capacity of land and dwellings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Services</td>
<td>Physical</td>
<td>Poor sanitation</td>
<td>Unhygienic living environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Temporary techniques and materials for dwelling construction</td>
<td>Poor insulation and protection of dwellings against heat, cold and rains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Higher Density</td>
<td>Overcrowding, Unhygienic living environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Socio-Political</td>
<td>Lack of community based organisations</td>
<td>Weak social networking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of political representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Too much dependency on local politicians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Analysed from Field Survey, 2012

Describing housing as a means for livelihood - the following findings can be drawn. The housing unit acts as a resource to address different vulnerabilities, mostly the economic and politico-legal vulnerability. The reasons behind choosing these settlements support the aforementioned findings. The urban poor living in Karail for longer period of time than their previous settlements though the duration of living for Karail slum is really scattered in nature, and signifies the pressure of migrant coming to Dhaka than other cities, as 47% of the households living in Karail arrived in the last five years. The employment opportunity has a direct impact on their livelihood opportunity, which is the main reason for longer duration of living in this settlement. Karail has been the most demanded settlement for its occupants. For Karail the most influential reason is better working opportunity (28% households in Karail. After interviewing several household members in the slum, it has been revealed that, the local people describe it as a „matured” slum, as it provides better service provision, locational advantage and available rental accommodation.

As described earlier, the occupational structure of Karail is determined by the neighbouring industrial and higher income residential area. In Karail the most common employment is skilled workers (19% of total population) in neighbouring factories. Thus the availability of informal employment opportunity attracts the urban poor to live nearby the employment opportunity. In terms of employment status, the survey findings explain that in Karail slum 52% people are employed. The most inspiring story behind these figures are that apart from the housewife (21% in Karail) and people who are living under age 10 and over the age of 60, every single household member is contributing to the household income.

As revealed in earlier sections, people living in these settlements are using all of their labour forces to extract their livelihood opportunity. In most of the cases the employment opportunity is related to their
surrounding built environment. Thus there is a symbiotic relationship between the built environment and livelihood opportunity. The provision of housing is giving them the opportunity for accommodating the urban labour and the location of housing is providing them the opportunity to explore job opportunities. Therefore, most of the people in Karail develop their livelihood opportunities based on this relationship. In Karail slum, as the slum is located next to the industrial zone and high income residential area of Dhaka city, therefore the number of skilled industrial workers living in this settlement is higher than any other occupation. Another important contribution to household income is generated through home based activities. Thus housing of the urban poor is an asset or a production unit for generating different employment opportunity for the urban poor.

In Karail 63% of the household members are engaged in a cooperative society. All the members living in this slum are eligible for membership in the cooperative society. Twice a week, each member of the society deposits a fixed amount of money in the common fund of the cooperative society. All the money from the members is invested in the informal business sector like buying a rickshaw, compressed natural gas (CNG) driven auto rickshaw etc. Living in the same settlement for a longer period of time created this type of social cohesion, which has been transformed as a social capital. This social capital is linked with civil society organisation, which helped the households living in this slum to form community based organisation. This type of mobilisation has a direct impact on perceived tenure security as only 36% of households perceive the threat of eviction in the near future. The reason behind such perception is the involvement in a „representative political structure“ through the community based organisation. It has identified that slum dwellers of Karail constantly disseminate job related information to their relatives living in the villages and hence create an invisible information network among them. They are also in touch with other people living in other slum areas in order to get job-related information. Therefore, it could be concluded that between the slum areas an invisible network exists which may be addressed as an element of „representative political structure“ (Mitlin, 2003; Levy, 2007).

It is evident that the housing unit provides an identity for the urban poor. It has been identified earlier that, based on this identity, the urban poor develop social networking. The urban poor are using this social network to reduce any vulnerability. The inhabitants of Karail have a very strong social network. Similar geographical backgrounds of poor households are the foundations for the creation of strong social networks in Karail slum. Simultaneously, the fear of a sudden eviction also pushed the inhabitants in Karail slum to form local networks and structures for tackling eviction threats. This strong community network has prevented eviction in a number of instances. The author’s field survey found that the community network played a dominant role in tackling the eviction treats of the Karail in 2012. The community committees mobilised the entire community in demonstration to tackle the eviction threats. They put pressure on the higher political levels, e.g. the Ministers, Member of Parliament, Mayor and Ward Councillor and also public agencies, who were involved in the evictions of the Karail on the 4th April, 2012. In addition, the community leaders developed a network with the civil society and legal aid institutions to initiate a legal action. They filed a writ petition in the High Court in order to suspend the evictions of the Karail slum until further orders. The leaders were also actively involved in the mass campaigning against the evictions of the Karail squatter settlement through the national newspapers and print media to get support from the people of Dhaka city. This has proved successful as they received support including financial and relief, protests and dialogues with the formal political systems (e.g. ministers, political leaders) on behalf of the evicted slum dwellers, from the civil society institutions and also from ordinary people in Dhaka city. Following
their writ petition, the High Court issued a stay order on the eviction of the Karail slum. Understanding the aforementioned analysis the following table summarise the livelihood opportunity of the households living in Karail slum. In this table the problems are marked as negative (-) and prospects are marked as positive (+).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 02: Livelihood Opportunity of the Households in Karail Slum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicators</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Criteria</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Economic Conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Political Recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased Social Well-Being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Environmental Conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced Living Conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Analysed from Field Survey, 2012

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The findings of this paper show that the interrelation of housing and urban poverty exists in the urban poor settlements of Bangladesh. The relation exists in two ways: firstly, living in these types of settlement causes several vulnerabilities and, secondly, the housing unit provides livelihood opportunity for the urban poor. Though in the case study settlement Karail, the statutes of tenure is informal. However, without having any support this informal shelter is providing the adaptive capacity of the urban poor to cope with urban poverty and generating different livelihood opportunities. Support from the formal structure can make this process more resilient as Wamsler (2007a & 2007b) argues that without adequate support from municipal authorities and aid organizations, people may not be able to fully use their adaptive capacity. Scholars also argue that the formal institutional structures in the global South for delivering services and supports to the poor are weak and fail to meet many of their responsibilities (Baker, 2012 & Dodman and Satterthwaite, 2008). Moreover, the informal context within which actors operate can provide a constraining environment for protecting or adapting assets. As a discourse of illegality and denial underpins the lack of significant urban policies and
interventions concerned with the reduction of vulnerability of urban slum dwellers, the informal network plays the central role for securing the livelihood opportunities. The issue of legality is always a concern for creating any room for manoeuvre. As portrayed in table 02 that, few indicators of livelihood opportunity exist in the urban poor settlements, however the urban poor are always under the threat of eviction. It has been observed that the networking of the urban poor is acting as a major process for enhancing the livelihood opportunity of the urban poor in Karail, Bangladesh. However, this opportunity of networked action lies in the physical space in the form of their housing unit to be a part of the networked society. Therefore the housing unit in the informal slums and squatters also offers the identity to get the livelihood opportunities from existing structures and processes. However, considering the legality of the land these people are always under the threat of relocation, which often has a direct impact on the livelihood opportunities. It has been revealed in several studies that relocation or dislocation through eviction causes real damage to social network (Mitlin, 2003 and Levy, 2007). In addition the Mumbai experience also shows that relocation affects social networking and employment opportunity, which have been identified as the major that generates livelihood opportunity for the urban poor. Considering these two contexts of Mumbai and Dhaka a collaborative action is essential by emphasising housing as the core asset for transforming the livelihood opportunities of the urban poor to a sustainable livelihood structure.

REFERENCES

Building the city from below: citizen participation
Chair: Håkan Magnusson & Björn Möller

Degree of citizen participation in participatory local governance: A case of Pune. Kavina Patel and Sejal Patel, Faculty of Planning, Centre for Environmental Planning and Technology University, Ahmedabad, India

Attempts at Participatory Governance in Urban Management in Kampala City, Uganda, Pamela MBabazi, Uganda National Council of Science & Technology.

Our city, Our Development, Our Plan Campaign, Mumbai: Citizen’s Campaign for a Participatory Development Plan. Maggie Paul, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, India.
DEGREE OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN PARTICIPATORY LOCAL GOVERNANCE: A CASE OF PUNE

SUB THEME: BUILDING THE CITY FROM BELOW

Kavina Patel¹, Sejal Patel²

¹ Graduate, Bachelors of Planning, Faculty of Planning, Centre for Environmental Planning and Technology University, Ahmedabad, India
kavinapatel95@gmail.com, kavina.patel.bplan12@cept.ac.in

² Professor, Faculty of Planning, Centre for Environmental Planning and Technology University, Ahmedabad, India
sejal.patel@cept.ac.in

ABSTRACT
Participatory local governance and its effectiveness for different social groups forms the core of our research. Post Washington Consensus in late 1980s many countries have simultaneously implemented economic liberalization and political decentralization reforms. Countries, including India, have mandated participatory local governance through national statutes but effectiveness at the local level has been arguably inadequate. Our research focuses on the national, state and local level mandates for participatory local governance and their implications for different social groups in the case of Pune city in India. We show that the State government mandates have been reduced from the National mandates and the State mandates have been further reduced in the practice of local government. As a consequence, ‘invited spaces’ for participation or negotiation with the state have either been captured by elite social groups or politicians and thereby have become closed spaces for citizens. In response the middle class elite have mobilized to form negotiating spaces locally termed as ‘Parisar Samitis’ through which they succeed in negotiating their socio-economic needs with the local government, quite often at the cost of the poor. The poor, on the other hand, resort to clientelist practices through elected representatives or claim spaces through social mobilization but meet with limited success. The acclaimed participatory budgeting of Pune has been ineffective in including all social groups. Although, citizens of Pune have been relatively active in participating in local governance through claimed or negotiated spaces, institutionalized and permanent invited spaces are required to ensure effective participation of all social groups.

KEY WORDS
participatory local governance, participatory budgeting, urban poor, invited spaces, claimed spaces, negotiated spaces
INTRODUCTION

Many countries have adopted economic liberalization and participatory governance framework under global restructuring catalyzed through the Washington Consensus in 1989 but the experience has been varied. The Government of India (GoI) initiated decentralization and participatory governance in 1992 through the 74th Constitution Amendment Act (74th CAA), wherein citizens are invited to participate in the decision making process at the lowest tiers of the government. This research explores participatory governance in India and how the state government in its policy and the local government in it’s practice share power with and include different sections of the society.

Political economists (Goodwin and Painter, 1996, Jones, 1999, Harvey, 1989) have shown that globalisation affects urban governance in three ways: urban areas are rescaling by devolution of powers, functions and resources from the national to the local government level; policy is reoriented from redistribution of income and towards competition for capital; and a market logic with focus on efficiency and profit maximisation dominates. The first effect underpins ‘decentralisation’, while the second and third effects underpin the ‘neoliberalisation’ of urban governance (Crook and Sverrisson, 2003, Eaton, 2001, Purcell, 2003).

With the sub-national rescaling of urban areas, local governments accept more responsibility as national governments devolve power, duties and funds to them. Devolution, often termed ‘democratic decentralisation’ (Eaton, 2001), means that local governments are increasingly responsible for economic development, provision of infrastructure, spatial planning and urban policy making (Painter, 1995). Decentralisation is often accompanied by further rescaling of power, duties and resources from local to lower tiers of government through opening of participatory spaces with the objective to deepen citizen participation and facilitate negotiation of their needs (Cornwall and Gaventa, 2001a, Gaventa, 2006b, Baud and deWit, 2009). The additional sub-local rescaling is referred to as ‘participatory governance’ (Gaventa, 2006b).

Decentralisation or participatory governance is contextual, takes different shapes and has mixed results across the globe (Crook and Manor, 1998, Turner and Hulme, 1997). In India, rescaling at sub-national and sub-local levels was effected through the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act (74th CAA 1992) and Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission’s (JNNURM) Community Participation Law (CPL) reform in 2005. Participatory governance is seen as a way for citizens, non-state actors like Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and civil society to get a platform to participate in the decision making process wherein they are the major stakeholders. These are organisations outside the state or governmental control and ‘influence governmental decision making and participate in a variety of public participation processes’ (University of Colorado).

Arnstein (1969) for the first time attempted to explain levels of citizen participation and ‘non-participation’ (Fig. 1) through an eight rung ladder ranging from ‘manipulation’ on the lowest rung to citizen control on the highest rung. From the review of citizen participation experience mainly in the US and in specific programs rather than routine governance process, she shows the different ways that citizen power is portrayed and how ‘participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating process for the powerless’ (Arnstein, 1969:2). She argues that out of the eight rungs of the ladder, citizens would be able to negotiate with trade-offs at the sixth rung of the ladder and at the topmost rungs citizens would attain ‘majority of decision making seats or full managerial power’. The
lower rungs of the ladder represent conditions where citizen participation is only portrayed but in effect no real participation or decision making power exists with the citizens (ibid).

![Eight rungs on ladder of citizen participation](image)

Figure 1 Eight rungs on ladder of citizen participation

The thought process behind the introduction of participatory governance is to make citizens aware of their surroundings and giving them a platform to collectively make decisions about various services that they can avail. These platforms for participation are called ‘spaces’ by Gaventa, which give the citizens ‘opportunities, moments and channels’ to affect ‘policies, discourses, decisions and relationships that affect their lives and interests’ (Gaventa, 2006a:26).

Referring to the three dimensions of power namely ‘visible, hidden and invisible’ developed by Steven Lukes & Gaventa, they argue that one dimension is not enough and it is important to link these forms of power to ‘spaces for engagement and levels of power’. These ‘spaces for engagement and levels of power’ can further be classified into three types, ‘closed, invited and claimed spaces’ and into three levels of power based on the level at which it is exercised, that is, ‘local, national and global.’ They define three types of spaces and each of its importance. Closed spaces are those where the ‘experts, bureaucrats or elected representatives’ make the decisions, invited spaces are those where the ‘citizens, users or beneficiaries’ are ‘invited to participate by various kinds of authorities, be they government, supranational agencies or NGOs’ (Cornwall, 2002:17), and claimed spaces are those where they ‘are claimed by less powerful actors from or against the power holders, or created more autonomously by them’ (Gaventa, 2006a:27). Out of the three spaces, invited spaces are the only spaces where citizens participate in the governance structure whereas the other two spaces do not positively allow citizens to be associated with the government.

Although, invited spaces cannot work in isolation and all three spaces are closely knit together, invited spaces may be created from claimed spaces with people having similar interests and needs, while closed spaces can be opened up by inviting citizens to participate. Just as all the spaces are related, different
levels of government are interrelated and need to work together for effective governance (Gaventa, 2006a).

Invited spaces need to have a strong policy level structure, strategically placed in different parts of the society. For good performance of participatory local governance ‘increased financial autonomy, increased proximity between the people and the government and improved match between the local needs’ are imperative (Wit et al., 2008:69, Cornwall, 2002). Swyngedouw argues that such involvement of ‘unauthorized actors’ in the system of governance may become ‘non transparent, context-dependent and questions remain regarding inclusion, legitimacy, representation, scale of operation and internal external accountability’ (2005:1999). Some authors have a positive approach towards it, and claim that such spaces can improve the way resources are allocated and if citizens are actively involved they actually contribute to the practice rather than getting involved politically.

Decentralisation as defined by Nainan and Baud, ‘is a means of strengthening local democracy by increasing the ‘spaces’ for greater participation of citizens in local governance processes’ which also enhances local level public consultation in the planning process (2008:116). It is argued that decentralisation process singe-handedly is not sufficient for an effective governance system and participatory methods also play a major role in the success of decentralizing powers and functions to lower tiers of the government and other non-state actors. It is also assumed that citizens have an interest in the decision making process and possess the necessary skills to contribute in it. Although, decentralisation has its pros and cons, it should have a strategic approach with clear delegation of functions to lower tiers of government to avoid misperceptions (ibid).

The ‘willingness of central elites, politicians and officials’ to share power with citizen groups is imperative for success of participatory governance (Nainan and Baud, 2008). Even when strategies and formulation of policies are in place, a risk that remains is that of elite capture. This defeats the purpose of decentralisation and participatory governance as it only caters to certain sections of the society.

Post Washington Consensus in 1980s when the process of ‘moving out from the government’ and devolution of powers to the lower tiers was proposed, sixty three developing countries implemented these reforms (Patel et al., 2016) either by making amendments in existing acts or making acts or policies. We reviewed case studies from Asia to understand the experience and effectiveness in local level.

In Nepal, the Local Self-Governance Act 2055, was enacted under the reign of King Birendra Bir in 1999, with a view to ‘[I]nstitutionalize the process of development by enhancing the participation of all the people’ and ‘have institutional development of local bodies capable of bearing responsibility, by providing such responsibility and power at the local level’ (UNDP, 1999:2). The act specifies two spaces for participation; at the village level and ward level. Each district is divided into village development areas according to various factors such as geography, location, population etc. Each village development area is divided into nine wards of equal population irrespective of its size or composition and a Ward Committee (WC) is formed for each ward. The village development committee is an ‘autonomous and corporate’ body and is supreme to all WCs and village councils. The policy mentions the composition of the WC and village development councils wherein women and different social groups are included in the committees. Because of equal distribution of wards in each village development area the proximity
Degree of citizen participation in participatory local governance

K Patel, S Patel

Göteborg, 16th – 19th November 2016

of citizens to the government differs in each district. We see a disconnect between the different tiers of the government and because of this disconnect while implementing as no monitoring happens at higher levels ‘A big fiscal resource gap in the local government’ exists because the national government collects more revenue than its expenditure and the local governments need more revenue to meet their expenditures (Association of District Development Committees of Nepal (ADDCN), 2007). Therefore, Nepal although envisions ‘responsibility and power’ at the local level it is not actually so, and a need for clear duties and responsibilities is necessary for the better functioning of the local self-governance system in Nepal (ibid).

In the Philippines, the Local government Code (LGC) was enacted in the year 1991 which ‘provided a framework for increased local autonomy with its provisions affecting assignment of functions across different levels of government, revenue sharing between national and local governments, resource generation and utilization by Local Government Units’ (Yilmaz and Venugopal, 2013:229). It provided spaces for citizen participation at two levels, Barangay Assemblies at ward level and Local Development Councils (LDCs) at city level although both these bodies have not fully been implemented (Patel et al., 2016). The composition of these assemblies and councils are not free from political influence. Presence of NGOs have a significant impact on the elections but so far nothing has been noticed at the local level. Because of proliferation of elite capture the poor were excluded from these processes leading to decisions in favour of the elites. In some cities the poor claimed their spaces with the help of NGOs and the government agreed to come up with programs which ensured the participation of poor in the governance system. (Patel et al., 2016).

We developed a conceptual framework inspired from Gaventa’s work on different spaces. Fig. 2 shows the relations between citizens, politicians/executives and the judiciary as they may exist in a just social order wherein social groups are empowered and able to negotiate their rights and ensure their well-being. These ideal relations form the conceptual framework of our research.

![Conceptual framework for participatory spaces](image)

The Government of India (GoI) mandated decentralisation and participatory governance first in 1992 through the 74th CAA and further in 2005 through the CPL, under JNNURM. Prior to 1992, citizen participation had been voluntary and mostly limited to projects, such as the Slum Networking Project, as well as other slum upgradation programs implemented in Ahmedabad (Dutta, 2000). Participation occurred less frequently in decision making stages than in the implementation and monitoring stages of projects (Ghosh and Mitra, 2008). Governments had no legal obligation to formalise citizen participation in routine governance processes such as annual budget formulation, planning and monitoring the implementation of neighbourhood infrastructure projects (Ghosh and Mitra, 2008). Decentralisation
through the 74th CAA involved the devolution of power, functions and resources from the State to local
governments and from local government to new participatory spaces, called Ward Committees (WC),
in cities with a population of more than 300,000. WCs were supposed to allow elected councillors,
administrative officers and citizens groups to deliberate together and allow citizens a platform to
negotiate their needs. The Act left it to state governments to decide the composition, proximity to
citizens, functions, powers and resources of WCs.

State governments took a long time to ratify the Act and set the processes in motion in their Urban Local
Bodies (ULBs). By 2005 many but not all cities had created WCs, though with ‘vast differences across
cities in terms of the committees’ composition, proximity to citizens, functions, powers and resources
(deWit et al., 2008). As a result, the same political party which had passed the 74th CAA in 1992,
reinforced the Act through the enactment of the CPL in 2005 to accelerate decentralisation at the state
and local levels.

GoI proposed a model CPL for state governments to emulate. The model CPL’s proclaimed objective
was to ‘deepen democracy, facilitate efficiency and socio-economic growth and promote pro-poor
initiatives’ (Government of India, 2006:2). It proposed a minimum of three tiers of decision making in
a ULB—the city level, the WC, and Area Sabha (AS) with participatory spaces for citizens at the latter
two levels. State governments had to either enact a separate CPL along the lines of the model CPL or
make appropriate amendments to their existing municipal laws to clearly define composition, proximity
criteria, functions, powers and funding sources of the two participatory tiers (Government of India,
2006). The ULBs had to implement these tiers as per the state’s CPL statute. To ensure compliance by
the State and local government, a tripartite Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) between national, state
and local government had to be signed. Non-compliance with the agreed conditions in the MoA would
lead to curtailment of the grants from the national government under JNNURM.

The WCs and ASs were to act as participatory platforms for neighbourhood governance, to deepen
the participation of the citizens in urban transformation processes and enhance the responsiveness of the
local government to their needs (Sivaramakrishnan, 2000). By 2010, both the 74th CAA and the CPL
were ratified and implemented to different degrees by state governments (De.Wit et al., 2008, Baud and
Nainan, 2008, TERI, 2010, Ghosh and Mitra, 2008). However, research on the implementation of these
initiatives in practice is limited to a few early-ratifier states, like West Bengal and Kerala. The
Government of Maharashtra (GoM) ratified the 74th CAA in 1994 and implemented the decentralisation
reforms by devolution of power, functions and resources from the State to the ULB. WCs were
institutionalised in 1994 and ASs only in 2009 when they were made a pre-requisite for availing grants
from GoI. GoM amended the existing ‘Maharashtra Municipal Corporations and Municipal Councils
(Amendment) Act, 2009’ to implement the CPL.

The practice of decentralised and participatory governance in cities of Maharashtra state, including
Pune, has not yet been researched.

The research aims at understanding the types of invited spaces mentioned by (Gaventa, 2006a) and how
they are created, at what level and how effective they are in hearing every citizens voice. The specific
research questions are:
- How are participatory spaces created locally under the mandates of national and state governments?
- What opportunities do participatory spaces offer to the two social groups to deliberate on ward planning and budgeting processes and to negotiate their rights?
- How do the two social groups attempt to negotiate their rights and whose interests are best served?

We adopt the following criteria to assess the performance of participatory governance as mentioned by (Wit et al., 2008):

1) Composition of the WC/AS
2) Financial Autonomy available to WC/AS
3) Devolution of power to WC/AS
4) Proximity of WC and AS to the citizens

**METHODS**

We undertook different objectives of the study at various levels and used mixed methods to collect and analyse the data. We collected secondary data to understand GoI mandates and GoM mandates and the gaps between the two. GoI mandates included the 74th CAA and CPL by JNNURM and for the GoM mandates the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act 1994 (BPMC Act, 1994) and the Maharashtra Municipal Corporation and Municipal Councils (Amendment) Act, 2009 were critically analysed. To study the implementation of GoM mandates by the Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC) primary and secondary data were collected and analysed. The secondary data included resolutions passed by the PMC regarding its participatory budgeting process, PMC budgets from 2012.

![Diagram](image_url)
to 2017, PMC rules on formation of WC. We conducted semi structured interviews of two senior PMC officials, four ward officers and eight councillors, members of four NGOs, eight academicians, six parisar samiti (PS) members working on participatory governance and two residents from each selected electoral wards (Fig. 3) and analysed the census population as well as ward wise population of Pune to understand the proximity of the citizens to the lowest level of administration in the PMC elected wing.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section discusses the findings under each sub-question in this research.

IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT MANDATES IN THE STATE GOVERNMENT POLICY

We studied the different mandates for WC and AS by the GoM in the context of the national government mandates i.e., 74th CAA and CPL and how effectively are the national mandates adapted in the State mandates.

GoM Mandates for WCs.
The GoI gave power to ‘3000 Urban Local bodies under the banner ‘power to the people’ (Nainan and Baud, 2008). GoM first amended its rules in 1994\(^1\) where as per the 74th CAA it introduced WCs in areas over 300,000 of population and ‘three WCs each comprising such contiguous electoral wards as may be decided by the Council’\(^2\). GoM empowered municipal corporation or councils to form the WCs (Nainan and Baud, 2008). A minimum and maximum number of elected councillors are established in the act depending upon the class of the municipal area.

A WC should typically consist of ‘elected councillors representing the electoral wards within the territorial area of the WC’\(^3\), a ward officer of the administrative ward in concern and no more than 3 members from NGOs and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) nominated by the councillors (Government of India, 1992). The participation of non-state actors ‘can lead to more inclusive and effective local governance’ (Nainan and Baud, 2008) and Maharashtra is one of the few states who have non-state actors in the constitution of WCs even when the 74th CAA mandate to have such members. Whereas in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh, NGOs are excluded in the decision making processes in contrast to West Bengal and Kerala where NGOs are an active part of the WCs (Patel et al., 2016, Bhardwaj, 2015). Although, a discrepancy occurs where no defined timeline is mentioned within which the NGO/CBO members need to be nominated by the councillors and non-state actors are advisory in nature who do not have voting rights in the WC meetings.

The WCs are formed in every administrative ward\(^4\) of Pune which gives an average representation ratio of about 223,000 with a minimum of 171,678 people to a maximum of 324,751 people per WC. This ratio is quite high and may not lead to increased proximity to the citizens.

---
\(^{1}\) The Maharashtra Municipal Corporations and Municipal Councils (Amendment) Act, 1994 which mentions the
\(^{2}\) Section 66A Mah. 41 of 1994, s. 143
\(^{3}\) As mentioned in section 66A Mah. 41 of 1994, s. 143
\(^{4}\) As mentioned in section 66A Mah. 41 of 1994, s. 143
The functions and powers of the WCs are clearly stated in the GoM mandates. A WC is allowed to make decisions for projects under INR 500,000 which gives them some extent of financial autonomy and powers; ensuring financial autonomy and faster decision making at the local level which when compared to the case of Gujarat is better as no financial autonomy has been given to WCs (Patel et al., 2016).

According to 74th CAA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composition of WC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ward councillor(s), Non state actors, Representative of Municipality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Maharashtra State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composition of WC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 ward officer, Elected councillors and 3 Non-state actors per WC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proximity of WC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representation ratio of an average of 200,000 people per WC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proximity of WC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WC to be formed for every ward</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Autonomy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To be decided by the state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Autonomy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Can sanction works up to INR 0.5 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Powers/Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To be decided by the state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Powers/Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As per the amendment act of 1994</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Fig.] 4 Mandates of GoM for WC

**GoM Mandates for AS**

The CPL under JNNURM introduces AS as an additional participatory tier below WC. The proximity of WCs under the 74th CAA was not enough to ascertain citizen participation and hence to strengthen local governance another level of participation or an invited space was proposed. GoM which had agreed to implement CPL under the tripartite MoA adopted it in 2009 by amending the Maharashtra Municipal Corporation Act 2009 but the amendment is not notified in the official gazette till date. In the amendment act, functions, duties and powers are mentioned as per the CPL. A ward is proposed to be divided into areas such that not more than five polling booths fall under the same area and at least two contiguous polling booths in an area are covered.

Our major finding is that, CPL mandates only two powers to the AS but in GoM mandates five powers are devolved to the AS, although they are functions mentioned as powers. So, even when a worthy picture is portrayed, GoM has not actually added any more powers to what the CPL has already mentioned.

The proximity of citizens to the government increases with the new reform and aims at a representation ratio of about 4000-5000 people per AS. GoM also mandates the same representation ratio adhering to the CPL.

CPL mentions that the state either needs to amend or notify its rules and GoM has amended its rules as mentioned. Although a notification of the same is still awaited (as of February 2016) and hence has not been applied rigidly in many cities in Maharashtra. This is a major hindrance in the implementation of reforms in cities as it is still not legally binding.

---

5 As stated in the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations (amendment) Act, 1994
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composition of AS</th>
<th>According to CPL Primer of MoUD</th>
<th>According to Maharashtra State Mandates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All members residing in that area</td>
<td>All members residing in the ward, chairperson (councillor) and secretary appointed by state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity of AS</td>
<td>At polling booth level, so representation ratio of about 4000-5000 people per AS</td>
<td>Representation ratio of 4000-5000 people per AS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Autonomy</td>
<td>To be decided by the state</td>
<td>No financial autonomy given to AS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powers/Functions</td>
<td>Mentioned in the CPL, but can be revised by the state</td>
<td>As per the amendment act of 2009(^7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Fig. 5] Mandates for GoM for AS

IMPLEMENTATION OF GoM’s MANDATES OF PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE IN PUNE

In this sub section we understand the implementation of GoM’s mandates for WC and AS by PMC.

[Fig. 6] Structure of PMC

---

\(^7\) As stated in the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations and Municipal Councils (Amendment) Act, 2009
Pune, like in other Indian cities has two wings; the elected and the administrative wing. Elected wing is headed by mayor who is elected by the general body and the administrative wing is headed by municipal commissioner. Administrative wing is responsible for ‘mostly the infrastructural and developmental work in the city’ and the elected wing is ‘mostly responsible for the financial deliverance and the approvals for the various developmental works undertaken by the administrative wing of the PMC’ (Voyants Solution Pvt. Ltd, 2012).

The elected wing of PMC is seen as invited spaces for citizens in the system. The PMC is divided into 4 zones, and 15 administrative wards which are further divided into 76 ‘Prabhags’ or electoral wards classified into two groups namely ‘A’ and ‘B’ with a total of 152 elected councillors or corporators or nagar sewaks (a locally adopted name) 50 per cent of the councillor seats are reserved for women out of the 152 which means that there are two councillors per electoral ward and one of them would be a woman in each electoral ward. According to the City Development Plan (CDP)\(^8\) of Pune, the general body is the most powerful body of the elected wing which comprises of 16 councillors out of the 152 who also elect the chairman to prepare the civic budget (Voyants Solution Pvt. Ltd, 2012). The general body comprises of all the 152 elected councillors as well as 5 appointed members which is headed by the mayor who holds office till two and a half years.

\(^8\) CDP is an initiative under JNNURM which is a perspective and a vision for the future development of a city.
The administrative wing of the PMC is headed by the municipal commissioner who is supported by three additional municipal commissioners and under them are four deputy commissioners who are subordinated by 4 zonal officers and each one heads about 3-4 administrative wards. Along with the zonal officer various other officials are present at the same level who oversee other aspects of the city.

**Implementation of WCs in Pune**

PMC passed a resolution to accommodate the formation of WCs known as Prabhag Samitis (Prabhag meaning area) in Pune, immediately after GoM’s amendments and soon formed functioning WCs in its next election cycle. The WCs in Pune are formed in every ward, are highly active and conduct regular meetings to solve issues related to the municipal functions such as solid waste management, sanitation, water supply etc. The main topic of interaction in these meetings is complaint redressal and this leads to accountability for the work to be done by the concerned ward official.

In PMC, 15 WCs are formed (since 15 administrative wards) and each WC comprises of 5 electoral wards on an average. Hence, the composition of WC in Pune is 8 to 12 councillors depending on the number of electoral wards under it, a ward officer and 3 NGO members. 3 NGO members are nominated per WC; hence 45 NGO members are nominated over the entire municipal area, although, the NGO members are only advisory in nature and do not exercise voting rights in the WC. All WCs in Pune are functioning and active; meetings happen every month at a time decided by the ward officer according to the members’ suitability. A monthly meeting minutes as well as a table mentioning the projects undertaken, completed or in progress are also given to the WC members every month. With this perspective it would seem like the WCs are working in perfect harmony and are active within its ward limits with maximum amount of citizen participation. Although, after interviewing a few key NGO members as well academia it was known that this is not the case in the nomination of NGO members.

While interviewing an NGO member who is also a part of a WC, he mentioned that the nomination for NGO members happened only about 8 months ago which means that after the 2012 elections, NGO members were appointed after about three years of the elections of the councillors. In absence of any timeline specified in the act, the nomination process of the NGO members was not mandatory immediately after the election of the councillors. All NGO members are decided upon the political strength of the WC; larger the number of councillors from one political party, more number of NGO seats are ‘allotted’ to them. There is hardly any invited space for non-state actors to participate in the WC showing lobbying of decisions at the WC level itself. This ‘allotment’ process takes place much before the nomination and the individuals to be nominated for the NGO seats are also decided beforehand. The NGOs that qualify for the WC seats are registered with the Societies Registration Act/ or Trusts Act well before the elections to show a history of works on projects related to the municipal functions.

An NGO named ‘Nagrik Chetna Manch’ has written a letter to the current municipal commissioner regarding the delay of the nomination process and also questioning the transparency of the process wherein they mentioned that the NGO members are nominated ‘despite glaring deviations and errors

---

9 Based on the interview of one of the WC member who is also a part of a NGO.
in the documents submitted by them\textsuperscript{10}. They have demanded that the Prabhag Samitis be dissolved and the persons responsible for the irregularities be booked. A reply was expected by the 15th of January but till date no action is taken against the impugned PS. This shows that the public is interested in participating at this invited space but are completely put off by the political affiliations in the nomination process. The lobbying process is enormously weaved into the system hence no NGO members without political affiliation take any interest in participating in this space and has therefore become a closed space for citizen participation.

The proximity of the WC each administrative ward has a minimum of 154,413 to a maximum of 324,751 population which means on an average each WC is representing about 223,000 population which is quite large in number and may deter the citizens to participate and express their grievances or issues. Hence the councillors play an integral role in the process of bridging the gap between the government and the citizens. Each electoral ward has two councillors and on an average each electoral ward has a population of 45,000 so each councillor has about 22,500 citizens which makes it difficult for the councillor to attend to every citizen. About 4000-5000 people per councillor of ratio should be maintained.

The process of electing the councillors is transparent and citizens have good access to the councillors in their areas, although they also have barriers in interacting with the citizens. When slum residents were enquired about their mode of communication with the councillor to redress their issues or express their needs/wants, they responded as, ‘they go to the councillor and at times the needs are redressed and at times they are ignored’. Another slum resident was enquired about effectiveness of the corporator and they said that ‘the corporators of the same electoral ward are from different political parties and if one corporator worked the other one would create obstacles’. Residents of the ward suffered the brunt of the political battles of the elected representatives and their needs and issues were side-lined in the interest of political power.

The residents tackle their daily neighbourhood issues/needs through the corporator and if community level issues arise or capital expenditure is required they approach the higher authorities like the ward officer who is generally not available for an individual, so has to be approached as a group of citizens. Slum representatives would convey to the corporator and get redressal on their complaints. Most times, the corporator would work based on clientelist practices in his/her ward wherein the corporator would promise a project in exchange for political support. Such vote bank politics is ubiquitous and aggrandizes the local politicians, in turn overlooking the interest of every citizen in the ward. When interviewing a middle class resident as well as a slum resident from the same ward, the mode of communication was different in both cases. The slum residents would either go as a community or approach the corporator personally whereas the middle-class residents would call the corporator anytime and convey their issues to him. We see a stark difference in the way slum residents are treated and how middle class residents are treated. The corporator is a representative of the people and it is essential that he/she should be equally accessible to different social groups.

\textsuperscript{10} As quoted in the letter written on 29th December 2015
The WC has the power to sanction projects under INR 0.5 million (USD 7518)\(^{11}\) in Pune and does not need to get it approved by higher authorities. This financial autonomy for the WC is essential to enable faster decision making at the local level and directly by the citizens.

A letter was passed to the WC mentioning the power to be given to the ward officer to approve the projects under INR 0.5 million and not the WC as mentioned in the GoM’s act. This withdrawal of power from the WC is a major fissure of PMC to GoM. Although, this power was given back to the WC after one of the NGOs approached the ward officer on the same and action was duly taken.

Each corporator is given a discretionary budget of INR 2 million which can be spent without prior permissions on projects which should not cost more than INR 0.2 million per project. In comparison discretionary budget for coporator is lower in cities of States of Gujarat and |Madhya Pradesh. In Ahmedabad it is INR 1.7 million and in Bhopal it is INR 0.5 million and provides some degree of financial autonomy to the local representative (Bhardwaj, 2015).

**Implementation of AS in Pune**

The GoM amended its rules in the year 2009\(^{12}\) to implement CPL but failed to notify its rules till date, although in Pune it was mentioned by a few interviewees that about 3-4 AS have been formed. On enquiring about the location in the areas mentioned nobody knew about it leading us to understand that they are not as active and need publicity and the sanction of law for proper functioning. The closure of JNURM in 2014 also discourages GoM to take any further action. On interviewing a PMC official about the functioning of AS and one NGO member, they mentioned that unless GoM doesn’t clarify its rules it would not be fully implemented and no funding has been received from JNURM till now. On enquiring about the representatives of the poor, it was told that although no federations have been formed they have representations through different departments of the ULB like the Urban Community Development (UCD)\(^{13}\) department and Community Development Society (CDS).

The middle class have negotiated their spaces by forming PS / Mohalla committees at the ward level which overlook their neighbourhood needs/ issues. These PSs are not mandated by the government but are negotiated spaces by the citizens to put forward their needs and wants, although these committees are exclusive to the middle and upper class citizens. About 40 PSs have already been formed and when enquired whether they have invited the slum residents to be a part of the PS, all the members were positive on having them on board, and also mentioned that they tried to invite them to be a part of the meeting and ‘had even tried going door-to-door to aware them of the same’\(^{14}\). When asked about the PS meetings a slum leader responded that ‘they do not have the time to spend on anything other than their basic needs’ and they have a notion of it being a space for the ‘upper class’ and do not want to be a part of it as they have a language barrier as well as an inferiority complex. This is a complex situation wherein

---

\(^{11}\) As per exchange rate of 1 USD= INR 66.5 prevailing in mid- April when the research was concluded (http://www.xe.com/currencytables/?from=INR&date=2016-04-15)


\(^{13}\) This is a department of the PMC which works towards uplifting the different communities and their development.

\(^{14}\) As said by one of the interviewee who is a member of the PS.
volunteer organisations invite representation from all sections of the society but is difficult to do so because of the social strata and general notions of the people. These PSs are highly active and work towards the betterment of the society although catering to only ‘elite and eminent citizens’ (Nainan and Baud, 2008). In absence of any statute, such volunteer organisations cater to a specific strata of the society and hence may work against the urban poor of the city.

PSs or Mohalla committees are citizen formed groups who work towards the betterment of the neighbourhoods. These are neighbourhood level groups similar to the RWAs (Resident Welfare Associations) in Delhi and the Bhaagidaari (participatory) system in Mumbai wherein citizens get together and resolve issues related to their neighbourhoods by interacting with the government and the WCs. These PSs do not have a formal structure in place and are completely run by citizen volunteers.

They are not statutory bodies, although some PSs are registered as NGOs or CBOs and work as formal bodies. PSs or Mohalla committees originated in the 70s when the city started witnessing an economic boom and people from other regions started shifting to the city for occupational or educational purposes. These people started making groups to ensure communal harmony between different castes and communities as said by an interviewee. Eventually, these groups started emerging as citizen committees without any cultural boundaries to resolve or redress their issues and increase the accountability of the officers in charge. In the late 90s, the then commissioner passed an order to have grievance meetings every month which was set by the officers at the ward level, generally at the ward office. The meetings happen on a fixed date and time every month where citizens solve the problems and discuss the progress on the projects that were conveyed in the previous meetings.

These negotiated spaces by the elite, point towards a need for neighbourhood level committees and for a need of a policy level intervention so as to include all the sections of the society and improve the implementation of the state level mandates in the cities to improve the proximity and interaction of the citizens and the government.

**Participatory Budgeting process**

Pune’s acclaimed participatory budgeting has been active since 2006. The concept of participatory budgeting originated in Porto Alegre, Brazil in late 1980s (Menon et al., 2013). The successful model led to the adaption in Pune and hence became a practice in the city where citizens could convey their ideas and suggest projects that they would want in their wards or at the city level within INR 2 million. Participatory budgeting is a form of engagement between the citizens and the government wherein citizens fill out forms and submit it to the respective ward offices. The forms are available online as well as at the administrative ward office and are easily accessible to the public. The WC then scrutinizes the suggestions given by the citizens, whether they are public works and within the INR 2 million limit. After the approval of the projects the ward office sends its budget to the corporation to add it to the city level budget. Citizens are allowed to make suggestions under INR 0.5 million which limits them to suggest only maintenance works. After suggestions are made citizens have no platform to know whether their suggestion was approved or rejected or if they have been incorporated in the city budget. No monitoring system has been set up and citizens can engage with the budget just once, which may discourage them to participate in the next cycle as this would be a static process for the citizens.
In the first cycle of the participatory budgeting process in 2006, orientation meetings took place through different departments such as the UCD and the CDS and these public meetings were even publicized through different media such as the newspaper and public notices and a phone call list was established to inform different citizens to participate in the process. Different PSs and Mohalla committees were contacted to ensure participation from them as well. But this happened in the initial years of the process and was discontinued in the later years which also reduced the participation from citizens (Fig. 9 & 10)
The funds allocated to participatory budgeting has increased over the years but participation is reduced. Upon enquiring in PMC we found that the budgeting process is caught in a vicious cycle where people do not trust the administration to incorporate their suggestions and hence nothing has been done and so on. The mistrust between the people and the government needs to be healed and improvements in the transparency of the process would ensure more participation.

A lack of transparency in the process would often lead to sanctioning of funds for personal benefits and would remain exclusive for the middle class and non-inclusive of the poor. It is essential to have the appropriate regulations and transparency in the process so as to create an invited space for all the citizens of the city. As of now, Pune is not very inclusive of the poor and out of the 854 projects listed only 80 have been allocated to the poor for infrastructure development. On interviewing a few people from the PMC, they were of the opinion that citizens are not aware of the projects to be suggested and the process should be moderated and informed participation would lead to better suggestions from the citizens.

Participatory budgeting gives more financial autonomy to the citizens but when the process is not transparent it hinders participation and more efforts and policy level changes need to be made in order to make the process more inclusive and to get more accountability from the government. If people find confidence in the government they would trust the officials in their decision making and a better approach can be devised between the government and the citizens.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget year for the year</th>
<th>Outlay in INR million</th>
<th>Actual expenditure INR million</th>
<th>per cent usage of funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007-08</td>
<td>17.62</td>
<td>11.32</td>
<td>64 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-09</td>
<td>27.27</td>
<td>20.75</td>
<td>76 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-10</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>21.62</td>
<td>62 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-11</td>
<td>30.16</td>
<td>16.55</td>
<td>55 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td>34.73</td>
<td>23.28</td>
<td>67 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-13</td>
<td>26.24</td>
<td>16.67</td>
<td>64 per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-14</td>
<td>29.52</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Fig. 11] Participatory budget over the years

### INCLUSION OF DIFFERENT SECTIONS OF THE SOCIETY AND REASSESSING SPACES FOR PARTICIPATION

This sub section focuses on the inclusion of different sections of the society in the spaces provided by the government to participate. We focus on the inclusion of people in the invited spaces for decision making. We identified spaces for participation at the administrative ward level and at the electoral ward level. We looked at the inclusion of different sections of the society in the WCs and the PS and claimed spaces by the excluded population and the disbursements of councillors’ budget.
Types of spaces of participation in Pune

At the ward level the ‘invited’ spaces are the 3 NGO/ CBO seats per administrative ward, in all there are 45 seats open to the citizens to participate. When talking to different stakeholders, who were part of the WCs it was clear that the seats were not open to the general public. It was a space where the members were ‘selected’ from political parties and no members of other NGOs could take part in the process. It was a complete political capture of the space, closed off to the citizens. This shows that the public is completely denied of the invited space which led them to form citizen groups like PSs.

PSs are negotiated spaces by the ‘elite and eminent citizens’ of Pune who are highly active and participate and discuss in the ongoing projects of the PMC (Nainan and Baud, 2008). They are completely citizen led groups who have negotiated their way in the local decision making process of the PMC. These Samitis are generally not formal structures and hence do not have an obligation for inclusion of all people. These are spaces captured by the ‘elite’ and tend to work towards the interest of a certain section of the society. This capture of space by the elite can be perilous to the urban poor in the city as they can lobby the processes and evict the poor from their neighbourhoods.

In some cases, people came together as a community to transform their lives and make them better by claiming spaces for participation, one such incident was of Solid Waste Collection and Handling Cooperative (SWaCH Coop). The people involved in municipal solid waste management came together and formed a cooperative and developed a system of collecting door to door garbage and segregating them by charging a small fee. Such a system exists in other cities as well such as Kottayam in Kerala, Patiala in Punjab, Patna in Bihar (SWaCH, February 2014). In 2008, SWaCH entered into an MoU with the Pune corporation, to collect waste door to door (SWaCH, February 2014). With the support of the PMC and the citizens, the model has been successfully implemented with viable gap funding from the PMC. PMC’s support was essential as they recognised the need for the waste pickers to be included and gave them a legal standing. This is an example for claiming spaces by the urban poor who were denied involvement in the society and through social mobilization they claimed their rights and contributed to the economy of the city.

Participatory budgeting process in Pune

In Pune there are about 564 slums out of which 353 are declared according to PMC. The slum population of the city is about 35.2 per cent with a land cover of just about 2.3 per cent (Pune Municipal Corporation, February 2011). It is essential to involve slum population of the city to improve their living conditions as well as people’s health. The budgeting process in Pune is acclaimed because of its participatory approach. Analysing the budget for the last six years and narrowing it down to the budget for the poor, we find that allocation to the poor is about 15.9 per cent to 18 per cent. The amount allocated is reasonable and logically complying to the minimum in other cities. Although the issue is the allocation of resources in the right sectors. In this process, capture in the space causes the poor to render helpless when it comes to approving the projects suggested by them. Hence transparency in the process of participatory budgeting as well as representatives’ power and role will tend to include the urban poor.

The PMC has initiated various mechanisms to improve the living conditions of the people in the slums such as Basic Services for Urban Poor (BSUP) under JNNURM and Rajiv Awas Yojna (RAY) and an NGO in the city initiated the slum sanitation project, in-situ slum housing under JNNURM, etc. Such one off programs by the PMC have been going on but it doesn’t adhere to the needs of the people living in the slums. Such mechanisms are highly active when initiated and then tend to tone down after a point
of time. To improve the conditions of the poor and include them in the city planning, there is a need for dynamic presence of such initiatives with utmost transparency and responsiveness.

Another aspect of decision making of projects transpires through the councillors’ budget. Each councillor gets a discretionary budget of INR 2 million per ward every year which he/she can use at his/her own discretion under certain guidelines prepared by the PMC. Thus in Pune, each ward gets an additional INR 4 million (2 councillors per ward) which is used in the works related to the ward. This budget is not included in the ward budget and the councillor approves and files a proposal which is sent to the ward office and the tendering process as well as the implementation is further carried out by the municipal authorities. The budget is used towards the additional works that are required in the ward according to the councillor. Clientelist practices often take place, wherein the people need to negotiate with the councillor on getting their suggested project approved. In many cases of urban poor, this is the only way to negotiate with the councillor. When interviewing one of the councillors, it was found that a lot of the councillor’s budget goes into the beautification of the area and can have a bias in the way the projects are approved. The proposals that were looked at in the year 2015-16 were of projects such as installing benches in parks, buying wheelbarrows and carts, making of footpaths, installing sign boards, repair work of roads, buying green and red dustbins, canvas bags etc. When the basic problem of facilities and other infrastructure related projects co-exist, it is essential to focus on the latter as they are day to day needs of the people.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poor Budget</strong></td>
<td>51,234</td>
<td>57,945</td>
<td>63,203</td>
<td>80,863</td>
<td>72,356</td>
<td>79,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total PMC Budget</strong></td>
<td>322,315</td>
<td>328,716</td>
<td>386,457</td>
<td>447,612</td>
<td>438,588</td>
<td>448,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>per cent for poor</strong></td>
<td>15.90 per cent</td>
<td>17.63 per cent</td>
<td>16.35 per cent</td>
<td>18.07 per cent</td>
<td>16.50 per cent</td>
<td>17.80 per cent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Fig. 12] Budget for the poor over the years by PMC

**CONCLUSION**

The main aim of the research was to understand the degree of citizen participation in the different ‘invited’ spaces in Pune. It was essential to understand the different spaces defined by Gaventa (Gaventa, 2006a) and its implications on the different sections of the society.

The research demonstrates the mandates of the national and the state governments and policies become ambiguous at every tier, ultimately failing the process of peoples’ participation. In the first objective we looked at the implementation of the national government’s mandates by the state government, wherein it amends it in its existing acts but fails to notify it in its rules in the official gazette which allows cities to not adopt it and hence a major fallacy is seen at the state level adoption. This corroborates the views (Baud and Wit, 2008, Nainan and Baud, 2008, Wit et al., 2008) that the state governments are hesitant in sharing power with the citizens and allow for elite capture in the spaces that are open to the public. The states’ policies lack the sternness and allow ambiguities which affects the poorer sections of the society in deliberating and negotiating their needs with the state.
As said by Cornwall and Gaventa (Cornwall and Gaventa, 2001b), if citizens see themselves ‘as actors rather than simply passive beneficiaries, user groups may be more able to assert their citizenship in a third sense through seeking greater accountability from service providers’ (Cornwall and Gaventa, 2001b:7). This is perceived in the case of Pune wherein lack of policy level implementation does not deter the citizens’ willingness and citizens have negotiated their way into making the decisions and participating in the process of planning at the electoral ward level through the formation of PSs. Lack of policy level clarity makes the spaces lucrative for the elite class to capture through lobbying. This is a setback to the citizens who have not been invited or do not have the influence in the society to deliberate and negotiate their needs. It is necessary for such spaces to remain open to each section of the society and also consciously include the urban poor in the invited spaces. Thus the inability of the 74th CAA and the CPL to usher in participatory governance has led to middle class activism through the formation of a new negotiating spaces called PSs (Kundu, 2011).

In Pune, lot of programs and processes have emerged to invite citizens to participate many of which have been successful in hearing citizens’ voices. The participatory budgeting process has been successful to a certain extent but there is still scope for improvement as loopholes have emerged after its first year of implementation and lobbying by the middle class and the local representatives is proliferating in the process of budgeting. The awareness campaigns and process of selecting projects suggested by the citizens in a transparent manner have been stopped which creates a mistrust between the citizens and the government (Menon et al., 2013).

In certain cases, slum dwellers have claimed their spaces and made the government act in favour of their demands. Pune has many initiatives and programmes to alleviate the urban poor, but these are one off mechanisms which do not yield a long term effect and hence a recurring participatory process and an invited space needs to be created to ensure the betterment of the urban poor. Thus spaces should be created in relation to the place which as mentioned by (Gaventa, 2006a), will yield maximum participation bringing in a change for the better.

[Fig. 13] Types of Spaces in Pune
Invited spaces by the PMC, have been captured in most cases by the political parties or by the elite. This disables the citizens to actively participate with definite powers and functions and exercise their rights. It is more of a negotiation between the government and the citizens to participate in the process of decision making rather than a judicial process.

Participatory governance is not a new concept and has ‘acquired a spectrum of meanings and given rise to a diversity of practices’ (Cornwall and Gaventa, 2001b:2). The difference in negotiation and claiming spaces by the bourgeoisie is quite evident and the response of the local representatives also leans towards the bourgeoisie as they are the power holders in the society. Such exclusion of the poor in invited spaces results in their further economic and social impoverishment which compels them to mobilize and claim such spaces (Patel et al., 2015). Comparing it to the conceptual framework we developed, citizens have claimed spaces through mobilisation and have negotiated their way through the closed spaces to create ‘negotiated’ spaces within the structure (Fig. 14).

To conclude, Pune’s experience in participatory governance has been relatively better compared to other cities in India. Although, the adoption of the policies from the national to the state level has been diluted and further more at the city level, the citizens congregated to create ‘invited’ as well ‘negotiated’ spaces with the government. Although, clear delegation of powers and responsibilities are yet to be created, Pune has had a good start with its different initiatives but also needs reforms that are more inclusive and in proximity to the urban poor to ensure optimum participation in the process of planning and decision making without political or elite capture of spaces.

![Fig. 14] Adaptation of conceptual framework in Pune
REFERENCES


SWACH. February 2014. SWaCH: Five years And counting... 3.


TERI 2010. Enhancing public participation through effective functioning of Area Sabhas. New Delhi: TERI.


Attempts at Participatory Governance in Urban Management in Kampala City, Uganda

Pamela K. Mbabazi
Uganda National Council of Science & Technology
p.mbabazi@unsct.go.ug

ABSTRACT
This paper tries to question the participatory dimension of urban governance in Kampala capital city, which is Uganda’s largest metropolitan area. Based on literature review and key informant interviews of selected stakeholders in two participatory projects for urban services in Kampala, the paper compares different impacts of participation amongst the middle-class communities of Nakasero with those in the slums of Kikoni in the city. Preliminary results demonstrate that changing citizen-government relationships have led to the empowerment of the middle-class and upper-class residents of the city who harness the potential of this new “invited space” to expand their claims on the city and political space. On the contrary, the poor end up losing as the NGOs that are contracted to deliver services, act more as agents of the state, rather than representatives of the poor. The paper’s main argument is that direct community participation empowers influential community members and small private enterprises while at the same time consolidating a form of “governing beyond the state” that promotes a managerial vision of participation and leads to double standards of participation and arguably, citizenship.

KEY WORDS
Participatory Governance, Urban Management

Introduction
With the advent of globalization and increasingly flexible modes of production, cities have become strategic places. Cities are now in the forefront of the restructuring agenda of many countries and have also become central to the new 2030 Development Agenda of the SDGs. In terms of decentralization and the neoliberal reform agenda, cities are being reformed in accordance with the standards of new public management (MacCourt and Minogue, 2001), which involves increased private sector participation (Batley, 2004) as well as a process of promoting local level participation (Blair, 2000). This has resulted in a weakening of the role of the public sector and the rise of new forms of service provision based on multi-stakeholder arrangements.

The term ‘urban governance’ has been coined to describe these new modes of governing. However questions have emerged regarding their effectiveness and their democratic credentials and this has given rise to the debate around the participatory dimension of governance (Baud and Dhanalakshmi, 2007), (Cabannes, 2004), (Fung and Wright, 2003) and (Mitlin, 2004).

This paper deals with the issue of urban governance in Kampala. The study of Kampala is relevant for a number of reasons. Firstly, Kampala is a complex and diverse city, being Uganda’s major capital city, with extreme disparities both socially and in spatial terms. In a very skewed distribution, approximately half of the population in Kampala live in slums and occupy only sixteen percent (16%) of the land\(^1\). Yet Kampala is also Uganda’s richest urban metropolitan centre. It represents fifteen to twenty percent (15-20%) of Uganda’s gross domestic product and the taxes collected in Kampala Capital City Authority area account for approximately 30% of the total budget of Uganda (UBOS, Kampala 2015). Finally, Kampala has a tradition of a vibrant and competitive political culture (mainly amongst the Baganda who are the indigenous tribe of the area), street riots and protests by the common people (especially the unemployed youth) as well as an active civil society. The analysis of shifts in urban public services provision in Kampala therefore, provides a relevant entry point of further understanding the emerging discourse on the new geometry of powers in cities.

The major aim of this paper is to focus on two participatory programs devised by Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) to provide urban infrastructure in both well-off and poor localities within Kampala. This is still an on-going research and what is presented here is only preliminary findings.

A comparison of practices, policy processes and outcomes in two distinct types of urban neighborhoods in Kampala city, reveals the features of participation in Uganda and tells us a lot about governance and citizenship. In terms of the social and spatial outcomes of these schemes/participatory programs, I ask the following questions; ‘Have the schemes lead to improvement in services and an increased participation in decision making processes in

\(^1\) A report from the ministry of land, housing and urban development has estimated that over 60 percent of the urban population live in slums - apparently brought about by the increasing rate at which people are leaving the rural areas and moving to the capital city.
Attempts at Participatory Governance in Urban Management in Kampala City, Uganda
P.K. Mbabazi

N-AERUS XVII
Göteborg, 16th – 19th November 2016

(KCCA? ‘Have these schemes which have led to new “spaces for the poor and vulnerable” opened up new opportunities to put forward demands for equity and social justice?’ ‘Is the impact of these schemes similar in the middle-class and the poor areas?’ ‘Is there a process of empowerment?’ ‘What shape does it take in terms of participation in decision making, inclusion and political process?’ What is the overall impact of these participatory programs in the slums in terms of employment and inclusiveness? Finally, what role do NGOs play in enhancing the citizenship of poor residents while engaging in these participatory programs?’ In terms of governance, I ask the questions; ‘have these participatory policies ensured greater inclusiveness and some form of democratization?’ Are they an efficient mechanism to deal with urban diversity or simply a managerial instrument to delegate responsibilities?’ These are the questions my research tries to address and a few of the reflections and findings are presented in this paper.

The research material for this paper is based on on-going fieldwork conducted since 2015 and to be completed in mid 2017. In depth surveys (mainly qualitative) are being conducted (and not yet fully completed) and studies of two public schemes dealing with provision of sanitation and waste management services in Kampala are also well underway. The paper starts with a discussion of the debate on potential participatory outcomes that accompany a decline in state-centric provision of services. A description of the process of decentralization and formation of Kampala Capital City Authority is then presented. This is followed by a description of how participatory governance has been introduced in Kampala and increasingly is forming part of the reform process to transform the city. The last section presents a preliminary analysis of the implementation of the participatory programs in two areas/neighborhoods of Kampala. One the one hand, the affluent neighborhood of Nakasero in Kampala and on the other, in the slum area of Kikoni, and provides a preliminary assessment of the outcomes both in terms of service delivery and political process.

**Participatory Governance Explained**

Participatory governance is a notion that has come to embody the shift towards new modes of steering public action in both rural and urban areas. It reflects a form of governance in which a multiplication of actors compels a shift from top-down bureaucratic approach to practices of negotiation and corporation. This process goes along with the restructuring of the state that include rescaling at sub-national levels, privatization, public sector reform (under the norms of new public management) and the emerging role of civil society (Marie-Helene Zarah, 2009). Whether several authors have referred to these processes as a retreat of the state or privatization, the common underlying factor is that there has been a questioning and undermining of the state-centric forms of service provision, especially so in the urban areas.

One major aspect of this debate of ‘governing beyond the state’ (Swyngedouw, 2005) is the importance placed on civil society and the notion of participation. The nature and character of ‘civil society’ has changed overtime from being de-politicized and no longer seen as being
Attempts at Participatory Governance in Urban Management in Kampala City, Uganda

P.K. Mbabazi

(First Draft Only, Not for Citation Yet)

radical organizations (that previously were seen to challenge the autocratic state and defend human rights) to consensual ones that are promoted by donors and development partners. In this paper, civil society is broadly used to equate to no-state and non-private actors involved in Kampala’s urban governance including international non-governmental organizations, grassroots organizations, think tanks and federations to mention but a few.

Many governments including Uganda have engaged in experiments with participatory governance much as this has often been part of the neo-liberal policies advanced by the western countries and the world bank. This participation has however come with a price in that each individual has had to assume new responsibilities and as Marie- Helene Zarah (2009) puts it, every individual has had to live life in an entrepreneurial form. Local authorities are spending a lot of money on participation like consultation activities as well as awareness raising activities which all come at a high cost. Many participants have also indicated and complained that participation in public activities is costing them a lot of time, which they consider a waste of time as they don’t always realize that much tangible benefit.

As one respondent put it:

“KCCA holds almost 2 - 3 community consultation meetings a week for us in Kikoni as if they don’t know that we have to make money to survive in this city. I do not even see what we have benefitted since we started these meetings”

On the other hand, participation has been seen as a tool to deepen democracy (Appadurai, 2001) and to make it representative and enable the average citizens to claim the larger share in any public debate (Mitlin, 2004). Participatory governance places a particular emphasis on the inclusion of poor people. This means that processes and practices have been opened up to accommodate everyone and this has arguably reshaped the geometry of power as will be demonstrated in this paper.

Many scholars (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Blair, 2000) have discussed, and quite convincingly, the potential positive outcomes that can result from participatory practices. One of the arguments is that service level provision improves with greater and more participation. It is assumed that providers would be more responsive to users demands especially if participation is part of a more decentralized delivery system. These authors argue that users are able to play a part in monitoring the services, discussing budgets and developing knowledge and expertise of running the services as well as influencing the policies through various mechanisms (Goetz & Gaventa, 2001).

When asked what they have benefitted from participating in community programs initiated by KCCA and the government in general, some respondents noted that crime rates in Kikoni Slum area had dropped by 50% in the first year of introducing Crime-Preventers which is a program of Uganda Police Force for community policing. The initiative takes a neighborhood management approach with strong participation. Although other factors could be attributed to
the drop in crime rate, arguably the involvement of the community in the crime preventers exercise could explain, to a larger extent, the fall in crimes within the city and Kikoni area over the last two years.

Furthermore, NGOs or Civic groups and associations can enhance relationships between government and citizens and can act as social intermediaries in donor funded or private sector participation projects (Mitlin, 2004). As Ostrom (1996) has argued, if the right incentives and credible commitments are in place, synergies between the State and civil society can lead to positive outcomes. In such cases, labour costs might even be reduced if the users contribute labour instead of making financial contributions in the building of the Infrastructure. Labour contribution can also provide employment locally and can lead to such benefits as a sense of self esteem and ownership which intern can lead to improved maintenance (Tounee and Van Esch, 2001; Majale, 2008; World Bank, 2004).

Cornwall (2002) on the other hand argues that redefined relationships between service providers and users can open up opportunities for empowerment and redistribution of responsibilities leading to a process of inclusiveness. Miltin (2004) also affirms that local democracy can be ‘reshaped’ when people are involved, reducing patronage and dependence relationships as they form a countervailing power. As Appadurai, 2001 asserts, democracy can be deepened when the poor act strategically and take participatory practices into their own hands.

However, it should be noted that these potentially promising outcomes of participation as not easy to achieve. As Miltin (2004) argues, if participation is limited in scope and space, it cannot be considered “participatory governance”. Participation if not well instituted is prone to capture by elites or political parties and patronage networks, resulting into an increase in patronage (Harris, 2007; Zerah, 2009).

Other critics have pointed to the role of NGOs. Lake and Newman (2002) argue that NGOs either by preference or because of institutional and material constraints tend to develop their own constituency. They find it difficult to reach out to all users and tend to abstain from interacting with local politics and local bureaucracy, but rather chose to develop closeness with higher echelons of government. Also because NGOs are increasingly close to and depend on donors, they tend to be less accountable to the local people (Edwards and Hulme, 1996). This often leads NGOs to consider the people they are working with as clients, causing a significant shift in the social transformation agenda (Hickey and Mohan, 2005).

As several scholars (Swyngedouw, 2005 and Zerah, 2009) have argued, NGOs can therefore contribute to a process of selectivity that leads to a form of social segregation and dual citizenship. As Zerah (2009) contends, these related issues of selectivity, targeting and inclusion need to be well interrogated when participatory practices are built on direct community participation especially in small projects. It is often believed that communities are able to organize themselves and are endowed with social capital but some critics of
community participation (Durlauf, 1999) have pointed out that social capital can lead to ‘social bads’ such as inter-group hostility, racism, discrimination based on age, gender etc. In practice, communities, which have the responsibility for social regulation tend to exclude some of their own members from services (Zerah, 2009). The role of urban management therefore should be to upscale the regulatory functions of the state but as we shall see in the case of Kampala, the reality is often different. Urban segregation, and exclusiveness appear to be more of reality and this, in my view, has seriously damaged the functioning of local democracy.

The above brief overview has highlighted what the key arguments for and against participation are, bringing out the issue areas. While some optimistic scholars argue that well-designed institutional reforms can lead to participatory governance, others believe that outcomes are shaped by the initial balance of power and the empowerment of communities (Zerah, 2009). A number of factors can influence the outcome of participatory practices namely; the role of the public sphere and politics, the initial endowment of communities, the socio-political and cultural context and the nature of civil society (Zerah, 2009). Participation therefore remains a subject of contention and any analysis of participatory governance needs to understand deeply all of these practices and across all classes of the population. With this in mind, the following section turns to the case study of Kampala, where participatory practices were introduced to deliver technical services both in the slum area and in a posh residential area.

Attempts at Participatory Governance and Urban Services in Kampala; How Uganda's Decentralization System functions and the Case of Kampala Capital City Authority.

Uganda has been somewhat of a late-comer compared to other African countries like Kenya and Ghana in the utilization of the private sector in offering services in the urban areas. It has however picked up fast since the onset of privatization in the 1990s, with the now increasing heavy reliance on the private sector to offer services to the public in most urban areas of Uganda. In the last few years, the process of urban reform has been especially visible with the many malls coming up in different parts of the city like the Oasis Mall, Acacia Mall in Kololo and Village Mall in Bugolobi, to mention but a few. In addition, many international brands and high-rise buildings are coming up in the city like the Hilton hotel and the NSSF Buildings among others. This growth has taken the shape of an Infrastructure led growth strategy for the city that has been prompted by a push for public – private partnerships in infrastructure.

Since Uganda’s decentralization programme of the late 1980s, more powers have been delegated to the municipalities including the creation of ward committees to ensure increased participation. A notable characteristic of Uganda’s decentralization is that from the very beginning of the National Resistance Movement’s (NRM) rule, the process was marked as fundamental and crucial to restoring good governance. The restoration of democracy was
Point No.1 in the NRM’s Ten Point Programme. The return of power to the people was, in keeping with the Ten Point Programme, a matter of urgency and nowhere is the tempo best set than in Y.K. Museveni ‘Ours is a fundamental change’ address of January 29, 1986. This urgency motivated the NRM to take certain measures to give assurances to the people that the return to democratic governance was a high priority. One of the measures was to establish, right from the village to the district, resistance councils and committees as policy-making organs.

Municipal councils have been granted wide-ranging powers. They are the highest political authority in their areas of jurisdiction, with both executive and legislative powers, and can therefore make local laws, but not inconsistent with the constitution or any other law. Local government councils and Municipal Councils have powers to make development plans based on locally determined priorities; raise revenue, including determining and implementing the revenue raising mechanism; make, approve and execute own budgets; alter or create new boundaries within their areas of jurisdiction; appoint statutory commissions, boards and committees for personnel (District/Municipal Service Commissions), land (District/Municipal/Town Land Boards), procurement (District and Urban Tender Boards) and Accountability (Local Government Public Accounts committees); establish or abolish offices in the public service of a district or urban council as well as hire and manage personnel, and administer own payroll and pension. Local governments are also vested with powers to provide such services as education (except tertiary education), health services (except referral hospitals), the construction of roads (except those under the central government), and ambulance services.

It is worth noting that these powers are assigned to the councils, and not to individual offices like that of the Chairperson or the Chief Administrative Officer. This is to ensure democratic participation in decision-making and control by the people as represented in council.

It is important to point out that the structure of local government in Uganda takes different forms depending on whether the administrative area in question is rural or urban. Other than Kampala City, which has a special local government administrative structure, the local government system is comprised of a five-tier structure where, in rural areas, the village council (LC1) forms the lowest level, followed by the parish council (LC2), then the sub-county council (LC3), the county council (LC4), and at the top (the district) the district council (LC5). On the other hand, in urban districts the structure begins with the village council (LC1), then the ward or parish council (LC2), the municipal or town division (LC3), the municipality (LC4) and the district council (LC5/mayor).

---

2 Financially, local governments and Municipal Councils in particular, are entitled to levy, charge and collect local taxes and fees as locally generated revenue. But they also receive grants of different kinds from the central government to supplement their meager revenue collections not only for local programmes but also for the purpose of enabling them to implement government plans at the local level. The different grants given to local governments include conditional, unconditional and equalisation grants.
Local governments under decentralization embraced contracting out selected public services to private firms. Tenders were awarded to successful firms to deliver particular services to the people, and in the late 1990s and late 2000s, it had become a fashion for all the districts in Uganda and in Kampala City too. Contracting out had proved to be an important method of prioritizing community social services but this started to go wrong with increased corruption and lack of accountability.

As an article by the Guardian Newspaper recently revealed about the state of corruption in Uganda:

“\textit{The head of state who presides over corruption at the centre has lost the moral ground to enforce discipline at the local government. In fact, as long as a corrupt district (or KCCA) official remains loyal to the president and the ruling party, there is very little chance of concrete action ever being taken against them – except, perhaps, if donors demand it. Corruption has become so endemic in Uganda, and is an accepted way of life, that when someone is appointed or elected to a public office they think it is now their turn to take advantage. The lack of civic competence makes the situation worse. People from rural areas treat the provision of services as a gift or favour from the government. They do not see it as their right to demand it and, therefore, settle for anything. They will never know, for example, how much money has been passed to their local leaders for a road or a school. Even if shoddy work is done they remain thankful because they never expected it in the first place. Public servants have got away with a lot of stealing because they face no sanctions from the beneficiaries. In fact, corrupt people are glorified in the villages because they are the ones with money and have the capacity to solve some of their problems, such as driving a critically ill person to hospital, driving couples around on their wedding day and sometimes building churches and mosques}\textsuperscript{3}.”

A lot of misgivings about the whole concept of contracting out in the delivery of services over time began to emanate under the decentralization program, especially over the last 15 years. Some of the contracts were being taken over by ‘Mafias’ who hijacked tenders and delivered ‘Air’ (Monitor Newspaper, 2002). Many accusations and counter accusations of corruption and substandard work by firms became apparent in the local media (Monitor Newspaper, 2002). Two decades later, public services are still desirable especially so in the largest city of Kampala. According to a local newspaper in Uganda\textsuperscript{4}, the majority of Ugandans were decrying of poor service delivery especially in the city.

The disappointment of private–public partnership and the accumulation of districts to 117 by 2012 coupled with scarce resources found many new districts and municipalities including Kampala City very unfortunate. Because the expansion has not been proportional to the

\textsuperscript{3} See \url{https://www.theguardian.com/katine/2009/mar/13/corruption-endemic-in-uganda}

\textsuperscript{4} See Article by Semujju in Observer Newspaper, 2013
growth of the resource envelope, infrastructure, and human resources and especially services delivery in many districts, stagnated. As such, the NRM government decided to establish the Kampala Capital City Authority.

It was envisioned that the authority would become an institution that would transform the past challenges of inadequate and poor quality service, lack of operational guidelines and standards, inadequate professionalism, poor inspection to confirm compliance to approved specifications, corruption, among many other service delivery issues, into operations with clearly defined administrative and technical structures that would enable the government to deliver much needed services to the residents of Kampala City.

Kampala capital city, is therefore governed under a special legislation, *Kampala Capital City Authority* Act of 2010 (KCCA). Though the City Council is the highest authority under KCCA, the executive functions are discharged by the Chief Executive Officer, who is appointed by the central government, while the Lord Mayor is the chief political officer and is elected, just like his counterparts in other districts, the LC5. The KCC Act came into effect on the 1st of March 2011. It changed Kampala City from a Local Government into a Government entity under Central Government.

It is therefore the failure of local governments in Kampala to deliver services that resulted in a new Kampala City Council (KCC) Act where we witnessed partnership arrangements and intergovernmental relationships (city–sub-county merger) under the current administration of KCC (herein after referred to as Kampala Capital City Authority—KCCA). This was set up after the approval of the KCC Act (GOU, 2010) and the appointment of the current executive director as the chief executive of the authority, the accounting officer, and headship of the central government in the authority. The intention (as noted earlier) was to help restructure, transform, and reposition the authority to deliver quality services to the people of Kampala. In particular, there was need to fix garbage, potholes, sewer services, construction, traffic management, corruption, health services, environment, stray livestock, and management of markets among other challenges in the city.

Suffice it to note that the establishment of KCCA in the capital has deprived elected politicians, noticeably the diminished mechanism of democracy in favor of top management. Mayors and councilors are currently conflicting with the top management of KCCA because they have observed that the reforms have underprivileged them of their controls and influences, and many of the elected leaders interviewed in this study confirmed this. Although the mayor is answerable to the executive director, he is not involved in day-to-day administering of the authority and he cannot question.

As local newspapers have reported, the conflicts between appointed officials of KCCA and elected leaders has derailed progress in the city:
“A fierce fight was on Tuesday reported between the Rubaga councillors and the Kampala City Council Authority (KCCA) law enforcement personnel after the councillors led by Mayor Joyce Ssebugwawo demonstrated, denying other workers entry to the division offices. This was triggered off after KCCA reportedly blocked the municipality accounts. On Wednesday, Mubarak Munyagwa, the Kawempe division mayor, led another demonstration over similar grievances. The Nakawa council leaders have also threatened similar action. Besides the dispute between the city division leaders and the KCCA Executive Director, Jennifer Musisi, there is also another row raging between the Lord Mayor, Erias Lukwago, and the executive director. The row between Musisi and Lukwago appears to be over role disparity. The Lord Mayor, the political head of the Authority, believes Musisi is usurping powers of the political leaders. The escalating conflicts between the city’s elected political leaders and the executive director are unfortunate. Obviously, one of the causes of these conflicts is the fact that there is a new legal framework for the city and both the political leaders and executive director have different interpretation and understanding of the new city law.\(^5\)

That being said, in terms of management structure, KCCA is divided into Divisions, Parishes and Villages. Kampala city is divided into five divisions; that is Central, Nakawa, Makindye, Kawempe and Rubaga. The Central division is the heart of the Kampala’s economic, social and political pulse and almost all government ministries and institutions have their headquarters and offices in the Central division. It also has some of the best hotels in the country which include Serena Hotel, Sheraton Hotel, Imperial Royale, Golf Course Hotel and Protea Hotel. Nakawa division is the industrial heart of Kampala. The industries include food processing, metal fabrication, foam and timber products, and plastics industries. Makindye division is the largest among the five divisions. It also has hotels that include Country Resort Hotel Munyonyo, Hotel Millennium, Chezi Johnson Hotel Muyenga, Tooro Cottage Muyenga B and many other hotels in Muyenga suburb of Makindye. Kawempe division is located in the north of Kampala. It has several trading centres including Bwaise, Kalerwe, Kazo among others and it has manufacturing industries such as Maganjo Grain Millers and cooking oil producing plants. Rubaga division is the cultural home of Buganda Kingdom. It also has industries in Nalukolongo industrial area and woodworks in Ndeeba. The Divisions are further divided into smaller units, from parish council down to Village council. Kikono Slum is located in Kawempe Division, while Nakasero is located in Kampala Division.

Participatory Sanitation and Waste Management Projects in Kampala City; The Case of Nakasero Community and Kikoni Slum area.

Kampala is the largest and richest city in Uganda, being also the country’s capital. It covers a jurisdiction of 1.5 million people. It is organized in 4 large spatial zones and most of the slums are located in the suburbs. As noted earlier, KCCA is headed by a powerful Executive Director, who initiates policies and prevails over the elected wing. Senior bureaucrats run

\[\text{http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1007143/city-leaders-stop-wrangling}\]
executive departments and wield considerable control over policy implementation. They are at the forefront of reforms that are often opposed and challenged by less influential elected councilors.

Kampala city generates an estimated 1,500 tonnes of garbage daily, but over the years KCCA has been able to pick up only 500 tonnes a day. This had caused garbage to accumulate in neighborhoods, on street corners and in local markets with resultant health risks and other environmental concerns.

On average, garbage collection stood at 29,543 tons/month as at end of June, 2012 when KCCA was established and this has increased to approx. 40,000 tons/month to-date.

This performance is attributed to KCCA’s contribution that has grown from 54% to 68.9% resulting from improved supervision, improved garbage fleet management and the increased number of casual laborers that have been brought on board to manage street sweeping and de-silting of road side drains. In addition, innovative arrangements arranged by KCCA to involve local communities especially in the slums to organize themselves and contract out some of these services has improved waste management in the City. KCCA also launched a community-based initiative to enhance community cleaning in the slum areas. The cleaning exercise has now been institutionalized as a monthly exercise in all divisions every last Saturday of the month. KCCA is working with various institutions including Banks, Telecom Companies, Buganda Government, Police, Religious Institutions and the Kampala City Yange Foundation.

According to officials interviewed, over 815 litter bins have so far been distributed in the Central Business District, KCCA schools and Hospitals to promote responsible solid waste management. The Solid Waste Ordinance was publicized and for the first time since its formulation 12 years ago, it was enforced and over 1,000 arrests were made.

To increase efficiency and realize higher collection rates KCCA designed an integrated solid waste management system with support from International Finance Corporation (IFC); an arm of the World Bank. The integrated solid waste management system incorporates both private companies and Community Based Organizations (CBOs) in a bid to institutionalize community involvement in the management of solid waste and general city clean up exercises. However, the paradoxes inherent in the rationale for participatory governance, highlighted in the earlier sections are very present in Kampala. It is the NGOs who are subcontracted by KCCA that spearhead the community involvement of slum dwellers with the rationale of community empowerment, civic sense and the creation of employment. In reality however, these NGOs tend to operate as businesses and have used this partnership with public authorities as a window of opportunity to push for their own agendas. As illustrated by one inhabitant of Kikoni slum interviewed;

“Our community association; ‘Kikubo Tweyambe’ has not met in three months, although we see the ‘Bin-it’ officials who assisted us in starting this community association coming once in
a while to pick our rubbish. But they do not even clean the place well. It seems they are only making their own money yet when they were awarded the tender, they promised to give us jobs and work with us. They are just using us to be close to the politicians and make money”.

In the more middle class urban neighborhoods of Kampala, of which Nakasero is part, the case is however different. Residents on their own, initially pioneered a program to ensure collective and better sanitation, cleanliness and proper management of waste in the area. The KCCA took advantage of this already existing framework of an organized community to institutionalize it and create conditions for working together with the residents, towards a shared objective of improving cleanliness, sanitation and proper waste management. The existing civic networks in most upscale urban neighborhoods in Kampala has made it possible for KCCA to champion such programs like the monthly cleaning program and the contracted collection of garbage. Through housing cooperative societies, churches and networks of associations, monthly meetings are held in most wards to sort out water, sanitation and waste management problems and improve coordination of the actors.

In Nakasero, the residents meet every first Friday of the month to take stock of any challenges in the area and address them. Cases of failure by a contractor to collect garbage on time or the littering of the garbage track have been handled under such meetings. Often, an official from KCCA is present as well as a representative from the contractors. These meetings have dealt with a wide array of issues and over time, these repeated interactions have led to good coordination and engagement with the KCCA officials, which have led to faster outcomes. Within these meetings, some leaders have also emerged and have been able to set agendas, prioritize issues and establish healthy relationships with the administration of the City culminating into their joining local politics. A former ward chairman in Nakasero housing Estate for instance has now joined mainstream politics and is a councilor championing the interests of residents in Nakasero in KCCA. In the interviews conducted among residents, most of the respondents (53 percent) felt that there are improved relations with administration of the city and that KCCA is indeed providing support and improving service provision within the city. As a result, many respondents agreed that the neighborhoods are cleaner with the level of satisfaction being 88 percent. Nevertheless, there is room for improvement as some residents/respondents noted that other services like roads take long to be maintained.

The question then arises; can these spaces of engagement, which Local residential associations occupy, be referred to as participatory governance? Arguably not as these sorts of arrangements remain limited to certain areas within the city. Residential Associations are located in areas with an important share of middle-class and upper middle class colonies. This allows them to interact with officials from KCCA as equals.

Suffice it to say that residents involved in such associations have been instrumental in harnessing the potential of these arrangements and spaces of engagement with KCCA
officials and contractors to create opportunities to influence decision making processes and be involved in local politics of the city.

Through such local networking, residential associations have been able to discuss and oppose some urban projects by establishing links with KCCA headquarters. In Nakasero for instance, residents opposed a road extension through the housing Estate and their concerns were taken into account. Their direct access to decision makers has led to meetings at the headquarters and which possibilities of a formal expansion of the role of residential associations is being discussed.

In addition, residential associations around Kampala have started to become part of the political processes. In the recently concluded National and Local elections of February 2016, many associations including that of Nakasero started interacting with prospective candidates for elections. Inviting the politicians to speak at the meetings and share their visions for the development of the area marked a shift towards political activity. Residents compelled the candidates to voice their priorities and make commitments to residents. Meetings have since continued to be organized with the elected councilors to take stock of their progress in honoring their promises and task them to deliver. This shift towards political engagement remains limited in scope and its potential still needs to be assessed.

Evidently, the residential associations have enabled the middle class to be empowered but the bigger questions remains, where is the space of the poorer localities?? Are they really involved and participating in Urban governance too?

For the poor and slum dwellers in Kampala, direct community participation through community-based organizations was introduced when KCCA was established. KCCA contracted NGOs to enhance community participation in waste management and cleanliness as well as improved waste management in the slums. However, many slum dwellers interviewed criticized the role of NGOs arguing that these behaved like traditional private entrepreneurs more concerned with making money from garbage collection and nothing else. Apart from a few workshops on keeping your environment clean and proper disposal of waste, some of the slum dwellers interviewed noted that there has not been any attempt to engage them in the business of garbage collection so they can also benefit. Many were disappointed that they had not gotten any jobs with the NGOs yet these were promised at the start.

**Conclusion**

Participation in urban governance arguably seems to perpetuate and reshape ‘clientelist’ relationships. The NGOs sub-contracted by KCCA to empower local communities in the slum areas to participate in waste management and cleaning of their areas have acted more as private businesses. In the case of upper middle-class and middle class communities like
Nakasero, it was evident from the preliminary findings of this research, that formal structures of governance are more accessible to the richer and more educated members of a community. Such studies make a strong case for reintroducing the question of local politics into the analysis of reformed urban service provision. As Zara, (2009) rightly argues; the embeddedness of community participation in local politics, contrary to a romanticized view of communities, does not lead to self management, but to reshaped forms of power geometry within communities as indicated by the Nakasero residents association example. In the poorer neighbourhoods of Kikoni however, community participation reinforces the importance of middlemen. Pre-liminary findings also suggest that community participation is very close to private contracting. Use of NGOs to manage waste in the slums by KCCA is one way that the authority has employed to improve sanitation in slums.

The proliferation of participatory mechanisms in the management of urban services has produced interesting discussions on their potential to contribute to the whole debate of participatory governance and its role in promoting citizen participation and empowerment. The aim of this paper is to contribute to this debate using the case of Kampala. New forms of urban management evidently contribute to a process of governing beyond the state, which is taking place in Kampala with the establishment of KCCA. Participation is now used as a managerial approach by the public sector to delegate responsibilities to communities and to reduce its labour burden by scaling down regulation at the neighborhood levels. Middle class communities, who have traditionally had better access to services, have significantly been able to harness their potential of participatory schemes and extend their scope. By building strong city networks, the middle and upper middle class communities have managed to influence decision-making processes and develop new citizen –government relationships.

On the other hand, participatory schemes have been designed to open up space for NGOs to become the bridges for poorer communities in the city, in an attempt to better adapt services to the slums. However on this front, the results have been disappointing. There has been limited success as NGOs have taken on the role of a contacted agent of the state for providing services in the slums and poor communities around the city. In effect therefore, some form of governing by influence is emerging which cannot be ignored.

REFERENCES

References:


Attempts at Participatory Governance in Urban Management in Kampala City, Uganda
P.K. Mbabazi
(First Draft Only, Not for Citation Yet)


Attempts at Participatory Governance in Urban Management in Kampala City, Uganda  
P.K. Mbabazi  
(First Draft Only, Not for Citation Yet)  


Newspaper Articles:
- https://books.google.com.gh/books?id=_3r7CwAAQBAJ&pg=PA194&lpg=PA194&dq=Kampala+Capital+City+Authority+and+Local+Participation&source=bl&ots=CoUl5hvEGF&sig=ECTIO3rOGDAC5 Ct1ljatUZK5ys&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwijy9Tl2siPAhXBNBoKHbRYBB4Q6AEIPDAF
Mobility, segregation and integration
Chair: Ester Barinaga & Henrietta Palmer

International mobility and resources in a metropolitan context: Central Americans trajectories in Mexico City. Laurent Faret, CESSMA – Université Paris Diderot

100 % uncertain. How urban planning in Germany is challenged by providing accommodation for refugees. Katrin Gliemann, TU Dortmund University, Faculty of Spatial Planning, Department International Planning Studies, Germany.

A Right to the 'World-Class City'? Processes of spatial exclusion of Romanian Roma migrants in Stockholm. Josh Levy and Ilda Lindell, Department of Human Geography, Stockholm University, Sweden.
ABSTRACT (Max. 300 words):

The paper aims to document and analyse the resource mobilization processes for Central American migrants acceeding a new metropolitan environment, the urban area of Mexico City. Within a short or longer lasting in Mexico, mobile populations from El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala address new questions on the forms of anchoring in the city and the social and spatial relationships of these populations with different urban dynamics in the metropolitan context. Beyond the transit phenomena, urban presence and settlement is getting increasingly important for individuals and families from Central America, calling for a new examination of the relationship between trajectories of mobility and installation in the metropolitan area by putting together migratory resources and urban resources. If the attractiveness of the urban area of Mexico is real, migrant courses are also the result of blocked paths either in attempted migration to the north or impossible returns to the origin country. Between migration projects failed and weakness of family and social networks, these populations are building adaptive strategies of installation and socioeconomic integration, creating despite the vulnerability a new horizon locally anchored.

L'article vise à documenter et analyser les formes de mobilisation de ressources pour des migrants centraméricains accédant à un nouvel environnement métropolitain, celui de la région urbaine de Mexico. Les présences, courtes ou plus durables, d'une population mobile en provenance du Salvador, du Honduras et du Guatemala dans la métropole interrogent les formes d'ancre dans la ville et les rapports socio-spatiaux de ces populations avec les différentes dynamiques urbaines et métropolitaines contemporaines. Au-delà du transit, la présence de plus en plus importante d’individus et de familles en provenance d’Amérique centrale appelle à réinterroger les rapports entre trajectoires de mobilité et installation dans l’espace métropolitain, mettant en tension ressources migratoires et ressources urbaines. Si l’attractivité de la région urbaine de Mexico est réelle, les parcours de migrants sont aussi le résultat de trajectoires bloquées, soit dans une tentative de migration vers le Nord, soit face à des logiques de retour impossible dans le pays d’origine. Entre projets migratoires contrariés et faiblesse de réseaux familiaux et sociaux d’entraide, ces populations construisent des stratégies adaptatives d’installation et d’insertion socioéconomique, fabriquant malgré la vulnérabilité un nouvel horizon ancré localement.

KEY WORDS
Dans une perspective classique de l’analyse des dynamiques urbaines, la ville peut être considérée à la fois comme le lieu d’un ensemble de ressources situées, existant par leur disponibilité relative pour des populations urbaines, et par les processus socioéconomiques et politiques qui contribuent à produire et organiser ces ressources, où interviennent des acteurs multiples aux intérêts non convergents (Pahl, 1975). Ces ressources, exprimées en termes de marchés (marchés de l’emploi, marché immobilier…) ou de potentialités (accès au système de santé, au système éducatif, à des dispositifs d’aide…), sont l’objet de dynamiques de production en permanente évolution. Ces dernières sont peu perméables à une lecture globale si l’on tient compte du fait que la question de l’accessibilité dépend aussi, et de façon irréductible, des caractéristiques des populations urbaines pour lesquelles l’existence de ces ressources est posée et des rapports de pouvoir entre groupes sociaux dans la ville (Duncan, 1976). La question de la distribution et de l’accès aux ressources a ainsi constitué et continue d’être une pierre angulaire des analyses sur le développement urbain et sur la ville en général, notamment lorsque celle-ci est appréhendée comme un système socio-spatial où s’expriment configurations territoriales et rapports de pouvoir autour de ces ressources et leur allocation (Mack et McElrath, 1964 ; ONU-Habitat 2012).

L’existence d’un ensemble d’opportunités potentiellement accessibles caractériserait ainsi l’attractivité d’un espace urbain, en particulier dans ses capacités à drainer des flux de population migrante. Dans ce sens, l’espace urbain, et plus encore métropolitain, offrirait des avantages objectifs, liés à la diversité des différents secteurs du marché de l’emploi, formel et informel, à la grande variété des types et des modalités d’accès au logement ou encore à l’éventail des services publics et privés, en matière de santé, d’éducation, de transport… Le risque d’une telle approche existe cependant, celui d’une vision mécaniste de la ville considérée comme un ensemble de lieux dotés de ressources accessibles et disponibles, même si diversement, que des acteurs urbains organisereraient. Une lecture normative ou prescriptive, à portée fonctionnaliste de la construction des dynamiques urbaines peut en découler. Si l’une des dimensions des dynamiques migratoires vers la ville est bien reliée à cette attractivité, il convient de s’interroger sur la nature du rapport entre l’existence de ressources situées et la possibilité de populations en provenance de l’extérieur, et en particulier de l’étranger, d’accéder à celles-ci. En particulier, pour ce qui nous intéresse ici, lorsque les populations migrantes en question sont dans des situations de trajectoires contrariées, de changement par rapport aux projets migratoires initiaux ou de faible recours à des réseaux de connaissance dans ces environnements urbains.

Le travail présenté ici a pour objectif de questionner ce rapport dans un cas trop peu étudié encore, celui des populations centraméricaines d’établissement récent à Mexico, à partir de l’observation des formes d’accès à un environnement métropolitain dans un contexte marqué par un fort niveau de mobilité, de vulnérabilité et d’invisibilité. Comme on le verra, les flux migratoires en provenance du Honduras, du Salvador et du Guatemala amènent aujourd’hui dans un nombre de cas non négligeable à des trajectoires non « linéaires », au sens où la présence au Mexique ne peut être restreinte à un simple moment (de quelques heures ou jours) dans un espace/temps de trajectoire vers les États-Unis. L’objectif est de proposer une réflexion sur les conditions de l’être en ville pour des populations migrantes dont le transit laisse place à des présences plus durables, et sur le
jeu des tensions entre possibilités et contraintes de l’insertion dans un nouvel environnement urbain. Il s’agit aussi de réfléchir aux formes de production d’urbanité par ces populations dans un contexte métropolitain, c’est-à-dire dont les échelles et mécanismes vont au-delà de la ville de dimension moindre pour laquelle on présupposerait une trame socio-spatiale plus homogène. En mobilisant différents niveaux d’échelle, le but est de conduire une observation des pratiques spécifiques de l’espace urbain en lien avec cette dynamique d’accès à des ressources et de s’interroger sur les différentes interactions socio-spatiales que celles-ci génèrent. On sait combien les présences migrantes, lorsqu’elles s’inscrivent dans la durée, participent à la production des dynamiques urbaines (Guillon, 1995 ; Tarrius, 1993). Avec la transformation des formes migratoires et le brouillage des catégories entre transit, étape, installation et circulation, les mobilités migratoires amènent aujourd’hui à d’autres lectures des formes du rapport à l’urbain, notamment dans les contextes de circuits transnationaux marqués par des niveaux élevés d’incertitude et/ou de vulnérabilité (Agier, 1999 ; Bensaâd, 2003 ; Alioua, 2007).

Posée de cette façon, la question de l’accès à des ressources des populations migrantes introduit la prise en compte de dynamiques sociales que l’on pourrait qualifier comme étant à l’articulation entre l’être en ville et l’être en migration. A la suite des travaux relevant du champ des études migratoires plus que des études urbaines, la ressource n’est pas que située/territorialisée, elle est aussi ce que les individus mobilisent : accès à l’information, réseaux de connaissances, production de la ressource par mobilisation d’un ensemble de contacts divers liés à connaissance de l’environnement socio-économique, production de stratégies d’adaptation et/ou d’invisibilisation par des pratiques adaptées à un contexte rencontré (« mimétisme » avec d’autres populations, usage de la langue et dissimulation des accents, formes de présentation de soi, réification des parcours…). Aborder la question de l’articulation de cet ensemble de moyens renvoie à une analyse des différents niveaux de l’interaction dans l’espace urbain, aux formes de ce qu’Isaac Joseph qualifiait de ressources et répertoires disponibles pour le citadin (Joseph, 1998) et la manière avec laquelle ces formes s’ancrent dans un contexte socioculturel en même temps qu’elles témoignent d’effets de temporalités spécifiques (Hernandez, 2015).

Face à la difficulté d’observer ces formes d’insertion, la méthodologie de cette recherche appelle quelques commentaires. En premier lieu, la nature même de la présence en ville, caractérisée par des temporalités fluctuantes, une dispersion spatiale relativement importante et des situations de précarité pour une part notable des populations a rendu nécessaire une démarche foncièrement qualitative, en lien avec des éléments de discussion provenant de la littérature existante et certaines sources secondaires. Les observations empiriques mobilisées dans ce texte proviennent d’un travail d’entretiens et d’observation conduit sur trois périodes entre juillet 2015 et juillet 2016. Les entretiens ont été conduits prioritairement auprès de migrants d’installation récente, auxquels s’ajoutent des entretiens avec des responsables des organisations civiles d’appui et des acteurs publics locaux ou nationaux concernés par le thème. En second lieu, les contextes d’insécurité et d’exposition des populations migrantes à diverses formes de violence de la part des acteurs de la criminalité organisée ou de certains agents des autorités locales et migratoires doivent être signalées ici. Parallèlement aux vulnérabilités qu’ils génèrent, ces contextes ont des effets sur la connaissance des processus en cours : des formes de méfiance généralisée et d’invisibilisation des individus sont largement perceptibles, notamment pour les plus vulnérables d’entre eux (familles, femmes seules, mineurs…). Par ailleurs, ces conditions sont à l’origine pour le chercheur

1 Le travail de recherche dont cet article présente une partie des résultats a été conduit dans le cadre de la participation de l’auteur à différents programmes, en particulier ici le Programme RESUM « Ressources urbaines et trajectoires familiales dans le Mexique des années 2010 » (PICS CNRS 2014-2016) coordonné par A. Ribardière, une mission longue durée IRD en avril-mai 2016 et la participation au LMI MESO (IRD).
2 Voir par exemple Ma Mung, 1999, Morokvasic-Muller, 1999.
3 Les modes d’entrée en contact avec les populations migrantes ont été diversifiés afin de couvrir au mieux les différentes situations existantes : via les organisations d’appui, via les structures et lieux de sociabilité (restaurants, espaces d’échange et d’organisation sur internet) et dans différents lieux de concentration temporaire des populations migrantes. Pour leur participation à la mise en œuvre du travail de terrain, l’auteur adresse ici ses remerciements à Marina Pantoja García, Gabriela Vargas Flores et María Luisa Buenrostro Loera.
d’une accessibilité limitée à une part des espaces de la présence en ville, notamment dans certains secteurs des périphéries extérieures de l’agglomération et dans les espaces interstitiels de la ville, là où le contrôle par les acteurs criminels est significatif. Ces dimensions limitatives, sans doute trop peu signalées aujourd’hui dans les travaux de sciences sociales, sont aussi partie prenante des réalités d’un contexte métropolitain comme celui du Grand Mexico, en même temps qu’elles peuvent relativiser en partie la portée des matériaux de terrain sur lesquels s’appuie l’analyse conduite ici.

Ressources urbaines et migration : échelles et processus

Dans l’espace métropolitain des villes latinoaméricaines, les facteurs de la distribution sociospatiale des ressources relèvent de processus induits par la diversité des vecteurs de production et d’organisation des formes urbaines et des stratifications sociales qui en résultent. Les dynamiques de fragmentation et de division sociale de l’espace métropolitain sont, entre autres caractéristiques, le reflet de formes d’accès aux ressources qui ne peuvent que très difficilement être lues à une échelle d’ensemble. En termes d’échelles d’analyse, la place des dynamiques de production métropolitaine et, en conséquence, de développement des espaces locaux urbains au sein d’un espace régional Urbain donné apparaît de plus en plus nécessaire pour saisir les formes de redistribution des mécanismes d’accès à des ressources, que celles-ci soient relatives au logement ou au marché du travail ou relatives à des services de santé et d’éducation par exemple. Les processus de transformation urbaine associés à la globalisation sont habituellement caractérisés, dans un registre souvent autant métaphorique qu’analytique, par les termes de polarisation des revenus, de dualisation du marché du travail et de fragmentation croissante de l’espace et des sociétés urbaines (Duhau, 2008). Sur ces aspects, on observera à partir de travaux récents que les échelles de la ségrégation de sont resserrées et que les logiques sociales qui sous-tendent ces processus renvoient à des contextes plus complexes, ou la localisation dans l’espace métropolitain n’est qu’une dimension à côté des processus sociaux et politiques d’insertion reformulés et à l’individualisation des trajectoires d’insertion (Bayón et Saravi, 2013).

Dans la perspective développée ici, il en résulte que l’idée d’une appréhension par les populations migrantes d’un environnement et d’une échelle métropolitaines relève souvent plus d’un effet d’analyse que des expériences propres telles que l’observation permet de les caractériser. L’accès à la ville est plus vraisemblablement la résultante d’un double jeu, celui des interactions à l’échelle locale, voire micro-locale, des contextes d’arrivée/insertion ; celui des articulations entre ces dynamiques locales et des facteurs structurant de niveau métropolitain. Pour compléter le cadre d’observation, ajoutons que dans le cas des trajectoires migratoires, les modes d’appréhension d’un environnement donné mobilisent également la référence à un espace physico-social migratoire plus large pour les individus, celui des environnements quittés, atteints préalablement ou objets de projets à réaliser.

En parallèle, la littérature sur l’accès aux ressources en ville pour les populations les plus vulnérables économiquement et socialement signale la dégradation des conditions d’insertion et de reproduction sociale, dans un contexte de renforcement d’inégalités et de transformation des politiques sociales et de gestion urbaine (Ziccardi, 2012 ; Sehtman y Zenteno, 2015). Les situations de crise et le renforcement des effets du modèle néolibéral dans la production des environnements urbains ont conduit à une érosion des réponses domestiques collectives et de la mobilisation des réseaux d’échange et de solidarité, rendant de plus en plus difficiles la mise en œuvre des stratégies adaptatives. Selon les termes de Gonzalez de la Rocha, les ressources de la pauvreté ont fait place à une pauvreté des ressources, dans le sens d’une dégradation des capacités d’adaptation des

4 Plusieurs municipes de l’Etat de Mexico en situation de conurbation présentent les taux de criminalité parmi les plus élevés du pays (El Universal, 16/11/2014 ; Expansion, 24/03/2014). La présence d’organisations criminelles comme Los Zetas et La Familia Michoacana opérant dans des activités d’enlèvements, d’extorsion et de narcomendudeo a été partiellement reconnue par les autorités policières (Sexenio Estado de México, 12/03/2012).
populations pauvres aux nouvelles dynamiques urbaines d’exclusion, y compris par l’érosion du recours à des activités économiques informelles (Gonzalez de la Rocha, 2001).

En parallèle de ces évolutions d’ensemble, on signalera que les modalités d’accès à la ville, quand elles sont considérées à l’échelle des groupes sociaux ou des individus, continuent de s’inscrire plus immédiatement dans une perspective locale. Ces modalités sont à la fois marquées par des trajectoires d’insertion dans le tissu urbain (y compris physique, de points d’étape dans les parcours de mobilité par exemple) et d’expérimentation d’environnements caractérisés par des situations de développement données, des contextes locaux produits par des dynamiques antérieures propres et par les articulations entre ces espaces et le reste d’un environnement urbain plus large. L’espace urbain métropolitain peut ainsi être abordé comme agrégation d’une pluralité d’espaces urbains distincts, avec coexistence et articulation différenciées de différents ordres associés à différents types de contextes urbains, produits de l’inclusion/production d’espaces plus ou moins reliés à l’ordre métropolitain (Duhau et Giglia, 2012 ; Prévôt-Schapira, 2005).

Trajectoires et lieux de la présence centraméricaine à Mexico

La population en provenance du Triangle nord de l’Amérique centrale (Honduras, El Salvador et Guatemala) est majoritairement dans une mobilité de « transit » au Mexique, selon les formes de structuration des systèmes migratoires régionaux construits sur la période 1970-2010 (Faret, 2015). Par nature difficile, La quantification des mobilités migratoires entre l’Amérique centrale et les Etats-Unis via le territoire mexicain est soumise à débat et des estimations entre 140 à 400 000 migrants en transit par an sont souvent retenues (Olayo Mendez et al., 2014) ⁵. Si la migration dite de passage est très majoritaire, un nombre croissant de travaux signalent le prolongement des durées de permanence au Mexique (Nájera, 2016 ; Cobo et Fuerte, 2013), en grande partie liées aux effets de vulnérabilité avérée des migrants face à des situations de violence, d’augmentation de l’insécurité, de discrimination et de criminalisation (Casillas, 2011 ; Rodríguez, 2014 ; REDODEM, 2015). Incluant des formes de mobilité interrompue, d’installation dans des espaces d’attente et des transformations des projets migratoires initiaux, cette dynamique va aujourd’hui au-delà des régions traditionnelles d’immigration dans le Sud du pays et génère des formes d’installation, de temporaires à durables, en particulier dans les contextes urbains, nœuds des déplacements et lieux de l’accès potentiel à des ressources (Tinoco, 2012).

Si les bases historiques de la présence centraméricaine au Mexique renvoie à la période des conflits armés dans l’isthme centraméricain⁶, les différences entre les migrations des années 1975-1990 et la migration actuelle sont notables, à la fois dans les caractéristiques sociodémographiques de la population et les contextes de mise en mobilité. De façon générale, et malgré l’absence de données précises, les flux d’aujourd’hui apparaissent plus divers en termes d’âge, de sexe, de niveau de scolarisation et d’origine géographique des migrants. Leur point commun est la très grande vulnérabilité des personnes en déplacement dans leur lieu d’origine, que celle-ci soit liée à l’augmentation de la violence, notamment urbaine, au cours des deux dernières décennies ou à la dégradation des conditions d’accès aux marchés du travail de la région (PEN, 2016 ; García et Villafuerte, 2014). Une autre dimension est la prédominance d’une migration très majoritairement sans documentation migratoire (ou par expiration du visa ayant permis l’entrée sur le territoire). Pour la période récente, l’obtention du statut de

---

⁵ Les données de 140 000 entrées annuelles à la frontière sud publiées par l’Institut National de Migration (INM) et celles de 104 000 expulsions annuelles de Centraméricains par les autorités états-unienes (Najera Aguirre, 2016) donnent aussi une mesure de l’importance du phénomène sur la période récente.

⁶ En faisant abstraction ici d’une présence plus ancienne remontant aux années 1950, mais beaucoup moins nombreuse et de nature très différente, celle d’étudiants, de professionnels spécialisés ou de leaders politiques.
réfugié ou d’un visa humanitaire ne concerne qu’une partie très restreinte des migrants (Cobo et Fuerte, 2013). La migration masculine reste majoritaire (Rodriguez, 2014), mais la féminisation des flux est devenue significative, ce que les études de la fin des années 1980 avait déjà commencé à enregistrer (O’Dogherty, 1989). La migration de mineurs, accompagnés mais surtout non accompagnés, est devenue importante, en particulier de jeunes adolescents (Rodriguez, 2014 ; UNICEF, 2016) et témoigne de l’absence d’alternatives dans les régions d’origine. Le niveau moyen de scolarité est plus bas que celui des périodes des guerres civiles, attestant d’un élargissement de la migration à des secteurs plus larges des pays d’origine. Concernant la région urbaine de Mexico, la migration salvadorienne est la plus ancienne, ce qui se traduit par l’existence de réseaux sociaux constitués, même s’ils ne sont que partiellement mobilisables par les populations récemment installées. La migration en provenance du Honduras a connu la croissance la plus significative sur la période récente, dans un environnement d’incertitudes plus élevé encore, pour des migrants très souvent dépourvus d’expérience migratoire antérieure.

De façon générale, la région urbaine de Mexico n’est pas la destination initiale de la migration centraméricaine. Pour une grande majorité des migrants dans l’échantillon d’étude, l’installation à Mexico résulte d’une rupture dans un projet initial orienté vers les États-Unis. Mexico apparaît comme un espace de réorientation des trajectoires, un point entre au moins deux types de flux : une trajectoire interrompue dans le parcours Amérique centrale / États-Unis ou une expulsion des États-Unis sans possibilité de retour dans le pays d’origine. On y arrive donc du sud mais aussi du nord. L’analyse de ces types de trajectoires explique en grande partie les conditions d’insertion dans l’espace métropolitain. Dans le premier cas, les situations rencontrées témoignent de l’insuffisance de ressources économiques et sociales pour prolonger le déplacement vers le Nord. Le coût du déplacement et son augmentation récente du fait de la montée en puissance des réseaux de passeurs, la faible connaissance des routes migratoires et une possibilité très restreinte de s’appuyer sur des réseaux de connaissance en sont les principales caractéristiques. La situation de transit s’inscrit alors peu à peu dans la durée, quand les situations croissantes d’exposition à des phénomènes de violence conduisent à l’interruption des parcours. Dans le second cas, Mexico apparaît comme une localisation de repli après une expulsion des États-Unis. Ici, ce sont à la fois les situations de violence vécues ou craintes dans l’environnement d’origine et, de façon moins marquée, les difficultés d’accès au marché du travail dans les pays d’origine qui empêchent le retour. Rester à Mexico apparaît alors comme une alternative, au-delà des difficultés rencontrées, en même temps qu’une possibilité d’entretenir l’espoir d’une nouvelle migration.


7 De 2001 à 2011, le Mexique a enregistré 1905 demandes de ressortissants d’Amérique centrale pour la reconnaissance du statut de réfugiés, par ordre d’importance du Honduras, du Salvador et du Guatemala. 296 statuts de réfugiés ont été délivrés, soit 15% des demandes.

8 Pour une analyse des dynamiques migratoires centraméricaines à Mexico durant la période des conflits armés, on se référa à O’Dogherty, 1989. Du point de vue des nationalités, l’étude indique que 72% des migrants enquêtés provenaient du Salvador, 20% du Guatemala et 6% du Honduras.

9 La plupart des observateurs des dynamiques migratoires centraméricaines s’accordent sur le fait que les flux sont de plus en plus « encadrés » par des groupes organisés illégaux qui tirent un bénéfice économique de ces mobilités, en particulier depuis 2008-2010.
de lire les trajectoires aux échelles locales, signalons que les données du recensement de 2010 permettent une appréciation, même si assez imprécise, puisque la part de la population la plus mobile et/ou la plus récemment arrivée est notablement sous renseignée. Selon cette source indirecte, une spatialisation à l’échelle des délégations (pour la ville de Mexico) et des municipes (pour la partie en conurbation de l’État de Mexico) permet une première caractérisation. Pour les Salvadoriens, les espaces de première périphérie anciennement intégrés sont les lieux d’une présence plus importante qu’ailleurs : Tlalpan, Naucalpan et Atizapán notamment. Ici les logiques d’insertion des années 1980 restent vraisemblablement perceptibles, même si moins opératoires aujourd’hui. Pour les Honduriens, la présence plus récente se lit en partie par une surreprésentation dans les municipes du nord de l’agglomération (Tultitlan, Ecatepec de Morelos et Cuautitlán Iztalí notamment), périphéries plus lointaines de l’agglomération, au niveau socio-économique plus bas et dont l’insertion dans l’espace métropolitain n’est que partielle. Pour la population originaire du Guatemala, une coexistence d’installations en situation centrale (Benito Juarez) et périphérique (Ecatepec) apparaît. Pour autant, on peut établir que la présence centraméricaine à Mexico est une réalité devenue significative selon une autre dynamique spatiale, récente et évolutive, plus lisible à une échelle locale, celles qui résultent des lieux d’interruption des parcours et de recherche d’appui dans l’environnement métropolitain. En ce sens, la géographie de la présence centraméricaine est en grande partie liée aux axes du déplacement, en lien avec la migration dite de transit. Nœud sur les routes migratoires qui conduisent vers les Etats-Unis, Mexico est le point de la concentration des réseaux routiers et ferroviaires nationaux. Une cartographie des routes migratoires fait apparaître la région urbaine de Mexico comme le lieu des ruptures de déplacement. Pour les mouvements en bus, les grandes jonctions inter-urbaines aboutissent ou partent des principaux terminaux de la capitale. La distribution des réseaux d’autobus de niveau secondaire est beaucoup plus complexe, mais les polarités que constituent les centralités de second ordre dans l’espace métropolitain sont également marquées, et certaines mobilités migratoires vers le Nord sont en partie assurées par ce réseau secondaire. Le moindre coût du transport et des contrôles migratoires plus rares expliquent des déplacements de courte distance, rendant nécessaire un apprentissage des destinations successives à atteindre. Dans le grand Mexico, cette mobilité par sauts successifs apparaît plus compliquée qu’ailleurs, une connaissance de l’espace métropolitain étant difficile à acquérir. Les déplacements migratoires à travers la grande région urbaine reposent également sur le réseau de transport ferroviaire des marchandises (Casillas, 2008 ; Aragon, 2014). Les convois provenant de l’isthme de Tehuantepec ou de Veracruz convergent au nord de Mexico. Ces trains permettent le déplacement des migrants depuis les régions sud du pays vers le centre du territoire national, avant une redistribution plus au nord selon les différentes destinations aux Etats-Unis ou les points de passage de la frontière (routes de Mexicali, el Paso, Laredo…).

Faire ressource à Mexico

Dans la logique de l’installation, il s’agit pour les migrants de « faire ressource » dans la ville, au sens de créer un certain nombre de conditions permettant une permanence au-delà des moments d’attente avant un prochain déplacement. La différence avec le transit apparaît ici clairement : la pérennité relative des solutions mises en œuvre l’emporte sur la stratégie de mobilité. Aux recherches de moyens et de ressources pour le déplacement se substitue la recherche de formes d’ancrage et de moyens de stabiliser une présence qui se prolonge.

Du point des vue des logiques territoriales, les lieux dans la ville doivent ici être appréhendées à des échelles micro-locales et au regard de leur articulation avec des territoires locaux. On observe ici l’existence de centralités dans les logiques de présence et d’installation en ville. Les espaces aux abords des voies de transport

10 Sur les routes de la migration, voir par exemple Casillas 2008.
11 Moins médiatisée mais tout aussi importante, sinon plus, que le déplacement en train (Rodriguez, 2014)
12 Mais loin d’être anodine, notamment dans la partie nord de la région urbaine, ou par sauts successifs les migrants quittent la ville en direction de Huehuetoca, Pachuca et Queretaro.
et les points de transbordement en sont une première dimension. C’est très souvent à partir de ces points, ou dans leur voisinage immédiat, que s’opère pour les arrivants la première mise en relation avec l’environnement local, à la fois par des formes d’interaction avec les acteurs locaux (migrants en transit, population locale et autorités) et par une exploration progressive en direction des tissus urbains proches. De ce point de vue, la place des centralités secondaires dans l’espace métropolitain est ici relativement significative : places publiques, églises, marchés ou parcs urbains jouent simultanément le rôle d’espaces d’attente/repos ou d’accès à des aides ponctuelles, notamment sous forme de sollicitation d’aide dans la rue. Sur ce dernier point, les axes routiers et les carrefours entre grandes avenues sont des lieux d’occupation fréquente de l’espace public. Ici la tension reste significative entre possibilité d’accéder à des ressources et exposition à des formes de rançonnage ou de violence.

Pour les migrants dépourvus de réseaux de connaissance dans la ville, cas fréquent dans l’échantillon d’enquête, le cheminement permettant une première insertion débute en ces lieux, et les récits d’accès par des contacts aléatoires à un hébergement temporaire ou une première possibilité d’emploi sont les plus fréquents. Une autre polarité significative, en partie en lien avec ce qui précède, est constituée par les lieux d’hébergement temporaire mis en place par les organisations civiles et religieuses locales, à Mexico et dans certains municipes de la conurbation. Circulant au sein des populations en mouvement, l’information sur l’existence de ces structures oriente une partie des trajectoires. Un exemple significatif est celui de la Casa del migrante San Juan Diego de Tultitlan-Lecheria, foyer d’accueil qui a joué jusqu’à sa fermeture en juillet 2012 un rôle d’espace de transit important, permettant un hébergement d’appoint pour les migrants en transit. Fermée suite aux récriminations des riverains dénonçant la concentration d’une population stigmatisée et perçue comme dangereuse, le diocèse de Cuautitlan a transféré le foyer à San Bartolo Huehuetoca, soit à 20 km plus au nord, en lointaine limite de l’espace métropolitain. Si ce lieu n’offrait qu’un hébergement sur la route migratoire, sa notoriété a aussi joué sur la canalisation des populations qui sont restées à Mexico.

Une autre forme de polarisation dans la ville est constituée par les structures des organisations civiles d’appui et d’orientation des migrants, dont le registre n’est pas celui de l’hébergement de quelques jours (comme celles signalées précédemment) mais un accompagnement plus durable, juridique et d’aide à l’insertion. Les foyers des organisations telles que Sin Fronteras, Casa Tochan, Cafemin ou Casa de los Amigos sont des lieux qui font centralité pour les migrants accueillis, dans des quartiers plus résidentiels que les lieux de première arrivée, au gré des bâtiments que ces organisation réussissent à utiliser pour leurs activités, souvent dans des extensions anciennes et intégrées de la métropole. Ces lieux sont alors la base d’une pratique de la ville qui va en s’élargissant, avec un usage assez restreint des transports publics au départ mais devenant un peu plus significatif au gré des expériences et des démarches entreprises (démarches administratives, recherche de revenus, premières formes de socialisation hors du foyer, etc…).

Dans les contextes décrits ci-dessus, l’accès aux ressources de l’environnement métropolitain est fortement contraint. Dans la logique de l’installation, les questions de l’accès à un logement, la possibilité de générer des ressources économiques ou l’accès aux services de santé sont des préoccupations permanentes, objet de réajustements permanents en fonction d’opportunités et de contraintes m.ées évolutives au gré du contexte urbain. En parallèle, la situation vis-à-vis du statut légal de présence effective sur le territoire mexicain conditionne en grande partie l’accès à ces ressources, faisant de la question de l’obtention de documents migratoires une préoccupation diversément prise en charge par les individus en fonction de leurs trajectoires. En parallèle, la vulnérabilité expérimentée lors des parcours ayant conduit à Mexico ne prend évidemment pas fin avec l’installation : la question de la sécurité physique et psychologique est présente en filigrane dans l’ensemble des expériences de l’environnement urbain, où les interactions avec la population locale et/ou les autres groupes migrants sont l’objet de négociations permanentes.
Sauf dans de rares cas qui relèvent aujourd’hui de l’exception13, l’accès à des ressources économiques relève des activités de type informel et sont marquées par une forte précarité. Les domaines les plus fréquemment signalés dans l’enquête comme premier accès à l’emploi sont ceux de l’embauche ponctuelle dans des activités localisées à proximité des points d’arrivée des flux : aide à la décharge de camions, travail de manœuvre sur des chantiers de construction, ateliers de réparation des pneus ou de mécanique auto. Avec un peu plus d’ancienneté, travail domestique, auxiliaire de petit commerce ou restaurant, activité de garde de bâtiments ou parkings... Les activités de prostitution ne sont pas absentes non plus. En grande périphérie, le travail d’ouvrier agricole journalier est également signalé. Le pus fréquemment, l’accès à ces activités ne se fait pas par la mobilisation de réseaux de connaissances mais par des démarches de recherche quotidienne pour des activités généralement de courte durée, très faiblement rémunérées. Les logiques d’accès à des emplois plus stables sont ensuite très diversifiées, mais relèvent dans l’ensemble de contacts établis au fur et à mesure de l’expérience urbaine, et de la possibilité de mobiliser les informations réunies au gré des expériences récentes. A la différence d’autres contextes migratoires, les réseaux d’interconnaissance apparaissent comme restreints, en particulier pour constituer une ressource à l’accès à l’emploi : une grande majorité des personnes de l’échantillon indiquent n’avoir pas eu de contact avec un proche ou un parent avant leur arrivée en ville, et l’obtention d’un emploi grâce à des parents déjà présents est une exception. Sur la question de l’accès à l’emploi, on signalera également que des secteurs d’activité apparaissent aujourd’hui comme des possibilités d’embauche en développement, en particulier dans l’environnement industriel du nord de la métropole. Pour certaines entreprises de sous-traitance de l’industrie automobile et chimique ou de recyclage des déchets, une demande existe pour une main d’œuvre prête à accepter des conditions de travail très précaires et hors du marché formel de l’emploi. Comme dans d’autres contextes migratoires, l’existence d’un sous-marché de l’emploi très exposé et non rempli par les populations locales semble exister.

Quelque soit l’origine de l’installation à Mexico, notamment entre provenance du sud ou du nord, les entretiens conduits permettent de dégager certains éléments partagés sur le contexte dans lequel se joue cet accès à des ressources. La vulnérabilité sociale est sans doute la dimension la plus prégnante. Au sens de travaux antérieurs, cette vulnérabilité peut se caractériser comme « un ensemble de situations cumulatives qui ont pour corolaire des vulnérabilités différentes en intensité, dans l’espace et dans le temps et qui se rétroatimentent » (Silva, 2014). Les récits des migrants centraméricains à Mexico témoignent de la difficulté de leur situation au moment de l’arrivée en ville et durant les premiers mois de leur installation. Dans des cas qui ne sont pas rares, l’insertion à l’environnement urbain se fait alors que les situations de risque connues lors de l’étape migratoire antérieure sont encore bien présents (abus et extorsions, violences subies ou séquestration, difficultés du déplacement dans des conditions très précaires, parfois avec contraction de dettes vis-à-vis des familles dans le lieu d’origine). Ces éléments de trajectoire contraignent les possibilités de l’insertion, comme en témoignent les études sur les situations de besoin d’aide psycho-sociale des migrants en transit (Temores et al., 2015).

Ensuite, la connaissance de l’environnement urbain, d’abord très fragmentaire puis en expansion, se fait dans des conditions de méfiance élevée. Aux dangers signalés précédemment s’ajoute une crainte vis-à-vis des autorités14 et une certaine méfiance vis-à-vis des autres Centraméricains, notamment depuis que les membres de maras sont également en situation de mobilité internationale vers Mexico. De même, la faiblesse de réseaux sociaux véritablement utilisables au moment de l’arrivée en ville est un élément qui apparaît nettement. Lorsqu’il y a connaissance de personnes sur place, l’aide apportée n’est qu’assez rarement économique ou de facilitation de l’accueil. On note par contre qu’une dimension significative des interactions avec les nationaux est relative à l’information sur les situations de risque, sur le degré de sureté des lieux, voire en termes d’orientation vers les structures d’aide ou de mise en place de démarches administratives.

13 Par exemple dans le cas de migrants avec un bon niveau d’études ou pouvant compter sur un solide réseau d’entraide.
14 Le rapport de la REDODEM indique une augmentation significative depuis 2014 des délits commis part des agents des autorités, en particulier de niveau fédéral (REDODEM, 2015)
Les logiques migratoires des Centraméricains à Mexico montrent que les situations rencontrées, plus ou moins temporaires, très souvent difficiles, rendent nécessaire la mobilisation d’un éventail de pratiques et stratégies qui tirent autant de ressources propres aux individus qu’à la mise en valeur des possibilités expérimentées dans le nouvel environnement atteint, donc de ressources situées. D’un côté, les conditions de l’accès à la ville renvoient à des logiques classiques, telles que par exemple celles décrites depuis longtemps par les travaux de l’anthropologie mexicaine, à la suite de Lourdes Arizpe ou Larissa Lomnitz. De l’autre, les formes d’appréhension de et d’insertion à la ville ont fortement changé. Dans un sens, la fragmentation des expériences de l’urbain semble faire écho à la fragmentation métropolitaine. Dans la perspective croisée des trajectoires migratoires et des dynamiques urbaines, ces populations migrantes ont à faire face à la fois à des situations de marge sociale dans le pays dit de transit, de relocalisation dans des espaces en position périphérique dans le contexte métropolitain, en même temps qu’à des micro-marges dans le tissu urbain aux échelles locales. La maîtrise de l’environnement urbain, la connaissance de ces lieux, l’expérimentation des interactions avec les autres populations et acteurs de la ville témoignent de formes spécifiques d’un être en ville. Celui-ci est marqué par le double jeu de trajectoires interrompues, voire d’impasses en ce qui concerne la poursuite du mouvement, avec ses effets de temporalités suspendues, de production d’un espace/temps contraint ou l’immobilité devient effective. En parallèle, les logiques d’ancrage, de recherche de ressources locales et de construction de trajectoires d’insertion dans la ville sont réelles. Comme ailleurs, elles conduisent à des formes de reproduction/transmission, générant dans le temps des mécanismes de consolidation qui vont en s’élargissant.

La place de ces populations, dans des contextes locaux souvent déjà tendus du point de vue des ressources, questionne les possibilités d’insertion. Quelle peut être, en ces lieux de la difficile amélioration des conditions de vie d’une large partie des populations pauvres de la métropole, la place des plus pauvres ? Les dimensions de la précarité, ici, ne sont pas à entendre seulement en termes économiques. Ce sont celles aussi des carences dans la possible mobilisation de ressources sociales, celle de la vulnérabilité, de l’exposition aux risques de l’illegalité ou de la très insuffisante réponse des autorités nationales ou locales. Plus largement, l’exercice de la citoyenneté urbaine est dans ces conditions extrêmement restreint pour ces populations. L’expression d’un « droit à la ville » passe par des pratiques, par un être là, mais sa formulation en tant que tel n’est aujourd’hui perceptible que dans des cercles très restreints. Qui plus est, lorsqu’elle existe, c’est porté par des organisations civiles ou de défense des droits de l’homme plus que par des groupes migrants organisés.

Pour autant, un autre questionnement est ouvert. Les observations conduites à Mexico montrent que des formes d’insertion sont à l’œuvre, que la métropole peut aussi faire ressource. D’une certaine façon, les dynamiques de cet ancrage contraint témoignent, en creux, des réalités métropolitaines d’aujourd’hui, en particulier dans les environnements urbains des pays dits du Sud. Nous considérons que les trajectoires observées à Mexico rendent compte de la construction d’une destination migratoire en cours de structuration pour les populations en provenance du Triangle Nord centraméricain. A la suite des travaux sur les nouvelles gateway cities, au sens de Price et Benton (2008), au moins trois dimensions sont à signaler. En premier lieu, la segmentation des marchés de l’emploi et la croissance des activités métropolitaines doivent conduire à mieux analyser la production de...
niches d’emploi. L’activité dans les secteurs du travail domestique (Toledo, 2008) ou dans les sous-secteurs informels de l’industrie en sont des exemples. Ce processus, observé ailleurs depuis longtemps, n’est vraisemblablement pas absent dans le Grand Mexico. La faiblesse des cadres normatifs, la flexibilité des arrangements locaux et les niveaux élevés de contrôle par des opérateurs aux légitimités construites hors du cadre légal jouent dans ce sens. En second lieu, la métropole apparaît aussi comme le lieu d’une possible invisibilité pour les migrants centraméricains. Au-delà des stratégies classiques de l’association avec des migrants internes (par dissimulation de l’accent, par apprentissage des façons d’être de la population locale…), l’immersion dans les dynamiques urbaines se traduit moins par des formes de construction de collectifs nationaux que par l’adoption progressive de normes locales, sous des formes qui tranchent avec les dynamiques d’organisation expérimentées ailleurs. Dans le cas des migrants salvadoriens, et même si les effets de temps sont bien sûr ici notables, la prégnance des réseaux sociaux et des organisations communautaires est incomparable avec celle en acte aux États-Unis. L’invisibilisation peut aussi être ici stratégie de défense face aux actions des organisations criminelles et autres agents de l’exploitation de la vulnérabilité migratoire, y compris les autorités locales et nationales. Enfin, en lien avec ce second point, c’est au regard des expériences migratoires que l’installation à Mexico peut être lue. Entre difficulté d’accéder aux États-Unis et impossibilité du retour, la métropole est un entre-deux. Par certains côtés, elle semble l’être plus que d’autres régions du Mexique, notamment au sud ou à la frontière nord, où discrimination et exposition aux opérations de déportation par les autorités migratoires sont plus prégnantes. Pour des populations évoluant dans un contexte psychosocial aussi contraint, l’idée que la métropole puisse constituer un environnement plus apaisé apparaît tangible. Malgré les nombreuses contraintes signalées, Mexico peut être un contexte à la fois moins violent que les lieux d’origine et moins exposé que les lieux de la mobilité.

Dans le même temps, la lecture de ces formes d’ancrage en amorce ne peut être pas découplée des perspectives de mobilité à venir, celles-ci apparaissant comme une toile de fond ancrée soit dans des projets migratoires encore effectifs quoique repoussés, soit dans l’éventualité de nouvelles mobilités comme réponse à un établissement devenant irréalisable. Cette récurrence d’une mobilité en perspective est en elle-même vraisemblablement une forme de ressource, mais elle n’apparaît pas comme toujours conciliable avec l’ancrage local. À la différence d’autres catégories sociales pour lesquelles la mobilité s’inscrit de plus en plus comme un élément dans un éventail de possible et de « compétences », celle des populations en situation de transit qui dure est d’avantage l’expression d’une somme de vulnérabilités. Le couplement des processus d’ancrage par défaut et de mobilité latente apparaissent comme symptomatiques des populations exposées à de tels niveaux de vulnérabilité dans les différents environnements qu’elles expérientent.

Références bibliographiques


International migration and resources in a metropolitan context
L. Faret
N-AERUS XVII
Göteborg, 16th – 19th November 2016

Casillas, Rodolfo. Las rutas de los centroamericanos por México, un ejercicio de caracterización, actores principales y complejidades, Migración y Desarrollo, núm. 10, 2008, pp. 157-174


Ma Mung, Emmanuel. La dispersion comme ressource, Cultures & Conflits [En ligne], 1999, n° 33-34, printemps-été 1999.


ABSTRACT:

In 2015 Germany hit the number of one million refugee registrations – more than ever since public records began. Integrating those of them who will be accepted for permanent settlement will be a challenge for German society within the next years or even decades. And it is also a challenge for planning authorities on different federal levels who are responsible for providing accommodation: by providing initial aid during the first weeks and months (e.g. in tent cities, vacant office buildings or cargo-container apartments) but also in the long run by integrating refugees into the housing market. The paper focuses on the so-called collective accommodation centres for refugees and highlights the difficult processes of selecting sites for these facilities.

Research on refugees has been a neglected topic in German academia, especially as compared to labour migration. The paper starts with a brief overview of the current state of spatial research – e.g. with regard to the allocation of refugees throughout the country, to local housing policies or living conditions in refugee facilities. Due to growing numbers of asylum seekers urban planners have been working under high pressure. In order to facilitate and accelerate the building of new facilities German planning law was changed twice; as a consequence refugee shelters can now be located in areas where it was not allowed before. The second part of the paper will discuss site selection processes for collective accommodation centres. Based on the academic discussion and on interviews in writing among six German cities these planning processes will be described – in the context of instable conditions, rapid change and processes of deregulation.

KEY WORDS
accommodation of refugees, reception facilities, site selection, urban planning, Germany
INTRODUCTION

“How should city planners act in an urban environment that is daily shaped by distant forces and hidden interdependencies that generate unpredictable and unexpected outcomes?” The question Amin (2013: 631) raised in an article published in 2013 well describes the situation Germany faced last year when more than one million people were registered as asylum seekers. This situation also had and still has an impact on spatial planning which is challenged in many respects: At the beginning especially with providing initial aid and temporary shelter at short notice, by now other issues have come to the fore. Current discussion is dominated by questions where and how to allocate permanent and affordable housing for refugees, provide social infrastructure and the like. All the time municipalities had to act without sufficient knowledge, for instance about the number of new refugees who will arrive the following day, the period of time provisional solutions like emergency shelters in school gyms will be needed or the share of refugees which will stay in Germany permanently. Responsible authorities seemed to lose control and overview of the situation – in a country which is known for its well-organised administrative system.

The paper focuses on the initial shelter in collective accommodation centres where many refugees have to stay until the decision on the asylum application has been made. To provide the necessary background information accommodation procedures in Germany will briefly be explained. Subsequently the state of planning-related research on refugees in Germany will be addressed and finally the perspective of the municipalities will be highlighted: How did they cope with the challenges of providing initial shelter, especially during peak times of immigration? In the context of this paper the terms refugees and asylum seekers are not necessarily used in the legal sense but as umbrella terms for foreigners seeking protection in Germany (following similar definitions e.g. in Bruecker et al. 2016: 1).

ACCOMMODATION OF REFUGEES: PROCEDURES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

When a foreigner enters the country and declares himself as an asylum seeker he is registered in the nationwide distribution system “EASY” which stands for ‘initial distribution of asylum seekers’. In 2015 about 1.1 million asylum seekers were registered in this system, most of them came from Syria (see fig. 1). However, in September 2016 the number was corrected downwards to 890,000 persons (cf. BMI 2016a). The reason: Besides incorrect or double registrations the number also included refugees who had been registered but travelled to other countries afterwards. In the same year 476,649 asylum applications were filed. The gap between applications and registrations was caused by delays in processing applications.

After their registration the refugees are sent to a so-called initial reception centre in one of Germany's federal states (“Laender”) who are responsible for accommodating refugees. The share of refugees each state has to take in is calculated according to the “Koenigstein quota” which is based on tax receipts and population numbers of the federal states (cf. in detail: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2014). Currently, this calculation method is strongly disputed because the parameters included tend to lead to a spatial concentration of refugees in densely populated regions – areas which are already affected by a tense housing market. This has caused a weird situation: At the beginning of the asylum procedure the Koenigstein quota fosters a concentration of refugees in exactly those areas where it is considered problematic later on. At conferences and in academic journals lively discussions have arisen about the question how refugees can be directed to shrinking regions with higher residential vacancy rates, for instance in Eastern parts of Germany.
Refugees usually have to stay in initial reception centres during the first weeks resp. months of the asylum procedure and they also hand in their asylum applications here. But due to the large number of refugees in 2015 the capacity of the existing reception facilities turned out to be far too small: “Asylum statistics for the period January through October 2015 indicated that 331,226 (first) asylum applications had been registered, while about 758,000 persons had been recorded as new arrivals by various authorities (…) This implies that more than 425,000 asylum seekers were still waiting for their asylum applications to be registered at the time, and it has to be assumed that the overwhelming majority of these were asylum seekers who were not staying in initial reception centres” (Asylum Information Database 2016).

When refugees are no longer obliged to live in an initial reception centre they are distributed within the respective federal state, in most states the municipalities are now responsible for their accommodation although the systems of transferring refugees to the lower level vary between the states (cf. Mueller 2013: 15). According to the Asylum Procedure Act (section 53 (1) first sentence) “foreigners who have filed an asylum application and are not or no longer required to live in a reception centre, should, as a rule, be housed in collective accommodation. In this context, both the public interest and the foreigner’s interests shall be taken into account.” However, many municipalities actually prefer to accommodate refugees in private apartments – of course a strategy which only works with moderate numbers of households but not in times of a massive increase. They are not the only ones who favour decentralised housing: Refugee organisations share this view as they strongly criticise the living conditions in collective accommodation centres. Nevertheless in times of large numbers of asylum seekers most municipalities could not do without collective accommodation: In 2014 and 2015 existing facilities were quickly overcrowded, so local authorities had to find new ways of giving shelter – e.g. in tent cities, housing containers, vacant public buildings, school gyms or even river cruise ships docked in a harbour. One reason why the situation was so critical can be found in the
years before the high influx of refugees: In times of low numbers of new arrivals most municipalities had considerably reduced their accommodation capacities for asylum seekers. As the number of registered refugees has decreased sharply this year (see fig. 2) uncertainty has once more spread among the authorities on different levels, also because everybody is cautious about forecasts after last year’s experiences: Will this be a permanent state or will the numbers rise again – and how many accommodation facilities are necessary against this background?

Of course, when discussing how to accommodate and integrate refugees another question arises: In how far can we benefit from empirically-based knowledge and theoretical findings on the topic? Hence, the following section outlines what academic research contributes to the discussion – and which gaps can be identified.

**REFUGEE RESEARCH IN GERMANY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW**

In Germany we can find plenty of research on labour migration but we only have little knowledge of flight migration, and this also applies to planning-related issues. This branch of research has tended to be sidelined although the influx of refugees has always been an inherent part of the flow of migration to Germany (albeit fluctuating over the years). One only needs to think of the reception of millions of refugees and displaced persons after the Second World War, the immigration of an increasing number of asylum seekers from the 1970s onwards or of refugees who had fled from the conflict in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. With regard to the reasons for poor research activities on flight migration Treibel (2011: 158) assumes that “the drama, spontaneity and unpredictability of flight activities (…) rather call for crisis management than for scientific analysis”\(^1\). In a report published at the beginning of this year Johansson took stock of refugee research in Germany and summarized the

---

\(^1\) All quotations from German literature sources in this paper were translated by the author.
existing gap(s) as following: “We only know that we do not yet know much about the living conditions of refugees in Germany” (Johansson 2016: 86). As a consequence, she calls for “profound knowledge of the refugees’ wishes, aspirations and expectations, of their health conditions and qualifications and of the effectiveness of existing measures and regulations” (ibid.: 85f). This is also important as scientifically based knowledge would urgently be needed to meet current challenges of receiving and integrating refugees. As a response to the outlined requirements there is a growing awareness of this desideratum in recent times – manifested in an increasing number of academic publications, conferences and research projects but also in the foundation of the “Netzwerk Flüchtlingsforschung” (Refugee Research Network), an association of researchers focusing on forced migration, refuge and asylum.

In the field of planning-related research refugees were usually given little attention until they settled down permanently – and afterwards they were often perceived just as ordinary migrants, despite their specific background and potentially specific needs. This corresponded with the political objective not to promote integration before the asylum procedure was finalized. In this respect at least a partial change can be observed, as nowadays some integration measures are already offered earlier to refugees. But often this only applies to asylum seekers who have good prospects of being allowed to stay in Germany according to their country of origin. Organisations like “Pro Asylum” criticise the early classification of refugees with good or with little prospects to remain because it is contradictory to one basic idea of German asylum law: the case-by-case examination of the individual's reasons for flight (cf. Pro Asyl 2015).

In general terms the scientific discussion about refugees and (urban) space – not only in the field of spatial planning but also in neighboring disciplines – has increased and decreased according to changing numbers of asylum seekers coming to Germany in different periods of time, for instance in the 1990s and in the recent past. Publications about this topic often focus on analysing the situation in specific cities or regions, research on a larger spatial scale can rarely be found (cf. e.g. Aumueller et al. 2015). Subsequently some major lines of discussion will be characterized briefly, especially focussing on the provision of temporary shelter at the beginning of the refugees’ stay in Germany.

Some publications aim at describing and explaining accommodation issues especially on the level of the federal states (“Laender”), for instance concerning the distribution of refugees, different types of accommodation or minimum standards to be guaranteed in the facilities (cf. Mueller 2013, Wendel 2014). But it is difficult to get a thorough overview of the topic due to the broad variety of existing approaches on the level of the Laender as well as the municipalities. Furthermore information on refugee and asylum issues, summarized in these publications, may quickly become outdated because of the rapid speed of change in this field.

The variety of approaches also applies to the question to what extent centralized accommodation in large facilities or decentralized housing in apartments is preferred: In 2013 the share of refugees who had already left the initial reception centres and now lived in single apartments varied from 90,6 % in Rheinland-Pfalz to 33,5 % in Baden-Wuerttemberg (cf. Wendel 2014: 72). However, the debate in academic publications about pros and cons of different housing strategies is quite clear (cf. e.g. Aumueller et al. 2015: 35ff). Concerning private housing more advantages than disadvantages are identified: It offers more room for privacy, facilitates socializing with Germans and often corresponds
with the refugees' individual preferences. Nevertheless refugees need basic language skills for accommodation in private housing, they should be able to manage daily tasks independently and to contact advice and counselling centres on their own. Although collective accommodation centres on the one hand also provide benefits like the easier offering of assistance especially for newly arrived refugees with little orientation in the new country, on the other hand a lot of serious deficits are discussed: a large number of people living closely together, missing leisure activities or difficulties in getting in touch with the receiving society – only to mention a few. The problematic situation in accommodation centres is reflected in detail in some empirical studies investigating the perspective of the refugees themselves, e.g. in a study published by Vicki Taeubig: She examined how refugees manage their everyday life in – as she called it – a context of “organized disintegration” (Taeubig 2009).

It can also be concluded from such studies that the location of a collective accommodation centre influences the refugees' opportunities for integration and participation in society, e.g. with regard to peripheral or central locations within the city. Nevertheless, there are only very few research findings explicitly addressing site selection processes for collective accommodation centres at the local level (cf. Aumueller et al. 2015). What is lacking are detailed analyses and theoretical frames discussing how municipalities select suitable locations, which criteria are decisive and what are relevant experiences with different types of sites. In line with fast-rising numbers of asylum seekers experts started to discuss how administrative obstacles hampering the identification of sites could be removed. As one consequence, German planning law was changed twice in 2014 and 2015. The new regulations were meant to accelerate planning processes and the provision of temporary accommodation especially by simplifying planning procedures and expanding the spectrum of potential sites for refugee facilities. For instance it is now possible – under specific circumstances – to locate collective accommodation centres in commercial areas or outskirt areas. On the one hand planning authorities welcomed these changes, but on the other hand there are also critical voices referring to potential negative effects. As an example the question was posed which impact the changes will have on the understanding of healthy living conditions, if specific groups will now be excluded from existing standards and if the legislative changes will lead to even more peripheral locations e.g. in commercial areas – also in the light of growing public protests against refugee accommodation in residential areas (cf. Gliemann/Ruediger 2017, forthcoming). In a resolution with the title “Migration meets the city. Against hysteria – for a different urban planning” the “Right to the City Network” in Hamburg characterizes the protests as follows: “We know that it's obviously difficult to put through refugee accommodations in well-off quarters where there's money for better lawyers and estate prices are astronomically high. However, the fact that wealthy and not so wealthy quarters now join forces does not make the distribution fairer. We worry that wherever the city plans housing for refugees it will always encounter people who think these plans are unacceptable” (Right to the City Network Hamburg 2016). To what extent the new regulations were implemented in planning practice has not yet been examined systematically – neither the emergence of possible positive or negative effects.

SITE SELECTION PROCESSES FOR REFUGEE FACILITIES

As site selection processes for refugee facilities are still a blind spot in research, the author conducted interviews with planning authorities in order to gain a deeper understanding of the topic. This preliminary study was carried out in November and December 2015 – hence at a time when the number of refugees arriving in Germany was very large (cf. fig. 2). In this context the fifteen largest
cities in North Rhine-Westphalia in terms of number of inhabitants were contacted, six of them agreed to participate. North Rhine-Westphalia was chosen because it is the federal state receiving the highest share of refugees according to the Koenigstein quota. The focus on large cities was due to the assumption that they are in a quite tense situation with regard to the provision of shelter for refugees – because they have to accommodate large numbers of refugees and also because of limited land availability. This assumption is supported not only by media reporting but also by relevant statements in publications, e.g. a survey conducted by the Institut fuer Demoskopie Allensbach (2016). Of course the specific situation in large cities and the small number of cases influences the significance of the results – but the study did not strive for representative results, it rather aimed at getting insight in the situation of this kind of municipalities in times of fast-rising immigration.

The interview questions were answered by administrative staff members responsible for the accommodation of refugees, in one case the press office collected and forwarded the required information. The mostly open-ended questions the interviewees answered in writing addressed the challenges urban planning is facing when providing accommodation for refugees with an emphasis on temporary initial shelter: local accommodation strategies, some key figures related to accommodation, problems in terms of the selection of sites as well as the situation in the facilities, need for improvement and the like. As the study addressed sensitive issues it was agreed that all statements will be anonymised. Therefore the names of the cities included in the survey and the names of the interviewed persons will not be mentioned subsequently.

One of the first questions focused on the general strategy of the municipality how to provide accommodation for asylum seekers. In line with the discussion of this topic in scientific literature the municipalities rather preferred decentralised housing, if possible in single apartments. For this purpose existing dwellings as well as newly constructed buildings are eligible, also in the context of social housing. According to one respondent the strategy of decentralised housing is preferred because housing is “the first component of integration”. But due to large numbers of refugees it was only possible to a limited extent to provide private homes. Additionally more and more collective accommodation centres had to be established – at least as a short-term solution. With regard to these facilities the interviewees aimed at a balanced distribution in all parts of the city, furthermore tried to limit the length of the stay especially in emergency shelters and preferred small dimensions. Nevertheless the objectives could not always be implemented against the background of adverse conditions: Whereas in scientific literature the size of 50 persons per facility is recommended and should not exceed 100 persons (cf. Aumueller et al. 2015: 68) one of the municipalities mentioned considerations to realize facilities with up to 600 places.

Although at the time of the interviews rather short-term emergency solutions were on the agenda in German cities some respondents also mentioned strategies pursued for the medium-to-long term, e.g. concerning several steps with different time horizons – from temporary shelter to permanent dwelling. In this context two interviewed persons gave more details on strategies how to create additional housing space, for instance by identifying plots appropriate for multi-story residential buildings, increasing the density of use in existing built-up areas, filling of vacant lots or selling municipal sites to private investors who construct residential buildings and offer them for lease to the municipality. With such rather small structures the municipalities also try to avoid new urban districts where many
refugees are concentrated. However, it has to be considered that these small-scale approaches are both
time-consuming and staff-intensive.

After the municipalities’ general strategies on providing shelter for refugees had been inquired, the
interview guideline focused on collective accommodation centres. The number of these facilities
varied between the municipalities: They ranged from 7 to 28 facilities. But this is only a snapshot valid
at the time the interviews were conducted, some respondents already mentioned that the construction
of new facilities was currently prepared. The respondents were also asked which were the three most
frequently used facilities for accommodating refugees: Vacant buildings like former schools or factory
halls are by far the most frequently used type, namely in all six municipalities. Half of the respondents
referred to school gyms, besides accommodation containers, regular transition hostels and – in
preparation – lightweight halls were indicated (2 answers each).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City A</th>
<th>Move-in date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Equipment / prize</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City B</td>
<td>Size of the area</td>
<td>Short-term availability</td>
<td>Distribution within the city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City C</td>
<td>Location / environment</td>
<td>Size</td>
<td>Economic efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City D</td>
<td>Integrated location</td>
<td>Building law</td>
<td>Size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City E</td>
<td>Feasibility regarding the building regulations law</td>
<td>Costs</td>
<td>Distribution within the city/ infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City F</td>
<td>Sufficient plot size</td>
<td>Neighborhood/ social structure</td>
<td>Quality and condition of the soil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[fig. 3] Main criteria for site selection in the six interviewed municipalities²

Figure 3 illustrates the answers concerning the three most important site selection criteria. As expected
in such a tense situation it is of very high importance to provide accommodation quickly. This is
related to criteria like short-term availability, sufficient size of the area, feasibility regarding the
building regulations law or economic efficiency of the project. As shown in the table the neighborhood
or the distribution of the facilities within the city were further aspects mentioned in the interviews.
However, as one respondent pointed out, criteria like the integration into the existing urban structure
or accessibility issues also played a role but “under normal conditions much more emphasis would be
paid to them”. This also shows that site requirements had to be adjusted resp. lowered due to limited
time and space.

The results provide a more detailed insight into the challenges the interviewed municipalities had to
face with regard to the selection of sites. On the one hand improvements caused by the legislative
changes already discussed above were mentioned, but other respondents still identified the building

² Because of the open wording of the question some municipalities used different terms for similar criteria.
law and high levels of regulation as main obstacles which hampered the identification of suitable sites. One example given in the interviews: The orientation of all windows to the north usually blocks approval of the building project. Further problems are e.g. related to time pressure, land use conflicts, insufficient suitability of plots for residential use or “opposing reactions by districts and interest groups”. It becomes obviously more and more difficult to find suitable sites as time goes on, this applies especially to large plots of land. The necessary coordination between different administrative units sometimes also hinders smooth processes, although one respondent mentioned that this has already improved due to the grown experience of the persons involved.

The interviewees were not only asked about site selection problems, but also about challenges after collective accommodation centres have been established. Here the respondents mentioned two types of problems: They firstly concern difficulties the authorities themselves are confronted with, for instance because they often do not get enough information about the number and background of new refugees or are informed about new arrivals only two days in advance. Secondly, the interviewed persons addressed the situation in the accommodation centres itself: They mentioned among others the lack of private sphere, thus it is quite important to ensure social stability in the shelters. The respondents also emphasized that it is necessary to foster the integration into the neighborhood and to establish acceptance – which is, as already shown above, not always an easy task.

Accordingly, need for improvement is seen in several respects: For instance, beyond the existing legislative changes more – temporary – exceptions in planning processes should be granted. In this context one respondent added that especially in urban agglomerations with large industrial areas suitable sites are difficult to find. Two interviewees raised another important issue: They would like to come back to smaller units – also because it is easier to integrate them into existing structures. On the other hand large accommodation centres cause considerable additional efforts e.g. concerning counselling and care. In the time period when the interviews were conducted it became obviously more and more difficult to ensure these additional efforts, because there was a high demand everywhere and the authorities feared that qualified personnel would soon become scarce: “By now the municipality has already reached the limits of what is possible.”

CONCLUSION

Even if the tense situation regarding the initial accommodation of refugees has improved in the course of this year the influx of such a large number of refugees has raised a lot of planning-related questions – and many of them still await an answer. This includes the current discussion how to accommodate the recognized asylum seekers in the future, ranging from small-scale solutions like in-fill development to the construction of larger settlements. Likewise the question is not yet clarified how to better prepare for future challenges of providing temporary accommodation during the refugees’ first weeks and months in Germany, especially as nobody knows how long the current state of small numbers will hold on.

The interviews which were conducted in a period of very high immigration rates revealed that the authorities were rather restricted to (re)acting spontaneously to new developments instead of planning for the medium-to-long-term. Obviously traditional tools and repertoires of actions were not or only partially suitable for such exceptional situations. For instance, regulations according to German planning law turned out to be too cumbersome in light of the problems which had to be solved
immediately. Similarly the nationwide quota system used for the distribution of refugees among the federal states may work fairly well in periods of low numbers of refugees but has apparently unintended negative effects in times of high immigration rates. Comparable conclusions can be drawn for the local level: Previously successful strategies like decentralized housing of asylum seekers turned out to be insufficient and proven site selection criteria for accommodation centres had to be adjusted to new circumstances – while knowing that this may have a negative impact on the refugees’ living conditions and their chance of integration. And still, apart from all the obstacles and problems there were also positive examples and learning effects. Just now it would be important to take stock of the recent experiences: Which types of accommodation have proved to be suitable? Which locations could be developed at short notice and met the requirements of humane living conditions? How can different municipalities better cooperate in the field of refugee accommodation? Which organisational structures worked well on the local level? And finally how can authorities involve the local people and prevent a defensive attitude against accommodation centres in their neighborhood? These are only a few questions which should be discussed among all those involved in order to draw conclusions for future challenges of receiving large numbers of refugees. Of course the result will not be an overall solution valid for each and every municipality. Instead it will be necessary to develop tailor-made concepts for different types of municipalities and also to think in alternatives and scenarios which are more adequate in an environment determined by instable conditions and unpredictable developments.

LIST OF REFERENCES


BAMF - Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (2016b): „EASY Verteilung“. Message to Katrin Gliemann. 27.07.2016. E-mail


Building the city from below: infrastructures and critical services
Chair: Cecilia Cabrera & Mariano Scheinsohn


The emerging geographies of waste governance in the privatization milieu. Of NIMBY and progressive city dynamics in Amritsar city, India. Kiran Sandhu, School of Urban and Regional Planning, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, India.

System-D in Bujumbura. The resourcefulness of users in daily practices of urban water provision, Anaïs De Keijser Technical University Darmstadt

Where the skip used to be. Informal settlements, the city, and waste management in Kisumu, Kenya. Michael Oloko, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga University, Kenya, Jaan-Henrik Kain, Chalmers University of Technology, Patrik Zapata & María José Zapata Campos, University of Gothenburg.
Urban inequality in a fragile global city. The case of Jakarta

M Thynell

ABSTRACT (Max. 300 words):

The city of Jakarta is an old Southeast Asian harbour that has developed into a thriving global city of 30 million people. In many ways development has been successful, and the expressed intention of the Governor is to become an important city of the Asian twenty-first Century. The inclusion of Jakarta into the global flows of the economic world order strengthens linkages between the various levels (global, regional, national, local) and contributes to a unique mixture of stakeholders and relations, also called ‘global cityness’. But despite rapid urbanization and enduring and impressive economic growth, inequality continues to increase. Inequality is constituted through practices that have developed over the centuries and also through heterogeneous pathways of urban development.

The article explores how practices in policy and planning interact with social structures to reproduce inequalities. I also draw attention to an under-studied factor – the impact of climate change. The urbanization-development nexus was established in the ‘Golden Age’ although the need to for dynamic understandings is increasingly felt sixty years later. By using the concept of assemblage, I will explore the role of inner, local dynamics in the development of global cities. The heuristic potential of the concept of assemblage lies in the fact that it helps disentangle established facts about Jakarta’s urbanization process. Contemporary development in Jakarta is approached using research on development, globalization and the evolution of the city to explore the co-constitution of inequality in times of climate change.

Urban modernization, governance practices, planning and policy, and environmental disasters form part of an assemblage that highlights urban inequality and the fragile character of this global city. The development of global cities is becoming increasingly uneven and this brings numerous problems. The uncertainties relating to uneven city development create a fragile urban future in which inequality and spatial and social segregation interplay with environmental deterioration to compound uncertainty about the future. Through the ‘glocal window’, the analysis in this article reveals a brutal reality.

KEY WORDS

Climate change; Urban growth; Inequality; Key word; Low-income settlements
1. Introduction

This article examines inequality and other forms of vulnerability in Jakarta. Features of globalization from different historical periods are visible in phenomena such as the canals built by the Dutch colonizers, public transport systems, European-style train stations and fashionable, iconic buildings. However, pre-existing social and political structures persist, coproducing the kind of vulnerability and inequality that existed when Jakarta was founded in the 17th century.

Inequality continues to grow in Jakarta despite rapid urbanization and enduring and impressive economic growth. I use a longitudinal case study to examine how inequality is constituted through policy and planning and it explores what development has come to mean in Jakarta. It focuses upon the way in which inequality and urban fragility are co-constituted in times of urban growth and climate change. I approach local views on housing, infrastructure and the environment from the perspective of Development Research, and I explore how socio-political forces, inequality and climate change problems relate to the material conditions seen in Jakarta.

A point of departure is that inequality in urban settings results from planning and policy and it is related to human, institutional and infrastructural vulnerability. As countries become absorbed into the global economic order, inequality tends to increase. This article uses the analytical concept of global assemblages to explore how inequality arises in social and political relations. The analyses focus on the less visible or obvious local processes that affect policy and planning and thereby also inequality.

Among the least studied factors that impact upon inequality are the degradation of the environment and climate change. Jakarta’s many low-income neighbourhoods, or kampongs, suffer from lack of access to modern infrastructure and their inhabitants are also at risk of flooding and the negative health effects of air pollution and poor living conditions. These problems are the subject of ongoing debate and expectations that the country’s democratic government should take action to transform Jakarta into a prime city in the ‘Asian century’ are growing. But the synergies between climate change, inequality and vulnerable populations are not studied well. The concept of global assemblage offers a heuristic device for inquiring into urban development as put forward by Sassen, 2008 and 2013, McFarlane, 2011, Latour, 2005, Simone, 2011 and Matthew, 2012. This will explore some of the process contributing to inequality and argue that inequality is likely to worsen in areas without modern infrastructure. The results yielded by using the assemblage to examine the case of Jakarta are presented below in sections 4 and 5.

Background

Jakarta is a cosmopolitan city whose connections to the outside world have a long history in maritime trade. Today, prominent local entrepreneurs who have connections with multinational and global businesses have an important influence on policy and planning in Jakarta. Modern mega-developments and a growing middle class are evidence of global flows of capital, but not everyone is able to benefit from these developments. Economic growth is unevenly distributed and in 2014, the richest 20 percent was consuming as much as the poorest 49 percent (WB 2015x). In order to qualify as belonging to the middle class in Jakarta a person must be economically secure, which means having a monthly income of more than 65 US dollars (World Bank, 2015b:7). The World Bank has observed that Indonesia is currently undergoing rapid transformation and modernization and this includes urbanization. However, the country is not realizing all the potential socio-economic gains - for every 1 percent increase in urban population correlated with an average 6 percent increase in per capita GDP for India and China;
an 8 percent increase in per capita GDP for Vietnam; and a 10 percent increase in per capita GDP for Thailand (World Bank, 2012: ix). Some 40 percent of the population remains excluded from development progress and most of the new urban jobs are in low-productive (and informal) sectors, where growth in real earnings is sluggish (ibid). The relative progress in terms of poverty reduction contrasts sharply with dismal rates of sharing in the new prosperity (2015b). Further, Jakarta’s inclusion in the capital flows of today’s global economic order affects the relationships between global, national, urban and local rural levels and creates ‘global cityness’ (Simone, 2014). The particular mixture of actors, structures and relations in Jakarta that constitute its cityness and influence the way the city is developing.

**How to approach inequality in Jakarta**

A global city is a social phenomenon that “symbolizes humanity in a microcosm” (Mumford, 1961) and the “[g]lobal city is not a descriptive term [but] an analytical construct that allows one to detect the global as it is filtered through the specifics of a place, its institutional orders, and its socio-spatial fragmentations (Sassen in Acuto 2011:2960). Previous research on global cities has tended to view them as part of a system in which they exert influence upon international development through political and economic relations and provide sites for business development and ‘the creative classes’. Post-modern global cities are nevertheless facing major problems with fragmented and uneven urban development. Deregulated markets and global influences may well encourage the evolution of more smart and large-scale technologies for addressing some of the risks that large cities are now confronting. All of these trends may be observed in Jakarta’s social and political future.

The article aims to address these problems by using methods and theoretical perspectives from Development Research to study the relationships between globalization, urbanization, inequality and climate change in Jakarta. In contrast to earlier studies based on hierarchies of world cities from the perspective of developmentalism, this contribution benefits from the forms and functionality of informal settlements (Davis, 2016) and socio-economic vulnerabilities. Anglo-Saxon academic studies of modern cities provide various general perspectives and tools but are they able to capture the processes underlying urbanization in cities like Jakarta that is “simultaneously growing, dividing, polarizing and decaying” (Gandy, 2006, p. 52). Most likely not since the context differs in each case due to variations in local cultural, historical and climatic factors. The forces driving the development of Jakarta therefore differ in some respects from those in Berlin, Nairobi, Buenos Aires or New York. “As scholars struggle to decipher current forms of urbanization, they are forced to confront the limitations of inherited approaches to urban questions …” (Urban Theory Lab, 2015). The late Edward Soja noted that “the field of urban studies has never been so robust, so expansive in the number of subject areas and scholarly disciplines involved with the study of cities … and so theoretically and methodically unsettled” (2000:xi).

The urbanization-development nexus was established in the ‘Golden Age’ although the need to for dynamic understandings is increasingly felt sixty years later. By using the concept of assemblage, I will explore the role of inner, local dynamics in the development of global cities. The article makes use of both archival materials and interviews with policy makers to identify how theories and practices of national and urban development have evolved in Indonesia. The materials consist of planning documents, policy papers and interviews conducted with officials from various levels of ministries and World Bank staff. Books and scientific articles have provided a background and activists and colleagues working on urban issues and planning at ITB, Universitas Indonesia and at Gadja Mahda in
Yogyakarta, have generously shared their knowledge of Jakarta with me. I have travelled into the city many times, using various means of transport and at different times of day and to different areas. This has all helped me gain insights into the conditions for life experienced by different social groups in their work and family life.

Expressions of inequality may be found on the one hand in polices, soft discourses, social practices and attitudes and, on the other, in the character of houses and infrastructure or transport. My choice of method for studying Jakarta is intended to highlight the interdependence between elements of a segregated city. It is designed to show how the informal and formal sectors are related and influenced by both international and local understandings of modernity and entrepreneurial opportunity.

I also look at the expression of cityness in Jakarta. By this I mean the particular factors that drive urban development and that, together with modernization, governance practices, planning and policy, and environmental disasters, affect public access to resources. The notion has been defined in different ways and I propose an alternative, comprehensive formulation of cityness that reflects the typical features of Jakarta, including its tropical location, the effects of climate change, its colonial past, its rapid growth based on neoliberal policies and the symbiotic relationship between the wealthy and the huge numbers of poor. Together these factors constitute the global assemblage that forms the topics of this text. Local expressions of the challenges families face in relation to issues such as housing and infrastructure are interconnected in a global assemblage. This means we need to explore local development and entrepreneurship from below and not simply from the perspective of global actors. In order to “cut across the binary of national versus global” (Sassen, 2008), environmental, technical, social and historical data will be gathered and used to gain insights into the development of vulnerability in the urban setting. The city is treated here as a place that “generates differences and assembles identities … and the city is a battle-ground through which groups define their identity, stake their claims, wage their battles and articulate citizenship rights, obligations and principles …. The city as a difference machine relentlessly provokes, differentiates, positions, mobilizes immobilizes, oppresses, liberates” (Isin, 2002:26). Finally, in times of intensifying globalization and climate change, the longue durée (Braudel, 1984) perspective of Development Research helps us understand how local practices have co-created inequality and exacerbated vulnerability.

Outline

In the next section, Introducing Jakarta, the city is described and the analytical tools of cityness and assemblage will be presented. Section 3, The issue of inequality, examines how inequality is expressed in housing and infrastructure. The differential ways in which eco-system services and efforts to mitigate man-made disasters such as floods illustrate how various forms of socio-economic vulnerability are linked to inequality. In section 4, The Emerging Picture of Inequality, information derived from the different sectors is collated with data on social expressions, practices, plans and policies and is viewed as an assemblage. This will bring to light the way in which information from different sectors and parts of the city about infrastructural standard and environmental issues are interrelated. When viewed over time, a picture of the city emerges in which aspects of social fragility, such as inequality, are seen to result from local political culture and the social structures – negotiations between the state, market actors and civil society. The final section, Conclusions, summarizes and discusses divisive practices in the city and the views from both below and above in relation to inequality and socio-economic vulnerabilities in Jakarta.
2. The Case of Jakarta

Jakarta is situated on the Northern shores of Java and it became an important node in the global economy long ago. It has since developed into a major global city, as described below in section 2.1. Today, Jakarta is booming and is the site of many flourishing businesses together with several other cities (MGI, 2012). The Indonesian economy is stable although growth has recently begun to slow down. The Indonesian government aims to maintain 7 percent growth per year until 2030. Indonesia had an urban population of 130 million, or 52% of the total population, in 2013. Between 1960 and 2013, urban population increased at an average rate of 4.4% per year, compared with 3.6% in China, 3.0% in India and 3.4% in the Philippines. By 2030, an estimated 71% of Indonesia's population will be urban (MGI, 2012:ii), which means it will be one of the most urbanized countries in Asia.

This bright view of Jakarta is rooted in its economic achievements and trade relations. However, there is a less uplifting side to the story. The city’s severe problems have also given it a reputation as an 'unloved' city (Steinberg, 2007). The rapidity of urban expansion has had major consequences for environmental vulnerability – waste management is inadequate, conditions are often detrimental to public health, the quality of roads, road networks and pedestrian or cycling lanes is often poor and public transport is underdeveloped. Overall, Jakarta suffers from poor spatial integration. The numerous modern spaces rely on advanced infrastructure and technology while traditional urban villages, the kampongs, often remain without access to the infrastructural facilities that enable a modern lifestyle. Life in the kampongs remains much as it was in the distant past, with marked social and political segregation. The need for more effective planning appears to be acute since the various sections of the city are so widely differentiated in terms of infrastructure for transport, housing and waste management. However, experts note that Jakarta is growing organically and has developed a kind of informal logic or messiness that counterbalances some of these weaknesses. A notable capacity for finding ways to cope with daily life, particularly through social networking, is part of Jakarta’s particular brand of cityness (Simone, 2010).

Jakarta’s development offers a powerful illustration of the growth dynamics seen all over contemporary Southeast Asia. As the world's economic centre has shifted from the US eastwards, the earlier American 20th Century has given way to the Asian 21st Century. Jakarta's absorption into the global economy has been rapid and its integration into the global marketplace is likely to continue. Eastern mega-cities host 90 percent of the large companies in the region (MGI, 2012) and huge future investments are expected to strengthen the role played by these cities in global economics. Indonesia is the world’s largest producer and exporter of palm oil and tin, the second-largest producer of cocoa, the second-biggest rubber exporter, and the fourth-largest exporter of coal (The Economist, 2015; MGI, 2012). The country’s economy has been and remains heavily dependent upon its natural resources but it is also becoming an important manufacturer as well. Jakarta is home of the national headquarters of many transnational corporations and manufacturing companies that are involved in export (Shatkin, 2007:2). Two thirds of the national economy is controlled and managed in Jakarta (Salim and Kombaitan, 2009).

Jakarta’s historical development has been driven by mercantilism, colonialism and, later, by the modern post-colonial Indonesian state. The country’s basic social structures have survived these historical shifts and they continue to contribute to the production of inequality. The social constraints people in Jakarta experience today are rooted partly in the way the Dutch colonial masters shaped the city according to models taken from their own homeland, with canals for drainage, waste and transport...
serving the areas inhabited by the white minority while other parts of the city were excluded. This can still be seen today. However, what was intended to become the ‘The Queen City of the East’ soon became famous as ‘The Graveyard of the Orient’ because of its unhealthy conditions (Steinberg, 2007).

Jakarta covers an area of 662 km² and was ranked among the largest cities in the world in 2010 (Sagala, 2013). Its development is the result of numerous planning projects that have been implemented over several centuries. One urban planner describes how the implementation of many of these projects has frequently diverged from the original plans (Silver, 2007). In recent decades, Jakarta has been suffering from a grave implementation deficit and to address the problems of such rapid urban growth a new administrative area known as the Jabodetabekpunjur was finally created incorporating a number of rapidly changing peri-urban cities (Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, South Tangerang, Bekasi and Cianjur). In 1992, only around 11 percent of built-up areas were included in Jakarta Municipal Area while in 2005, 29 percent were included (Firman, 2004). The lack of state and formal institutional capacity to manage the problems associated with rapid urban growth meant that private entrepreneurs began developing their capacity to fill the gaps. In recent decades, private companies have therefore increasingly been taking over roles that were traditionally attributed to the state (Winarso and Firman, 2002) - “private developers take on broad responsibilities for constructing and managing large urban areas, which is now accepted by most parties in Indonesia, including the government” (Dieleman, 2011: 83).

Jakarta is located on the equator in ‘the ring of fire’ in which there is considerable seismic activity and a risk of earthquakes and tsunamis. The city is situated on wetlands surrounded by the sea, lakes and rivers on the one side and mountains to the South. It also suffers from heat waves, tropical cyclones and heavy rains with repeated flooding and a rising sea level. This tropical environment places particular demands upon infrastructure and global warming is now becoming yet another burden for Jakarta to deal with. “Some believe, at the end of the day, that the ecological devastation of the city stems from our own mentality to ‘conquer nature’ that has become a characteristic of Jakarta people” (Kusno, 2011:527). The environmental and social problems the city faces today far outweigh the management capacity of the administrators and national government.

In 2010, a visionary plan called ‘Growth through Equality’ was launched to “guide the spatial transformation of Jakarta in ‘an integrated, harmonious, coordinated, balanced efficient, effective, civilized and sustainable manner’” (Silver, 2007:206). Nonetheless, families in many neighbourhoods still have to rely on their own capacity to cope with everyday life and problems with flooding, waste management and mobility. Van Dijk has observed that “...to manage a city is to attempt to manage something spontaneous” (2006:xvii) and this captures the messiness of Jakarta’s development. However, former President, Megawati, claimed that the problem was that the civil servants were ‘unproductive and unskilled’ and that although the government was overstaffed, its employees were underperforming (Steinberg, 2007:362). The ineffectiveness of spatial planning in Indonesia, including Jakarta, is also associated with an enduring political culture of centralization, arbitrariness and clientelism that persists from the New Order regime (Rukmana, 2015:18). Endemic corruption also has a negative impact upon planning and implementation.

In order to explore the particular and local relations between the state, the market and civil society, Jakarta’s global cityness will now be introduced into the theoretical framework.
2.1 The global cityness of Jakarta

The evolution of a global city means that national political and market forces have become integrated into the global economy by means of advanced technologies that make it possible to remotely manage capital flows in various sectors (Wallerstein, 2011; Castells, 1996; Acuto, 2010; Brenner and Schmid, 2015).

Transnational social networks and their urban territories contribute to the unique ‘global cityness’ of each urban node. It is through such networks that formal and informal local partners may gain access to various kinds of resources and power. This means that global cities are the sites at which negotiations between state representatives, business actors and civil society take place. The influx of global actors and capital makes governments aware of the importance maintaining conditions that are favourable for global corporations and of their need for private participation to speed up and help finance infrastructure development. This approach thus offers a means of critically observing the local elements of global cityness, elements that may be defined as “the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions” (Stone, 1989:6).

The notion of ‘global cityness’ is used here to refer somewhat loosely to the process of creation, interpretation and reinterpretation of the development in Jakarta. The characteristics of this unique city must be identified in order to elucidate what is essentially the Jakarta way of ‘doing things’. This does not only mean referring to old Betawi culture, since Jakarta has always been an international city. However, the literature on global cities has paid little attention to “the ways in which actors and institutions as active agents in cities make the world-city-ness of cities” (Robinson, 2002:548). Global social networks and their urban territories form part of the uniqueness of ‘global cityness’ in each case. It is through these networks that formal and informal local partners also ultimately gain access to resources and power. Jakarta may be seen as just another global city and an “achievement of performances and encounters that are globally distributed with varying degrees of clustering and dispersion.”

The next section describes the assemblage in order to show how inequality is created in the city.

2.2 A global assemblage

The global assemblage is an analytical tool that may shed light on some of the structures underlying contemporary interactions and that thus form part of cityness. The term is used here to describe the way in which emerging issues like climate change relate to inequality – it represents the gathering of heterogeneous factors into a utilitarian kind of mosaic. The assemblage draws our attention to some of the problems of inequality, such as insecurity and deprivation, and the way in which these relate to governance, the politics of climate change and economic growth. All of this supports the choice to use the concept of assemblage in order to move beyond fixed ideas of the past and provide new insights.
Urban inequality in a fragile global city. The case of Jakarta

M Thynell

into conditions in a rapidly changing city. The notion of a global assemblage stresses the “agentic role of socio-material allocation that make cities [sic].” (McFarlane, 2011:667) and draws attention to the socio-political factors that drive the development of social structures over extended time. Sassen writes that “assemblages allow me to detect and construct formations that include only elements of established institutions. In this regard, an assemblage cannot be reduced to an institution (the state, the economy, etc.), but rather contains elements of diverse institutions or other identifiable entities, which cohere through specific, often situated dynamics or logics.” (2013:102) The international political economy is highly complex and its expression in Jakarta is particularly difficult to track since the administration is so “Kafkaesque” (Economist, 2015). Besides the environmental issues that influence development, inequality needs to be analyzed from the perspective of the international political economy of Jakarta. This article therefore makes use of information about both material and social conditions, bringing science and social science together to help us better understand change. The “expressive components” (Hillier, 2010) may be global discourses or best practices, municipal policies or neighbourhood voices (civil society), while infrastructure (such as sea-walls and sewers), buildings, technology (such as ICT and vehicles) constitute the materiality (Hillier, 2010) of the assemblage. Other aspects of the assemblage relate to how its elements become established – why do some actors have the power to make relations legitimate or accepted, what meanings are ascribed to these relations and what do they articulate? (Hillier, 2010: 238). Attention is paid to how issues are territorialized (localized or situated) and de-territorialized (made into national policy and planning, news, and media happenings).

The concept of assemblage enables us to see how expressive components interact and how various features of a city are in transition. An urban socio-material assemblage is thus a construct that highlights the actual and potential of both materiality and human behavior and there is a debate about the pros and cons of the method since they are “ephemeral rather than longue durée” (McFarlane, 2011:655; Matthew, 2012). The anthropologist Collier, notes, assemblages “are the actual configurations through which global forms of techno-science, economic rationalism, and other expert system gain significance” (2006: 400) and therefore I will place the assemblage in a long term perspective, a longue durée, including the necessary structural conditions prevalent in Jakarta. See also the critical urban debate by e.g. Storper and Scott, 2016.

The assemblage is situated at the interface between the global and the local. It includes urban ecosystem services, social practices and technical artefacts. When we focus on technical and social expressions, important “global forms are articulated in specific situations – or territorialized in assemblages” (Collier, 2006:399). The concept of assemblage may thus make visible issues that other concepts lead us to overlook. An assemblage will only ever capture part of the picture since it is analytically drawn up from phenomena selected for particular purposes, such as to highlight inequality, but it can help capture “an actual and specific articulation of a global form” (Collier, 2006:399) that serves as a “tool for a critical global knowledge.” Certain phenomena are selected in order to make visible a unique form of global cityness with its fragmented distribution of services and uneven development, a city that is ‘simultaneously growing, dividing, polarizing and decaying’ (Gandy, 2006, p. 52). According to Kusno “Jakarta thus is filled with clusters of exclusive but displayable new zones and surrounding them is the sea of unnoticed, often decaying but densely populated areas. The simultaneous production of the new and the decay forms a powerful ‘habitus’ for Jakarta” p57. In this assemblage I include elements from international political economy, policy,
Urban inequality in a fragile global city. The case of Jakarta

M Thynell

social ecology, xx xx and analyze them together. Using this analytical approach helps us understand not only of the current situation but also how it has evolved historically. This way of considering the contemporary situation may both enrich our understanding of urban development in general and challenge the international view of Jakarta’s development in particular.
3. The Issue of Inequality

It is well-known that more egalitarian societies are ‘doing better’ and their people are enjoying greater well-being than in non-egalitarian or authoritarian countries (REFS). It is also acknowledged that urban prosperity thrives on equity, and this requires enhancing individual/collective potential, provision of opportunities and the strengthening of human agency and civic engagement. However, growing inequality is a widespread problem in many cities, including Jakarta. This gives rise to not only individual suffering but also social conflicts. The concentration of wealth in the hands of a few while huge numbers of families are left highly vulnerable is the two faces of an unequal society. In the long run, this means that economic growth may be limited by the fact that some money is not invested in a way that contributes to common benefits. According to the World Bank, almost 70 million Indonesians live just “above [the] poverty line and are thus vulnerable to falling into poverty. In times of shocks, for example an illness, disasters, job loss, or accelerated inflation, this group can easily fall into poverty. 25 million Indonesians are classified as ‘poor’ and another 65 million are considered ‘vulnerable’, hovering just above the poverty line and remain highly susceptible to shocks – food price increases, health shocks and natural disasters” (World Bank, 2015a). This risk is due to the lack of social safety nets and wealth redistribution policies. In Indonesia (2003 and 2010) consumption by the poorest 40 percent of the population grew by 1-2 percent annually, while that of the two richest quintiles grew by about 6 percent (World Bank, 2015b:9). In other words, growth over the past decade has “primarily benefitted the richest 20% and left behind the remaining 80% of the population—that is more than 205 million people” (World Bank 2015b:2). The Gini coefficient index has worsened from 0.329 in 2002 to 0.413 in 2013 (UNDP, 2016) and Jakarta was shown to be one of the cities with the most rapidly growing inequality. Jakarta is nevertheless believed to have a promising future and it is anticipated that large groups will become part of the high-consuming class while another 90 million Indonesians will become middle class (MGI, 2012). In 2002, the richest 10 percent of Indonesians consumed as much as the poorest 42 percent combined; by 2014, they consumed as much as the poorest 54 percent (World Bank, 2015a:7). In Indonesia, the goal is to “progressively achieve and sustain income growth of the bottom 40 percent of the population at a rate higher than the national average” (World Bank, 2015a). Children in poorer families are born into deprivation and most of them will not be able to gain access to resources in the way that the children of middle-class families may. There are various ways to define inequality in terms of resources: a) income - assets, skills, b) health - sense of wellbeing, c) existential - freedom, respect, rights to social and political participation (Therborn et al., 2006).

In Development Research, inequality is also referred to as “differences in access to, control of, and outcomes from the use of urban resources as well as more generally, difference in income and wealth” (Obeng-Odoom, 2013:55). The economist Stiglitz has drawn up a list of dimensions of wellbeing that reflect social relations: material wellbeing, health, education, political voice, personal activity (work and leisure), social relations, personal security and environmental conditions. These are key elements for assessing inequality (Stiglitz, 2012). Over and above economic poverty, people may also suffer from insecurity, material deprivation, poor health and malnutrition, low education, inadequate livelihoods, poor housing and social exclusion (World Bank, 2015a). Indonesia ranks 61st on the global list of countries’ literacy rates (UNDP, 2016) and “under-five mortality among the bottom 40 percent is two-and-a-half times higher than among the richest quintile of the population (World Bank, 2015a:21).
In Jakarta, low-income families themselves define vulnerability in terms of legal rights to their property and a steady income (McCarthy, 2003). This fits with the discourse of the vicious cycle of exclusion, inequality and poverty, in which the “root causes” of vulnerability, such as limited access to power, structures and resources (Wisner et al., 2003:51, 62), delimit possibilities. These root causes are also under “dynamic pressure” from other factors, such as the lack of local institutions and investments in traditional urban areas, and due to rapid urbanization.

Today’s problems with accelerating climate change exacerbate these problems with damage, loss of proper properties and unhealthy. During the period from 1980 to 2007, about 90 per cent of disasters were caused by recurrent events such as droughts, windstorms, tropical cyclones, storm surges, floods, landslides and extreme temperatures, or by forest fires, health epidemics and insect infestations, which are linked to meteorological and hydrological conditions (CRED, 2013). According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fourth Assessment Report, the frequency and intensity of weather-, climate-, and water-related hazards are increasing as a result of climate change (Yohe et al., 2007). Huge numbers of families are now living in “unsafe conditions” on scarce resources and with endemic diseases (for example). Exposure to heavy rains and sicknesses may impede on possibilities to work and make families poorer through losses of property. In turn such spiral of deprivation interplay negatively with lack of institutional and infrastructural support to recover from hazards. Such dismal conditions in ‘defenseless’ social groups contribute to a “progression of vulnerability” (Wisner et al., 2003:51, 87) and hence on long-term inequality. Whereas, in modern parts of the city families enjoy better health, education and conditions for recovery.

To describe the constitution and co-constitution of inequality we now turn to the issue of residential areas and infrastructure. I have elected to focus on these issues because of the way in which they are affected by environmental problems and climate change.

3a. New Towns and the Old Kampongs – A Divided City

There are basically two kinds of housing areas in Jakarta: the New Towns and the traditional kampongs. These host households from different social and economic groups and provide extremely different standards of living, although in some kampongs socio-economic conditions may vary. In the last 40 years, Jakarta has undergone dramatic change including the demolishing of many large, traditional urban villages. Many older residential areas have been replaced by modern comfortable high-rise buildings, the so-called New Towns, or by mega-developments that include shopping malls and gated communities designed for a modern American and European lifestyle.

The wealthy groups and the growing middle class are looking for better houses, private schools, private hospitals and central areas and this is leading to a growing social and economic divide between newer and older areas in the city. The demand for quality housing and fashionable business districts has caused a great deal of land conversion. Rustiadi (2007) noted that 16,600 ha land had been converted from rural to urban. Decades ago, large areas of the city were demolished and then reshaped to suit the needs of the global business community and the growing middle class. It was noted that, “Jakarta’s marble-walled Stock Exchange and adjacent office complex symbolized the role that global capitalism played in transforming Indonesia from an underdeveloped nation into a global player” (Silver, 2007:187). The “mega-urbanization” (Firman, 2009) of Jakarta refers to the transformation and the construction of infrastructure, industrial estate development, the modern superblocks of Kebayoran (built four decades ago) and the Central Business District and the ‘Golden Triangle’
around Jalan Jendral Sudirman, Jalan Patai Senayan, Jalan Kuningan, Jalan H.R. Rasuna Said. In less than 15 years, the urban area of Greater Jakarta has increased by 18 percent (Firman, 2004) and the services associated with a modern affluent lifestyle are now visible in these new areas. In the last 40 years, the New Towns with their modern infrastructure, high-rise buildings, hundreds of shopping malls, golf courses, toll roads and shopping malls have dramatically changed the urban landscape of Jakarta. The introduction of gated communities, high-tech urban landscapes and gentrified areas has intensified the divided character of the city.

The New Town developments are supplied with modern infrastructure, they are well-connected and their way of life contrasts starkly with the precarious conditions in the kampongs, which have developed 'spontaneously' without formal planning and with most houses having been built by the residents themselves and with electricity supplied by a government-run company or informal providers. Many kampongs are old villages that developed over time but that continue to lack public services (Kooy and Bakker, 2008).

Urban kampongs are often overcrowded, worn down neighborhoods that have only limited access to water and sewer connections and have few open spaces. According to estimates, 60 percent of the city’s residents live in an area of 180 square kilometer. 60–70 percent of them reside in kampongs with a net population density at 30,300 persons per square kilometer (Silver, 2007:147; Zhu & Simarmata, 2015). Infrastructure, housing and transport systems are at risk of repeated damage by heavy rains and flooding. Residents are often threatened with relocation because of river embankment projects and suffer from poor infrastructure that increases their vulnerability to tropical rainstorms and cyclones. Government policies and programmes for housing have been “entirely inadequate in meeting the needs of the urban poor; for all intents and purposes, the government abdicated its role in the provision of housing” (UN-Habitat, 2003:212).

According to Dr Oswar Mungkasa, Jakarta’s Deputy Governor for Spatial Planning and Environment, “urban development is subject to rapid change which the government can only partly meet due to lack of institutional human and financial resources. Jakarta grows in a rather haphazard fashion, creating ambiguity and discrepancies between rules and practices. In this newly constructed space of urban governance, private sector actors have the opportunity to carve out new strategies to address the problems and circumstances arising from urban living” (Dieleman, 2011:63). According to Mungkasa, roughly 25 percent of the expenditure in Jakarta comes from the state budget and the remaining 75 percent derives from private banks, mostly from Singapore, US, Korean and Chinese investments (interview, March 2016).

Although this has not been thoroughly surveyed (McCarthy, 2003; Silver, 2007), experience suggests that most of the poorer households in Jakarta lack formal property rights. Their futures are therefore uncertain and, even though they may have been living on the land for three or four generations, they may be evicted whenever it becomes attractive to urban developers. Gandy summarized the land-use in following words: “The simultaneous production of the new and the decay forms a powerful ‘habitus’ for Jakarta. The city’s normative environment thus is generated by modernist and capitalist demands – that what is new and current is powerful” (2006: 52).

Simone and Rao ask “Who has the right to operate, how and where?” (2012:315). The reality is that private developers have taken over some of the roles traditionally attributed to the state (Winarso and Firman, 2002) and largely set the rules of play for the modernization of Jakarta. Developers may even assume responsibilities for areas beyond their town borders. For example, to appease poor
neighbouring villagers, they may build roads and traditional markets where villagers can sell agricultural products and maintain good contact with their local preman (literally freeman) or thug, gangster, menace or local leader. Indonesian developers are now planning for more New Towns and mega-infrastructure projects to protect the city from floods and a rise in sea level.

Dividing neighbourhood practices

The historical division of residential areas along social and ethnic lines continues to influence the planning of residential areas. Kampongs are politically controlled and led by an informal/formal organization, an ‘RT’ community leader (rukun tetangg). There are also several ‘RW’s (rukun warga, meaning neighbourhoods), which consist of about ten RTs (roughly about 3-4000 persons) (Sihombing, 2002). In turn, RWs are brought together into a “kelurahan” (a large urban neighbourhood). The kampong leaders are either appointed by higher political authorities or selected by a non-representative body of the political elite. “Even though the heads of both ‘RT’ and ‘RW’ are elected by the people they are also representatives of government. In the present reform era, people expect that ‘RT’ and ‘RW’ (both leadership and organization) are fully their representatives” (Sihombing, 2014:351). It is obligatory and also socially and politically advantageous to register one’s name with the kampong leaders, though this is not always done (McCarthy, 2003).

By contrast, the New Town areas or mega-developments, kota, fall within another formal and legal system - the old kota-negara, “the centre of political and economic power in Indonesia cities” - that separates people from the power. These are often wealthier and commercially driven developments whereas the kampongs “retain their own spirit of local space” (Sihombing, 2004:10).

The government has invited urban developers to become the agents of change in shaping the future of the global city and to invest and manage the New Towns. These new housings enjoy a higher standard of law enforcement than other parts of the city. A former Mayor of Jakarta explained “that if temperature and pollution levels were too high he prohibited motorcycles from entering the city, and provided bus shuttle services instead, so as to maintain a clean and cool environment” (Dieleman, 2011:76). In reality, New Town administrators have far greater power than that arising from their formal position.

Despite clear divisions between the various kinds of urban areas, symbiotic relations between kotas and kampungs characterize Jakarta’s development. The community, komunitas, is the link between the kampong people and the powerful social groups in the kotas or New Towns. The New Town families need the labour of those from the kampongs and conversely, the kampong people need employment. The kota dwellers also need supplies available in the kampongs, such as from shops, markets and service providers. “The city develops through “kotanization of kampongs and also kampongization of kotas” (Sihombing, 2004:9).

Segregation practices are however at the root of an unequal system. While the New Towns are provided with all the prerequisites for modern urban life, this is not the case in older and neglected kampongs. Individuals, families and neighbourhood committees are engaged in solving infrastructural issues associated with urban housing and access to resources in an ad hoc manner. However, these problems cannot be managed by the inhabitants themselves in the longer term. Though they may have lived in the same place for decades, their future is uncertain and many families must continually find ways to cope with extreme adversity. Large-scale and modern solutions are costly and there is
therefore a pressing need to find collective solutions for great numbers of households and to connect them with the rest of Jakarta.

3b. Infrastructural services

The role of infrastructure is to provide services to facilitate various activities and support the long-term development of the city. Modern infrastructure is necessary for growth and development and terms such as “networks” or “large technological systems” highlight the connectivity and integration that infrastructure enables (Hommels, Kaijser, and Van Der Vleuten, 2013). The notion of “critical infrastructure” underscores the crucial role played by infrastructural services – from water and energy to transport and communication as well as sewage and waste management – in providing a reasonable standard of living. Infrastructure is “the underlying structure that keeps society together” (Hommels, Kaijser, and Van Der Vleuten, 2013).

The wealthy parts of Jakarta enjoy good infrastructural services but there is a lack of connecting roads between different areas of the city. The official explanation is that the government did not manage the developers, and stakeholders were consequently insufficiently coordinated. In this context, the objects of collective consumption—such as water, air, open space, power, transport, waste—become subject to positional struggles in the way that other kinds of goods are (Tonkiss, 2015: 387). The integration of water, energy, transport services, canals, sluices, bridges, roads, and rail services organizes urban life, attracts transnational businesses and promotes development. Infrastructure also forms part of a political project and is thus socially constructed. Infrastructural designs change over time and may become obsolete and be replaced or may be taken over by marginalized groups (Van der Vleuten, 2004;). For instance, in the 17th century, Jakarta’s canals represented the introduction of foreign systems of water management, waste disposal and transport. Century’s later, they are being used for managing waste and for regulating the effects of tropical rains.

Despite availability of modern infrastructure for managing water, energy and waste, the large, poorer section of the population is still using their bodies and carrygoods and waste, as was the case in the 19th century. UN-Habitat stated that “state-owned monopolies in water and sanitation, power and telecommunications were operated with an inefficiency remarkable even by most developing country standards” (2003: 212). Simone writes of “people as infrastructure” (2004), by which he means that low-cost, low-tech or no-tech engineering and embodied practices are used to provide services. Tonkiss writes about “how informal patterns of transaction trace out networks of exchange in the city, assembling and reproducing urban social systems outside the frame of collective norms or formal organization” (2015: 386). This echoes Darwin’s “survival of the fittest”.

The private investors in communication, internet and water supply are active in wealthy parts of cities where they provide access to essential amenities as well as to shopping malls, where people can walk safely and comfortably. However, low-income families often have difficulty reaching workplaces, schools, travel centres and public services and their shopping areas are less comfortable and secure. In Jakarta the availability, standard and costs of infrastructural services vary considerably in different parts of the city. The modern mega-developments and the New Towns are better connected and have better services than informal or less modern areas that largely lack services such as electricity, waste management and water supplies.

The city administration did not plan for the mobility needs of a rapidly growing middle class with a modern urban lifestyle. Hence the lack of public transport, such as commuter trains and express or
BRT buses. Many families require a private car for their daily transport needs. Road traffic moves at an average speed of 13km/h and statistics suggest that many people spend three or four hours a day gridlocked in traffic jams. Traffic congestion costs the city around $2.5bn a year in lost production. An interviewee, Kusumawijaya, director of the environmental NGO, Rujak, claimed that “In Jakarta there are 250 cars per 1,000 people, compared with 800 in the United States. The real problem is that people use their cars too often in one day because of the shortcomings of the transit system”. Gentrification and differences in people’s access to transport is yet another factor that reduces social mobility and deepens divisions. The lack of infrastructure means that spatial and social integration have failed. There are local providers offering cheap and informal services in some areas and large international transport companies offering more costly and comfortable services in others.

Riding a motor bicycle is by far the most common way of travelling in Jakarta and the distance that it is possible to cycle may play into people’s decisions about where to live, work or study. This illustrates how costly institutional and infrastructural vulnerabilities may be. The “underinvestment in infrastructure, chiefly transportation” is estimated to be 1 percentage point of GDP growth (2015). Addressing this problem would lead to an increase in jobs, higher household income and consumption, and greater fiscal resources for the government to spend on programmes and all of this would contribute to urban development for all.

Together with new land use planning policies the shortage of transport systems has become yet another driver of city development since the informal sector provides motorcycle taxis on street corners and online, gojek. I refer to this as the “gojekisation of Jakarta”, which means that communities are expanding as far as possible, mostly southwards, provided that families can still reach their work or studies by gojek. Highways, flyovers, rapid bus transport systems, and suburban trains such as the Jabotabek Rail System have been built to help ease transport problems. However, the government has also financed road construction in the fast growing peri-urban areas and this has meant that there are more cars on the roads in central areas, and this causes more traffic jams.

The various income groups still travel in different ways. Traditional means of transport, such as bajaj and other tricycles, are unsuitable for long-distance and high-speed travel but are still widely used for short journeys. Their informal operators are seen to be creating safety risks and they are opposed by the city authorities, who are planning for long-distance, fast bus and rail services that will be provided by large companies. These offer reliable services and bring modern development to the wealthier parts of the city. The new transport technologies are efficiently managed, they generate income and provide information that helps people plans their mobility in the city. They are an expression of political as well as technical engineering and they enable the control of flows of both goods and people. This kind of global cityness is the result of “remote encounters” (Giddens, 1990) and governing from a distance through economic and spatial relations.

Infrastructure is also part of broader political agenda to strengthen the city’s image and show that the authorities are taking action. Technologies are embedded in a socio-political framework that pursues a certain logic - “technical objects are always political devices” (Sundqvist, 2012) and they are therefore never neutral. Modern technology has long been available in Jakarta but it has yet to become accessible to some 40 percent of the population. Different socio-economic groups interact with infrastructure in different ways and this guides their behaviour and informs them about where they are ‘invited’ and where they have the possibilities to engage in fruitful interaction with networks or develop income generating activities. The less developed and poorer areas of the city do not receive
investments driven by transnational partnerships and they remain excluded from infrastructure developments that would help them cope with problems of accessing water, transport and health. Instead, they continue to depend on face-to-face contacts and informal and cheaper services provided by local individuals. In deprived contexts the bodies are the main asset and families rely on their physical strength to carry water, food travel in the city and for income-generating activities. To be able to provide for their families many rely on physical work, and disability and unhealthiness comes at a high cost. Vulnerability refers to the exposure to contingencies and stress and difficulty in coping with them.

Therefore “vulnerability … is not the same as poverty” (Chambers 2006: 37).

In Jakarta, spatial fragmentation and social barriers limit people’s access to key amenities and resources. This affects poor families disproportionally and exacerbates inequality. In water management, traffic and transport the barriers are mainly spatial whereas other kinds of barriers impede access to eco-system services and work, study or participation opportunities. So far, I have seen no reliable models indicating the level of losses due to structural mismanagement or inequality and this is possible because they are made in the informal sector. The “unwillingness of the Jakarta administration to involve the urban stakeholders in this planning exercise is seen by many as a ‘mockery’ of the spirit of decentralization laws which proposed the introduction of a democratized planning process” (Steinberg 2007: 356).

3c. Natural environment

There are numerous man-made environmental issues that require urgent attention in Jakarta. They include: the city is sinking by 10 cm/year, the sea level is rising by 0, 6 cm/year, there is a lack of wetlands to absorb rain and floods, a lack of adequate drainage, floods, cyclones, urban heat waves, humidity, air pollution, noise pollution and poor waste management in large parts of greater Jakarta. In a study by Yusuf and Francisco (2009), Jakarta was listed as the city in Southeast Asia that was most vulnerable to climate change. Flooding affects Jakarta in many ways and even smaller floods disturb the transport systems and affect the daily lives of people living close to waterways and in the northern part of the city. In January 2013, the inundated areas in the city were larger than they had been in 2007 and enormous costs were incurred (Texier, 2008, Susandi, 2011, Sagala, 2013).

These environmental problems interfere with the built environment in a large number of neighborhoods and the huge, already vulnerable population is further stressed by these man-made hazards.

Mega-infrastructure projects in the last two decades have been inflexible and poorly adapted to emerging needs in the urban villages or to local ways of managing environmental problems that suit local economic conditions.
4. The Emerging Picture of the Co-Constitution of Inequalities

In his world systems theory, Immanuel Wallerstein described inequality as “power hierarchies by capitalism where physical flows and material arrangements are inextricably intertwined with social alignments and marginalizations” (2011). Experience from Jakarta supports this and Braudel’s (1984) idea of the longue durée in showing how inequality is related to persistent economic, educational and social conditions. When socio-spatial divisions and local political practices are brought together in the notion of a global assemblage, the following picture of inequality and vulnerabilities emerges.

The city has expanded and modernization has progressed but the basic environmental, technical and social issues continuously reproduce social divisions and inequality. City development is complex. Viewing it as an assemblage enables us to see how social hierarchies, practices of inclusion and exclusion and social structures related to inequality together contribute to maintaining inequality. Inequality is evident both in the city’s materiality (its urban form, the built environment, infrastructure) and its expressions (social structures, policy, planning, civil society). The order commanded by earlier colonial powers was replaced by today’s liberal economic trade order, with its stress on the need for economic growth and modernization and today’s Jakarta builds on technological optimism and technology transfers by market actors. Furthermore, the assemblage findings from analysis of infrastructure and houses, local values, meanings, social expressions and policies supports the idea that vulnerabilities are drivers of inequality. The resilience notion is about ability to recover from damage but whenever the conditions in neighborhoods are dismal the damage will be more thorough and recovery will perhaps be difficult or not take place. The article argues that using a systematic and empirical link between urban developments and infrastructural, human and institutional vulnerabilities highlights how urbanization and environmental hazards strengthen inequality.

The emerging picture of Jakarta’s activities in global, national and local networks in times of climate change reveals a city that suffers from lack of collaboration between actors and sectors to confront the challenges. Authoritarian leadership limits dialogue at the community level and plans and decisions are often poorly implemented. Instead urban development has been driven by investments in so called “premium networked spaces” (Graham and Marvin, 2001:139). This fragmentation of urban space, in turn, produces global enclaves in a vicious cycle of urban splintering.

The heuristic potential of the concept of assemblage lies in the fact that it helps disentangle established facts about Jakarta’s urbanization process. The assemblage highlights the city’s particular dynamic of the cityness and the uncertain futures for large segments of its population, particularly the 40 percent that are excluded from average levels productivity and formal economic growth due precarious living conditions (and that have a hard time to improve their conditions and possibilities according to the World Bank). The parts of the assemblage vary according to the characteristics of cityness. In Jakarta, the housing and transport sectors influence one another in ways that increase vulnerability and co-constitute inequality. Through the prism of the assemblage we find that the authorities in Jakarta have failed to develop a city for all. According to anthropologist Anna Tsing, a strong belief “in the blessings of deregulated markets, has dominated Indonesian politics” (Hylland Eriksen, 2014:145). Jakarta’s increasing absorption into the global economy put pressure on the government to remove barriers to growth, but, as discussed in section 5 below, this has proven difficult for the city administration.

Two other recent changes need to be considered here: firstly, the magnitude of the problems and, secondly, climate change. Studies of political, social, economic and cultural aspects of urban life need
Urban inequality in a fragile global city. The case of Jakarta

M Thynell

Natural catastrophes are common in Jakarta and they impact most heavily upon the large number of already vulnerable households. In 1998, for example, both El Niño and the financial crisis hit Jakarta at the same time. Vulnerable groups suffered the consequences of flooding and a number of unfinished new buildings became the breeding grounds for mosquitos. There were outbreaks of malaria and dengue fever and many families suffered loss of income due to sickness (Butsch, 2009). Crises like this have become forces in shaping city development. Today’s alarming environmental problems are now threatening to destroy Jakarta’s unique global cityness: “Jakarta has reached the limits of what it can absorb. There is just no more space for urban development. This situation has a high social, economic and psychological cost” (Keraf, Former Minister of Environment, 2011). Former President Sudhoyono Bambang, 2004–2014, offered little in the way of practical ways to shape Jakarta’s future but today’s national and local governments are beginning to implement projects to remedy some of the difficulties. Greater exploration of how socio-ecological systems interact with vulnerability and resilience will help in the development of ideas for alleviating current problems.

In Jakarta, social networks are crucial to the resilience of civil society. For instance, the upper middle class thrives in certain parts of the city or in foreign territories, such as embassies and clubs. Their social activities underline the geopolitical character of urban spaces, such as the Menteng, and they operationalize modern business districts in Jakarta. The wealthy groups have agency and entrepreneurship whereas local groups lack the resources and information to improve their situation or get in touch with the global networks. Wealthy families live in private spaces, spending most of their time in houses, cars, businesses, clubs or shopping malls. The different economic strata operate in different contexts according to their different needs and opportunities. Private developers have taken “the opportunity to carve out new strategies to address the problems and circumstances arising from urban living” (Dieleman, 2011:63). The unevenness of city development is evident in the fact that few efforts have been made to improve public arenas.

Living on the margins in poor urban areas means being exposed to multiple inequalities. Inequalities co-constitute one another and are the result of centuries of poor urban leadership and management, or perhaps even the results of a deliberate strategy to maintain segregation. Informal activities fill the gaps left by the state and municipalities on the one hand, and the needs of international trade and business on the other. These dynamics created by the local entrepreneurs are part of the particular cityness of Jakarta but they are not openly discussed and the formal sector provides no support because of the lack of collaboration between state, market actors and civil society.

However, strategies for reducing inequality and environmental disasters may also help restructure some of the traditional political arenas, as will be discussed in the final section.
5. Conclusion

The darker side of Jakarta’s apparently successful modernization is growing inequality. Climate change is bringing significant change to this tropical city - inequality is growing and large groups are finding themselves excluded from development. Today’s uncertainties have brought a heightened awareness of risks and Giddens uses the term “post-traditional society” (1990) to describe a society in which “traditions can no longer be taken for granted, but must actively be defended vis-à-vis its alternatives, which now appear realistic” (Hylland Eriksen, 2014:134). Global inequality is being hotly debated and “excessive inequality has been argued to attack the foundations of democracy” and furthermore the “inequality is cause and consequence of the failure of the political system, and it contributes to the instability of our economic system, which in turn contributes to increased inequality” (Stiglitz, 2012:14) and bring unforeseeable consequences. These quotes draw attention to changing political and social conditions and to the need of cities like Jakarta for a democratic leadership that is able to take action to reduce inequality and environmental hazards.

The aim was to explore urban inequality and use a longitudinal case study, Jakarta, to investigate the larger meaning of development dynamics in Jakarta, its fragile aspects and in particular the constitution of inequality in times of urban growth and climate change through ways of developing the city. This brief exploration of a highly complex topic, using the notion of assemblage, can only touch on some of the issues of relevance for inequality.

The informal nature of the city’s development is partly the outcome of institutional and infrastructural weaknesses (governance, budget and competence) feeding into an already unequal society. The findings reveal both human and social vulnerability and how it relates to institutional and infrastructural vulnerabilities. A key issue is the long-standing socio-spatial divide between the wealthy and the vast majority of the population, who lack access to resources. The notion of assemblage brings into focus a picture of lacking policies, regulations and public debate about what needs to be managed and developed in the city.

Jakarta’s cityness (its political and social structures, agency, global relations, informal sector) can be divided into two basic parts. The picture that emerges from below shows how low-income families in kampungs depend on social networks in their vicinity to compensate for lack of modern technology, lack of infrastructure and other services. Traditional social practices strengthen the sense of community and fuel urban resilience.

In Development Research focus is often laid on the local context, power relations and socio-economic groups (Long, 2001). In Jakarta, the informal way of coping with everyday life is often referred to as self-organization, resilience, or an organic neighbourhood development. Despite the fact that they represent a major section of the population in the global city of Jakarta, marginalized groups remain beyond the control and management of legal authorities. For roughly 40 percent of the population, access to the plentiful resources and amenities available has not improved substantially. These people remain largely excluded from progress on account of the lack of re-distributive policies. “The physical design of infrastructural environments both reproduces and generates relations of economic and spatial inequity” (Tonkiss, 2015:387). For instance, the inadequate infrastructural services available to low-income families shows how “spatial proximities frequently translate to economic ones, as there are intersections of interests and various projects” (Simone and Rao, 2012:323). In theory, spatial proximity should facilitate social integration and encourage innovation. But in Jakarta, physical proximity does not dissolve the old, invisible barriers between socio-economic groups. Instead
Urban inequality in a fragile global city. The case of Jakarta

M Thynell

fragmentation and social barriers impede access to services. Kabeer, an economist from Bangladesh, notes how the “systematic social exclusion” of certain groups results in multiple inequalities that limit people’s life chances (2011:1). The 40 percent that are excluded from normal levels of productivity and formal economic growth and who must depend on their own skills and resources suffers from these limitations. Kabeer also lists cultural, spatial, economic and political inequalities. She argues that while each of these inequalities is a source of injustice “But it is the mutual—and intersecting—nature of these inequalities that reinforces the persistence of social exclusion over time and its resistance to ‘business as usual’ approaches to the MDGs” (2011:1). The various aspects of life in Jakarta examined here illustrate how inequality is constituted through policies and practices.

People organize themselves “for carrying water and fuel, the donkey work of informal and embodied transport systems, and dense logistical networks for the low-tech distribution of goods, food and information. These embodied infrastructures are at least as resilient and usually more adaptive than official and technical networks” (Simone in Tonkiss, 2015:388). The poorer communities are confronted with a brutal reality and families have to cope with precarious and extreme conditions that recall those described by Charles Dickens in London some 150 years ago. Failure by the city administration to improve conditions means that people have to organize themselves in order to deal with emergencies such as floods. Depending on their business interests, families depend on their networking skills and these “activities entail pooling meager household assets and sometimes labour” (Simone, 2004:xx). In this way communities are kept together, survive and eventually also develop without support from the city. Social networks compensate for the lack of services and infrastructure in marginalized urban villages.

Social networks are therefore probably one of people’s most important assets and are key features of community resilience as long as they are not “disturbed” by government interventions, such as relocations or evictions. However, as shown in Maclean, Cuthill, and Ross, social resilience may be explored in terms of “knowledge, skills and learning; community networks; people-place connections; community infrastructure; diverse and innovative economy; and engaged governance” (2013:149).

There is a growing body of literature on the social aspects of community development and resilience. The picture that emerges from above reveals a business community playing the most important role in the development of the city. Following decentralization in 2001, the public sector has lost some of its power and modernization continues by and large according to earlier colonial patterns of trade and international relationships. Globalization has no particular direction but so far, it has meant greater interconnectedness and the emergence of new risks and vulnerabilities at the local level.

International relationships enable the development of a modern city suited to the needs of international stakeholders and this establishes a world apart from traditional Indonesian areas. Members of the colonizing elite have both the technological and economic capacity as well as the local patron-client relations necessary to get things done their way. Global actors tend to be found in certain urban areas but are able to manage their interests and activities in distant areas through ICT and smart technology.

For decades, urban planning has been driven by investment interests. Eco-system service options have been ignored and a fragmented and unequal city has evolved. A former minister claims that developers

---

2Maclean et al., 2016; Norris et al., 2007; Magis, 2010; Berkes and Ross, 2013.
“bankroll the local elections by sponsoring candidates. If you are a rich developer, you can buy all the candidates, so that you are sure that whoever wins is your man” (Dieleman, 2011). When the political system is so easily manipulated by money, economic inequality inevitably grows and this in turn leads to a growing imbalance of political power. This leads to a vicious cycle between politics and economics, and “the two together shape, and are shaped by, societal forces—social mores and institutions—that help reinforce this growing inequality” (Stiglitz, 2012). If this continues, inequality will remain a problem and future stability and economic growth may be hampered. Finally, leadership will also be commented on.

5a. Governing Jakarta

The shortcomings of former city governments in dealing with institutional and infrastructural weaknesses have left today’s leaders facing major challenges. Firman et al, write “The city of Jakarta is facing disastrous impact of climate change, most notably flood and sea-level rise related disasters. However, the Jakarta City Government does not yet have concrete steps to tackle the problems. Current endeavors by the Jakarta City.

These problems of creating livable post-modern cities are compounded by the unpredictable effects of climate change. Government tends to focus more on disaster management, rather than efforts to specifically tackle the impact of climate change” (2011:377). In Jakarta, the magnitude of these problems is putting pressure on the leadership to become more inclusive with regard to public investment in housing and infrastructure, as well as in health and education. The politics of climate change has created opportunities for new actors and has shaped new political arenas. Demands for the right to participate and enjoy a modern standard of living in cities are now falling into the realm of human rights.

Infrastructure enables people to access services and contributes to production. It is at the core of what a city is, or, as Simone writes: ‘urban life is … a matter of what can be made relatable at any point in time’ (2011:355). Infrastructural systems are the most basic elements allowing people to organize their lives and accordingly to strengthen resilience making it possible to recover after heavy rain or flooding’s. Yet the authorities in Jakarta have largely abdicated from their responsibility to provide equal access to infrastructure for electricity, waste, transport or water in parts of Jakarta. The inadequacy of services helps produce ever greater inequalities. Wealthy parts of the city are more resilient and attract new investments for mega-development and good roads. The seawall and other mega-projects are taking development and management out of the hands of the public administration. Social movements and participatory democratic practices are new to Indonesian political culture and they have yet to exert any influence upon urban development. In Indonesia focus is laid on mitigating the consequences of environmental disaster, but plans for sustainable development are lacking, whereas the early industrialized countries are better equipped to meet environmental issues and to confront the problems of growing cities.

In a nutshell, the uncertainties relating to uneven city development create a fragile urban future in which inequality and spatial and social segregation interplay with environmental deterioration to compound uncertainty about the future. In the kampongs the climate change and the ensuing man-made disasters in Jakarta spiral events that have a direct and negative bearing on inequality. Whereas in modern areas, the New Towns, the support systems in terms of institutional and infrastructural capacity, such as good roads, drinkable water, waste management, safe electricity net and so on, The support speeds up the recovery and diminishes the damage on property and on health. Hence affluent
persons ‘do better’ in times of environmental and health hazards, and may continue their normal life, including normal levels of productivity. In the meanwhile poorer families will have to evacuate and perhaps live in tents far away from school and workplaces. As seen in Jakarta poorer groups also need a lot of time to prepare for coming rains or loss of electricity, whereas wealthy groups may pay someone to organize their daily life smoothly.

The consequences of climate change on the vulnerable parts of the city vary and families respond in different ways according to their physical, material and social resources. As in other accidents when damage is made, time for recovery is prolonged whenever capacity and resources are scarce. The coping methods differs and the relation to exposure, alternative to deal with the disaster, all have a bearing on Climate change on planning on policy, in the areas and on individuals – but the costs or loss of income.

Asian mega-cities make efforts to manage disasters and are less equipped to handle increasing problems with climate change, vulnerability and inequality than European cities.

Uncertainties and growing vulnerability are intertwined with social marginalization “rapidly changing and emerging markets more often feature such nascent fields” (Child, Lu, and Tsai, 2007). This is particularly true in areas in which companies create and control new markets by appropriating government roles. The most obvious reason for this is the lack of local inclusive political strategies and effective urban planning. Research on global cities has largely focused on the international features of cities. For instance, Acuto notes that “some world cities, which rests upon an urban entrepreneurial spirit that situate these metropolises as the strategic hinges of globalisation” (2011:2953). The role of national and regional government in rapidly growing cities requires further analysis.

The era of climate change and its effects upon Jakarta may “unsettle older frameworks of wealth and poverty” (Sassen, 2008). And perhaps authoritarian leadership was a prerequisite for the development of the modern and private “clusters of exclusive but displayable new zones and surrounding them is the sea of unnoticed, often decaying but densely populated areas. The city’s normative environment thus is generated by modernist and capitalist demands – that what is new and current is powerful (Gandy, 2006: 52). Hopefully such trends are history now and that we will look forward to democratic times enabling new political arenas to define a livable Jakarta.

The complexity of natural disasters in Jakarta means that integrated, coordinated and thorough strategies are required (Mungkasa, 2015). Sustainability will need to be built upon collaborative efforts to improve conditions for all instead of allowing earlier liberal policies that benefitted particular consumer groups to continue. An action plan to design a livable Jakarta will need to include government partners, such as NGOs, scientists, private sector representatives and various professionals who are qualified to help develop a culture of security in Jakarta. We also know that actions on global, local, and individual levels need to converge to be effective (Giddens, 2009).

The question raised concerns the magnitude of the problems people face and asks where low-income communities may turn to for political alliances that may help them improve their living conditions. Will there be a breakthrough towards more inclusive politics? Will earlier conflicts of interests be replaced by an era of colliding interests, a golden opportunity, enabling the development of a livable city for all?
6. Reference list


The Economist (2015). Spicing up growth,Bad policy as much as bad infrastructure is holding Indonesia back. May 9th JAKARTA May 9th-15th Available at: http://www.economist.com/node/21650586/print [10 July 2016].


Urban inequality in a fragile global city: The case of Jakarta

M Thynell


Urban inequality in a fragile global city. The case of Jakarta
M Thynell

http://research.ncl.ac.uk/forum/v7i1/SihombingA-Living%20in%20the%20Kampungs.pdf. [5 July 2016]


THE EMERGING GEOGRAPHIES OF WASTE GOVERNANCE IN THE PRIVATIZATION MILIEU; OF NIMBY AND PROGRESSIVE CITY DYNAMICS IN AMRITSAR CITY, INDIA

Kiran Sandhu

School of Urban and Regional Planning, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, India
kiransandhu13@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

The current prevailing macro-economic orthodoxies are dominated by a turn of tide in favour of the free market and privatization paradigms that have made inroads in all development and service delivery initiatives, previously the sole domain of the state. Developing countries like India are no exception to this trend that is being promoted as ‘the’ solution to the delivery of municipal services such as municipal solid waste. However waste governance in the liberalized economic setup is proving to be highly contentious with conflicts and NIMBY (not in my backyard) protests erupting over the issues of waste treatment and disposal in particular. The decision of the state to bring in technological solutions as the waste to energy plants and especially its location has brought the principal stakeholders; the community, the private actors and the state authorities in conflict, with the state actors trying to push through their waste privatization agendas and the others posing a stiff resistance. With this backdrop and with the objective of providing insights into the situation that could inform policy decisions or course correction, the research study takes up the case of Amritsar city in India. Relying on semi structured interviews of stakeholders, direct observations from the field, archival and documentary evidence, the research conducts an empirical investigation into the waste governance, focusing on the spatial dimensions; the siting of landfills and the waste to energy plant. It encompasses the analysis of progressive agendas and spatial decisions in the contestations for the right to a better quality of life in the city. The research points to the need for scalar strategies and policies that are based on a thorough understanding and sensitivity of spatial geographies in waste and its governance.

KEY WORDS

Municipal solid waste, NIMBY, Amritsar, landfill, Waste to Energy Plant, Governance
INTRODUCTION

One of the services that received scant attention until recently in context of the developing countries has been the management of MSW. While provision of basic services i.e., water and sanitation have figured high on the priority list of municipalities, MSW management has emerged as a grim environmental and public health issue requiring urgent attention only in the last decade or so. The unprecedented increase in solid waste generation and its poor management has forced the public sector institutions to allocate more priority to its effective management. According to UN-Habitat (2009: 9), the current global estimates of MSW generation is two billion tonnes annually and given the spate in per capita waste generation, by 2025, the figure is expected to touch 7 billion tonnes. International Solid Waste Association (2012) estimates that the total MSW produced annually is between 1.6 to 2 billion tonnes, out of the total waste streams (municipal, industrial and hazardous) amounting to 4 billion tonnes, thus constituting a major share of 50 percent of the total.

While the public sector has been at the forefront of managing a city’s waste till recent times, the shift towards private sector participation and technology oriented solid waste management is seen as an outcome of the globalization policies and the incapabilities of the public sector to tackle the issue on its own effectively (Zhu et al. 2008; UN-Habitat, 2009; Ministry of Urban development (MoUD), 2010; Cointreau-Levine, 1995; Cointreau-Levine, 2000). Thus, the role change of the state from service provider to service facilitator within the framework of globalization processes has seen the emergence of private players on the scene. Institutional arrangements and mechanisms are thereby being put in place to facilitate the development of such like technological solutions and arrangements to enable the private stakeholders to participate in the solid waste management processes.

In the Indian context, the growing crevice between waste generation and its management, the disposal in particular has turned the spotlight on waste as a matter out of place to a matter that must be made invisible. The neo-liberalization of governance through policy and development reforms have entailed the public sector to facilitate private sector participation and promote waste management technologies. This is in pursuit of the larger objective of showcasing a progressive dynamic city capable of offering a high quality of life and propelling economic growth. As such, there have been significant upheavals in policy design and decision making wherein the principle stakeholders, the government and private sectors have been playing a pivotal role in shaping India’s post liberalization waste landscape.

The last two decades have witnessed a thrust in national and state policy to establish solid waste processing facilities. Also referred to as waste-to-energy plants (WTE), this is the corporate solution to a city's waste problems. Recent years have also seen a spurt in the NIMBY (not in my backyard) protests. These are entrenched in the politics of waste governance in Indian towns and cities in the backdrop of the surmounting solid waste management crisis. The outbreak of several NIMBY protests across the country coincide with the realignment of waste policies to favour new landfills and technology applications in Indian cities. Waste and its disposal in particular has an inherently spatial connotation as argued by many researchers (Whitson, 2011; Moore, 2012; Davies, 2005; Mihai, 2012). Therefore the practice of waste governance requires careful consideration of spatial matters that are bound to have a social implication often manifested in space based contestations underpinned therein by waste conceptualizations. The geographies of waste and its governance encompass these dimensions and requires sensitivity to be able to unravel these complexities.

In this paper, I seek to contribute to the ongoing debates around geographies of waste and its governance by taking the case of Amritsar city in Punjab state of India. Through an empirical investigation into the waste geographies in Amritsar, I emphasize upon the need to understand such dynamics with the purpose of shaping inclusive policies and actions that underpin waste decision making and produce viable spatio-social outcomes. The data for analysis is largely sourced from archival and documentary evidences including newspapers, correspondence letters between Amritsar Municipal Corporation (AMC), Bhaktanwala Resident Association (BRA), Non-Government
Organization, Pollution Control Committee (PCC), Government of Punjab, Department of Local Bodies, Punjab Pollution Control Board (PPCB), Punjab State Human Rights Commission (PSHRC) and National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). Data was also sieved from the semi-structured interviews of the stakeholders from the AMC, BRA, PCC, households adjacent the Bhaktanwala Landfill site, representatives from the Bhaktanwala grain market and informal waste pickers at Bhaktanwala landfill site. The information was also supplemented by a purposive household survey of adjacent households and direct observations by the researcher. Before embarking on a critical analysis of Amritsar, it is important to examine the relevant extant literature that in turn serves as a base to construct an analytical framework for case study application.

THEORIZING GEOGRAPHIES OF WASTE GOVERNANCE AND NIMBYISM

Davies (2005:394) emphasizes that “attention to the practices of waste governance also require careful consideration of the spatial strategies that are inherent in those webs of social practise particularly in case of state actors who seek to impose select waste management strategies and on the other hand civil society actors, seeking to resist those strategies and trying to negotiate on location and other alternatives. Davies also laments that the geographies of waste governance have been given little attention despite the significance of the issue. Arguing the case of the spatial dimensions of waste and its management, Mihai (2012:41) states that its “territorial and temporal variability, spatial analysis of treatment or disposal facilities, systematic implications on the environment, the harmonization of international policy at national, regional and local level” all have territorial implication. Further Mihai (2012:14) categories this into two related components, the first being the quantitative approach that extends to the spatial analysis of waste management infrastructure (collection, transport, storage, treatment and disposal facilities) and the second encompasses the qualitative or social approach. This brings in the stakeholders and their behaviours and responses to waste management options. NIMBY is examined under this context as an analysis of behavioural changes of all social factors forwards issues involving territorial governance.

Furthering this understanding, Whitson (2011:1412) points out that the geographies of waste and especially its disposal are also increasingly fundamental to understanding social relations and changes therein. “Rather than the commodity’s life cycle ending at the point of consumption and use, they continue to circulate through society in the process of disposal, deriving meaning from and giving meaning to social interactions, identities and spaces” (Whitson, 2011:1405). In this sense waste and its disposal have the “potential to transform or reinforce longstanding inequitable social structure.” In her bid to further theorize the waste geographies and its inherent impact on the constitution of social structures Whitson (2011:1412) proposes a conceptualization of waste and its perceptions, wherein this conceptualization highlights “the material, discursive and ideological” aspects of waste and serves to constitute social identities, paces and boundaries.

Categorizing waste conceptualizations, Moore (2012:781) states that waste is often assumed to be a environmental and public health hazard. It is a social spatial process and distributes environmental risks unevenly and creates marginalized populations leading to social movements and discourses of environmental justices. On the opposite side, the conceptualization of waste as a resources can limit marginalisation of people engaged in generating livelihood while also be a potential economic resource for the public or private sector. This conceptualisation of waste presents the economic dimensions of waste as it “traverses the circuit of production, distribution, consumption, reclamation and annihilation (Gille, 2010:1050 in Moore 2012:785).

Further Moore (2014:786) presents waste as a manageable object, bring in the aspects of governance, stakeholder and scales encompassing the effects of regulation, issues of the privatization and the interactions between states and non-state actors. In waste as a disorder, Moore emphasizes that its disposal is about placing and therefore it is a spatial practise and thereby the process becomes constitutive of social and ethical activities (Hertherington, 2004:162 in the Moore, 2012:788). As
such, landfills for instance that actually play a role of hiding waste from society become points of contention through their impacts. In context of manageable object, drawing on Faucalt’s ideas of governmentality, Moore states that waste as a governable object helps to create the power it becomes subject to. In doing so, the state extends its power institutionally by setting governing mechanisms for waste practices and waste becomes open to technical and institutional interventions. Finally the concept of waste as the abject mechanism dealing with waste, place and people are considered essential to production of “modern spaces and citizens” albeit through socio-political manifestations (Moore, 2012:792).

The conceptualization of waste underpins the spatial social dynamics through the attributes of location and conformality of the waste space to adjacent uses. In this context, Davies (2005:377) argues for a scale sensitive approach to the analysis of waste governance, emphasizing its importance in policy making and environment governance. Policy outcome are actually the products of processes occurring in scalar hierarchies of governance as national, regional and local. (Boyle in Davies, 2007:163). Moore (2012:784) states that the issues of scale is of significance, “both for analysis and for activism around environmental justice.” since there are instances where the decision making takes place beyond the local arenas. However it is the inter-relationship of three sets of stakeholders- public, private and civil society that fundamentally shape the outcomes (Davies, 2007:161). Their inter-relationships can produce a myriad of outcomes including contestations, and conflicts manifested in the NIMBY syndrome bringing in debates around political power and symbolism to the fore. In context of NIMBY, Dear (1992:288) refers to it as “the protectionist attitudes of and oppositional tactics adopted by the community groups facing an unwelcome development in their neighbourhood.” Luloff, Albrecht and Bourke (1998:82) state that deconstructing and understanding NIMBY concerns is an important factor in understanding the pattern of policy in waste siting and may open potential pathway for viable action.

The NIMBY as such, primarily is an outcome of spatial decision making. Davies (2005:378) cites cities, Cox (1998) to state that governance of environmental issues demonstrates two components referred to as spaces of dependence and spaces of engagement. Space of dependence is place specific such as proximately to a landfill or a WTE plant and provides a social identity in relation to a site. Whereas in this complex geographical setup, spaces of engagement may be created by communities to alleviate their problems related to the space of dependence (Davies, 2005:392).

Further the spaces of dependence encompasses the motivation for NIMBY and its causative factors. Whereas spaces of engagement include stakeholder tactics, both community and civil society based as well as institutional. It can well be argued that the motivation for NIMBY movements can be determined by what Esaisson (2014:187) mentions as stake and clarity of choice. When stack are high with clear options, self interest and even involvement of the public conscious members of the civil society dominates. Understanding and perceptions of facility siting are usually marked by the quality of life risks referred to as health concerns, material concerns (decline of property values) emotional concerns (place attachments) , aesthetic concerns (as eyesores) and unequal environmental risk distribution (Marques, et al, 2005:2; Dear, 1992:290; Kikuchi and Gernado; 2009:1682; Luloff, Albrecht and Bourke, 2016:85, Shen and Yu, 1997:273).

While the spaces of dependence may be constructed from the motivations derived from perceptions of causative factors as mentioned, spaces of engagement lay grounds for interfere that is manifested in conflicts and contestations leading to a grid lock situation or creating grounds for policy realignment and resolutions. Both extreme situations shape the futuristic course of spatio-socio outcomes and policy discourse. As such, while the community/civil society tactics may largely encompass oppositions and protests, acquiring the form as demonstrations, disobedience or even violence and arson. On a more positive side could be disseminating information about more benign and viable alternatives. Institutional tactics span political power play, manipulations, public hearings compensation (for the perceived losses) or even collaborations to find a way out from the grid lock
situation (Lulof f, Albrecht And Bourke, 2016:84, Dear, 1992:290). Based upon a review of related body of literature, an analytical framework for analysis in case study has been constructed (Table 1).

Table 1 Analytical framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>Conceptualizations</th>
<th>Spatiality dimensions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Waste</td>
<td>Hazard/risk</td>
<td>-Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resource</td>
<td>-Conformality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disorder</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abject</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale</td>
<td>Political decisions and Policy making</td>
<td>Siting processes &amp; outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental Governance regulations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholders</td>
<td>Public/private</td>
<td>Community &amp; civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>Spatio-social context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community &amp; civil society</td>
<td>Community activism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proximity principle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spatio-social context</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community activism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technologies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimby-</td>
<td>Spaces of Dependence</td>
<td>Spaces of Engagement and action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causative factors</td>
<td>Motivations</td>
<td>Community tactics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health concerns</td>
<td>Self Interest</td>
<td>Passive opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material concerns</td>
<td>Common interest</td>
<td>Active Protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional concerns</td>
<td>Public consciousness</td>
<td>Judicial interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetic concerns</td>
<td>Stake &amp; clarity of choice</td>
<td>Disseminating alternatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EMERGING GEOGRAPHIES OF WASTE GOVERNANCE IN INDIA

One of the most critical areas of concern in rapidly urbanizing India relates to the issue of waste management in Indian cities. As per Government of India estimates (GOI, 2010) urban India currently produces about 70 million tonnes of waste and this figure is expected to touch an astounding 370 million tonnes in 2030 given the current spate in the consumption patterns and materialistic lifestyles. The current per capita rate of 490 grams MSW generation is expected to reach 945 grams by 2047. The per capita generation is increasing by 1.3 percent per year with class I cities accounting for nearly three fourths of the waste generated in urban areas (Technology Review, 2010:40). Despite the fact that as much as 30-50 percent of the Municipal budgets in Indian cities are being spent on solid waste management, the state of affairs continues to be unmanageable (Zhu et.al, 2008:51). Societal and management apathy and poor enforcement of Municipal Solid Waste (Management and Handling) Rules, 2000 have compounded the problems of solid waste management in urban India. Thus the state of MSW in urban India is a challenge to city managers and policy makers alike.

Coming to the context of city governance and service delivery, India entered the process of economic liberalization in the early nineties following which the reform policies radically oriented towards an open market economy. In terms of governance, the first generation of urban reforms initiated by the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 paved way for a greater role by the urban local governments through decentralization of power and functions and also promote private sector participation and

1 A Class I city refers to the Census of India classification of Indian settlements with a population of 100000 or above. The current number of such settlements is 468 out of which 53 cities are million plus cities (Census of India, 2011:3).
2 The Municipal Solid Waste (Management and Handling) Rules, 2000 were notified by the Government of India and provide directions to municipalities and other urban local bodies to establish compliance with its provisions listed under four schedules i.e., implementation schedule, management of MSW, specifications for landfill sites and standards for composting, treated leachates and incineration. The Rules were updated and revised to Solid Waste Management (SWM) Rules, 2016 and notified in April 2016.
citizen’s participation in city building. The focus has been to empower the urban local bodies to initiate independent decision making and undertake fiscal generation towards city upgradation, physically, socially and economically. While the policy interventions in the MSW sector by the Government of India can be traced back to the 1960s, focused policy attention actually emerged from the plague epidemic in Surat city in Gujarat which led to the constitution of the J.L. Bajaj Committee, 1995. The committee made a wide range of MSW related recommendations such as segregation of waste at the source, levying user charges, use of appropriate equipment and technologies and involvement of the private sector in management of solid waste (GOI, 2010:10-11; Zhu et.al; 2008:11-12; Dhamija, 2006:111-140).

The late 1990s witnessed increasing involvement of the private sector in MSW operations (figure 1). Consequently, private sector involvement in MSW started in the mid-1990s in major metropolitan cities like Chennai and Hyderabad and witnessed further growth by the mid-2000s into waste processing, sanitary landfill development and management and closure of existing dumpsites.

The second generation of urban reforms, the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM)³ was initiated in December 2005 with the objective of encouraging reforms and development of identified cities. The Government of India made mandatory provisions for the municipalities to observe compliance with the MSW Rules 2000 provisions regarding efficient management of MSW. The compliance was to be achieved by 2003 but other than a few cities this has not been achieved to date (GOI, 2009:29).

The onus of urban service lies with the local government at city level under the urban reform structure. The local government under the Constitution of India comes under the domain of the state government⁴ and in the pre-privatization setup they have been operating under the control of the state government with very little fiscal or functional autonomy (Punjab Development Report, 2002:291). Despite the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992, that aimed to remove structural deficiencies and upgrade the municipalities to improve decision making and discharge of their responsibilities, it has not happened largely due to traditional bureaucratic power structures that favour control instead of devolution of power to local government. The Planning Commission (2002) and Sandhu and Teotia (2013:229) mention that the functional domain of the municipalities in Punjab state continues to suffer from lack of clarity, stability and its functional responsibilities are usually controlled or even taken over by the state and fragmented amongst several agencies such as parastatal⁵ organizations; Punjab

³The thrust of JNNURM is on building efficiency in infrastructure and service delivery mechanisms, community participation and accountability of urban local bodies and parastatal agencies towards the citizens. In a bid to augment and improve infrastructure the mission was launched in 2005 in 64 cities with a provision of Rs 50,000 crores (878 million USD) over a seven year period.

⁴In the list II of the 7th schedule of Article 246 of the Constitution of India.

⁵Organizations owned or controlled partially or wholly by the government.
Water Supply and Sanitation Board (PWSSB) and State Urban Development Authority (SUDA). These organizations encroach upon the functional domain of the municipalities. As such, MSW, while being under the functional domain of the municipality, is subject to state control through the Department of Local Government, Punjab Infrastructure Development Board (PIDB), Punjab Municipal Infrastructure Development Company (PMIDC) and PWSSB. With this administrative backdrop, the organizational structure of AMC regarding MSW is denoted by the figure 2.

[fig. 2]  Institutional structures in MSW management
Source: Constructed by the researcher

**AMRITSAR’S NEO-LIBERAL CITYSCAPE AND PROGRESSIVE DYNAMICS**

Amritsar is the second largest City in Punjab in India, located 27 kilometers from the international border with Pakistan with a population of 1,132,761 and areal extent of 14237.2 hectares. Being the seat of the sikh religion and owing to the location of the golden temple, the city attracts tourists from all over the world and has also witnessed a spate in development activities in the last two decades owing largely to the liberalization measures and a proactive political economic scenario leading to planning and implementations of numerous infrastructure, commercial and residential development projects in the city.

Coming specifically to the MSW scenario, the city generates about 600-650 metric tonnes of MSW per day. The waste trail reveals the imprint of the colonial system and structures extended into the current day waste management systems. The establishment of the municipal structures of administration and The Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 established an exclusive public responsibility towards waste management. The colonial practices of collection, storage, transportation or disposal did not change much and the unsanitary practices of dumping waste without treatment and dumping continue to this very day. While the manual scavenging practices have also continued since, the only change has been the shift from excreta lifting to scavenging recyclables from MSW by the informal waste pickers. The Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, formulated to upgrade the municipal body did not deflect much from The Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 and did not propose any structural reforms for undertaking MSW management. Consequently the AMC continued operations as the service provider with no innovative or new practices adopted in managing the city waste.

A fundamental turn from the continuing tradition of AMC managing city waste came through the adoption of the privatized approach by the state government led by the central government directives.
In a typical bureaucratic top-down decision making, as against the specifications of the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992, the decision to privatize MSW in Amritsar city was made at the level of the Government of Punjab and Department of Local Government.

The intention of the Government of Punjab to privatize MSW operations and establish a waste management plant in Amritsar was mentioned in the correspondence between AMC and PSHRC in February 1999. Meanwhile the Government of Punjab planned a scheme for the management of MSW in three cities, i.e., Jalandhar, Ludhiana and Amritsar in early 2000 and declared the PWSSB as the nodal agency under Department of Local Government to manage the process. After Amritsar came under JNNURM in 2005, the MSW project earned central government patronage and the same mandated the preparation and submission of a Detailed Project Report (DPR) for the MSW management project as a condition for release of funds from the Central Government. In keeping with this requirement, in June 2008, a private consultant was approved to prepare DPR for MSW collection and transportation (Phase I) and WTE plant (Phase II).

The DPR prepared for phase II (MSW management plant) was accorded accent by state government and the JNNURM Cell of MoUD in February 2009. Based on tenders invited for the same, M/S AKC Developers Private Limited, Noida were allotted the work and the contract agreement was executed in May 2009. Vide a resolution, the AMC resolved to lease land at Bhaktanwala landfill site @ Rs one/square metre/year for thirty years on Build Own Operate and Transfer (BOOT) basis and the lease deed to this effect was signed between AMC and M/S AKC Developers Private Limited in July 2009. However even before the operations could begin, the Department of Local Government cancelled the contract for Phase II on the grounds that AMC had finalized the same in an arbitrary manner at exaggerated cost. An excerpt from a newspaper (Amritsar Tribune, 7 September 2012) reads, “Amritsar waste plant contract terminated, connivance investigation finds serious irregularities, norms were relaxed, rates exaggerated to favour firms.” Phase II of the MSW project did not take off, however there have been continuous efforts by the AMC, pushed by the state government to establish the WTE plant.

WASTE DISPOSAL PRACTICES

When it comes to MSW treatment and disposal mechanisms, it may be well said that not only most basic and unscientific but also the most insensitive allocation of space to the landfill has been made by the AMC. No pre-treatment or sorting is done except by the waste pickers. The post-partition trajectory of the unsanitary landfill in mapped in table 2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Land space in hectares</th>
<th>Distance from CBD in Kilometres</th>
<th>Current status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post partition- 1999</td>
<td>Chabal Road Naraingarh</td>
<td>2 hectares 1 hectare</td>
<td>2 6</td>
<td>Exhausted but informal dumping practiced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2014 to February 2015</td>
<td>Fatehpura</td>
<td>5.8 hectares</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Started dumping in November 2014 but stopped after NIMBY protests and Court intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed</td>
<td>Bharariwal Mahal</td>
<td>2.65 hectares 3 Hectares</td>
<td>5 5</td>
<td>proposed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JBIC (2010, p.2-31)

It mentioned that a scheme was being prepared by the Department of Local Government to enter into a formal agreement with a private company, M/S Excel Industries Private Limited.
The current landfill at Bhaktanwala lies adjoining to the district grain market and has been the city landfill since 1999. The inappropriateness of the location is the non-conformity of the surrounding landuses and especially the grain market through which the vehicles transporting waste often trespass into the adjoining dump sharing a common boundary with the grain market (figure 3). Way back in 2002, Amritsar Tribune (16 April 2002) reported that, “so pathetic is the situation here that even all sides of the grain market, consisting of at least 60 shops, have been covered with garbage stock piles. The place, which otherwise displays paddy and wheat grains during procurement season, has now been accumulated with solid garbage, emanating a filthy smell.”

The landfill has been a constant and continued source of conflict between the Punjab Mandi Board (the institution running the grain market), the labour unions of the grain market and the residents associations of the surroundings localities who claim that the localities were existing before the designation of the landfill. This has also been as subject of judicial litigation but till date no lasting solution has been conceived and indiscriminate disposal has continued despite emergence of factual data pertaining to environmental and health concerns in the adjacent surroundings.

The landfill, as high as ten feet, extends into the area of the grain market as well as along the rail line and overspills into the adjacent residential localities. Foul odour, large number of rodents and frequent self-ignition, gas formation and contamination of ground water due to leachate have been reported (Dainik Bhaskar, 7 July 2007, Amritsar Tribune, 12 November 2014). This landfill is earmarked as the site for establishment of the WTE plant since 2006. The WTE plant for the city to be operated through private sector comprised of the following components.

- Bio-remediation⁷ and closure of old dump sites and reclamation of land at Bhaktanwala site.
- Establishing therein, an integrated MSW processing and treatment facility⁸ of 600 Tonnes/day comprising of a material sorting and recycling unit, windrow composting plant (350 tonnes/day), RDF plant (100 tonnes/day), recycling unit (50 tonnes/day) and a sanitary landfill (100 tonnes/day).

---

⁷ Bioremediation implies treatment of old dump sites through biological acceleration and mechanical stirring up of heaps aimed at volume reduction and recovery of stabilized earth.
⁸ Also referred to as the MSW plant as per the contract agreement (AMC, 2009:13)
The integrated MSW plant project was proposed as a technical solution to deal with the city’s waste issues. The establishment of such technology oriented solutions comes largely from national policy as the MSW Manual, (MoUD, 2000) and the Technological EIA guidance manual for common MSW management facilities issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF, 2010) that several other policy documents that favoured technological interventions to deal with the city’s waste woes and achieve compliance as per specified policy directives. However it is the location and siting of the plant itself which is the most critical aspect and defies the siting norms and criteria therein.

WASTE CONCEPTUALIZATION AND ACTUALITIES

As has been emphasized in the theoretical section, waste perceptions and their conceptualizations manifest in actual responses and actions of the stakeholders. In the case study, an attempt was made to underpin the waste constructs and the findings are presented in table 3. The perception of waste as risk arising out of a disorder that requires pursuit of order and removal of the abject led to the AMC’s actions of depositing it in the Bhaktanwala landfill where it could be hidden till the WTE plant came into operation. Location aspects appear to be subordinate wherein the risk after disposal was not perceived as risk per say by the AMC. Wherein on the other hand the community’s perception was the risk that is posed beyond disposal at the landfill site and that the establishing of the WTE plant that would deter their quality of life further. An attempt to unravel the actual risk through primary household survey of respondents residing in proximity to the landfill reveal as table 3 indicates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Waste conceptualization</th>
<th>AMC</th>
<th>Private company</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Informal sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorder</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abject</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial dimension</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>Access to waste</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The survey of the households conducted in the localities around the landfill (table 4) reveals that a majority of the households (84%) were disturbed due to the presence of the landfill. A combination of factors comprising of foul odour and air pollutant, water contamination from leachate were the main causes of disturbance. In terms of diseases associated with proximity to the landfill, 83% respondents responded that a combination of respiratory disorders, skin infections and with vector borne diseases as malaria, dengue and cholera and diarrhoea caused health risks. Further, 29% of the respondents answered in affirmative when asked about death in the family probably due to landfill related health risks. 86% of households wanted to shift to another location but had not been able to do so either due to a lack of buyer of their property, low value offered and low rents there that enabled the occupiers, mostly poor residents some form of access to housing in the city. A majority of the respondents saw the landfill and the proposed WTE plant as an eyesore and also displayed an affinity for the place of their residence. A majority of the respondents also lamented the unequal distribution of risk in the siting decision of the landfill and the WTE plant. However when asked to mention one single most pressing reason that served as their motivation to join the NIMBY protests, health concerns remained on the top.

Synchronizing the actual risk on ground with the proposed WTE plant highlighted that the concerns are not purely unfounded and the threat was apparent and constituted non conformal space in the residential locations. “The lives of thirty thousand people are getting buried under the landfill. Poisonous gas and foul smell is causing havoc to the people’s health but the AMC is not interested...
and dumping continues there unabated.” (Dainik Bhaskar, 7 July 2007). An excerpt from the Amritsar Tribune (5 November 2012) reads, “70% of population had been suffering from various health problems due to smoke emanating from the dump yard. A resident of the area said she had recently lost her husband as he was suffering from acute respiratory problems. Another resident said, ‘I have lost my 25 year old son. He was also suffering from breathing problems.’

Table 4: Households concerns in relation to the Bhaktanwala Landfill

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concern</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Can’t say</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does being closely sited to the landfill disturb you (RR100)</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If yes, how (RR 84)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foul odour and air pollution</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leachate and water pollution</td>
<td>05</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disturbance from animals and rodents</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noise from vehicles</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A combination of the above</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
<td>82.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you or your family members faced any of the following health issues in the near past (RR97)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respiratory disorders</td>
<td>05</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skin infections</td>
<td>03</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water borne diseases like diarrhoea/cholera/gastroenteritis/other</td>
<td>02</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaria/dengue</td>
<td>04</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A combination of the above</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
<td>85.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you wanted to shift to another location (RR100)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If yes then why have you not shifted yet (RR 86)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No buyer for this house</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low value offered</td>
<td>08</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low rents here than other locations</td>
<td>03</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All the above reasons</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
<td>75.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can’t say</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you see the landfill and the proposed WTE plant as an eyesore? (RR-100)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can’t say</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you have an emotional attachment to the place? (RR 100)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can’t say</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you feel that you are unfairly subject to the risk of the proximily of the landfill and the proposed WTE plant? (100)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>02</td>
<td></td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can’t say</td>
<td>06</td>
<td></td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which amongst the following is the biggest motivation for you to participate in the protests against the Landfill and the proposed WTE plant? (RR 100)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health concerns</td>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material concerns</td>
<td>04</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetic concerns</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional concerns</td>
<td>02</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unequal risk distribution</td>
<td>07</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RR is response rate
Another excerpt (Amritsar Tribune, 6 November 2014) reads, “contaminated ground water is leading to many diseases. People are losing their family members due to medical problems whereas authorities have shown casual approach towards their case. Diseases such as hepatitis are rampant in the area. There cannot be a single house where the family members are not on medicines which cost 200-500 daily.” A first-hand account of the health conditions and suffering around the landfill was provided by a leader of the BRA who stated, “diseases like asthma are quite common here. Many people have fallen sick. After 10 deaths in the area, the local MLA9 gave 10,000 to those families as compensation. But it was not of much help. It was to pacify them so that they don’t agitate. The people in the surrounding localities are very poor. They cannot sell their house and go to another place. Another 10-15 people died due to polluting water from the hand pumps. The leachate from the dump has polluted ground water in this area. Go to any house in this area, you will find sick people. Everyday people spend Rupees 100-150 on medicines. All these eucalyptus trees along the rail track have burnt with the smoke. Both smoke and ground water have impacted us.”

SCALE MATTERS AND STAKEHOLDER INTERFACE

As has been mentioned earlier, the policy and decision making for waste management has been shaped by the national and regional policy dictates, a typical top down bureaucratic model that gave little space to the local government to manoeuvre when it came to taking decisions regarding the most optimal way to manage waste and its disposal. In the times of neo-liberal governance, national and state policy has favoured private sector participation in establishing WTE plants and also provides incentives. Accordingly, the decision to establish WTE plant in Amritsar was actually taken at state level and imposed on the local Government for its implementation. The responsibility of the AMC was to facilitate the private players by providing land following the proximity principle to cut vehicular trip costs. Therefore the existing landfill Bhaktanwala was proposed as the most suitable site for the WTE plant, this despite the same being surrounded by residential population on three sides. The argument was that a modern WTE plant causes no pollution and hence the fears of the residents were unfounded. This statement was supported by private consultants hired to prepare the details for the WTE plant. Here scale also brings in a dimension of contradiction wherein the national policy (MoEF, 2010:3-15) clearly state that a distance of at least 500 metres must be maintained from habitation clusters.

The conceptualization of waste and the actions therein in the ambit of scalar strategies and decisions create spaces of complex interactions resulting in contestations where the decisions redefine social identities. As the marginalized non state actor, the community was denied any space in the locational decision of either landfill siting or the WTE plant. The only option it had was to resort to NIMBY protests, albeit with a weak political backing or resource looking at the fact that the areas surrounding the landfill are inhabited largely by low income communities. The other actor that stood marginalized by the decision of the WTE plant was the informal waste sector. The waste picker community is most vulnerable and economically weak. Lack of an organizational structure and access to power conduits could at best only produce a passive dissent against the decision of the WTE plant.

THE EMERGENCE OF NIMBY MOVEMENTS

The genesis of the NIMBY in Amritsar can be traced to a series of representations and written communication between community organizations, non-government organizations as the PCC and the AMC, PPCB, PSHRC, Department of local Government, Punjab, NHRC and Punjab and Haryana High Court10 as the institution to which the complaints were made.

---

9 MLA is the abbreviated for of Member of Legislative assembly of the state of Punjab.
10 The National Human Rights Commission is constituted under the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 to look into matters related to violation of human rights in the country (NHRC, 193,p.3). In addition state level bodies to safeguard
Some of the earliest representation are traced to the year 1994-95 when the Parents-Teachers Association of the Girls Senior Secondary School, Chabhal Road, the Head of the Kusht Ashram (Leprosy Home), Chabhal Road Commercial Association, all located in vicinity of the erstwhile Chabhal Road landfill highlighted the issue of foul smell and prevalent diseases as skin and respiratory disorders and requested the shifting of the landfill to an alternate site. A similar plea to the AMC was made by the a city NGO, the Pollution Control Committee, Amritsar (PCC) who in their letter, cited issues including disposal of toxic waste, release of potent gases, de-skinnning dead animals and health implications to the surrounding population. Between 1994 and 1999 a number of such like representations were made from the associations of affected as well as the local NGO’s as Amritsar Vikas Manch and PCC. However, the non-responsive and lackadaisical attitude of the AMC led to the one of the local NGO’s PCC making a formal complaint to the PSHRC. The complaint elaborated twelve issues highlighting the negative implications to the 50,000 surrounding residents and made reference to the Article 21 of the constitution of India as being violated by the AMC and the State of Punjab.

Under PSHRC directives, the PPCB Amritsar recommended the closure of the Chabhal Road landfill site in March 1999 and the same was formally closed to dumping operations by the AMC in December 1999 and shifted to the alternate location at the site adjoining the Bhaktanwala Grain Market. However dumping at the alternate chosen site adjacent to the Bhaktanwala grain market led to the opening of another front of conflict between the AMC, the grain market associations, the District Market Committee, the surrounding residents and the PCC. In one of their communications from July 2000, the PCC appraised the PSHRC about the dumping of MSW at Bhaktanwala site and also pleaded with the PSHRC to direct the AMC to adhere to the MSW Rules, 2000 in all matters and identify landfill site locations as per the specification mentioned therein. In its final decision the PSHRC in January 2004 directed the AMC to “ensure that the action already initiated is completed expeditiously and promptly within four months.”

Despite the directive from the PSHRC, the shifting and closure of the Bhaktanwala landfill did not take place. Left with no other resort, the PCC filed a Civil Writ Petition12 in February 2006 in the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The Complaint highlighted the failings of the AMC to follow PSHRC orders as well as to comply with the provisions of the MSW Rules 2000 for closure of operations and shifting of the landfill to a compliant location. The Court’s decision in July 2013, while reprimanding the AMC, PPCB and Department of Local Government for the lapses in complying to the MSW Rules, 2000, also noted that consistent efforts were being made to organize MSW management by initiating private sector participation and achieving compliance as per rules.

Based upon a massive protest by the affected residents and under political pressure emanating from the same, the AMC had to temporarily stop dumping waste at the Bhaktanwala landfill site (Amritsar Tribune, 5 November 2014, 12 November 2014) and for number of days the city garbage was not picked up due to lack of another disposal site. Finally the site at Fatehpur was made functional (Amritsar Tribune, 2 December 2014, 3 December 2014) but not without another protest from the Fatehpur village in a typical NIMBY syndrome erupting there. The AMC withdrew operations thereafter and resumed dumping at Bhaktanwala site again under police protection and in the backdrop of the NIMBY struggle gaining renewed momentum.

human rights are also constituted as Punjab State Human Rights Commission (PSHRC) in state of Punjab, The Department of Local Government, Punjab administers Municipalities in the state. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana is an institution of justice for the states of Punjab, Haryana and Union territory of Chandigarh.

11 Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees the right to life and personal liberty.

12 In the Indian legal system a civil writ petition is filed in the High Courts and the supreme Court under Article 226 and Article 32 of Constitution of India.
NIMBY- SPACES OF DEPENDENCE AND ENGAGEMENT

As previously mentioned, the current landfill site, Bhaktanwala is surrounded on three sites by habitation and a regional grain market. The WTE plant was proposed to be implemented within the existing landfill site after bioremediation of the old site. Naturally, the locational aspect of the WTE plant invoked mass protests. As a member of the NGO remarked, “Our main contention is that current existing landfill site after bioremediation of the old site. Naturally, the locational aspect of the WTE plant was proposed to be implemented within the habitation and a regional grain market. The WTE plant was proposed to be implemented within the existing landfill site after bioremediation of the old site. Naturally, the locational aspect of the WTE plant invoked mass protests. As a member of the NGO remarked, “Our main contention is that current

Table 5 Public health risks associated with MSW management plant components

| 1. Material sorting and recycling facility | Based upon research in the UK and other countries, Gladding (2002,p.58) states that material recycling plants especially the ones where mixed waste is sorted, show high concentration of dust, bioaerosols and metal toxins. Whereas Wheeler et.al (2001) and Swan (et.al,2003) in (n.d, n.d) state that particulate matter may exist within 250 metres of the facility indicating a potential risk to the residents within this range. Gladding (2002,p.66) quotes a study from Denmark that considered bioaerosols to be of significant concern in waste sorting activities. Besides material sorting facilities are also vulnerable to fires and the noise and vibrations emanating from the plant also pose public health and occupational risks. |
| 2. Composting activities | Literature review (Harrison,2007) reveals the potential negative impacts that composting activities may have in situ and in immediate adjacent areas. For instance, microbial decomposition of organic materials leads to production of CO\textsubscript{2}, NO\textsubscript{x}, CH\textsubscript{4} in addition to microbial population organisms which are potentially pathogenic. Secondly leachate so produced may contain high concentration of pathogens, organic components, metals or nutrients that can negatively impact water quality. Thirdly, the bio-aerosols\textsuperscript{13} concentrated downwind of outdoor composting facilities are present within distance of 200 to 500 metres. They are known to cause a wide range of health effects and infection (Harrison, 2007,p.2,12). Finally, odour can be a persistent problem at composting sites especially if improperly managed compost pits deplete the supply of oxygen leading to anaerobic conditions (Harrison, 2007,p.12). |
| 3. RDF plant | According to GAIA (2013,p.9), people residing near RDF plants are exposed to high levels of dioxins and furans which are highly poisonous and can damage the reproductive system, immune system and hormonal imbalance and even cause cancer (GAIA,2013,p.6). Also the heavy metal emissions can accumulate in the body and emitted nanoparticulate matter can enter human blood stream and cause damage to central nervous system, cardio-vascular and respiratory system, liver and kidneys. |
| 4. Sanitary landfill | In case of sanitary landfills, there is always a risk of flies, mosquitoes, rodents, birds and more so if there are lapses in maintaining it with a daily compaction and soil cover. As such, birds, rodents in particular can pose a serious hazard to aircrafts and nuisance to the surrounding population. Besides, the landfill is a potential source of unpleasant odour that may occur at the time of waste delivery and decomposition of waste and leachate formation (UNEP,2005,p.363). A sanitary landfill is also subject to noise from landfill operating equipment and collection vehicles. The noise is quite similar to heavy construction activity and this is potential disturbance to surroundings. In addition, sound after or during the process of waste delivery, wind blown litter and bio-aerosols are a source of discomfort to the surroundings besides the landfill being a potential source of fire either due to self combustion (in case gas extraction is not conducted properly) or through receipt of hot ambers as waste components, sparks from collection vehicles or other equipment. |

site is not suitable. No waste management system takes care of toxics as mercury and toxins. It leads to cancer. There are heavy metals and cause diseases.” One of the interviewees from the BRA lamented, “putting a waste plant there means killing the residents. The condition there is alread pitiable. It should be beyond the municipal corporation limit\textsuperscript{14} whereas currently it is very much within it. The concerns of the affected residents and NGOs spearheading the resistance were not totally unfounded as an analysis of impacts from each of the proposed components reveals (table 5).

Siting the WTE plant on the current location would mean exposing the surrounding population to risk, albeit from an organized MSW management mechanism replacing the unsanitary landfill. Further the residents were highly perturbed by the unequal distribution of risk to the city residents saying that, “why do they not put the plant adjacent to the elite areas? We are poor people, we don’t matter. We do not have voice so its easy for them to put it here.” A WTE plant in the immediate vicinity was also

\textsuperscript{13} Bio-aerosols are particles of microbial plant or animal origin and may be called organic dust. They can include live or dead bacteria, fungi, viruses, allergies, bacteria, andotoxins and toxins (Harrison, 2007:12).

\textsuperscript{14} Refers to the urban boundary under the jurisdiction of the AMC.
The emerging geographies of waste governance in the privatization milieu; Of NIMBY and progressive city dynamics in Amritsar city, India
K. sandhu

COMMUNITY TACTICS AND ACTIVISM

The Bhaktanwala dump site for the proposed WTE plant is surrounded by at least 50,000 population and comprises of largely lower middle and low to very low income households. While the previous protests have been against waste dumping at the site, the announcement of a WTE plant at the site brought in additional concerns and reaction by the local community. With active support of the PCC, the BRA has been carrying out protests since 2009. The anti-landfilling and WTE campaign was influenced by the behavioural modes as well as tactics adopted towards drawing focus on the agitation. While the campaign was largely conceived and led by locals, other professionals who could add to the authenticity of the local concerns through their knowledge and experience were also approached. Besides national level organizations as the NHRC and PSHRC, Toxics Link, a national level NGO with an anti WTE stand were also approached to extend support to the campaign.

Largely traditional tactics of both passive opposition and active protests were deployed to communicate the target audiences as the AMC, PPCB, City Mayor, Politicians, citizens and media. Between 2009 and 2015, a number of protests meetings and written communications were used as the instruments of dissent. However there have been instances when violence was reported in a conflict situation between protesters and the municipal sanitary staff leading to police intervention. Simultaneously some of the activists also prepared documentary of the sanitary and health conditions of the area adjacent the dumping site and how the WTE would further deteriorate the quality of life of the residents.

The BRA and PCC also networked with opposition and ruling party politicians to garner their support for the agitation. While the opposition parties gave full support to the movement, a prominent local politician from the ruling party lent his support openly, in defiance of the party’s stand to go ahead with the WTE plant on the same site. Further, adding more credibility to the campaign, backed by tactic knowledge based support from academics and professionals, the campaign acquired wider dimensions with proposals being framed and disseminated through meetings, media, pamphlets and special lectures about the alternative benign methods to manage the city’s waste without resorting to the WTE plant. The same was depicted as highly capital intensive venture that would only benefit the political leadership and the private developers but bring untold miseries to the adjacent households.

While the court hearings against the dumping at the Bhaktanwala landfill were on, the AMC argued of the dump having been in existence before the illegal informal settlements sprung up in the surroundings. However this was refuted by the BRA and PCC who provided evidence to the contrary. However in July 2013, the High court in its decision, ordered the AMC to prove through authorization and clearances from relevant bodies that the site was indeed suitable and comply with national regulations in all respect of location and other directives. However the AMC did not comply with the directives and finally the matter was taken to the National Green Tribunal, a national level environment body which also directed the AMC to comply with the regulations in all its decision making regarding the WTE plant.

INSTITUTIONAL TACTICS

As mentioned, the conception of a WTE plant was a state policy decision, while its siting was based on the local decision making bodies, the AMC in particular with approval of the PPCB, the local environmental regulation institution. The siting was based on the proximity principle, i.e., nearness to the waste generation sources and second and perhaps a larger factor was the easily available land at
AMCs disposable. In this the AMC saw an opportunity in the Bhaktanwala landfill. Surrounded by low income colonies and yet on the city periphery, it met the requirements of least resistance. Despite on and off protests against the dumping there, the AMC, with approval of the state government, earmarked the land for the WTE plant, in contravention of the prevailing norms and regulations notified by the national government.

Simultaneously, in order to pacify the BRA and PCC and convince them, the AMC conducted public hearings while also trying to convince the residents of the pollution free nature of the WTE plant. Playing symbolic politics, the Mayor and local ruling party MLAs and so much so, even the Deputy Chief Minister of the State visited the site to assure the residents that the project would be of their benefit. There has also been a situation when police force was deployed to ensure protest free and smooth dumping operations at site. When one of the protests turned violent, 40 members of the BRA were charged with arson and arrested. Court cases were filed and some of the hearings continue to date. However no attempt was made by the state and local authorities to attempt participatory decision making and all instruments deployed so far have been of pacification, manipulation, power play and control tactics, leaving less conciliatory space for collaborative consensus to evolve.

DISCUSSION; THAT NICHE SPACE IN CONTESTATION AND MANOEUVRES

The analysis reveals the geographic location of the disposal site is in the heart of human habitation. NIMBY protests and the risks were visibly ignored by both AMC and private company, which also indulged in clandestine dumping practices besides routinely offloading at Bhaktanwala landfill without treatment. None of the compliance criteria was followed, playing havoc with the lives of the residents around the landfill. Resultantly the survey from surrounding localities revealed acute vulnerability of the surrounding residents to ill health and even fatality.

The deconstruction of the NIMBY activism clearly reveals the strategies adopted by both the BRA and the governance structures to play out to their respective line of thought. The fact that NIMBY protests have continued off and on for a fairly long temporal span brings to fore the issue that such movements struggle to accumulate enough power to congregate and alter the governance decision making systems in which they are placed. However the protests did gather steam particularly in its later phase and can be credited for creating a wider space for engagement and other options to be considered besides creating awareness in the city and beyond through the media and networks. It did succeed in mobilizing both state and non-state actors across income and professional spectrums and in creating political ripple impacts by garnering political support from both opposition and ruling party actors. A huge trust deficit in governing agencies and the ability to take the governing bodies to task through courts of justice by challenging unequal risk distribution, a new precedence in quest for environmental justice was set.

At the same time, the agitation set grounds for rescaling the local to regional and national by involving actors beyond the immediate geographic space of the conflict. The desire of the BRA and PCC to be seen as legitimate led them to create networks tapping in knowledge conduits in a bid to validate the protests. Even though the BRA constituted largely low income groups, the desire to learn about alternative waste management solutions and using that as a tool to forward their case is an example of how communities seek to acquire relevant factual and scientific knowledge to the context they find themselves in.

The NIMBY protests had an impact on the institutional mechanisms wherein the WTE project gained infamous publicity and discouraged private players from bidding for the WTE plant at Bhaktanwala site. Till date the AMC has not been able to successfully negotiate a deal despite several concessions offered to this effect including highly subsidized land. Moreover, in the run up of elections in the state of Punjab, the state government decided to lower its emphasis on WTE plants, also looking at protests across other major cities in the state and therefore the matter has been pushed to a corner as of now.
One of the impacts has also been the new found openness of the AMC to meet experts proposing non-WTE solutions to manage the city’s waste through more indigenous solutions as the Vellore city model wherein one of the experts came to Amritsar on the invitation of the new AMC commissioner and demonstrated the SLRM (solid and liquid resource management) model to diverse stakeholders from the city including the NIMBY activists. However as discussed earlier the decision making lies with the state government and if the move to go in for a WTE begins again, the local government will have no choice but to fall in line. Finally, perhaps one of the bigger contribution of the NIMBY protests can be seen as an attempt to foster transparency, monitoring and reviewing of Governmental decision making and practices, in a way demanding to be heard and included in policy making that could impact their lives.

CONCLUSIONS

The post liberalization cities in India are increasingly competing to showcase themselves as spaces of opportunity, competitiveness and as ones offering a better quality of life to its inhabitants. The setting up of landfills and WTE plants have been regarded as a necessity in this march towards modern global cities. However waste governance carefully evolved through more collaborative and sensitive spatial decision making has remained elusive and thereby the cause of many NIMBY uprisings across the country. The case of Amritsar points to the ways in which spatial waste strategies can become the islands of spatio-social contestations that have the potential to create grid lock situations or enable new options to emerge and take shape. As articulated by Whitson (2011: ) “place is a critical component in the ongoing negotiation of what constitutes waste and the role of those who work with waste.” It is stressed that the regulations framed at national level regarding location and siting of landfills and WTE plants must be adhered to at all costs to minimize unnecessary conflicts and also in interest of environmental justice. Also specified regulations with respect to the WTE plants and landfills must be followed and blatant technology transfer pushed by private players that are redundant or not applicable in Indian situations, looking at the waste compositions must be carefully examined before application. Such strategies are inherently scalar in nature but local in application. Therefore they must be formulated and implemented with collaborative instruments so that acceptability widens, benefits accrue and a better quality of life is accorded to all city inhabitants irrespective of other differences.

REFERENCES


The emerging geographies of waste governance in the privatization milieu: Of NIMBY and progressive city dynamics in Amritsar city, India

K. sandhu


The emerging geographies of waste governance in the privatization milieu; Of NIMBY and progressive city dynamics in Amritsar city, India

K. sandhu


Building the city from below: grassroots movements
Chair: Enrico Michelutti & Alexandra Linden


Tres experiencias de exclusión y resistencia. Estrategias comparadas en Senegal, España y Argentina. Eva Álvarez de Andrés, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Cecilia Cabrera Universidad de Buenos Aires, Harry Smith, Heriot-Watt University Edinburgh, UK.

A critical starting point for cities: Data that is inclusive. Smruti Srinivas Jukur, Praveen Yadav, Maria Lobo, Sheela Patel. Society for the promotion of area resource centers, Mumbai, India.
Building the city from below in the South: Understanding co-production in Kampala (Uganda)

Gilbert Siame
Lecturer
University of Zambia (UNZA), School of Natural Sciences, Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, P.O. Box, 32379, Lusaka, Zambia,

PhD Scholar: Planning & Architecture, University of Cape Town (UCT)
Supervisor: Professor Vanessa Watson (UCT)

Email addresses: siamegilbert@yahoo.co.uk; smxgil002@myuct.ac.za

ABSTRACT
There is rising interest in the need to understand city planning using a different lens rather than universalising the traditional global North planning thought. Informality, urban poverty and the rising influence of bottom-up movements in shaping cities in many areas of the South are at the centre of broad state-societal changes in many global South cities. I argue that urban challenges facing cities of the South cannot be tackled adequately by traditional city planning approaches and that co-production is a useful frame for developing a more radical approach to city planning. Planning is in need of a fundamental shift in the way power is conceptualised and treaded in professional practice, and that low level conflicts should be considered necessary in the reform process existing in state-society engagements. The global grassroots movement called Slum Dwellers International (SDI) has mobilised residents of the slums in the City of Kampala to engage with the state in improving livelihoods and services for the people living in slums. Findings indicate that co-production processes in Kampala are different from the processes envisaged in communicative and collaborative planning approaches. While low level conflicts are ever present, the processes and outcomes of engagements in Kampala evidently put the urban poor at the centre of the all settlement upgrade initiatives.

KEY WORDS: Co-production, state-society relations; global South, Kampala, informality
Introduction
There is rising interest in the need to understand city planning using a different lens rather than universalising the traditional global North planning thought. Informality, urban poverty and shifts specific to the infrastructure service delivery as well as the rising influence of civic movements in shaping cities in many areas of the South are at the centre of broad state-societal changes in many global South cities. The shifts in state-society relations is constituted by a variety of trends which, together, have provided a window of opportunity for the civic movements to become an accepted mode of infrastructure service provisioning especially in informal settlements. The overriding argument in this paper is that challenges facing cities in the global South today cannot be tackled adequately by traditional spatial planning and that co-production may be a useful frame for developing a more radical approach to city planning (Albrechts, 2013; Watson, 2014b). The paper adds to the on-going debates, and new concepts on planning and the nature of state-society relations in the cities of the global South.

The paper has seven sections. With introduction presented in section one, the second section will analyse literature on urban planning and state-society relations in a postcolonial context of Kampala. In the third section, I analyse urban governance in Kampala, before I turn to section four to review recent institutional reforms that have caused a return to centralised governance in Kampala. In section five, I analyse the findings on partnership-based community development processes, initiatives and outcomes in Kampala. In section six, I argue that co-production engagement in Kampala is not all smooth, but that conflicts are part of the engagement process. I conclude the paper by arguing that community-initiated city-wide governance systems and development methodologies have contributed to the on-going shifts in the policy and development paradigm in Kampala. The following section presents a brief component on the methodological approach that I have used in the PhD project, where this paper is based on.

Methodological approach
The study is based on a programmatic approach to advance concepts and ideas around incremental settlement development. Accordingly, the study uses the case study approach, as recommended by Yiftachel & Huxley (2000:911) who call upon planning theoreticians and practitioners to “critically examine planning practices -using cases- rather than to search for a planning theory” (Flyvbjerg, 2004). Flyvbjerg (2004: 283) calls for planning theorists to turn
to “phronetic planning research” which is set out to answer questions of power and values for specific instances of planning practices. Thus, planning researchers should focus on practical cases and practical knowledge in everyday situations in planning. Watson (2003) argues that planning research needs to return to the concrete, to the empirical and to case research. This turn in planning inquiry should not be as a “mindless return to empiricism, but as a way of gaining a better understanding of the nature of difference and conflict, and generating ideas and propositions” which can more adequately inform planning practice than much current planning theory and research (Flyvbjerg, 2004:297). Flyvbjerg (2004) identifies knowledge of ‘particular circumstances’ as a main ingredient of valuable inquiries that never lose sight of reference to concrete examples. Hence, the point of departure for any research that seeks to enhance planning thought must “benefit from focusing on case studies, precedents and exemplars, practical planning rationality and judgement” which evolve and operate primarily by virtue of in-depth case experiences (Flyvbjerg, 2004: 298).

The minutiae, practices, and concrete cases that lie at the heart of ‘phronetic planning research’ must be seen in their proper contexts which give phenomena their immediate meaning, and the larger, international and global context in which phenomena can be appreciated for their theoretical and conceptual significance (Flyvbjerg, 2004). Thus, reflecting on the salient questions to be asked in this study, I consider the case research method to be the most appropriate in ensuring an in-depth understanding of the dynamics of co-production arrangements in the City of Kampala. This being part of the PhD project, in-depth interviews were done with over ninety research participants drawn from a wide range of institutions and sectors in all the three case studies including (see figure 1): community residents, organised community groups, non-government organisation and national and local government officials among others. Thus, primary information detailed in the later sections of this paper is based on everyday co-production practices and processes in Kampala.

**Urban planning in a postcolonial context of Uganda: Enduring colonial influence**

The postcolonial era from 1962 saw a remarkable urbanization growth in Uganda. Planning of Kampala during this era was influenced by a combination of ideas and theories dating back to the early twentieth century, and through to the 1950s and to the 1960s (Omolo-Okalebo, 2011). Modernity, coloniality and postcoloniality are relational and inseparably interlinked, and an understanding of modernity requires that its (ongoing) global project is taken into
Building the city from below in the South:
Understanding co-production in Kampala (Uganda)
G Siame

account (Mignolo, 2007). “There is no modernity without coloniality”, argues Mignolo (2007: 476). Across large swathes of the global South, colonized territories were drawn into, and became part of, the Western project of modernity together with particular conceptions of economy, politics and knowledge-making. The concept of urban planning, along with its institutional structures, hierarchical power relations, Cartesian concept of space, and ideas about what constituted modern cities, was very much part of the colonial and modernizing project (Nunes Silva, 2015). But while the years since formal political independence in 1962 have seen significant changes in Uganda and other former colonies in Africa and their cities, the project of modernity has persisted, supported and taken forward to a large extent by a national elite linked to global networks of power and money. This project is very evident in the field of urban planning in Kampala, where modernist national planning legislation was imported as copies of planning laws of the colonizers, and has changed very little up to the present time.

The British Protectorate of Uganda was created in 1894 from two previously antagonistic kingdoms, the Buganda and the Bunyoro, which created political divisions from the start. Planning in Uganda falls under inherited British planning law in the form of the Town and Country Planning Act (1951; revised 1964; 1972 and 1994) and the more recent Physical Planning Act of 2010. Collaborative or participatory planning processes have not found their way into Ugandan planning systems, which are still highly technocratic and centralised at national and city/district government level. Essentially, the highly modernist form of planning which prevailed in the UK and other European countries in the post-War period still holds in Uganda, despite the fact that it is wholly inappropriate to deal with the very different dynamics and issues of Kampala.

While a great deal of planning work has been done in both the colonial and postcolonial eras of Uganda, almost all planning ideas expressed in the colonial planning schemes of Kampala City in 1912, 1919, 1930 and 1951 have had an enduring physical impact on the spatial structure of Kampala City compared to any period after independence (Omolo-Okalebo, 2011). Kampala has had a number of master plans which have shaped the growth and change of the city and while the plans themselves have been revised on occasion times, the top-down, state-directed and regulating approach to planning in the City has persisted, like in many African cities (Berrisford, 2011). As such, the nature of planning in the colonial era seems to
Building the city from below in the South: Understanding co-production in Kampala (Uganda)

G Siame

have continued shaping the relations between the state and citizens in matters of urban land administration, management and urban development processes in Kampala.

Goodfellow (2013) writes that both colonial and postcolonial urban planning regimes across the African continent have certainly contributed to fragmented cities that spatially exclude the poor (Balbo, 1993; Myers, 2003; Nkurunziza, 2006). For example, Kampala is renowned for haphazard development and collapsing buildings (Pelling, & Wisner, 2009), shanty settlements prone to fatal flooding and waterborne disease outbreaks (Mabasi, 2009), as well as its pot-holed streets, crumbling infrastructure and crippling traffic congestion worsened by the illegal conversion of parking spaces. Much of the urban development in the City is cauterised as informal or illegal by planning statues. Demolitions and evictions by City authorities are common, but at the same time, clientelistic practices seem to shape the way the state relates with multiple groups and individuals operating in the City. With ‘corruption’ as an underlying motive for many decisions, a very complex state-society web of engagements does exist in Kampala. While previous and current planning systems were put in place as part of the colonial project of control, and while these have persisted over time, supported more recently by local elites who also find planning to be a useful tool to manage (or manipulate) the value and use of urban land, the implementation and effectiveness of these planning approaches has varied significantly. Goodfellow (2013: 91) argues that the particular “urban political bargaining environment” of a country or city strongly influences the way in which state actors implement policies and regulations as well as the extent to which urban dwellers comply with them. The current constitution of Uganda, the Local Government Act and the decentralisation policy provide that planning functions and public service provision are functions of local councils.

The structure and functions of local government in Uganda

In 1993, the policy of decentralization was officially launched and districts became centres for service provision. The district council, which is comprised of elected members, is the highest political authority having legislative and executive powers within the district, and other councils in lower-level local government are also the highest political authorities in their jurisdictions. The structure of local government in Uganda takes different forms depending on whether the administrative area in question is rural or urban. Decentralization led to the devolution of broad powers of administration and implementation to the districts, leaving the
centre with responsibility for matters of defence and law and order (Gore & Muwanga, 2014). According to Ojambo (2012), the local government administrative structure and system are comprised of a five-tier structure where, in urban districts the structure begins with the village council (LC1), then the ward or parish council (LC2), the municipal or town division (LC3), the municipality (LC4) and the district/city council (LC5/) with the Mayor as a political head of LC5.

The local government councils are mandated to perform a variety of state functions ranging from making development plans based on locally determined priorities, raising revenue, budgeting and appointing statutory commissions, boards and committees for various function. Uganda's framework of local government entails three different forms of devolution of power, namely: 1) political decentralisation (as evidenced by the election of council members), 2) administrative decentralisation (as evidenced by the appointment of local administration personnel by council), and 3) fiscal decentralisation (as evidenced by the powers granted to local councils to raise local revenue and receive funds from the central government for the implementation of agreed-upon national programmes). However, the introduction of multiparty politics in Uganda created a new threat to the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) government. The discomfort between the NRM government and the local government system started to manifest itself in the late 1990s, and this led to a stream of efforts in the first decade of the 21st century by the NRM national government to interfere and/or recentralise the governance systems and institutions in Uganda, especially in the biggest urban centre, Kampala (Mugabi, 2004). In the following section, I argue that urban governance in Kampala is dynamic complex and unpredictable as actors straddle between spaces of society and government in non-structured ways, if seen in the Western sense of institutions.

**Urban Governance in Kampala: Fluid relations and multiple loyalties**

Goodfellow & Titeca (2012) argue that in theory, urban governance involves non-state actors and the state working together in formally institutionalized ways to make collective decisions and provide urban services. However, in Kampala, with highly informalized economies, the processes that underpin ‘real’ governance often reflect informal bargaining power much more than formal institutional frameworks. Increased political competition in Kampala has created an environment where informal groups seeking to protect their livelihoods can tactically
leverage a high level government and/or political intervention in their favour, helping them evade the policies and regulations of City government. In Kampala, since the 1990s, discourses of urban governance have progressively displaced earlier preoccupations with urban planning and management, reflecting an increasing recognition of the role of pluralistic politics and non-state actors in running the city on a day-to-day basis (Goodfellow, 2013). Here the desire of informal economic actors to retain some distance from state regulation, combined with the motivations of politicians seeking urban votes, have produced over time clientelistic linkages. In Kampala, formal state structures are relatively powerless because “local power struggles often subvert and have” continued to “reshape key issues of urban development and management” (Gombay, 1994:86). Decentralization and other institutional reforms intended to promote ‘good urban governance’ have largely been superseded by clientelistic links between senior NRM and government officials like the President and particular urban groups, resulting in new forms of informal city governance. It is common practice that “many of the city’s workers increasingly secure their livelihoods in the city’s crowded informal economic sphere through exploiting their political significance” for political parties (Goodfellow & Titeca, 2012:2). Various community groups do shift loyalty depending on temporal and political circumstances, with the ruling party offering the highest bids for political incentives as NRM continues to face political opposition.

According to Goodfellow & Titeca (2012), in Kampala, the proliferation of competing interests with a stake in urban governance has been exacerbated by decentralization, which introduced new local state actors as well various private sector ones. This multiplicity of actors is underpinned by power dynamics that have made both decision-making and policy implementation more contested and difficult. Among the many actors competing for influence and loyalty in the sphere of governance at city level are those earning a living in the urban informal economy. Kampala’s informal economy has grown rapidly, reflecting a general trend towards increasing informality on the African continent (Lindell & Appelblad, 2009). One would argue that in the African city, ‘informality matters’ for development as it has now reached a high socio-economic status (demographic quantum) and can play such an important political role that no single government can completely ignore it (According to Goodfellow & Titeca, 2012). This has had profound implications for the politics underlying ‘real governance’ in the city. Various stakeholder especially political parties do compete to
prove relevance to the groups working and earning a living in the informal sector. The city authorities are made to reach out to this large category of the population and this challenges the role of legal and institutional set up for governing Kampala. As discussed in the following section, the vicious competition between the ruling NRM and the opposition to control the capital city led to the recentralisation of the governance of Kampala.

**Capital city reforms and the eventual death of decentralisation in Kampala**

After years of neglect and antagonism towards the country’s largest urban centre, the Ugandan national government significantly reformed the political and administrative structure of Kampala by 2010. It created a new national authority to oversee the administration of the city- the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA). After the formation of KCCA in 2010, a major change came when the appointment of all staff- the Executive Director, chief administrative officers and their deputies for various KCCA directorates- became centralized, giving the national government power over the tendering process at the local level (Gore and Muwanga, 2013). According to Gore & Muwanga (2013), KCCA effectively took away administrative and decision-making authority from a popularly elected council and mayor. KCCA took over budgeting, service delivery, planning and regulation- all functions previously performed by the KCC. Thus, the executive director of the KCCA has the most powerful policy tools - financial authority. Henceforth, the elected representatives lack fiscal autonomy- bearing a de facto unfunded mandate. Under the new system, all funds are administered by the KCCA but only with the approval of the appointed and unelected executive director.

Most significantly, the reforms being implemented in Kampala suggest that the national government’s longstanding decentralization programme is now dead in the capital city (Gore & Muwanga, 2013). While the execution of this reform may produce immediate tangible service improvements in Kampala, the process of achieving this reform shows that the national government’s decision has not been motivated by a serious and historic effort to support the capital and to facilitate its maturity. Corruption in Uganda is endemic, and therefore was not just a KCC problem. But the previous opposition run city authority- Kampala City Council- (KCC) had long been widely perceived as the most corrupt and inefficient body in Uganda. Gore and Muwanga (2013:2209) say “KCC could not collect taxes, effectively collect waste, fill potholes or approve building plans without a bribe”. Such
were the concerns over KCC’s lack of transparency and accountability that in 2008 the World Bank stipulated the development of a Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategy (GGACS) for the city as a necessary requirement for the further release of development funds. The central government’s move to administer the capital had some practical merits—an increase in the financial resources available to the city, the capacity in the form of technical staff, and the long-term perspective of the strategic focus and prioritization of needs within national development planning. However, many people still believe that NRM’s move to take over Kampala was largely aimed to minimize Kampala-based opposition to national government priorities (Gore & Muwanga, 2013).

The purpose of this section has been to set the background for the innovative co-production initiative described in the remaining sections of paper. It contrasts the modernist approach to planning which informed inherited planning in Uganda (and elsewhere) with a new and progressive approach introduced by an international NGO called Slum Dwellers International (SDI) in the early 2000s. Ironically, it is probable that the highly complex, conflicted and informally networked way in which planning happens in Kampala opened the way for these innovative co-production processes. Based on the Kampala experiences, the question can asked: How have communities and SDI engaged the state in Kampala on the issue of informal settlement recognition and service provision, and by extension, how has the process differed from the mainstream participatory/collaborative planning processes?

**Co-production as a pro-poor urban development strategy: Kampala**

SDI, established in 1996, is a global network of community-based organizations of the urban poor with its origins in India, but now with a presence in 33 countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America ([www.sdinet.org](http://www.sdinet.org)). It is made up of national federations of urban poor movements and the NGOs that support them. SDI assists community-based organizations and their federations to engage with governments and national and international organizations around urban strategies which address urban land, shelter and service needs, and shift urban policy towards a more pro-poor stance. SDI promotes a particular set and sequence of grassroots practices which were first tried in the context of urban India, and have since been internationalized through the global work of the NGO. These include settlement self-enumeration and mapping, learning exchanges, community-based savings schemes and building relationships with city governments.
SDI’s approach to negotiations between communities and governments on upgrade issues has been termed ‘co-production’ rather than ‘collaboration’ in the sense that it is understood in the largely global North literature on participatory planning (Mitlin, 2008; Watson, 2014b). Mitlin (2008: 339) describes SDI’s approach to co-production as a political strategy used by citizen groups and social movement organizations to “…enable individual members and their associations to secure effective relations with state institutions that address both immediate basic needs and enable them to negotiate for greater benefits”. SDI values collaborative relationships with government, but in practice these relationships can take on a combination of both conflict and collaboration, depending on the issues and strategies at hand, in order to achieve institutional change (Bradlow, 2013).

The immediate goal of co-production may be to secure outcomes in terms of service and land delivery, but such initiatives also aim to shift forms of democratic practice and power, to create an alternative form of governmentality which both complies with and resists top down rule. Appadurai (2001) calls this ‘counter-governmentality’. Understanding the role of knowledge and power is central to these processes, and hence the need to exercise power through informal settlement self-enumerations and mapping and to control the production and interpretation of this critical information. There is an awareness (drawing on Foucault) that power is embodied in development processes and in technologies of rule such as surveys and maps (Chatterji & Mehta, 2007), and these must be appropriated by communities. Based on the evidence obtained during field research, these practices have shaped co-production engagements in Kampala. In the following section I present the major periodisation of the development of co-production in Kampala.

Periodization of the development of co-production: Distinguishing the time periods

Periodization involves the categorization of the past into discrete periods of time in order to facilitate the study and analysis of a particular history. Periods of time are defined on the assumption that these periods contained particular characteristics which differ from each other. In this research the establishment and development of co-production in Kampala can be divided into four phases from the initiation of the Partnership up until the end of the research in 2015. The current period is ongoing.
Figure 1 indicates the periodisation of relations of co-production in Kampala. The three timelines in Figure 1 indicate the shift in events in the overall case of Kampala and the two sub-cases. The first period from 2002-2007 covers the time in which the Slum Dwellers Federation of Uganda (SDFU and hereafter referred to as the ‘Federation’) established itself in Kampala and Uganda and began engagement with communities and the state. The second phase from 2007-2010 covers the time in which the Federation and partners consolidated the shared methodologies for co-production. The third phase from 2010-2014 marks the period for national scaling up where partners implemented large scale projects to achieve physical transformation in fourteen secondary cities of Uganda. The last phase from 2014-2015 is ongoing with partners working to broaden the scope of co-production to include boosting incomes for slum dwellers as a key theme.

Shown in figure 1, the overall case of Kampala is used to study co-production relations across the City. In Kampala, the Partnership has undergone four major growth phases. The first phase is referred to by many research participants as the setting up phase. Co-production was first introduced in Kampala in 2002, and the period up to 2007 marks the time for formation and early growth of the Partnership in the City in particular and in Uganda in general. The phase is characterised by implementation of early co-production initiatives which saw the introduction and adoption of Slum Dwellers International (SDI) sanctioned methodologies to settlement upgrading and service delivery. During this period, co-production engagements were supported by the state through (KCC) and the Ministry of Lands and Housing (MLH). The period is credited for implementation of early city-based co-production activities that include enumerations, community savings, community infrastructural projects and building partnerships. This is a period of experimentation with co-production in Kampala. Respondents indicated that co-production activities were restricted to Kampala Central and Kawempe regions of the City, and in the secondary city of Jinja. Human resource limitations, over reliance on the Kenyan Federation and support NGO, are cited as reasons for limited geographical coverage in this first period.

The second phase of co-production engagements in Kampala is referred to by research participants as the consolidation phase. This phase marks the period when co-production methodologies were being strengthened with a focus on capacity building, and refocusing of activities to include broader human settlement issues. During this period, co-production
initiatives and relations were being supported by the then newly formed support NGO called Actogether. Actogether, a technical support NGO to the Federation, was formed in December 2006 and became operational in January 2007. In this period, a tripartite Partnership involving the state, Federation and Actogether was formed. Training and capacity building on all the SDI methodologies were enhanced by Actogether. The Federation had its capacity built to a level where stakeholders could see it as a critical player in city development. Further, growth involved activities meant to broaden the City co-production agenda from a narrow housing focus to promoting service delivery, knowledge generation, building infrastructure and structures for promoting accountability and transparency among partners. Furthermore, the period saw the emergence of management related conflicts between the Federation and Actogether. After figure 1, the next paragraphs explain the other two phases of co-production engagements in Kampala.

**Figure 1: Periodization of co-production in the City of Kampala**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Setting up phase</td>
<td>National scaling up phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Consolidation phase</td>
<td>Broadening scope phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Application of setting up activities</td>
<td>-National scaling up activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consolidation activities</td>
<td>-Local initiatives on governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Broadening scope phase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Field research, 2015 & 2016

The third phase involves the utilisation of a grown and mature Federation to implement large scale co-production initiatives at national level. Many research participants called the third phase a national scaling up phase which lasted between late 2010 and 2014. The phase involves the introduction of Transforming Settlements of the Urban Poor in Uganda (TSUPU)
and Uganda Support to Municipal Infrastructure Development (USMID) projects in 2012 and 2014 respectively. Implemented in 14 secondary cities, these two co-production initiatives enabled the signing of MoUs, specific project agreements, and led to the introduction of Municipal Development Forums (MDFs) as a new governance initiative for Kampala. During the same period, many water and sanitation infrastructural projects were implemented. This period is described as a period of growth and transformation in the geographical and demographical reach of co-production activities in the City. On the one hand, this is the period when the relationship between state agencies and the Federation is at its best. On the other hand, the relationship between the Slum Dwellers Federation of Uganda and Actogether became more conflicted leading to a forced resignation of the fifth Executive Director of Actogether.

The final and on-going phase of Partnership activities and relations in Kampala is dubbed the phase of broadening scope. This phase begun in 2014 and remains the major guiding thread of the Partnership. The phase is about expanding the activity scope of co-production. In this phase, partners agree that to transform slums, co-production activities must focus on both physical infrastructure and on boosting people’s income. Thus, the phase sees a sustained joint focus on income generating activities. The partners focus on providing investment capital, and capacity building in project design and management. Projects on loaning, mushroom production, poultry, briquette making and stationary form key areas of co-production.

In 2002 the Ugandan national Minister of Housing and Urban Development approached SDI with the request that they assist poor urban communities to engage in urban upgrade projects in partnership with government. This was an unusual move as far more frequently governments see SDI and their tactics of community mobilization as a threat. However it is possible that the nature of urban political contestation in Uganda (see above) suggested to national government and the ruling party that this could be a politically advantageous initiative. The same year an agreement was signed between government and SDI for the NGO to initiate a co-production process involving information production on slums and the implementation of infrastructural projects. It was agreed that the Kampala City Council and the Local Council structures at urban ‘village’ level would engage with communities to plan for upgrade. SDI helped establish the National Slum Dwellers Federation of Uganda.
(NSDFU) – a country-level NGO which is affiliated to the global SDI network and which in turn co-ordinates committees and savings groups at community level. SDI presence in Uganda is on-going and it is generally regarded as a country where SDI has been able to have a positive impact, especially in upscaling co-production from community to city level and in taking projects through to implementation.

Research on the co-production process in Kampala shows that this is an approach which has empowered communities, established negotiating relations between communities and various levels and departments of government, and is producing tangible positive outcomes for those poorer residents involved. I believe that more conventional contemporary approaches to participation involving collaborative and communicative planning would have been far less effective in this context (Robins, Cornwall, & Von Lieres, 2008; Watson 2002) given their underlying assumptions of state willingness to engage in democratic debate, of community trust in state institutions, of the ability of state-society engagement to overcome broader social and political conflicts and divisions and of stable civil society organizations with the capacity to both debate planning and project alternatives and to ensure implementation. However, the research also shows that this co-production process has not been without its challenges, conflicts and failures, as it takes place context where conflict is a defining feature of broader society.

The co-production process, like anywhere else where SDI works, did implement five key rituals a mechanisms for community empowerment and improving service delivery. The partnership implemented carried out profiling and comprehensive enumerations and mapping all slums in Kampala between 2002 and 2015. Enumerations have been used both to support community demands for housing and services and also to fight evictions of informal settlements by the Municipality which, regardless of the Partnership, have continued in some parts of Kampala.

Secondly, the Partnership has used the strategy of ‘learning exchanges’ to empower communities, transform minds, knowledge and development practice. Learning exchange programmes involves groups of poor communities and government officials, moving between upgrade sites nationally or internationally to share knowledge and gains in savings, construction and engagement with authorities. In Kampala, there was strong reliance in the
early days on the ‘mature’ Federations in Kenya, South Africa and Tanzania and ‘learning exchange’ visits were arranged from Uganda to see co-production in action. In Kampala, exchange programmes have built rapport and solidified the relationships between state officials including top politicians and community leaders. In 2004, leaders from the Federation, a structural engineer from ACTogether; and a structural engineer and planner from KCC and the Ministry for Works went to Kenya and Tanzania to specifically learn about the use of alternative building technologies and apply this knowledge in the construction of the inaugural water and sanitation project in Kisenyi settlement. This visit seems to have been successful in changing state attitudes to the use of new building materials:

“After an exchange on alternative building materials, the Ministry for Works became one of the negotiators and advocates for KCC to allow the use of alternative building materials to construct water and sanitation facilities in Kampala. As such ACTogether and the Federation used the exchange creatively to convince state technical staff to allow the use of construction technologies and materials produced by the Federation”. (Interview 8/2/2016 with the structural engineer of ACTogether).

Thirdly, small-scale savings were introduced, nurtured and grew to create a sense of community self-reliance and to indicate to the state that poor communities can contribute financially to upgrade processes and improved service delivery. There are two forms of savings. One is called ‘daily savings’ groups which were introduced at the community level after 2002, each with a set of regulations and a constitution which follow an SDI template. The second is a national fund called the Ugandan Urban Poor Fund (or SUUBI) which helps to fund larger-scale and city-wide infrastructure projects. This was established in 2010. Savings group members are expected to meet once a week and make a financial contribution of 100 Ugandan shillings per day to SUUBI. All research participants argues that savings have made government re-profile the image of the people in slums and realise that they are not all law breakers and land encroachers as was claimed in the past. Accordingly, state agencies have become more flexible and willing to consider slum dwellers as essential partners in various project and policy formulation initiatives. The following section discusses the role of women in the co-production process.
The special role of women in the co-production process

The success of all co-production initiatives in Kampala needed the participation of vibrant and dedicated communities. This means that community mobilization and organization is a key aspect of all co-production engagements in Kampala. To achieve this, research showed that women constituted a key and strategic constituent that anchored community support in most engagements. Women constituted the majority membership of the Federation and provided their skills and time to mobilize and organize communities for co-production. At national level, the Federation is sustained by women who are often more committed to the Federation rituals and practices than men.

However, it is significant that men frequently attempted to gain positions in the co-production process which would bring them direct access to power and resources. In all the Federation groups studied, men are more dominant in applying for loans and demanding leadership positions. They desire leadership positions in order for them to secure control over Federation and co-production activities such as savings and exchange visits. Within Kawempe, Nakawa and Kampala Central regions, it is established that saving groups that are led by women are doing better and have less incidences of defaulting. For example, Chisachamukama, Chanja, Zibula Tunde, Chamala, Ram Computers and Mbuya saving groups were all led by men who later on abused the funds. On the other hand, women in Kawempe and Nakawa believe that it is their responsibility to safeguard the interests of the movement. The women believe in the long term prospects of being members of the Federation in terms of securing gains at community and household levels. Thus, their commitment is high and very different from that of men. Men seem to be interested in short term benefits that accrue to them because of their membership to the Federation.

Working within the framework of a tripartite partnership, the partners have constructed sanitation units in Kisenyi III, Kinawataka, and Kalimali in Kampala, and six in municipalities outside of Kampala (Dobson, Nyamweru, & Dodman, 2015; Makau, Dobson, & Samia, 2012). These units have demonstrate the capacity of communities to manage the construction and on-going maintenance of public infrastructure in the water and sanitation sector (with flush toilets, showers, clean water access, and sometimes a community hall on the top floor and occasionally water harvesting capabilities). While most facilities are fairly new, a unit in Kisenyi has been in operation for approximately 10 years and remains clean, fully
operational and in use seven days a week. In addition, the construction process of many projects promoted community contracting and procurement for community upgrading projects, thereby, causing a landmark transformation impact on the political and institutional practices and processes at KCCA (Bachmayer & Shermbrucker, 2014). Before presenting the major arguments in section seven, I use Figure 1 to show a summary of community organisation, responsibility allocation and accountability measures during three phases of communal infrastructure development: design and planning, construction, and on-going management phases.

**Conflicts in the interaction between state and within the partnership**

While coproduction assumes that a degree of collaboration can be achieved between state and communities, it is also possible for conflict to emerge and for communities and NGOs to resort to using conflict and resistance as a strategy to put pressure on the state. The findings reveal that all the cases experienced conflicts during co-production. While the engagement processes have managed to improve relations among the actors and has led to improvement in service delivery, it is not surprising that this initiative has been unable to escape the deep conflicts which divide Ugandan society. Some community groups have used political connections to secure their interests. Many leaders of the Federation are also members of the political ruling party and have used these links to influence co-production projects and processes through vote-banking and clientelism, with some Federation leaders actively promoting the ruling political party prior to the elections in 2015.

In the Mbuya area of the Nakawa region, the research established that each group had lines of communication with different state actors and agencies. Groups and individuals protected their interests by contacting politicians and different state agencies while weaker groups, like women traders, used popular mobilization to resist those co-production projects which could have adverse effects such as the introduction of service charges, land rates and evictions. On the other hand, political leaders from the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) considered the various community groups as vote banks especially in the wake of the 2015 general elections. The networks created a fertile ground for clientelism and the politics of patronage to flourish, and areas such Kinawataka became well-known to political leaders wanting to use these strategies.
The savings groups have also been a source of tension and division. Local savings groups have at times demanded more of a say in how the national SUUBI savings fund is managed and how the funds are distributed as they want to see direct benefit from their contributions, or have demanded that saved funds stay at the local level. This has led to tension between the Federation and its technical arm, ACTogether. The State as well has made efforts to gain a more active controlling role in the national and community-based funds. Within local savings groups, there have been incidents of corruption and abuse of funds, with leaders sometimes attempting to use the funds for private interests.

Conclusion

Based on the findings, I argue that organised communities have the potential to develop functional and sustainable systems for the planning, construction and management of communal infrastructure. Shared learning, comprehensive community surveys and practical experiences and exchanges driven by communities assist in refining city-wide tools of governance and technologies. The other important value in community-driven service delivery and settlement upgrade initiatives in Kampala is seen in terms of scale and leverage in the provision of communal infrastructural, creating opportunities for income improvement and poverty reduction, generation of new knowledge and subsequent adjustments in development practice. Based grassroots innovations, infrastructural improvement in water and sanitation sector in many slums of Kampala have largely been implemented within a tripartite framework involving Actogether, NSDFU and KCCA. This partnership has managed to navigate complex socio-political systems and land tenure issues to move from mere negotiations to actual service improvement for thousands of ordinary city residents in Kampala.

REFERENCES


Building the city from below in the South: Understanding co-production in Kampala (Uganda)

G Siame


Tres experiencias de exclusión y resiliencia. Estrategias comparadas en Senegal, España y Argentina.

Eva Álvarez de Andrés1, Cecilia Cabrera2, Harry Smith3

Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, España
eva.alvarez@upm.es
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
ceciliac1@yahoo.com
Heriot-Watt University Edinburgh, UK
H.C.Smith@hw.ac.uk

RESUMEN

El actual contexto de crisis, evidencia el desinterés de las instituciones y de los mercados “convencionales” para responder a las necesidades de amplios sectores. El suelo y la vivienda, se han consolidado como bienes de intercambio, y el acceso “formal” se ha convertido en inasible para sectores cada vez más amplias de la población.

Los excluidos, han desarrollado modos “alternativos” de producción y acceso al suelo y la vivienda, como la única posibilidad de satisfacer sus necesidades de manera integral, aunque sea de un modo precario. Mientras, las instituciones que deberían garantizar esos derechos, en lugar de reconocer y apoyar estas iniciativas, las criminalizan, persiguen y penalizan. Como consecuencia, han aumentado los procesos de exclusión, y se ha incrementado la brecha de la desigualdad.

Este artículo propone examinar el papel de los distintos actores para responder a las necesidades de los sectores más vulnerables de forma integral, para ello se ha elaborado un marco analítico y se ha aplicado a tres asentamientos “auto-producidos” en distintos continentes: Las Sabinas (España); Guinaw Rails Nord (Senegal) y Villa 31 (Argentina).

El trabajo muestra, en todos los casos, cómo los residentes son quienes más han hecho por satisfacer sus necesidades de manera integral, mientras que, desde las instituciones gubernamentales, se aplicaron sistemáticamente políticas de exclusión y abandono. Demostrando, que hacer efectivo el derecho a la vida urbana, ha sido y sigue siendo una lucha, en un mundo de relaciones de poder desigual. Donde la “informalidad” es una cuestión política, relacionada con la posición en el espacio social y la vinculación que se establece con el resto de las estructuras de poder.

KEYWORDS

Gobernanza urbana; Conflicto de intereses, Mobilización ciudadana, Derecho a la vida urbana.

---

1 Departamento de Urbanística y Ordenación del Territorio (DuyOT -ETSAM) de la Universidad Politécnica de, Avenida de Juan de Herrera, 4, Madrid, Spain eva.alvarez@upm.es
2 Instituto Superior de Urbanismo, Territorio y Ambiente, Facultad de Arquitectura, Diseño y Urbanismo, Universidad de Buenos Aires (ISU-FADU-UBA) Buenos Aires, Argentina cecilia1@yahoo.com
3 School of Energy, Geoscience, Infrastructure and Society (EGIS), Heriot-Watt University, Riccarton, Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, Scotland, UK H.C.Smith@hw.ac.uk
INTRODUCCIÓN

Según UN-Hábitat para el año 2020 889 millones de personas vivirán en tugurios. El actual contexto de crisis, evidencia la incapacidad de las instituciones y de los mercados “convencionales” para responder a las necesidades de amplios sectores de la población.

El suelo y la vivienda lejos de ser bienes de uso se han venido consolidado como bienes de intercambio (Harvey, 2012). El acceso a estos bienes se ha convertido en algo cada vez más inasequibles, dado el aumento de la brecha entre el valor de mercado de los mismos y la perdida de valor salarial y la precarización del empleo de un amplio sector de la sociedad (Portes, 2005; Piketty, 2015).

Todo ello ha contribuido a que se desarrollen modos “alternativos” de producción del espacio y de acceso a bienes y servicios de primera necesidad como la vivienda, el agua o la energía. Muchas veces estas alternativas también implican procesos paradójicos ya que a menudo tienden a desenvolverse con la misma lógica de generación de rentas, aunque desde una lógica no-formalizada (Scheinsohn et al. 2010; Scheinsohn y Cabrera, 2012). Estos modos “alternativos” se han ido consolidando como una de las formas significativas en las que están creciendo las ciudades (Davies, 2007; Pastrana, 2012), dado que resultan, para muchas familias, la única manera para poder acceder a unas condiciones habitacionales mínimas por precarias que estas puedan resultar.

En este contexto las instituciones, que deberían de cumplir con su función de ser garantes de derechos, lejos de reconocer y apoyar estas iniciativas, legislan e implementan políticas en favor de los intereses de una minoría, y cimrinalizan, persiguen y penalizan, las practicas “alternativas” que se dan quienes han quedado excluidos del acceso formal al suelo, la vivienda, las infraestructuras y los servicios. Se observa además un posicionamiento nada inocente por parte de las instituciones, que a menudo permiten que estos sectores “informales” se instalen y desarrollen, en la medida en que no les interesa actuar o incluso les resulta de utilidad para el incremento del valor inmobiliario urbano (ya sea formal o informal), produciéndose un proceso cíclico de abandono y expulsión. (Álvarez et al. 2015a; 2015b).

Los desalojos y los desahucios, no han hecho sino aumentar en todo el mundo, con lo que ello conlleva de incremento de las desigualdades (Milanovic, 2006; Hardoon et al.,2016). Ante la falta de legitimidad de las instituciones la sociedad civil se ha organizado, proliferando en las últimas décadas los movimientos de defensa del derecho a la vivienda y a la ciudad por todo el mundo (Castells, 2012).

Hacer efectivos los derechos, ha sido y sigue siendo una lucha en un mundo de relaciones de poder desigual (Marcussen 1990; Jenkins et al., 2007; Belil et al., 2012), la “informalidad” es por tanto una cuestión política, que tiene que ver con el lugar que se ocupa dentro del espacio social y el modo de vinculación que se tiene con el resto de las estructuras de poder. (Scheinsohn y Cabrera, 2009) La “informalidad” vendría a ser la institucionalización de “la explotación, dominación o alienación que desempeñara a los sujetos y sus comunidades de modo que se anula socialmente su presencia, impidiendo satisfacer sus necesidades libremente” (Vidal, 2009:488) y que como diría Shiva (2005) permite a otros apropiarse indebidamente de su riqueza y sus recursos.

El objetivo de este artículo es analizar y visibilizar cómo, en los márgenes del sistema, emergen y se desencadenan procesos de resiliencia colectiva con capacidad para desafiar al poder establecido (Castells, 2012), para poder seguir ejerciendo su derecho a producir su propio espacio (Lefebvre,1968; Harvey, 2012). Para ello se ha elaborado un marco analítico y se ha aplicado a tres asentamientos
Tres experiencias de exclusión y resistencia. Estrategias comparadas en Senegal, España y Argentina.

E. Álvarez, C. Cabrera. H. Smith

“auto-producidos” en tres contextos completamente distintos: Las Sabinas (España); Guinaw Rails Nord (Senegal) y Villa 31 (Argentina).

A pesar de las distancias y las diferencias de contexto, en los tres casos se muestra como los residentes son quienes más han hecho por satisfacer sus necesidades de manera integral, mientras que, desde las instituciones, se ha seguido aplicando, de manera sistemática, políticas de exclusión y abandono.

En todos los casos se observa como la unión, ante una amenaza externa que afectaba a toda la comunidad por igual (inundaciones, corte de suministro de luz, etc.), se ha convertido en el desencadenante para la construcción de procesos de resiliencia colectivos.

“…muchos individuos ... humillados, explotados, ignorados... dispuestos a transformar su ira en acción en cuanto superen el miedo.” (Castells, 2012: 31).

En todos los casos la unión se ha constituido como el factor clave para superar el miedo, para que la impotencia se transforme en empoderamiento, para que las víctimas pasen a ser sujetos activos de su propio proceso de transformación (Max-Neef et al., 1986; 2010), para que se desencadenen la alegría de hacer y la conviertan en actos (Vidal, 2009), para mostrar que la realidad es transformable (Galeano,2006; Colau & Alemany, 2012).

El artículo que se presenta a continuación se ha estructurado de la siguiente manera: Tras la introducción, se describe el marco analítico que se ha utilizado para entender los casos de estudio, posteriormente se presentan los casos de estudio y los resultados obtenidos respecto al papel de los diferentes actores en cada uno de los procesos, para finalmente extraer conclusiones a partir de la discusión cruzada de los resultados obtenidos de los tres casos.

METODO, SELECCIÓN DE LOS CASOS DE ESTUDIO Y RECOGIDA DE INFORMACIÓN

El objetivo de este artículo es analizar y visibilizar, los procesos de resiliencia colectivos que se desencadenan en los márgenes del sistema, y que permiten a las comunidades contestar al poder establecido para poder ejercer su derecho y su deber de producir su propio espacio (Lefebvre,1968; Harvey, 2012).

La investigación se ha llevado a cabo mediante el método de casos de estudio (Yin, 1994) y la elaboración y aplicación del marco analítico (basado en la triada de Giddens) a dichos casos de estudio con el fin de entender, en todos los casos, las siguientes cuestiones: Condiciones de contexto y el papel de las instituciones públicas en relación al asentamiento, el procesos de construcción colectiva de la resiliencia en el seno de la comunidad (génesis, acciones, recursos, etc.), así como los logros alcanzados y los retos pendientes.

Hay que poner de relieve que para esta investigación se ha partido de los procesos que promueven la auto-organización ciudadana y la defensa de los derechos, lo que no ha ido en ningún momento en perjuicio de la aplicación rigurosa del método científico (Álvarez et al., 2015b). Así mismo se le ha dado particular importancia a recoger la voz de quienes ven vulnerados sus derechos con el fin de que sus luchas y esfuerzos sean visibilizados (Freire, 1970; Wresinski,1980; Maf-Neef et al., 2010).
El proceso de análisis de la información se ha llevado a cabo en cuatro etapas: inmersión (descripción); recogida sistemática de información (clasificación); procesado de la información (conexión), y extracción de conclusiones (producción de conocimiento) (Frediani, 2007).

La etapa de inmersión ha permitido entender los procesos desde dentro de los mismos, así como establecer las conexiones entre ellos. Algunos de los investigadores, en los casos de Senegal y España, han participado en el proceso de investigación – acción con las comunidades involucradas y quienes les apoyan, cómo es el caso de la Asamblea de Vivienda Digna, en Madrid, El Equipo de Lucha Contras las Inundaciones en Senegal, el Movimiento AT Cuarto Mundo, etc. Además, en todos los casos, la información recogida se ha contrastado con entrevistas semi-estructuradas con las instituciones públicas así como con la información recogida sistemáticamente tanto de artículos de investigación como de divulgación, acerca de los casos. La información se ha procesado a través del marco analítico para finalmente extraer las correspondientes conclusiones.

Para esta investigación se han seleccionado tres casos de estudio que tienen lugar en contextos, dimensiones y etapas del proceso completamente distintos: Las Sabinas (España); Guinaw Rails Nord (Senegal) y Villa 31 (Argentina). Si bien en todos los casos se ha partido de barrios auto-producidos, fruto de la misma situación de abandono institucional y amenaza de expulsión de sus residentes, lo que en todos los casos les ha llevado a desencadenar un proceso de resiliencia colectiva. La discusión cruzada de los resultados obtenidos en los tres casos permite responder al objetivo de la investigación de entender y visibilizar los factores determinantes para que estos procesos se desencadenen, desarrollen y puedan desafiar al poder establecido (Castells, 2012), para poder ejercer su derecho de producir su propio espacio (Lefebvre,1968; Harvey, 2012).

A continuación pasamos a presentar los resultados obtenidos de aplicar el método a los casos de estudio. Empezaremos abordando los casos desde el de menor tamaño y menor desarrollo del proceso de resiliencia (Las Sabinas, España, caso 1) para acabar por el de mayor envergadura y madurez del proceso de resiliencia (Villa 31, Argentina, caso 2). Finalmente llevaremos a cabo la discusión cruzada de los resultados y la extracción de conclusiones.

**LAS SABINAS (ESPAÑA) caso 1.**

En esta sección se presentan los resultados obtenidos de la aplicación del marco analítico al caso de estudio de “Las Sabinas” en España. Los resultados se han obtenido del proceso de investigación-acción llevado a cabo con la comunidad y con quienes les acompañan (La Asamblea de Vivienda Digna para Todas las Personas y el movimiento ATD Cuarto Mundo en España) desde finales de 2014, dicha información ha sido contrastada tanto mediante entrevistas semi-estructuradas a otros actores (autoridades locales y regionales) como mediante el análisis de los documentos publicados.

**CONTEXTO**

La respuesta a los núcleos chabolistas que han dado las autoridades de la Comunidad de Madrid (CAM) en las últimas décadas ha demostrado ser un absoluto fracaso, a pesar de contar con fondos suficientes. Desde 2002 se han demolido más de 2.000 viviendas auto-producidas en la CAM. Si bien, pese a que las instituciones disponían de un presupuesto de unos 126.000€ por familias, lo que se
corresponde con el precio de una vivienda, apenas se realojó al 10% de las familias afectadas (Nogués, 2010). Además a estas no se les otorgó un piso sino un alquiler social de 50€ al mes, lo que unido a los gastos de comunidad y suministro les suponía dedicar entre el 50% de sus escasos ingresos al pago de la misma. La experiencia de quienes llevan años acompañado a familias afectadas por estos procesos, cómo el movimiento ATD Cuarto Mundo en España, es que una parte sustancial de las mismas han acabado siendo desahuciada por la misma institución que demolió sus viviendas auto-construidas y las realojó. Ahora bien, este segundo proceso fue completamente invisible, ya que las familias habían sido realojadas de forma dispersa por todo el territorio y su red de apoyo mutuo había quedado destruida, y con ella su posibilidad de luchar por sus derechos.

En la actualidad, muchas de estas familias viven en una situación de profunda desesperanza, ocupando naves o pisos vacíos, o han tenido que volver a auto-construir sus viviendas y sus barrios en otros lugares, como es el caso de las Sabinas en las que una parte sustancial de la población procede del desalojo de las mimbreras, uno de esos barrios chabolistas desmantelado por la CAM en (2009-2010).

“Si vivo en una chabola hago mal, si ocupo una vivienda vacía estoy haciendo mal y si me quedo en la calle sigo haciendo mal .. ¿Qué salida tengo? ..Si me dicen que firme mi sentencia de muerte para que me den una vivienda, yo la firme por mis hijos. Yo estoy intentando hacer las cosas bien, pero nadie me facilita nada. No quiero seguir discriminado, quiero poder salir de mi casa sin vergüenza”

Actualmente se desconoce si esas viviendas, permanecen vacías, o cuántos de las mismas podrían estar entre las 3.000 viviendas que la CAM vendió a Fondos Buitre entre 2012 y 2013.

PROCESO DE CONSTRUCCIÓN DE LA RESILIENCIA

En la actualidad, más de mil familias siguen viviendo en núcleos auto-producidos en la CAM. Entre ellos se encuentra el del barrio del Río Guadarrama-Las Sabinas, en el que viven unas 376 familias, a lo largo de más de 2 Km entre los municipios de Móstoles y Arroyomolinos. El asentamiento surge y crece por la imposibilidad de la mayoría de sus habitantes de hacer efectivo su derecho a una vivienda de otro modo. Ante el abandono institucional como única respuesta, las familias se han visto obligadas a auto-construir sus viviendas y a auto-gestionar su acceso a servicios básicos como el agua o la energía, contando únicamente con sus propios recursos y el apoyo de su comunidad. Si bien todos estos esfuerzos siguen siendo considerados por las instituciones públicas como “ilegales” y lejos de ser reconocidos y apoyados son estigmatizados y perseguidos.

Prueba de ello es la firma del convenio de “desmantelamiento” entre la CAM y el Ayuntamiento de Móstoles en 2013. Al igual que ocurrió en el pasado se estima que para este proceso la CAM cuenta con unos 130.000 € por familia, si bien los requisitos establecidos en el convenio dejan a la mitad de las mismas sin posibilidad de realojo, ya que se empadronaron con posterioridad a 2009 (tras el estallido de la crisis de 2008 y el desmantelamiento de las mimbreras entre 2009 y 2010, del que proceden muchas de las familias).

4 eldiario.es (2016/05/02)
En este contexto la Asamblea de Vivienda Digna y algunos miembros del movimiento ATD Cuarto Mundo en España, empezaron en 2014 a hacerse presentes en el barrio, con el único objetivo de acompañar a las familias y de visibilizar tanto sus capacidades y esfuerzos como la posible vulneración de sus derechos. En 2015, la compañía de luz a la que estaban enganchadas “ilegalmente” las familias desde hacía años, al no tener ninguna otra alternativa para acceder al suministro, les denuncia y les corta la luz. Al parecer está viene siendo una práctica habitual en estos procesos de desalojo para cansar a las familias y forzarlas a irse.

El corte del suministro, afecta a todas las familias por igual dejándolas sin luz, ni acceso al agua de los pozos, etc… En esta situación deciden unirse, y por primera vez en su historia, concentrarse junto con quienes les apoyan en la plaza del ayuntamiento para visibilizar la vulneración de sus derechos y reclamar que el ayuntamiento les dé acceso “legal” a los servicios básicos de luz y de agua.

El ayuntamiento, conformado por un nuevo gobierno, recibe a las familias ese mismo día y se compromete a ofrecerles una solución provisional de suministro de energía mediante generadores y a mediar con la compañía eléctrica comprometiéndose a poner un punto de luz seguro para que la compañía eléctrica les vuelva a dar suministro.

Este proceso ha desencadenado nuevas maneras de organizarse en el barrio, las familias se han conectado en redes de washap y Facebook, para informarse y ser informadas de lo que tiene que ver con su barrio, han contratado colectivamente a un abogado para que les defienda de la denuncia presentada por la compañía eléctrica, han mantenido reuniones con autoridades locales y regionales dentro y fuera del barrio, han solicitado que se les dé servicio de recogida de basuras hasta ahora inexistente, han difundido sus demandas en los medios de comunicación (radio y periódicos locales y nacionales) y han empezado a reclamar que se les informe de su situación y sus derechos en lo que respecta al realojo.

“Según el derecho internacional [...] los desalojos sólo pueden llevarse a cabo como último recurso, una vez que se han estudiado todas las demás alternativas posibles en una verdadera consulta con las personas afectadas. [...] Los gobiernos deben garantizar también que nadie se queda sin vivienda.” (Amnistía Internacional, 2012).

Ante la movilización de estas familias y quienes les apoyan y la repercusión mediática que están logrando, el ayuntamiento ha empezado a trabajar en un plan “B” con el fin de evitar que sus derechos sean vulnerados.

LOGROS y RETOS

Por primera vez las familias han logrado junto a quienes les apoyan unirse y vencer el miedo para reivindicar sus derechos y han logrado forzar a las autoridades locales a que sus demandas sean incluidas en sus agendas políticas. El reto sigue siendo lograr que sus capacidades y esfuerzos sean reconocidos y apoyados, para poder formar parte de la comunidad como el resto de sus vecinas y vecinos de Móstoles.
GUINAW RAILS NORD (SENEGAL) caso 2

En esta sección se presentan los resultados obtenidos de la aplicación del marco analítico al caso de estudio de “Guinaw Rails Nord” en Senegal. Como en el caso anterior, los resultados se han obtenido del proceso de investigación-acción llevado a cabo con la comunidad y con quienes les acompañan (Equipo de Lucha Contra las Inundaciones y el movimiento ATD Cuarto Mundo en Senegal) desde finales de 2008, dicha información ha sido contrastada tanto mediante entrevistas semi-estructuradas a otros actores (autoridades locales, regionales, nacionales, etc.) como mediante el análisis de los documentos publicados.

CONTEXTO

Guinaw Rails Nord es una de las 5 comunas de Pikine Irregular Sur (PIS), un asentamiento fundado en los años 70 en tanto que “campo provisional” para recibir a las familias desalojadas del centro de Dakar. Inicialmente se trataba de un lugar alejado del centro, mal comunicado y de baja densidad habitacional, si bien durante décadas el asentamiento se ha ido densificando gracias al esfuerzo de las familias, que dado el abandono institucional, se han visto obligadas a ir progresivamente auto-construyendo sus viviendas, tejiendo sus redes de apoyo mutuo y auto-gestionando su acceso a servicios básicos como el agua o la energía. Si bien todos estos esfuerzos lejos de ser reconocidos por las instituciones gubernamentales siguen siendo considerados por estas como “ilegales”.

En la actualidad PIS con GRN a la cabeza, se ha convertido en un lugar estratégico dentro de la región, al quedar situado entre el centro económico-administrativo y los nuevos desarrollos. La fuerte presión inmobiliaria llevo a que el gobierno nacional a solicitar en el año 2000 una auditoria urbana en la que se concluyó que dada la escasez de espacio en Dakar, la ocupación irregular de Pikine debía reducirse de manera significativa (République du Sénégal-APIX,2006:32). Cabe poner de relieve en este punto que el 85% de la población de PIS no dispone de tenencia “formal” (République du Sénégal-APIX, 2006:71-77), por lo que, dada la ley 64-46, vigente desde 1964, el Gobierno puede expulsar a los actuales residentes de PIS sin indemnizarles por el valor del suelo en caso de aprobación de un programa de “utilidad pública”.

Al problema de presión inmobiliaria se suma el problema recurrente de vulnerabilidad a las inundaciones que viene afectando al asentamiento desde 1989. Según las autoridades, el problema se debe a la ocupación irregular del suelo, si bien tanto afectados como expertos ponen de relieve la falta de inversión por parte de las instituciones gubernamentales de una red de evacuación de aguas. En este contexto, los afectados llevan décadas luchando por recuperar sus viviendas y su asentamiento tras cada nueva inundación y manifestando su desacuerdo ante cualquier solución que implique su desalojo.

Sin embargo, tras las inundaciones de 2005, el gobierno local decidió poner en marcha el “Plan Jaxaay”. Un plan nacional de lucha contra las inundaciones, que en la práctica se concentró en el desalojo involuntario de 3.000 familias, en un 90% de los casos procedentes de la periferia urbana de Dakar, que fueron realojadas en un asentamiento situado a 22 Km del centro de Dakar, con una densidad de 4.000hab/Km2 y un tejido productivo escaso (République du Sénégal – MHUCH, 2009; Álvarez et al., 2015 a). El plan apenas respondió a las necesidades del 3% de las víctimas de las
inundaciones\textsuperscript{5}, las obras hidráulicas realizadas fueron consideradas por los expertos como inútiles y los directamente afectados declararon haber sido empobrecidos y obligados a “empezar de cero”. El Estado paso a disponer de las plusvalías de los terrenos expropiados, así como de las plusvalías futuras generadas por el nuevo asentamiento de realojo, ya que las viviendas otorgadas a los afectados por el plan siguen siendo propiedad del gobierno. Pese a todo lo cual en 2011 se puso en marcha el “Plan Jaxaay II” con el apoyo del BM\textsuperscript{6}.

El problema de las inundaciones parece haberse convertido en un pretexto para llevar a cabo un proceso de gentrificación que conlleva la pérdida de la red social de apoyo mutuo y de los bienes de los afectados en favor de otros intereses.

**PROCESO DE CONSTRUCCIÓN DE LA RESILIENCIA**

Ante la falta de una respuesta eficaz por parte de las instituciones gubernamentales, contra el problema de las inundaciones que asola el barrio desde hace décadas, la comunidad de GRN junto con quienes les apoyan (movimiento internacional ATD Cuarto Mundo, decidieron unirse y actuar colectivamente a partir de sus recursos y capacidades con el fin de expulsar el agua del barrio y no a su gente.

En 2009, construyeron una red de canales con el fin de evacuar el agua en la época de lluvias de forma gravitatoria y constituyeron el equipo local de lucha contra las inundaciones (ELCI) formado mayoritariamente por jóvenes del barrio para el mantenimiento de la red. La acción se llevó a cabo mediante recursos locales al alcance de todos (botas, picos y palas) con el fin de que todo el mundo pueda participar. El coste total de la acción durante los dos primeros años fue de 2.104€

El fin último de la acción era fortalecer la capacidad de actuar colectivamente de los vecinos y contribuir a que todo el mundo pudiera permanecer en GRN, un asentamiento situado a apenas 12 Km del centro, con una densidad de 40.000 hab/Km\textsuperscript{2} y un tejido productivo denso y de confianza. El consejero de medio ambiente de GRN afirmaba que desde que la acción se había llevado a cabo nadie se había visto obligado a desalojar la comuna por causa de las inundaciones.

A la vista de la actuación de los vecinos el gobierno local decidió en 2010 participar en la realización de la red de canales, e invirtió los fondos del departamento destinados a la lucha contra las inundaciones de la comuna (18.293€), en la realización de un canal que apenas supuso el 7\% del total de la red canales y que no podía ser desaguado de forma gravitatoria como el resto de la red. Este canal, según palabras del consejero de medioambiente de la comuna, “trajo más problemas que soluciones”. Por su parte, el Gobierno Nacional siguió promoviendo la transformación físico-social de PIS (Álvarez et al., 2015a), y aumentando la presión inmobiliaria de GRN con lo que ello sigue suponiendo de incremento de la vulnerabilidad a los desalojos de los vecinos.

\textsuperscript{5} Es decir a 3.000 de las 90.000 familias víctimas de las inundaciones según el informe del Banco Mundial (World Bank, 2010).

LOGROS y RETOS

Las familias han logrado actuar colectivamente a partir de sus capacidades y sus recursos y mostrar que “sacar el agua” y no a las personas es la alternativa más útil y eficaz para luchar contra las inundaciones, sin embargo el reto sigue siendo que quienes toman las decisiones reconozcan sus capacidades y esfuerzos y apoyen sus “alternativas” para que estas sean duradera a largo plazo. La comunidad sigue bajo la amenaza de la expulsión.

VILLA 31 (ARGENTINA) caso 3

En esta sección se presentan los resultados obtenidos de la aplicación del marco analítico al caso de estudio de “Villa 31” en Argentina. El análisis que aquí se presenta es parte de los resultados de dos Proyectos de Investigación realizados en el Instituto Superior de Urbanismo, Territorio y Ambiente ISU-FADU-UBA, a través de la interpretación de información secundaria cuantitativa, e información cualitativa recolectada mediante entrevistas semi-estructuradas a diversos actores sociales que participan activamente en los procesos comunitarios y sociales del sector.

CONTEXTO

El antecedente de lo que hoy se conoce como “Villa 31”, estuvo conformado por inmigrantes polacos desocupados que ocuparon galpones ferroviarios y construyeron un pequeño conjunto de casillas de cartón y chapa en la década de 1930. Desde entonces, la Villa 31 debido a su carácter y su historia, constituyó por más de ocho décadas uno de los espacios emblemáticos de la vivienda informal en Buenos Aires, representativo de un particular tipo de desarrollo urbano que tuvo lugar en la ciudad durante el Siglo XX y lo que va del XXI.

La Villa 31 se localiza en una zona estratégica, próxima a uno de los principales nodos de transporte de la región, lindante con uno de los sectores de mayor valor inmobiliario (Retiro-Recoleta). Se encuentra entre las villas miseria con mayor incremento de población, - entre 2001 y 2009 se asentaron allí 1.930 personas por año-. Ocupa un área de 32 hectáreas con una densidad de 850 hab/ha y según estimaciones de algunos delegados del barrio, actualmente contaría con más de 40.000 habitantes. En el periodo 2005-2015, el valor del suelo de La Villa se ha incrementado correlativamente con los aumentos de los valores del suelo de la “ciudad formal”, debido principalmente a su localización estratégica.

9 La densidad promedio de la ciudad es de 14.973 hab/km2 y la Comuna 1 (donde se encuentra ubicada la Villa 31) es de 11.409 hab/km2. Además alrededor del 20% de los hogares habita en construcciones de 2 pisos y más. Fuente Censo de Hogares y Población Villa 31 y 31 bis, GCBA, Marzo 2009
PROCESO DE CONSTRUCCIÓN DE LA RESILIENCIA

A comienzos de la década de 1940, el gobierno desalojó a los ocupantes de la villa, pero a fines de esa misma década, volvió a ser ocupada por inmigrantes internos, como consecuencia del proceso de industrialización que desplazó población del campo hacia la ciudad. Entre las décadas de 1950 y 1970 la Villa 31 se consolidó y creció a través de asentamientos espontáneos con una composición migratoria interna y de países limítrofes10.

Este crecimiento y primera densificación trajo aparejado el surgimiento de organizaciones comunitarias con marcada impronta social y política. Así la Villa 31 fue configurando un espacio socio-urbano con una fuerte identidad, construida en la lucha contra la estigmatización (representativa de la pobreza y exclusión) y la resistencia ante los diversos procesos de desalojo. Mientras tanto desde el Estado y la opinión pública se pretendía invisibilizar los asentamientos informales y la pobreza urbana.

Ante la escasez de políticas públicas, surgieron de modo comunitario y solidario pequeños equipamientos de salud, educación, religiosos y comercios informales.

Entre la segunda mitad de la década de 1970 y hasta principios de los 80’s, la dictadura cívico-militar, aplicó políticas represivas vinculadas con el modelo socio-económico, que implicaron la erradicación de villas miseria de la ciudad, a través de violentos desalojos11.

La población asentada en villas en la ciudad, que en 1976 alcanzaba las 208.700 personas, en 1981 quedó reducido a algo más de 8.700 habitantes (Pastrana et al., 2014 p.408). En la Villa 31, al inicio de la dictadura vivían aproximadamente 6.000 familias y al término de la misma quedaron sólo 44, que resistieron la expulsión porque se encontraban fuertemente organizados social y políticamente y contaron con el apoyo de sectores de la Iglesia Católica Tercermundista.

Durante los primeros años de la década de 1980 con el retorno a la democracia, se produjo un proceso de recuperación, reconstrucción y reapropiación de la Villa 31. Los habitantes volvieron a ocupar los espacios de los cuales habían sido expulsados, reconstruyendo sus viviendas y los espacios que propiciaban la interacción social.

Su crecimiento a partir de ese momento fue constante y exponencial, se densificó12 y se fortalecieron las organizaciones sociales y políticas en el marco democrático13.

---

10 “Los 8000 migrantes internos que se recibían por año hasta 1936 pasaron a un promedio de 70.000 entre 1937 y 1943, y a 117.000 en el período 1944-1947. En total se sumaron cerca de un millón de nuevos residentes en el Gran Buenos Aires, que creció de los 3,4 millones de habitantes en 1936 a 4,6 millones registrados en 1947; en forma previsible, también aumentó su incidencia en ese conglomerado urbano, desde el 12 por ciento en 1936, al 29 en 1943; y al 37 en 1947, proporciones que se incrementaron aún más entre los estratos más bajos” (Torres, 2010: 192).

11 “los resultados de dicha acción se tradujeron en que de las 28 villas existentes en la ciudad, cuatro fueron totalmente erradicadas (Villas 28, 29, 30 y 40), mientras que las restantes vieron reducir su población notablemente. Los 208.783 habitantes que en 1976 residían en el total de villas se habían reducido siete años después a 8709”. En Pastrana et al, 2012, p.408

12 Evolución población en la Villa 31-31 bis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Años</th>
<th>Habitantes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dicho crecimiento trajo como consecuencia el surgimiento de nuevos asentamientos que complejizaron y diferenciaron su estructura interna\textsuperscript{14}, en un proceso que no se interrumpiría hasta la actualidad.

Durante la última década, el incremento de la actividad social y económica de la villa, estuvo acompañado por una progresiva y creciente consolidación de sus construcciones y de las actividades económicas asociadas a la especulación en el mercado inmobiliario informal. A partir de 2006, la Universidad de Buenos Aires emergió públicamente como un actor estratégico. La Facultad de Arquitectura (UBA) elaboró un Plan de Urbanización para la Villa 31 “Proyecto Barrio 31”, a partir de un proceso participativo.

La propuesta fue rápidamente apropiada por parte de los habitantes, como una herramienta estratégica en el reclamo por su derecho a permanecer en ese valorado sector de la ciudad. Una propuesta producida y respaldada por una institución prestigiosa, que otorgaba a su reclamo cierta legitimidad ante la opinión pública\textsuperscript{15} en el marco de un proceso históricamente conflictivo. Cuya última etapa estuvo marcada por diversas tensiones (cortes recurrentes de la autopista o la prohibición de seguir construyendo en la villa por parte del gobierno local).

A partir del Proyecto Barrio 31, a fines del año 2009 se logró la promulgación de la Ley 3343 que disponía la urbanización del polígono que abarca la Villa 31 y 31 bis, y que establecía también la constitución de una Mesa de Trabajo\textsuperscript{16} integrada por representantes del gobierno local, nacional, instituciones académicas y organizaciones sociales.

LOGROS y RETOS

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
Año & Número de habitantes  \\
\hline
1976 & 24.324  \\
1980 & 796  \\
1991 & 5.668  \\
2001 & 12.204  \\
2003 & 14.584  \\
2010 & 26.492  \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Elaboración propia en base a datos de Raspall, Rodríguez. Lucken y Perea, 2013, p.49.

\textsuperscript{13} Durante los primeros años de democracia se estima que se instalaban mas de 200 familias por noche En Pastrana et al, 2012, p.414


\textsuperscript{15} Durante ese periodo algunas organizaciones sociales de la villa dentro de su repertorio de acciones de protesta cortan la Autopista Illia sostenido los renders y planos del proyecto propuesto por la UBA

\textsuperscript{16} “Mesa de Gestión y Planeamiento Multidisciplinaria y Participativa para la Urbanización de las Villas 31 y 31bis” que funcionaría en el ámbito de la Legislatura porteña.
Si bien a partir de la sanción de la Ley 3343 parecía que la materialización del Proyecto Barrio 31 (FADU-UBA) era solo una cuestión de tiempo, el mismo se fue postergando por conflictos entre los distintos actores sociales en el proceso de la reglamentación de la ley. La relación entre el Estado Nacional y el Gobierno local, los diversos intereses y puntos de vista de las distintas organizaciones sociales y políticas que conforman la compleja trama social de la villa y su permanente crecimiento y densificación, hicieron finalmente que el proyecto se empantane en un limbo político y burocrático.

En la actualidad, la Villa 31 tiene un futuro incierto. Por un lado, de acuerdo a la percepción de los diversos actores y la historia reciente resultaría poco probable que dejara de existir como tal en el corto plazo. Por una parte, quienes viven en la villa, siguen demandando al Estado por el incumplimiento del proyecto, mientras señalan el agravamiento de problemas de sobrepoblación del territorio, falta de obras de infraestructura y servicios, y actividades ilícitas que deterioran el tejido social. Estas dificultades se suman a las diferenciaciones socio-espaciales internas que, de algún modo, constituyen una segregación duplicada de aquella otra que el resto de la Ciudad practica con la propia villa, estigmatizándola.

TOMAR Y HACER EN LUGAR DE PEDIR Y ESPERAR

El artículo muestra, a través del análisis de tres casos en tres continentes distintos, cómo los residentes de las comunidades auto-producidas son quienes más han hecho por satisfacer sus necesidades de manera integral, mientras que desde las instituciones gubernamentales, se han aplicado sistemáticamente políticas de exclusión y abandono. Se ha demostrado, que hacer efectivo el derecho a la vida urbana, ha sido y sigue siendo una lucha, en un mundo de relaciones de poder desigual. Donde la “informalidad” sigue siendo una cuestión política, relacionada con la posición en el espacio social y la vinculación que se establece con el resto de las estructuras de poder.

El marco analítico basado en la triada de Giddens se ha aplicado a los tres casos de estudio: Las Sabinas (España); Guinaw Rails Nord (Senegal) y Villa 31 (Argentina), lo que ha permitido extraer las siguientes conclusiones:

- En lo que concierne al contexto, en los casos 1 y 2 se observa como las necesidades de las comunidades auto-producidas parecen convertirse en un pretexto para las instituciones gubernamentales para implementar planes que las empobrecen, en beneficio de otros intereses que tienden a invisibilizarse, como la recuperación de suelo para fines más lucrativos, apropiación de plusvalías presentes y futuras, venta de viviendas a fondos buitres, etc. Lo que lleva a las comunidades afectadas a vivir bajo la amenaza permanente de la expulsión, quienes viven estos procesos sostienen que “nos quieren tirar” “nos obligan a empezar de cero” en lugares más alejados, menos densificados, donde sus actividades productivas no funcionan etc. En el caso 3 se observa que, además de lo anteriormente mencionado en relación con la permanente amenaza de desalojo (que en algún momento casi llegó a concretarse), el sólido entramado social, conjuntamente con su fuerte identidad, hizo posible la resistencia, permanencia, crecimiento y consolidación del barrio.

- En lo que concierne al proceso de construcción de la resiliencia, en los tres casos se ha mostrado como estos procesos se han desencadenado ante un “problema” (corte de luz, inundaciones, amenaza de desalojo, etc.) que afectaba a toda la comunidad por igual, ante el

que han decidido dejar de esperar una respuesta institucional y unirse a otros actores que les apoyan (movimientos sociales, universidades, etc.) para actuar colectivamente. Se han llevado a cabo acciones útiles a partir de los recursos y capacidades de la comunidad de modo que todo el mundo pudiera participar de la solución. Los afectados han pasado de ser víctimas a ser sujetos activos de su propio proceso de cambio.

- En lo que concierne a los logros y a los retos, en todos los casos la unión se ha constituido como el factor clave para superar el miedo (Castells, 2012) para actuar colectivamente y mostrar que la realidad es transformable (Galeano, 2006; Colau & Alemany, 2012). En los tres casos la acción ha contribuido a legitimar a la comunidad y a señalar a los verdaderos responsables de su situación, lo que ha forzado a las autoridades locales a reconocer las reivindicaciones de la comunidad e incluirlas en la agenda política, lo que no ha significado que el proceso culminara con una propuesta de solución definitiva del problema. El reto sigue siendo lograr que las instituciones gubernamentales que deberían ser garantes de derechos de todas las personas, reconozcan y apoyen las iniciativas de las comunidades auto-producidas, en lugar de seguirlas criminalizando, persiguiendo y penalizando.

Señalar que si bien los resultados obtenidos son contexto-dependientes, se considera que se podrían obtener resultados similares en otros casos en contextos similares.

Se considera que el artículo contribuye a mostrar cómo en los márgenes del sistema, emergen y se desencadenan procesos de resiliencia colectiva con capacidad para desafiar al poder establecido (Castells, 2012), para poder seguir ejerciendo su derecho de producir su propio espacio (Lefebvre, 1968; Harvey, 2012).

Se observa como la auto-producción del espacio se convierte en sí misma en un desafío para el poder establecido, en la medida en la que por una parte pone en evidencia la incapacidad del sistema actual de dar una respuesta a una cada vez más amplia mayoría y por otro muestran que hay modos alternativos de producción del espacio que están al margen del mercado y que sin embargo se convierten en el único modo de acceso asequible aunque precario, a la vivienda o a la energía reconocidos como derechos. Se observa en las autoridades un miedo “latente” a que estos pudieran ser replicados y/o legalizados.

Se considera que el reto sigue siendo definir el “bien común” en un contexto de política real de desequilibrio de poder (Jenkins et al., 2007). Se recomienda seguir investigando en cómo fortalecer la capacidad de las comunidades excluidas para lograr que sus demandas formen parte de la agenda política y sus derechos se hagan efectivos. Dicho de otro modo, tenemos que seguir trabajando para que las políticas se implementen en favor de la mayoría y no de la minoría que en la actualidad gestiona y decide sobre el bien común.

REFERENCIAS


Scheinsohn, M. et al. (2010) Notas preliminares sobre la segregación y los procesos de diffusion urbana, en Expresiones de la apropiación especial en las ciudades latinoamericanas, (Rodriguez, M comp.); ALAS y Fundación Ideas, Ciudad de México; 95-110


A CRITICAL STARTING POINT FOR CITIES: DATA THAT IS INCLUSIVE.

Smruti Jukur¹, Praveen Yadav², Maria Lobo³, Sheela Patel⁴

Smruti Jukur¹
Architect Urban Planner at SPARC - Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres (SPARC), India
smrutisj@gmail.com

Praveen Yadav²
Urban Planner at SPARC - Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres (SPARC), India
p.yadav220@gmail.com

Maria Lobo³
Coordinator and Consultant at Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres (SPARC), India.
mariamaxim77@gmail.com

Sheela Patel⁴
Founder and Director Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres (SPARC), India.
sparcssns@gmail.com

ABSTRACT (Max. 300 words):
Most cities in the global south are being challenged by several tough transitions. Firstly, there is in migration and internal city growth which happens due to a range of reasons, but results into much of the urban population living and working in informality. Secondly, most cities are unequipped to deal with increasing population growth and their increasing demands, crumbling infrastructure, transport systems and other public services and have a terrible financial crunch. In the times of external commercial investments in public sector services, cities are now expected to ‘compete’ with one another to access scarce resources and fuel their ‘development agenda’. Though the sustainable development goals (SDGs) require adherence to sustainable and inclusive practices and ensure equitable distribution of resources, imageries of western development have implied currently development practices in many cities as exclusionary. In this given context where do the poor place themselves within these complexities of urban development, and express their requirements still continues to receive less attention.

This paper is written by group of professionals associated with urban social movements of slum dwellers associated with SPARC and SDI known as NSDF and Mahila Milan in India. Which over the last three decades has been supporting poor communities to locate themselves and articulate their needs within these urban complexities and seek improvement in their quality of life.
This paper discusses one of its most important tools that the Alliance has been using since its inception over last 30 years, to enable communities collecting data about themselves. This is undertaken in different forms, and has served the poor to advocate for change and the city to solve many seemingly unsolvable problems. This tool, through its evolution has undergone several upgrades, but continuous
to be a ‘ritual practice’ which contest official data which rarely represents poor communities and work with their city and province to explore negotiations which are inclusionary.

This paper discusses this as a critical starting point for cities that is to build a ‘Bottom up’ process to create inclusionary development practices through ‘data that is inclusive’. A case study from the most current and evolved approach of the Alliance concludes the paper. This process initiated in India, is now a standard activity in SDI which is a transnational network of slum dwellers operating in 42 countries across Asia Africa and Latin America.

KEY WORDS
Informal settlements; Basic services; Data collection; Negotiations; Enumerations; Settlement Profiling.

1. INTRODUCTION
Urbanization in global south is seen as the most evident event of the 21st century. Statistics reveal that 2.3 billion people will be added to urban areas by 2050, which will be centred at Asia and Africa (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2014). Projections predict the growth of this will be highest in India with addition of 404 million people followed by China and Nigeria with 292 and 212 million people respectively added to its cities by 2050. Dream of better paying jobs will dominate migration from rural areas. It will be influenced by the fact that three-quarters of the population in developing countries is still depending on agriculture for living ((International Labour Office, 2006). In that case most affected countries are India with 867 million and china with 635 million people in rural areas. Urbanisation and migration to cities occurs for many reasons, as rural economies dependent on agriculture start mechanising, large unskilled agricultural works will become redundant. In many instances cities as they grow have absorbed villages on their periphery and sitting where they are people find themselves part of cities. And while the possible reasons can be listed, the fact is that urbanisation is accelerating while decadal challenges on cities dealing with informality continue to remain unresolved.

Cities in their vision statements and in the process of competing with global trends state proudly of becoming competitive, while aspiring to follow the path of sustainable and inclusive development. With huge back logs of poor infrastructure cities have increasing tended to upgrade infrastructure of the formal city in areas around the business district to produce exclusive islands in order to become competitive and global. Over time the difference between the two parts of the city have got exacerbated and the contract of the formal and informal city have grown in proportion to the high genic coefficient.

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDG’s) on the other hand are suggesting inclusive and sustainable development. How can this present trend even align with the SDG aspirations? What southern cities face today and expanding informality which is poorly documented, rarely recognised, and where a majority of the future growth of the city through rural migration will ultimately house the inhabitants.
1.1 THE CHALLENGE OF INFORMALITY

What does informal habitat and livelihood imply for those trapped in this invisibility? Cities in the global south have generally adopted planning to serve the interests of businesses and housing those who work in formal industry finance and manufacturing and cities have 18th and 19th century planning systems where the separate districts has residential commercial and manufacturing districts. Yet even then and more so now, many who service these formal institutions are not formally contracted to work in these cities. They serviced these formal residential commercial and manufacturing areas informally, were paid less that minimum wages and “allowed to live on the periphery of those districts usually walking to work. When the city needed more space they were pushed back further (now we call it evictions).

As the rate and pace of urbanisation increased these volumes increased, Unionised labour (5-10% of the working populations) viewed these informal labourers with antagonism and hostility. Over the years in many countries most population is engaged in informal businesses, manufacturing which occurs in slums and informal settlement where people live and work. More and more formal businesses outsource work to these informal businesses and yet there is hospitality and angst about those who live and work in informality. In the mid 1990 young Swedish parliamentarians visited Dharavi and while walking through this town within the city, identified 18 objects belts and buckles wallets, clothing etc which was manufactures in that area itself. (SPARC diaries)

Along with informality comes invisibility, lack of recognition and exclusion from investments in basic amenities and services and constant fear of displacement demolitions and evictions. The vaccume created by lack of governance produces informal governance which is often mafia like, patronage and protection (from the state) at costs that are akin to the feudalism people ran away from their villages for.

Though it is the basis on which formal systems thrive and continue to prosper, neither the contribution of the informality is acknowledged, nor is its presence legitimized. As a result, in the context of development, on the pretext of improving the lives of marginalized populations, the poor become ‘beneficiaries’ of development rather than being partners to it. As such, their needs do not get articulated by themselves but by the grant makers of development. Only when the poor communities are able to own the process of collecting data about themselves and articulating them, will there be a level playing field and they will cease to be simple beneficiaries.

1.2 THE RIGHT TO THE CITY: WHO DOES THE CITY BELONG?

What constitutes illegality when 60 to 70% of city population resides in informal settlements? Can the informal settlements be perceived as solutions in the absence of a strategy coming from the nation state? What can the science of planning do to accommodate this century old reality that it has never accommodated in the development of cities?

There is no doubt that Informal settlements or poor neighbourhoods have provided shelter to people and have the potential for contributing to upward mobility. Urbanization has facilitated the employment for semi-skilled and unskilled labour force which eventually works as self-sustainable model for poverty reduction. In such cases negligence or short sightseeing of governance systems have
reduced the pace which is possible to be achieved only through simple support systems and provision of basic civic infrastructure. For example in Mumbai a total of only 23% of land is utilised under residential use, of which 8% is home to informal settlements which house 60% of the city population which is unserved. The development plan however does not acknowledge these special focus areas which explains the city’s planning and governance, ignorance for more than half of the population. The whole story of mismanagement is indirectly inducing multidimensional poverty into national economy. After repetitive attempts cities do not include the informal settlements into its planning instruments which have clear reflection in infrastructure availabilities to these subaltern spaces. The city development as we see it today excludes with or without purpose the challenges that poor people who live in cities either recently or over the last eight decades have been facing, they remain invisible, and their participation we believe is a very important ingredient in decision making. These highly dense habitats need special attention not only in terms of physical infrastructure but also needs social amenities such as education, health and open spaces in equitable proportions.

There is a deep relationship between the informal communities and the city, they are the building blocks and resources that build and run the city. There is a glaring absence of acknowledging their presence. There is very little coordination between the government policies and the fast transition. Over a third of India’s slum population lives in 46 million plus cities, the percentage of slum households in the metro cities are Mumbai 41.3%, Delhi-14.6% Chennai 28.5%, Kolkatta-29.6%. With almost 79% of urban population working for informal jobs, they provide services to the formal economy. The solutions lies in very simple equation- understand the complexities of informal settlement, prepare a system through community participation which can penetrate the complex political process in the settlements and realise the interventions. Such processes have explored new methods that are presented through this paper.

2. THE UNINFORMED: DATA OF THE UNKNOWN

This paper enquires the paradox of Mumbai on one hand being a financial capital and world class city and on the other hand more than 50 percent of the cities’ population lives in informal conditions, with restricted access to safe water and less than 40 percent having access to sanitation systems. Where is the gap? If planning were to merely speculate then how can we ignore the sixty percent of the city population?

The Census of India is an elaborate detail process of collection and assimilation of decadal data at household aggregated to city level. Although it is one of the most reliable sources, its use is limited to city level which is vital in understanding city and regional dynamics. The action plan however needs deeper penetration into local area level like the wards and sub wards through local governance systems. This requires tools that understands local needs and allocates resources based on priorities which differ in different areas. Hence, the accuracy and consistency of data is very important to assess the current scenario and plan for future needs from a micro level. In a city where more than 60% people live in informal settlements as suspended citizens, most of the migrants are from rural distress and in search of employment; they are mostly under skilled and are willing to do menial jobs at low wages. As a result of this most jobs in the service sector are informal. Apart from this, there are many who are engaged in small scale manufacturing at home and low income self-employment activities mainly involving women. “At least half of the migrants have become indispensable to the city’s economy by filling -in cheap labour-oriented and unskilled jobs” (MCGM 2010). Nearly 40% of this
population is below Poverty Line (Survey conducted by MMRDA) these raise serious concerns which needs a more robust approach.

3. WHERE TO BEGIN?

3.1 THE EMERGENCE OF THE PROCESS OF DATA COLLECTION BY THE ALLIANCE:

Informality breeds invisibility, and its contribution is taken for granted, assumed and often abused. When formal and informal systems compete for share of city’s limited resources, the formal systems get an upper hand. If we look at land as a resource, expansion of requirements of formal systems has meant that informally occupied land is cleared to make way for formal development and this has meant that the informal residents are evicted and pushed to lands with lesser demands. How do the informal dwellers articulate their contribution to the city? How do they locate themselves within the urbanization process and demand legitimate positions? And importantly, how do they break the myth that by removing them and erasing them will not solve the issues of informality? The Alliance realized that, the first thing to do is to get counted. From there emerged the process of data collection by the poor.

At its inception in 1984, much of the founding group’s work focused on the pavement dwellers of Byculla a place in central Mumbai, where the women, in particular, repeatedly endured demolitions of their homes and loss of their mere belongings. Observing the failure of welfare-oriented NGOs to deal with the demolitions, SPARC began to work with these women to better understand the effects of the demolitions and how they could be countered. This was the first work of SPARC with the women pavement dwellers of Mumbai in collecting their data is the crucible, based on which the process of data collection emerged. This was the first process of data collection by the residents with the support of a few professional social workers, basically aimed at proving the fact that the pavement dwellers were as much legitimate citizens of the city as others and cannot be simply evicted as insignificant squatters. The process and the outcome was called “WE the invisible”, (SPARC, 1985) Training programmes were established where women learned how to survey their own settlements and how to use the data generated to campaign for land. From this work, Mahila Milan (MM) was formed and its coalition with SPARC was expanded through the addition of the National Slum Dwellers Federation (NSDF). Collectively, the SPARC, NSDF and Mahila Milan partnership is known as the Alliance.

The activity attempted to demonstrate that it is possible to COUNT pavement dwellers, and the data about their migration history, family, occupation, access to public resources. Most importantly, it contested claims of the city data which reduced them to temporary migrants that are in all practical terms, invisible to the city and its development, and gave the poor the power to place themselves within the urban maze. This data collection methodology therefore became a critical starting point for cities to now include the ‘invisible people’, the pavement dwellers.

From this experience, the necessity to collect data proactively and contest data that is not an accurate representation of the situation of informality in the city became a “ritual” of the Alliance. Throughout, the paper discusses the Alliance’s data collection methodology that is centred around habitat related conditions, however the general principles should be applicable across other subjects of development that need data as their basic inputs. Case examples are based predominantly from experiences in Mumbai city which is the Alliance’s oldest and most mature federating city. Nevertheless the ritual practice is followed in each of city where the Alliance works.
The National Slum Dwellers Federation organizes communities living in informal urban settlements and mobilizes them to articulate demands, explore development strategies and negotiate with city authorities. Originally formed to fight evictions, NSDF has moved from a protest model to one that encourages poor people to see themselves as active partners in development. Mahila Milan—or “Women Together”—is a decentralized, settlement-level network of poor women’s collectives that manage savings and credit activities, slum surveys and mapping, and housing and infrastructure projects. MM empowers women to become active leaders in community and urban development.

The Alliance aims to create the institutional arrangements which mobilize large numbers of the urban poor and to support and strengthen their organizations. The overall goal for these community-driven organizations is to become an important part of the city system so that the poor can directly participate in how the city is managed.

The Alliance works in various ways towards expanding and building the capacities of the NSDF and MM. This involves facilitating peer exchanges between poor communities and their leaders, encouraging community-led enumerations and surveys and supporting and advocating for community-initiated and driven projects and programmes. Furthermore, the Alliance works on pro-poor policy changes and strengthening dialogues, relationships and discussions between the poor and their local, regional and national authorities.

Today, the Alliance works to produce collective solutions for affordable housing and sanitation in over 75 cities in India. The Indian Alliance also works with similar NGOs and CBOs in Asia and Africa, and is a founding member of Slum/Shack Dwellers International, a transnational network of the urban poor in over 30 countries.

Since its inception, SPARC has been working and focusing on the poorest urban dwellers who otherwise were ignored and neglected by the city. Its goal is to give voice and increased options to women’s collectives and networks of slum federations, to access development investments and become drivers of development rather than beneficiaries. One of its first activities was to create a census of pavement dwellers in Mumbai and support women pavement dwellers in negotiating against evictions with the municipality. Since then, member communities of National Slum Dwellers Federation and Mahila Milan (women’s collectives) collect data and use it to dialogue with the government on issues of land, amenities and welfare. This includes work that fits with Millennium Development Goals (MDG) targets: reducing the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water and sanitation (through hundreds of community-managed toilets with washing facilities) and significantly improving the lives of slum dwellers (through secure tenure, upgrading, new housing for those displaced by infrastructure initiatives and setting up and supporting community-police partnerships for police stations in slums). SPARC supports community-driven surveys, mapping and enumeration of slums which includes city-wide mapping.

3.2 EXPANDING THE PRECEDENT

After the breakthrough of “We the invisible” that produced a platform for dialogue with the state and its allied machinery for the poor pavement dwellers, the Alliance realized the basic tenets of the process, which will become the central feature of the process, no matter where it is applied. That both the process and the data needs to be owned by the community is clearly the central feature. What
worked for the pavement dwellers of Byculla, should work for all the pavement dwellers of the city. The same should work for the slum dwellers living on lands owned by different authorities. Therefore it became a ritual to gather data about slum dwellers living on different land ownership typologies, different city administration typologies etc.

What became a ritual practice, became a tool to contest data collected without the participation of resident communities. In the later years and until today, when infrastructure development of the cities meant displacement of informal dwellers living on the land needed for the development, this data collection exercise became the central tool to negotiate for relocation instead of eviction. In the various projects in the city, the railway expansions under Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP), (Sheela Patel, 2002) the infrastructure development under Mumbai Urban Infrastructure Project, it was imperative to have accurate data about all those families that would be displaced. Thanks to the relocation policy of the state of Maharashtra in place, based on a particular eligibility criteria, families affected by the project are entitled to be housed at the cost of the project. Nevertheless, the process of relocation is a cumbersome one, and without accurate data about the residents, the process is bound to be fraught with roadblocks. Participation of the residents in collecting and vetting the data is imperative to insure that the eligible residents do not get excluded. Data about their socio economic status is important to understand the impact to their lives due to relocation and what support will they need until their lives are settled in the new place. The ritualistic practices produced data that contested data and numbers generated by external entities, and finally had to be accepted for their accurate representation of the situation on the ground. Today, this has translated into a standard practice of data collection of communities affected by infrastructure projects, and the process is legitimized within the policy framework. The Alliance continues to be the preferred partner of the Government in this process.

The process of data collection by the resident communities to articulate their current conditions and negotiate for alternatives to displacement became a critical starting point for the city to include affected slum dwellers as rightful citizens that need to be compensated when they give up their residences for larger public good.

4. TECHNOLOGY AS AN ASSISTING TOOL- WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONALS HERE?

The argument that this paper makes about a bottom up approach for data collection of the poor does not discredit the work of professionals, rather advocates that the role of professionals in this practice is as much important as the local residents and their collective ownership. Similarly, it does not discredit that technological tools are irrelevant to data about the poor, but argues how tools should be created to support the elements of the process, not substitute them. Let us examine this in detail.

When data is collected by the poor themselves and owned by them, it is nurtured and valued as an asset. This is because, it is collected by them, for them and represents data of their own. The sense of ownership gives them the power of negotiating what they need, and most importantly it makes them understand what they represent collectively as a community as against individuals. Most data has a historical flavour to it and without the participation of the residents, this feature is diluted. Peer pressure of neighbours and fellow residents insure that the data gathered is more accurate. Collective contestation of the overall data of communities and slums brings out new perspectives. If communities can be self-reliant in this process, what is the role of professionals and technology?

While resident communities are best suited to contest data and vouch for its accuracy, they still need ways to represent this data to the outside world, and locate themselves in the overall cityscape that includes formal residents as well. This is where professionals and technology become the most
important support structures for the communities. Ever growing cities need comprehensive planning for meeting the current as well as future needs of the citizens. This process of planning is complemented by availability of professionals in the field of urban development. Given the scale, using technological tools becomes inevitable. However, this process today makes crude and inaccurate representation of the informality especially in terms of habitat conditions of the informal populations, or slums as we may call them. The gap is mainly due to little or no representation of the informal residents themselves in the process of data collection and representation. The planning outputs are too technical for resident communities to locate themselves within these plans and contest them. This is the gap that professionals should ideally bridge. What does the Alliance do to address this challenge?

The Alliance and its networks support both technological as well as professional inputs to the resident communities and slum dwellers to collect, analyse and present the data. While data collection continues to be predominantly paper based, computerization of the data into simple and easy to use data bases has meant that data can be collected periodically, compared chronologically, and aggregated at various collective levels. Keeping the systems simple means that the new computer savvy generation is trained to carry out these simple tasks, keeping the costs of the process low at the same time putting the onus of the data ownership on resident communities and their representatives. Using simple tools such as GPS/GIS mapping of the settlements has meant that the residents can now locate themselves not only within their geographies but also see the scale of informality across geographies and how their challenges are shared by other communities across extended geographies. Introducing, training and assisting the communities to take their data to this next level cannot happen without support of technological inputs and training from professionals. This gives the communities the opportunity to now make sense of the larger development goals of the city, and locate themselves within the city’s development framework. That automatically increases their confidence to articulate their data, and contest data that is not an accurate representation of their condition.

The particular case of Dharavi redevelopment is a testing example of what such a partnership can produce. A joint work between local resident communities of a cluster in Dharavi (a slum requiring no introduction), and architecture and planning professionals produced an alternative development plan to contest the development plans created without community’s knowledge or interest, yet accepted by the state authorities. The residents and the professionals jointly did an exercise of detailed data collection, used technological tools and professional knowledge to produce a neighbourhood plan that acknowledged the real ground situation, kept interests of the resident dwellers, and was financially viable. The presentation of this exercise and its outcome produced an alternative viewpoint about development and stood the potential of breaking the traditional imagery of urban development. It became a critical starting point for the city to include the residents of Dharavi and their interests within the frame work of its redevelopment.

4.1 CASE STUDY OF DETAILED DATA COLLECTION

In this section, we examine a case study of preparing detailed documentation of informal settlements. This is based in Mumbai and explains the process by which detailed data at a local level is being examined for the change dialogue.

Several instruments of data collection, analysis and presentation exist today. In India, the national government conducts a detailed socio-economic survey of each household called as the Census Survey. The data is publicly available, yet at aggregated levels. This forms a very important input for the policy makers and is one of drivers of policy and program decisions. While this can form a guideline, at smaller local levels, granular data at the local level becomes imperative to prioritize and take smaller development decisions. The census data is available, aggregated at the district level which is a large geographic area that may cover several cities and villages. Large cities are also divided into
smaller geographies called wards, which may in turn be separated into smaller electoral constituencies, based on the population living there. While welfare initiatives and programs of the various Government bodies, the national and state trickle down to everyone in a more or less uniform fashion, for immediate priorities, people seek to resolve them with local leaders that are democratically elected, and make representation to the city administration. These leaders are elected from their respective constituencies and the electoral pressure makes them obligated to support the local residents’ resolve to address their issues. In such situations, local data available at the lowest level carries tremendous value.

In the case study discussed below, the Alliance seeks to sharpen its data collection ritual, called as ‘Slum Profiling’, and produce detailed data collected and presented at a constituency and ward level. The scale of data collection is represented below which shows the division of the city of Mumbai into 24 Wards, and the division of a particular ward P-North into smaller constituencies. The case study pertains to this ward and its constituencies, situated in the northern suburbs of the city.

While the goal is to ultimately collect data at the entire city level, the exercise starts with constituencies that gets aggregated to the wards and then to the city. P-North was chosen as the ward that presents most challenges in comparison to other wards, and the belief of the Alliance that, taking up difficult ones presents more learning and eases up the others. P-North is a ward that has the highest number of slums in the city and has a very high proportion of people living in slums in comparison to the general population. This single ward has 16 constituencies that have 176 slums in total. Its topography is complex with the coast on the west side and hilly terrain in the west. In this ward, one can find high end real estate development and advanced tourism coexisting with slums with poor basic infrastructure. One finds slum settlements on lands owned by central government, state government, municipal government as well as trusts and private owners, presenting a full range of ownership patterns and the complications of service delivery which continue to be mostly tenure linked.

The process of data collection first involves filling up the standard questionnaire called as the’ Slum profile’ with the help of resident communities. After the form filling, data is cleaned up, corrected, revisited with the residents and vetted collectively by the different groups of residents. Slum
boundaries and services are mapped using simple GPS devices and then transferred to the GIS platform. The data is then analysed on various themes and conclusive indicators are drawn at both constituency as well as the ward level. The indicators drawn from the answers on the questionnaire are tallied with the priorities articulated by the residents as mechanisms to check data accuracy and deliberated with the residents when found otherwise.

The set of tables below and step by step process are excerpts from the exercise in P-North and are representative of the kind of data collected and analysed by the exercise.

The existing slum lands are checked with the proposed land use: The result is a direct indication of acknowledgment of slums viz-a-viz the plans for these informal settlements.

From the following (Fig. 3) Proposed land uses from the Development Plan it can be clearly seen that there is no allocations or reservations for the existing slum settlements. As per existing land use the area under slums is 126.11 acres, which is nearly 2.5% of total area. Two slums of the constituency are under a Special Planning Authority (SPA), in this case MMRDA that will develop the area for tourism and will be responsible for these slums.

2) The settlements are zoned into clusters based on their proximity and their common priorities are identified. (Refer Map 3). This will help in provision of infrastructure and further identifying higher level of priorities.
Cluster 1
Structures: 4000-4900
Common Priority: Health Center, Water and Sanitation

Cluster 2
Structures: 1500-1900
Common Priority: Drainage & Toilet

Cluster 3
Structures: 3000-3900
Common Issues: Health and Education Services

Cluster 4
Structures: 3000-3900
Common Priority: Drainage

[Fig. 4]: Cluster Identification: Area Planning- Constituency 29
4.2 FINDINGS

The findings at single constituency where information from every settlement is highlighted. The process is as follows:

1) The existing slum lands are checked with the proposed land use: The result is a direct indication of acknowledgment of slums vis-a-vis the plans for these informal settlements.

From the following (Fig. 3) Proposed land uses from the Development Plan it can be clearly seen that there is no allocations or reservations for the existing slum settlements. As per existing land use the area under slums is 126.11 acres, which is nearly 2.5% of total area. Two slums of the constituency are under a Special Planning Authority (SPA), in this case MMRDA that will develop the area for tourism and will be responsible for these slums.
2) The settlements are zoned into clusters based on their proximity and their common priorities are identified. (Refer Map 3). This will help in provision of infrastructure and further identifying higher level of priorities.
[Fig. 4]: Cluster Identification: Area Planning - Constituency 29
## COMMUNITY PRIORITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLUSTER</th>
<th>Name of settlement</th>
<th>Priority 1</th>
<th>Priority 2</th>
<th>Priority 3</th>
<th>Priority 4</th>
<th>Priority 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Shivaji nagar</td>
<td>Water</td>
<td>Toilet</td>
<td>Sewrage &amp; drainage</td>
<td>Health facility</td>
<td>Street light</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pashkalwadi</td>
<td>Water</td>
<td>Toilet</td>
<td>Health facility</td>
<td>Education facility</td>
<td>Connectiviti to Versova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Patel Wadi</td>
<td>Health clinic</td>
<td>Water &amp; Drainage</td>
<td>Property tax regularization</td>
<td>Resolve Land dispute</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shakar wadi</td>
<td>Toilet</td>
<td>Water</td>
<td>Housing tenure</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chikuwadi Malwam</td>
<td>Sewage line</td>
<td>Toilet</td>
<td>Health facility</td>
<td>Drainage</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Manthan Pada</td>
<td>Toilet</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Health facility</td>
<td>Creamatory</td>
<td>Street light</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manori Gaon</td>
<td>Health services</td>
<td>Education facilities</td>
<td>Toilet</td>
<td>solid waste management</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Murum Khan Nagar</td>
<td>Drainage</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inaswadi Kharodi Gaon</td>
<td>Toilet</td>
<td>Water</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Health facility</td>
<td>Sewage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Fig. 5*: Priority chart in Constituency 29.
2) The housing densities, type of structures and land ownership are listed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Name of settlement</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Land Area (Ha)</th>
<th>No. of Structure</th>
<th>Existing Density (DU/ha)</th>
<th>Minimum Density (SRA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Shivaji nagar</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12.55</td>
<td>4008</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pashkalwadi</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6.08</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Patel Wadi</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shakar wadi</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chikuwadi Malwam</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Manthan Pada</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6.03</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manori Gaon</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>11.86</td>
<td>3030</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Murum Khan Nagar</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inaswadi Kharodi Gaon</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>3005</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: Density

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&lt; 300</th>
<th>300-500</th>
<th>&gt;500</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1) Water and Sanitation deficits based on quantity of supply and hence access are identified.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Name of settlement</th>
<th>Total Household (HH)</th>
<th>Municipal Water</th>
<th>Buy Water/ Other Access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shared Taps Access</td>
<td>Community Taps No.</td>
<td>HH No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Shivaji nagar</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pashkalwadi</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Patel Wadi</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shakar wadi</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chikuwadi Malwam</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Manthan Pada</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The map shows the sewerage network and the Location of slum settlements.

[Fig. 6]: Sewerage Line coverage in Constituency 29.
The Priority Index:

From the above study based on vulnerability indexing, priority and need the following analysis is made. This helps to identify the slums which needs focus.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Sub Parameters</th>
<th>MANTHAN PADA</th>
<th>MANORI GAON</th>
<th>MURUM KHAN NAGAR</th>
<th>CHIKUWADI MALWAM</th>
<th>KAMWADI KHOI GAON</th>
<th>SHIVAJI NAGAR</th>
<th>PASHKALWADI ADI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Slum Location</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Land ownership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Tenability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Size of settlement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Housing Condition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Access to infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Social Infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Access to Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Involvement with organizations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legend</td>
<td>Access to Toilets</td>
<td>&gt; 10%</td>
<td>50-10%</td>
<td>&gt; 50%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data collected and analysed by this exercise is presented into a document called the “Ward Diary”. At both ward and the constituency levels, the ward diary will express the current situation, deficits, community priorities, tools for target interventions. This will be an outcome deliverable of the process, prepared by the residents, and owned by them and supported by the professionals. While it will basically serve the residents to articulate and negotiate for solutions at micro levels, it is expected to
grow into a document that finds representation in the city’s overall development plans. It will be the ‘data that is inclusive’ and will be the critical starting point for the cities that seek to acknowledge informality and seek ways to integrate them into the overall city’s development plan to be really inclusive!

5. LEARN, SHARE AND EXPAND

The Indian Alliance is also the founding member of a network of slum dwellers across Asia, Africa and Latin America, called the Shack/Slum Dweller’s International (SDI) all of which work on similar principles. SDI now works in 42 countries in the global south. The ‘rituals’ of the Indian Alliance are now rituals across these countries. The exercise of data collection is now a movement called ‘Know your city’, Where residents of informal settlements or slums are collecting data about themselves. This has emerged as a major tool to seek solutions to evictions, an excellent example of good citizenship as the urban poor reclaim their identity as citizens.

The KNOW YOUR CITY Or KYC is a global campaign initiated by SDI to encourage informal residents of cities and their mayors to create a city wide mapping of informal settlement and include them in the city’s investment plans. SDI is a transnational organisation whose members are national federations of the urban poor which champion women leaders to drive the transformation of their neighbourhoods as integral part of cities.

6. CONCLUSION

The work of the Indian Alliance and its international network of affiliates on data collection of the informal urban poor has undergone tremendous transformation over last the last three decades, yet to reiterate, the fact that it is community driven and community owned data and process remains its central feature. The impact of this methodology on seeking change in the lives of urban poor communities stand as live testimonies that prove that it works. The process has a very crude face when it begins, but as it nurtures and matures, it gets more robust. We as professionals must celebrate this and commit to support the communities to seek this nourishment to their process and advocate for the change. The process must be the change-maker that has a constant quest to create data that is inclusive, the critical starting point for cities.

REFERENCES


INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, 2006. CHANGING PATTERNS IN THE WORLD OF WORK, Geneva, Switzerland: ILO.


SPARC, 1985. WE the Invisible, Mumbai: SPARC.

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2014. World Urbanization Prospects, sl: sn
An integrated inter-disciplinary approach to well-being, air quality management and city development in Nairobi, Johan Boman, Department of chemistry and molecular biology, Marie Thynell, School of Global studies, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden

Strategic Master Plan of the City of São Paulo (brazil) and the decentralised energy management. F.M.A. Collaço, R.B.C. Cruz, K.R.C.C. Marins and C. Bermann, University of Sao Paulo.

Producing critical and dynamic tools to evaluate how urban water services are (co)produced, managed and governed. Comparing three Ethiopian case studies. J-F Pinet, C Dobre, L Moretto, M Ranzato, Fac. of Architecture of the Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium.
STRATEGIC MASTER PLAN OF THE CITY OF SÃO PAULO (BRAZIL) AND THE DECENTRALISED ENERGY MANAGEMENT

Flávia M. de A. Collaço¹, Rafael B.C. Cruz², Karin R.C.C. Marins³, Célio Bermann⁴

Affiliation¹– PhD student in Energy at the Energy and Environment Institute, University of São Paulo, Brazil. flavia.collaco@usp.br
Affiliation²– PhD student in Urban and Civil Construction Engineering at Escola Politécnica, University of São Paulo, Brazil. rafaelcastelo@usp.br
Affiliation³– Professor, Civil Construction Engineering Department at Escola Politécnica, University of São Paulo, Brazil. karin.marins@usp.br
Affiliation⁴– Professor, Graduate Energy Program Coordinator of the Energy and Environment Institute, University of São Paulo, Brazil. cbermann@ieee.usp.br

ABSTRACT:
In Brazil, more than 80% of the population live in urban areas. Therefore, cities are a potential locus for energy generation and conservation that are ignored by the current Energy Planning in the country. Such planning has occurred historically in a centralized manner, and has a supply focus, that implies in a continuous search for the expansion and the increasing of the energy supply system. In this context, urban planning and policy regulation of land use can help in making rational use of resources in order to avoid to overload the available infrastructure. The main objective of the research was to verify what was the urban planning strategies set out in the Strategic Master Plan of the city of São Paulo (2014), which may influence the Decentralized Energy Management (DEM). Based on literature review and on the application of the Ishikawa diagram (1968), the relationship of cause and effect of DEM strategies to urban characteristics proposals was verified. The possibilities and/or limitations imposed by the Plan, that could produce changes in energy generation and conservation under the decentralized perspective, were identified. It was noted that the planning of cities, when idealized in a sustainable way, should apply the systemic approach with the involvement of various stakeholders, and associate the governance with multidisciplinary teams. The results of this research show that the DEM was not thought as a strategy/goal in the Plan of São Paulo. However, it was found that 80% of the strategies and 77% of actions foreseen by the Plan also indirectly end up working in DEM.

KEY WORDS
INTRODUCTION

More than half of the world's population currently lives in cities, and projections indicate that by 2050, the percentage of the global population living in urban areas will reach around 66% (UN, 2016). Such a concentration of people goes hand in hand with a concentration of consumption, including the consumption of energy resources.

A greater concentration of people living in urban environments, which by definition produce fewer natural resources, combined with their relative consumption of about 75% of the world's resources (Madlener and Sunak, 2011), will demand a robust effort by civilization in terms of technological, educational, political and social development.

Energy planning in Brazil has historically been conducted centrally, and from a supply-side perspective (Bermann, 2012). However, a growing number of studies are showing a global trend toward a decentralization of planning in various sectors, such as sanitation and energy (Chittum and Østergaard, 2014; Hiremath, Shikha and Ravindranath, 2007; Hiremath et al., 2009; Lüthi et al., 2009), and a correlation with the pursuit of sustainability in cities (Sadownik and Jaccard, 2001; Pohekar and Ramachandran, 2004; Madlener and Sunak, 2011; Marins, 2014).

In this sense, there has been a rise in the development of city management, planning and design approaches that seek to integrate and optimize systems through water reuse, alternative energy sources, efficient lighting, and waste recycling, in both public spaces and private buildings (MIT, 2013). Transit-oriented, mixed-use strategies for compact urban development (SMART GROWTH NETWORK, 2006), which involve concepts geared toward the pursuit of sustainable development in cities, are gaining popularity.

Lamour and Marins (2016) highlight the use of the Transit Oriented Development, or TOD principles in the development of the 2014 São Paulo Strategic Master Plan, which introduced various strategies from new urbanism, such as Smart Growth, Compact Cities with the promotion of development axes, and stimulation of public transport through the development of property in areas with easy transportation access.


The general objective of this study was assess the strategies and mechanisms established in the 2014 by the São Paulo SMP influential in order to identify their contribution to the promotion of energy conservation, energy efficiency and distributed generation.

The term Decentralized Energy Management (DEM) will be used in this article to refer to the combined results achieved within these three categories: energy conservation, energy efficiency and distributed generation.
The analysis was based on a literature review, which provided inputs for the parameterization and development of cause and effect diagrams relating to the strategies and mechanisms outlined in the São Paulo SMP and its role in DEM.

CONTEXTUALISATION

Energy is an essential resource because of the services derived from it. The so-called "energy services" provided by this resource are wide-ranging, from the generation of heat and labor (in the physical sense), to the provision of lighting.

Energy supply depends on the existence of supply infrastructure. This implies the need for city planning alongside energy planning.

Supply infrastructure includes the energy sources, which can be divided into various categories, including renewable and non-renewable; commercial and non-commercial; and primary and secondary.1

Thus, a proper infrastructure network must provide the facilities and resources needed for the extraction of raw materials from the natural environment, generation or conversion into energy, storage, and transportation and distribution of resources or services.

In the last 90 years, the technical apparatus used in this infrastructure in Brazil has increased in scale, coming to extend across the entire national territory. However, there are other ways to ensure that sustainable energy is available without necessarily resorting to centralized and increased supply (SEGER, 2015).

Such a concept has no scientific or political consensus. It is safe to say that it is also not in line with public opinion or the collective imagination. However, the notion of sustainability, when evoked, is based on principles relating to the rational use of resources in order to safeguard them for the future.

In addition to these arguments, there is a global trend toward transitioning from energy mixes based primarily on fossil fuel sources to mixes that use renewable sources.2

The adoption of a renewable energy mix may require numerous changes to the current planning system such as greater decentralization of energy planning, because energy from wind, solar, solid waste, and biomass, among other sources, occurs at a local level, making the municipality an important player in

---

1 According to Goldemberg and Lucon (2012), there are several classifications for the various types of energy sources that can be divided into "Non-Renewable" and "Renewable", for example. "Renewable" resources are those that can be replenished within a short time under natural conditions and "Non-Renewable" resources are those that are not able to replenish themselves within a time frame compatible with human consumption. The authors also classify fossil and nuclear sources such as coal, oil and oil derivatives, natural gas, and fissile materials, as "Non-Renewable". The "Renewable" category covers the "traditional" (primitive biomass such as wood and manure); "conventional" (potential hydraulic resources); and "modern" or "new" sources, such as biofuels, solar, wind, electricity, among others. A primary energy source is that taken directly from nature, while a secondary source is the resource that undergoes transformation in order to actually be consumed by people.

2 Failing, 1995; Sadownik et al., 2001; Jank, 2000; Hiremath et al., 2007; Hiremath et al., 2010; Nissing and Blottnitz, 2010.; Baynes et al., 2011; Sperling, Hvelplund and Vad Mathiesen, 2011.; Bale et al., 2012; Parag et al., 2013; Morlet and Keirstead, 2013.; Sampaio, 2013; Chmutina and Goodier, 2014.
the effective implementation of this new form of management (Bristoti; Adams, 1990; Sperling, Hvelplund and Vad Mathiesen, 2011).

It should also be noted that Brazil has a total area of 8,515,767.049 km² (IBGE, 2013), and is large enough to contain roughly the entire European continent within its national territory (excluding Russia). Its size and its history of colonization and occupation make it an unequal country, not only with respect to socioeconomic conditions (distribution of income, financial resources, access to infrastructure, services, security, etc.), but also regarding its bioclimatic conditions (hours of sun, wind, natural resources, etc.).

Such disparities, in addition to regional and local characteristics, justify the need for more specialized planning that takes the particularities of each locality into account in a way that generates results in DEM, assuming that the closer such planning is to reality, the more effective it will be. For this reason, combining Urban Planning and Energy Planning could result in interesting Public Policy strategies with potential improvements in terms of energy efficiency, energy conservation and the possible promotion of distributed generation.

To evaluate the interaction between DEM and Urban Planning, it is worth briefly discussing the characteristics and history of Urban Planning within Brazil's legal framework. Figure 1 below shows the country's main current legislation regarding aspects of Urban Planning, Decentralization and Energy in Cities.
It is important to highlight the inclusion of an amendment for Urban Reform in the country's largest charter (The Federal Constitution, 1988), as well as the inclusion of the Urban Policy Chapter.

As indicated in FIGURE 1, some of the relevant articles to the topic of this study are worth noting:

- Article 18 states that all federal entities (the Federal Government, the States, the Federal District and the Municipalities) are autonomous;
- Article 30 states that it is the responsibility of the municipalities to: I - legislate on matters of local interest; II - supplement federal and state legislation where applicable; VIII - promote appropriate land use, where applicable, through planning and control, apportionment and occupation of urban land, and;
- Article 182 presents the urban development policy as a duty to be implemented by the municipal government, with the aim of organizing complete development of the municipality's social functions and ensuring the well-being of its inhabitants. It establishes the mandatory development of Master Plans for cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants (Federal Constitution, 1988).

To provide municipalities with the necessary tools and to standardize the content of the Master Plans, the Federal Law number 10,257, known as the Cities Statute, was established in 2001. This law is primarily devoted to the tools required to promote urban policy, especially at the municipal level.

It establishes the following Urban Policy tools: National, State and Regional Plans on land use and economic and social development; planning of metropolitan regions, urban agglomerations and micro-regions; and municipal planning (Oliveira, 2001).

For the purposes of this study, only the following articles from the City Statute will be discussed: Article 2, which states that urban policy must aim to organize the complete development of the city's social functions and urban property through I – a guaranteed right to sustainable cities, II - democratic management via popular participation; IV - planned development of cities in order to prevent and correct the problems of urban growth and their negative effects on the environment, V - supply of urban and community equipment, public transportation and services suited to the interests and needs of the local population and environment; and VI - land use planning and control (Cities Statute, 2001).

Conversely, Article 3 states that it is the responsibility of the Federal Government to legislate on the rules of cooperation between federal entities regarding urban policy, and to establish urban development guidelines including housing, basic sanitation, urban transport, and energy and telecommunications infrastructure (Cities Statute, 2001).

Article 42 states that the Master Plans must include, as a minimum, the delimitation of urban areas where apportionment, construction or compulsory use could be applied, as well as monitoring and control systems (Cities Statute, 2001).

Similarly, Law No. 13,089/2015, known as the Metropolis Statute, establishes general guidelines for the planning, management and implementation of public functions of common interest in metropolitan regions and urban agglomerations instituted by the States, in addition to general rules on the integrated urban development plan and other interfederative governance tools.
This new statute, by its very nature, can impose difficulties on the decentralization of planning at the municipal level, but on the other hand, it can also be used as a tool to make larger scale infrastructure projects viable, such as energy supply projects between municipalities, for example.

The Metropolis Statute establishes the sharing of responsibilities and actions between entities of the Federation with respect to the organization, planning and implementation of public functions of common interest, and establishes an integrated urban development plan based on an ongoing planning process that aims to follow guidelines on urban development in the metropolitan region or urban agglomeration.

On this subject, it should be noted that Article 6 states that the interfederative governance of metropolitan regions and urban agglomerations shall respect the following principles: I - prevalence of common interest regarding the location; II - sharing of responsibilities for the promotion of integrated urban development; III - autonomy of entities of the Federation; IV - compliance with regional and local particularities; V - democratic management of the city; VI - effective use of public resources; VII - the pursuit of sustainable development (Metropolis Statute, 2015).

Finally, Master Plans are mandatory for cities that have more than 20,000 inhabitants, are part of metropolitan regions and urban agglomerations, are classified as areas of special tourist interest or are located within the area of influence of developments or activities with a significant regional or national environmental impact. They are mandatory for all municipalities in São Paulo. Currently, 2,786 of Brazil's 5,572 municipalities have developed Master Plans to guide urban policies (IBGE, 2016).

According to the Cities Statute, the Master Plan must be approved by municipal law. As part of the Municipal Planning process, it is a basic tool for urban development and expansion policy that must be integrated into the Multi-Year Plan, the Budget Guidelines and the Annual Budget (Oliveira, 2001). It must be reviewed every ten years, at the least.

Another principle that must be promoted in the Master Plans is that of participative management. Municipalities must generate information about the municipal territory and its use, update its records, improve its tax system and understand the dynamics of the local property market (Oliveira, 2001).

RESULTS

The São Paulo Strategic Master Plan (Law 16,050/2014) is in its second version, which must be reviewed in 2021, as this Law has a duration of 10 years. It is important to note that the SMP supports the review process established in the set of laws that compose the municipal urban policy, which are: Zoning Law, Construction and Building Code, the development of Regional Council Plans and Neighborhood Plans.

The main objective of the 2014 SMP is "to humanize and rebalance São Paulo, bringing housing and employment closer together, and addressing socio-spatial inequalities" (São Paulo Strategic Master Plan, 2014).

---

3 A municipality is the political territory within a state or federal unit, run by a local government. Municipalities have rural and urbanized zones.
The Plan is presented according to the concepts, principles, guidelines and objectives that govern the strategies and mechanisms of the formulated policy and that it aims to implement. The "strategies" of the 2014 SMP reflect the goals or results expected from implementation of the Master Plan.

The SMP strategies (2014) analyzed in this study are:

- Strategy No. 1) Share the profits of the city's production;
- Strategy No. 2) Ensure the right to proper housing for those in need;
- Strategy No. 3) Improve urban mobility;
- Strategy No. 4) Improve the quality of life in urban neighborhoods;
- Strategy No. 5) Guide the growth of the city around public transport;
- Strategy No. 6) Reorganize metropolitan dynamics;
- Strategy No. 7) Promote economic development of the city;
- Strategy No. 8) Incorporate the environmental agenda into the development of the city;
- Strategy No. 9) Preserve heritage and encourage cultural initiatives;
- Strategy No. 10) Strengthen Popular Participation in decisions on how the city is run.

In addition to the above strategies, the mechanisms established in order to implement the strategies were also analyzed. Table 1 below presents the strategies and their mechanisms:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMP strategies</th>
<th>Mechanisms established by the SMP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Share the profits of the city's production.</td>
<td>Basic Plot-area ratio = 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Calculation to build according to market value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Property social function tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic areas for application of property social function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Ensure the right to proper housing for those in need</td>
<td>Special Social Housing Zones (SSIZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Priority for those earning up to 3x the minimum wage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solidarity Quota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FUNDURB and Urban Projects grants for social housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land Title Regularization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Municipal Housing Plan (MHP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Improve Urban Mobility</td>
<td>Stimulating public transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FUNDURB mobility grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wide sidewalks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Municipal Urban Mobility Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New mobility systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Improve the quality of life of Urban Neighborhoods</td>
<td>Heart of neighborhoods preserved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed use</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 1 - Strategies and mechanisms established by the São Paulo SMP (2014). Source: authors, 2016.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Strategies and Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional Council Plans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Plans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Network Equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Axes of Urban Transformation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Axes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanized public spaces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parking spaces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum Land Share per Unit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers and Railway Sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Axes Sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Area Sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Organization and Restructuring Projects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation of Economic Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Economic Development Centers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networks of Polar and Linear Centralities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology Parks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial and Economic Development Zones</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Zone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167 proposed parks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Parks Fund</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment for Provision of Environmental Services (PES)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectorial environment management policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Areas of Cultural Interest and Scenery (ACIS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Cultural Preservation Zones (SCPZ)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban landscape</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural tools</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Development Fund (FUNDURB)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Urban Policy Council (MUPC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Conference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Councils</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participative Councils</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMP Monitoring System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Through the literature review, it was possible to establish some analysis criteria and categories for evaluating the São Paulo Strategic Master Plan from the perspective of DEM.

Five criteria and six categories were selected to evaluate the strategies and mechanisms of the São Paulo SMP and its role in DEM, i.e. the results it achieved in: energy conservation, energy efficiency and distributed generation. Table 2 below shows the criteria selected and their analysis categories:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis criteria</th>
<th>Analysis categories</th>
<th>Influence Aspects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban Form</td>
<td>Mixed use and Compactness</td>
<td>Encouraging Mixed Use and Compactness can lead to EE and EC gains (greater proximity between services, commerce and housing, resulting in less need for displacement).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passive Architecture and Built Environments</td>
<td>Passive Buildings, Architecture and Built Environments</td>
<td>Investment in Passive Architecture can result in more efficient buildings, reducing energy consumption. In buildings it is also possible to invest in DG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green spaces</td>
<td>Green spaces</td>
<td>Integration of open, green spaces into the city helps to maintain the microclimate and permeability, leading to EC gains in the surrounding areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Mobility</td>
<td>Public Transport</td>
<td>Stimulating public/collective transport leads to EE gains and a reduction of GHGs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-motorized transport</td>
<td>Stimulation and construction of non-motorized transport infrastructure leads to EC gains and reduces GHG emissions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Sanitation</td>
<td>Energy use</td>
<td>Encouraging the use of energy from municipal solid waste (sewage and garbage treatment), possibility of DG.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 2) - Urban Planning criteria, categories and aspects of influence in relation to energy issues with a focus on Energy Conservation, Energy Efficiency, and possible Distributed Generation. Source: authors, 2016.

In addition to the literature review, another methodology used in this study to analyze the 2014 SMP and its role in DEM was the construction of Ishikawa Diagrams (1968), also known as fishbone diagrams. According to Vieira (1999) this analysis method aims to investigate the probable causes of a certain event. The diagrams are a graphical tool developed by Kaoru Ishikawa in 1968, used to identify, organize and present the objectives, issues, or causes of problems in a structured way, in order to clearly determine the variables that affect a certain process, its process of implementation therefore relates to cause and effect.

Ishikawa diagrams simplify complex processes by dividing them into simpler and therefore more controllable processes (Tubino, 2000). According to Werkema (1995), it is a tool used to identify the relationship between the result of a process and the causes that could technically affect this result. According to Meireles (2001), it is useful tool for analyzing processes in order to identify the cause and effect of a particular object of study, be it a problem to be solved or an objective to be achieved.
The strategies and mechanisms presented in [table 2] were related to the five criteria and the six categories determined in the methodology in [table 1]. It may be prudent to point out that these criteria and categories were designed during the literature review and used as parameters to assess which strategies and mechanisms established in the 2014 São Paulo SMP may have an influence on DEM.

[Diagram 1] below summarizes what was presented in [table 2] and shows the relationship between the selected analysis criteria and the Urban Planning tools that may help to achieve results in DEM:

[Diagram 1] presents the cause and effect relationship between the Urban Planning tools that contribute to energy efficiency, energy conservation and distributed generation, and DEM performance. Source: authors, 2016

It is important to note that the selected Urban Planning tools (Urban Form, Passive Architecture, Green Spaces, Urban Sanitation and Urban Mobility) can be used to increase energy consumption, or to decrease it.

If urban policy focuses on the expansion of roads for the exclusive use of private transport, removing bus lanes, for example, it will be classified according to a selected criterion (Urban Mobility), but this criterion would increase the consumption of fuel and consequently the demand for energy. The analysis criteria and categories are therefore dependent on energy demand.
ANALYSIS OF THE SÃO PAULO STRATEGIC MASTER PLAN (2014) AND ITS ROLE IN DEM.

To analyze the 2014 SMP in accordance with the diagram methodology, the strategies and mechanisms of the SMP (2014) and its relationship with the selected analysis criteria and categories were parameterized. The five diagrams below present the analysis criteria determined in the Literature Review, the São Paulo SMP strategies and mechanisms analyzed, and its relationship with the achievement of objectives in DEM:

a) **Urban Form**: the layout of a city establishes a direct relationship to the demand for energy. The spatial characteristics of urban infrastructure have a great influence on the sustainability of a city:

(...)Yet energy consumption patterns are not influenced by equipment choice and building design alone. At a macro level, they are influenced by the spatial characteristics of urban infrastructure. In turn, the spatial characteristics of urban infrastructure have a dramatic impact on urban sustainability. Today there is a growing recognition of the need to expand the traditional energy focus to address the question of how infrastructure impacts energy and sustainability objectives, and how policy might, in the long term, influence the shape and character of urban infrastructure (Failing, 1995, p.1)

[diagram 2] - Presents the São Paulo SMP strategies and mechanisms that are associated with the Urban Form criterion. Source: authors, 2016
As can be observed in [diagram 2], there were 6 strategies and 21 mechanisms in the São Paulo SMP that are associated with the "Urban Form" criterion, which were considered by the authors as tools that have an impact on DEM results. In this case, such results are associated with zoning policies, primarily in relation to mixed land use, the compactness of the city, and increasing population density.

These factors will lead to gains in energy conservation and energy efficiency by prioritizing policies that enable less displacement, because in theory, they bring services, commerce and housing closer together, as well as making policies that stimulate the use of public/collective transport viable by increasing population density.

b) **Urban Mobility System**: the vehicles, transportation options (private or public), modes of transport (rail, motorized or non-motorized) and the infrastructure required for the adoption of such modalities are closely related to the energy issue. In Brazil, it is the transportation sector that emits most of the greenhouse gases (GHGs) (EPE, 2015).

In addition, transport and movement in most urban areas has led to vastly reduced quality of life, causing environmental problems in cities such as air pollution, noise, and traffic congestion, while also being responsible for high levels of energy consumption (Santamouris et al. 2006).

[diagram 3] - Presents the São Paulo SMP strategies and mechanisms that are associated with the Mobility criterion. Source: authors, 2016
For the "Urban Mobility" criterion, there were 6 strategies and 13 mechanisms in the SMP (2014) that will play a part in DEM. This result was primarily due to policies that promote the use of Public Transport by encouraging the construction of properties near locations/areas that already have existing or planned public transportation infrastructure, such as bus lanes and subway stations. There were also several policies discouraging the use of private transport, such as a restriction on the number of car parking spaces in garages and the widening of sidewalks in certain neighborhoods. All these policies culminate in a reduced fuel consumption per capita - in other words, a reduced demand for energy.

c) **Urban Sanitation**: involves the supply of drinking water, collection and treatment of sewage, management of rainwater, and management of solid waste/urban cleaning. It is widely acknowledged that sanitation systems are energy intensive, mainly because of the water pumping systems. According to Pinheiro et al. (2005), electricity is the second largest operating cost for providers of Urban Sanitation services, and it would be possible to reduce this consumption by around 20% through the use of more efficient technologies and the generation of energy from methane produced by the treatment plants.

In the case of Urban Sanitation, the number of policies identified as likely to affect DEM was noticeably discrepant than what was found for the "Urban Form" and "Urban Mobility" criteria.

Of all the SMP strategies and mechanisms, only strategy 8 and the "Sectorial Environment Management Policies" mechanism were identified under the "Urban Sanitation" criterion. This mechanism is composed of a joint policy involving systems for water supply, sewage, drainage and integrated solid waste management, aimed at providing universal access to basic sanitation services.

Given that the SMP leaves the development of this policy open, and although consideration of energy management aspects and their relationship with Urban Sanitation is not required by law, this mechanism was deemed likely to affect DEM, because energy issues could be addressed during the development of Sectorial Policies.

d) **Green Spaces**: according to Madlener and Sunak (2011), very dense cities (considering density of buildings and of people) result in an effect known as "heat islands". This effect can lead to increases in local temperature of 1°C to 3°C (33.8 °F to 37.4 °F), affecting the climate of cities and potentially increasing energy consumption by cooling systems in buildings. One option that
the authors recommend to mitigate the climatic effects of "heat islands" is to create green spaces within cities.

Regarding the "Green Spaces" criterion, 4 strategies and 9 mechanisms were identified in the São Paulo SMP. The SMP's main contribution to DEM under this criterion is linked to the creation of 167 new parks in the city of São Paulo (as described above, green spaces help to mitigate the effects of heat islands and maintain the microclimate, possibly reducing the amount of energy used for cooling systems).

e) Passive Architecture and Built Environments: the architecture, design and even the materials chosen for a built environment are directly related to a higher or lower energy demand. For Pacione (2009) and Tombazis and Preuss (2001), one efficient way to take advantage of the bioclimatic characteristics of each region is to use passive architecture (which takes advantage of local features in order to create more energy-efficient buildings), making use of sunlight, natural ventilation and heating, thus reducing energy consumption for thermal comfort, lighting, and hot water.
Two strategies and three mechanisms were identified in total for SMP strategies and mechanisms related to Passive Architecture and Built Environments. Similar to the findings for "Urban Sanitation", there are fewer Urban Policies that cover "Passive Architecture and Built Environments" than what was found for the other criteria selected. It is also important to note that all the mechanisms related to this criterion are also present under other criteria. The Neighborhood Plans and Preserved Heart of the Neighborhood mechanisms, for example, are also present under the "Green Spaces" criterion, and the Parking Spaces mechanism is also present under 'Urban Mobility'.

The discouragement against buying cars through the reduced number of parking spaces in garages could lead to gains in energy efficiency and energy conservation as a result of the decreased demand for fuel. In addition, encouraging the preservation of the hearts of neighborhoods and the development of Neighborhood Plans helps to maintain the microclimate (green spaces). The Neighborhood Plans can also be used to promote the idea of distributed generation in buildings for example, as well as to promote passive construction, increasing the efficiency with which buildings use environmental resources (bioclimatic) and reducing the need for artificial lighting and thermal comfort solutions.

[Diagram 7] below shows the final result of the comparative analysis of the 2014 SMP strategies, which were presented in the diagrams above, and the criteria for analyzing its role in DEM:
In summary, the São Paulo SMP (2014) showed a significant presence in the "Urban Form" and "Urban Mobility" criteria (both tied in first place with six strategies classified within these criteria). The "Green Spaces" criterion was in second place, with four strategies. This demonstrates that the Plan sought to focus its policies on zoning, stimulating public and non-motorized transport, and improving green spaces in the city. Very few of the Plan's strategies were focused on achieving objectives under the remaining criteria ("Urban Sanitation" and "Passive Architecture and Built Environments").

ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS

The tables below show the main results of the SMP analysis. The first line in [table 1] shows the total number of Strategies (targets) established in the 2014 SMP, as well as the total number of mechanisms outlined in the Plan. The second line details the strategies and mechanisms identified in this study as likely to be affected by DEM:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Strategies Established in the 2014 SMP</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>Total mechanisms established in the 2014 SMP</th>
<th>49</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total SMP strategies that play a role in DEM</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Total mechanisms established in the SMP that play a role in DEM</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of the ten strategies established in the São Paulo SMP (2014), eight were considered as strategies that also produce results in DEM. Regarding the mechanisms (steps to be taken in order to achieve the strategies), of the 49 mechanisms established in the 2014 SMP, 38 were related to the achievement of objectives in DEM, according to the analysis categories and criteria defined in the study's methodology and explained in [table 2].

As previously discussed, the 2014 SMP makes no direct mention of the power management issues associated with urban planning. However, it does forecast improvements in energy efficiency and the promotion and use of renewable energy sources, as well as a reduction in pollution and GHGs. Furthermore, the energy aspects are presented in sectorial contexts by Law and are not included as a whole in the city's Urban Planning. The Master Plan itself is not seen as a tool with a direct influence on energy use and consumption.

It is important to emphasize that within the strategies and mechanisms analyzed, there is only one mention of energy, which is included in the context of the development of Neighborhood Plans (which may consider the issue of public lighting). The reuse of energy from Urban Solid Waste, for example, was not established as a strategy or mechanism, although this intention does exist in the law.

Thus, it is clear that Energy Management is not contemplated by the SMP. There are no actions aimed at energy efficiency or energy conservation, much less the possibility of distributed energy generation.

However, despite these issues not being expressed in the form of strategies and/or mechanisms by the law, energy conservation was identified as a possible result of 28 mechanisms, energy efficiency as a result of 14 mechanisms and the possibility of distributed generation as a result of 5 mechanisms, as can be seen in [table 2]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total SMP mechanisms that support Energy Efficiency</th>
<th>14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total SMP mechanisms that support Energy Conservation</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total SMP mechanisms that support Distributed Generation</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Table 2] - SMP mechanisms that support gains in energy efficiency, energy conservation and distributed generation. Source: authors, 2016.

[Table 2] and [graph 1] below present all the SMP mechanisms that could have indirect results in DEM through gains in energy efficiency (34% of the mechanisms identified could lead to gains in energy efficiency), energy conservation (50% of the mechanisms identified could lead to gains in energy conservation), and possible promotion of distributed generation (five mechanisms were considered, related to the possibility of investments in passive infrastructure, the establishment of Neighborhood Plans, and the use of cogeneration for industrial zones, which represented 16% of the mechanisms identified as affecting DEM):
Strategic Master Plan of the city of São Paulo (Brazil) and the Decentralized Energy Management

F. Collaço, R. Cruz, K. Marins and C. Bermann

N-AERUS XVII
Gothenburg, 16th – 19th November 2016


It should be noted, however, that the analysis category adopted in this research under the Environmental Sanitation criteria - energy use related to environmental sanitation, and production of distributed generation in buildings - was not considered in the Plan. On the other hand, it included the other methods of promoting distributed generation mentioned above.

In general, all of the selected criteria were included in the São Paulo SMP (2014), with Urban Form and Urban Mobility the criteria most covered by the Plan. On the other hand, there was only one mechanism and one strategy in the whole plan concerning the issue of Urban Sanitation. [Table 3], [graph 2] and [graph 3]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis Criteria</th>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban Form</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Mobility</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Spaces</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passive Architecture and Built Environments</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Sanitation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Table 3] - Presents the results regarding the number of strategies and mechanisms established in the 2014 SMP that play a role in the five criteria established. Source: authors, 2016.
[Graph 2] and [graph 3] - Present the results regarding the concentration of strategies and mechanisms established in the 2014 SMP that play a role in the five criteria established. Source: authors, 2016.

As mentioned above, it is important to emphasize that some mechanisms can simultaneously influence more than one DEM action, and were thus considered in more than one analysis criterion.

The results of the SMP (2014) analysis also show that the mechanisms with most influence on Energy Conservation were Urban Form and Mobility. It should be noted that there are very few mechanisms and strategies aimed at Passive Architecture and Built Environments for the achievement of objectives in energy conservation, energy efficiency and distributed generation:

[Graph 4] - Presents the results regarding the concentration of strategies and mechanisms established in the 2014 SMP that play a role in EC, EE and DG. Source: authors, 2016.
It was clear, therefore, that the SMP directed strong efforts toward issues of Urban Form and stimulating public/collective and non-motorized transport. However, it left out important urban planning issues such as passive architecture and buildings, which are also closely linked to gains in DEM. Finally, the mechanisms included in the SMP make energy conservation the most influential factor within DEM.

CONCLUSION

The current economic, environmental and social situation imposes the need for changes in government agendas. The literature review confirmed that City Planning, when considering sustainability, must take a systemic approach, involving various stakeholders, addressing the issue of governance, including knowledge of the environment/territory in question. City Planning also demands multidisciplinary teams and technical skills on various topics related to city management, including the following in particular: the management of energy, water, waste and sanitation; the mobility system; sociocultural aspects; urban morphology; bioclimatic characteristics; access to services; products and goods; environmental management; and in Brazil especially, the construction of cities that are less unequal in terms of opportunity and quality of life.

The results of this research show that Decentralized Energy Management was not considered as a strategy/goal in the São Paulo SMP, however, 80% of the strategies and 77% of the mechanisms established by the plan were found to have an influence on DEM, and this influence is closely related to gains in energy conservation. On the other hand, the issue of distributed generation of energy is still nascent.

Despite the good result achieved, more progress in DEM is needed. The results found in this research are assumed to be at least partly linked to the current methods of Energy Management in Brazil, which focus on generating energy centrally at the expense of decentralization and energy efficiency. There are no policies or commands from central government regarding the development of local energy plans that consider city planning associated with energy services, allowing municipalities to absolve themselves of the responsibility.

REFERENCES


Strategic Master Plan of the city of São Paulo (Brazil) and the Decentralized Energy Management
F. Collaço, R. Cruz, K. Marins and C. Bermann

N-AERUS XVII
Göteborg, 16th – 19th November 2016


CRITICAL AND DYNAMIC TOOLS TO UNDERSTAND URBAN WATER SERVICES AND RELATED PRACTICES. THREE ETHIOPIAN CASE STUDIES.

Catalina C. Dobre¹, Jean-François Pinet², Luisa Moretto³, Marco Ranzato⁴

1: PhD student, Faculty of Architecture, Université Libre de Bruxelles, centre HABITER catalina.dobre@ulb.ac.be

2: PhD student, Faculty of Architecture, Université Libre de Bruxelles, centre HABITER jean-francois.pinet@ulb.ac.be

3: Associate Professor, Faculty of Architecture, Université Libre de Bruxelles, centre HABITER Luisa.Moretto@ulb.ac.be

4: Post-doc, Faculty of Architecture, Université Libre de Bruxelles, centre HABITER Marco.Ranzato@ulb.ac.be

ABSTRACT (Max. 300 words):
Ensuring equitable and efficient urban development includes securing access to basic urban services for everyone. Nevertheless, in many Southern cities, people develop everyday practices based on a compromise between formal provisions, and individual and/or collective strategies, often illegally or informally organised. Based on three Ethiopian case studies (a slum and a condominium areas in Addis Ababa and the small town of Ankober), this paper has a twofold objective. First, characterising everyday practices to secure better access to water services in terms of actors involved, resources mobilised, and urban spaces covered in producing water services. Second, investigating a critical and ‘dynamic’ methodological framework to collect data. This includes the combination of various methods (interviews, participatory mapping, site plans design, etc.) through an empirical and dynamic adaptation to a context characterised by uncertainty: not only at the social, economic, and institutional level, but also in the collection of information. Results ultimately reveal that everyday practices of access to water services are characterised by: first, some forms of service coproduction arrangements between citizens and public authorities; second, an incipient use of water ‘sensitive’ devices produced by users, and third, the development of local tactics in guaranteeing better services by addressing at the same time drinking water supply, storage, drainage, and sanitation. Conclusions also focus on the benefits and limitations of the critical and ‘dynamic’ methodological tools proposed.

KEY WORDS
Ethiopia, water services, coproduction, water sensitivity, water cycle
INTRODUCTION

In a still urbanising South, ensuring sustainable urban service provisions, which means effective and equitable service supply, implies understanding past failures in service delivery and looking for diverse new organisational arrangements that can guarantee improved access to services. In the search for alternatives to hierarchically organised or market-driven systems of urban service delivery – which have often proved to be inefficient – multiple stakeholders are increasingly invoked as possible contributors in the delivery process. They range from private actors to community-based associations; from formal organisations to informal committees and groups. As a consequence, people frequently develop everyday practices based on a compromise between formal provisions, and individual and/or collective strategies, often illegally or informally organised.

Our paper has a twofold objective.
• First, we aim to characterise everyday practices to understand how to secure better accessibility to water services and sustainable use of water resources.
• Second, we want to investigate a critical and ‘dynamic’ methodological framework to collect data. This includes the combination of various methods (interviews, participatory mapping, site plans design, etc.) through an empirical and dynamic adaptation to a context characterised by uncertainty: not only at the social, economic, and institutional level, but also in the collection of information.

Our study is based on the following hypothesis:
• We argue that the diversity of everyday practices related to water in underdeveloped countries done at individual or community level is due to a compromise between the administration’s centralised infrastructure and private/collective initiatives. This compromise brings to arrangements of service co-production.
• We argue that, in certain cases, these co-produced arrangements could enable the development of diverse water sensitive behaviours and devices.
• We also argue that the diversity of everyday practices related to water needs to be analysed by looking at water practices as an interaction between supply, storage, sanitation and drainage,

WATER SERVICES IN URBAN AREAS, A METHODOLOGICAL PROCESS

For investigating urban services (such as water services), the current paper follows the perspective already investigated by Moretto and Ranzato (2016) to simultaneously address service accessibility and environmental sustainability. We resume in two key points this approach of investigation of urban water services. Firstly, conventional urban services need to be closely examined, first, with respect to the objective of guaranteeing and enhancing their accessibility based on social, political, economic, and governance structures. Second, to improve the use of the environmental resources they convey. These outputs can be reached if service provision and the resources they deliver are simultaneously regarded.

Therefore, by following this theoretical perspective to explore both accessibility and environmental sustainability of urban water services, we propose to ground our theoretical exploration on four entry points. We elaborate on the entry points to understand water service production and management:
• WATER ACCESS: including the exploration of the devices to access and store, when applicable, water services, the frequency of accessibility, the efficiency, quality and cost of services.
• WATER MANAGEMENT: including community or individual service distribution/storage, collaboration with public and/or private agents, leadership in organising the services’ production and management.
• WATER USES and NEEDS: including the kinds of uses of drinking water and water storage, the frequency, and any shortcomings for water services
• ‘WATER CONSTRAINTS’: focusing on difficulties encountered by inhabitants to access water, to store it, to access sanitation, and to face large precipitations.

A preparatory theoretical research carried on by the authors on equitable access to water and sanitation services and sustainable use of natural resources in underdeveloped urban areas had led to put forward three interrelated hypotheses. They guide the research presented in this paper. Firstly, we consider that, in developing countries, the diversity of everyday water practices, at the community or individual level, is the result of the interaction between the centralised infrastructure managed by the administration and local initiatives, private or collective. Along the same line, we presume that current form of urban water management in Ethiopia can be related to service coproduction, understood as the possible synergies between government actions and citizens’ interaction (Ostrom 1996). Secondly, water sensitive behaviours and devices sometimes lie behind the co-produced water services worked out. Thirdly, we argue that the interaction between four categories of the water cycle, supply, storage, sanitation and drainage provides an appropriate framework for understanding the diversity of water practices.

The theoretical insights were developed further on through a case study research approach. We relied on the definition of case study research from social science as an ‘empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-time context’ (Yin, 2014). In addition, we completed it with the perspective from architectural research that case study research aims to explain casual relationships of a phenomenon, to lead theory development and to integrate different sources of evidence (Groat & Wang, 2013). In particular, we carried on our research on multiple case studies to allow us to have a wide spectrum of situations to check the previously defined hypotheses.

We selected the case studies based on authors’ current research in the framework of two research projects in Ethiopia, both funded by the Académie de Recherche d’Enseignement Supérieur (ARES). The first research project (2013–2018) focuses on the strengthening of academic and institutional capacities to face the explosion of emerging towns in Ethiopia; the second one concerns a research project run in collaboration with MA students from Brussels and Addis Ababa, to understand urban water uses and constraints. In order to study water services in different urban situations, we selected three urban tissues specific to the urban development of Ethiopia: the condominiums and slums both located in the capital Addis Ababa and Ankober, a small town.

In January 2016, in order to gather the information in the select urban areas, we carried out the fieldwork of two weeks. Based on the previously defined theoretical hypotheses, we identified several objectives that guided our fieldwork:

• To map current systems that give access to urban water to understand how and who manages water services (economically, community involvement, governance arrangements between public authorities
Critical and dynamic tools to understand urban water services and related practices.
CC Dobre, JF Pinet, L Moretto, M Ranzato

and communities, types of technologies involved – low cost or expensive) and to position them in the water cycle.

• To identify the uses of water and further needs by each family.
• To identify limitations and constraints in ensuring sustainable water provisions.

During the fieldwork, we used qualitative research methods of data collection specific to case study research, such as documentation for gathering secondary data and semi-structured interviews, field observation and mapping for primary data collection. The four main methods of data collection were adapted accordingly to the main elements of the water cycle (supply, storage, sanitation and drainage) and to the case studies, the three urban tissues, situated in Addis Ababa and Ankober.

We collected visual (diagrams or official maps of the built environment) and textual documents about the general situation of water services in Ethiopia. The documentation sources from local departments through the help of our partners on site, from the Ethiopian Institute of Architecture, Building Construction and City Development (EiABC) and from reports produced by international organisation such as World Bank, UN-Habitat and WHO-UNICEF. In addition, we gathered information from studies carried out by Ethiopian researchers on the topic of water supply and sanitation in Addis Ababa or the relation between urban development and waterways (Mamo, 2015). On site, we collected data from the Water department in Addis Ababa and the local administration in Ankober relative to future projects for rehabilitating and extending the existing water infrastructure. This data allowed us to have an overview picture of the current situation and future tendencies on access to water supply and sanitation (see next section). However, the major constraints were the lack of maps’ accuracy with the actual spatial disposition of the built environment, the lack of information about needs and difficulties daily faced by inhabitants in terms of water provision and discharge, the incomplete information concerning water supply and sanitation networks, and the missing information on drainage and water storage.

Under these conditions, we aimed to overpass this lack through the fieldwork and the process of primary data collection and to create the most accurate image of the current situation of water services in the selected case studies. Firstly, we carried out semi-structured interviews to gather information related to access, usages, needs, management, limitations and constraints related to water services of a series of households (n=26). We selected the households based on their different location (apartments on different floors in the condominiums or compounds located on the upper and lower parts of Ankober), the typology of access to water, and the availability of the people interviewed. The information gathered during the interviews was verified through field observation by capturing diverse situations of water usages or devices through the medium of photography or sketches. This information was gathered in the form of typology tables to represent the diversity of the water practices encountered.

Secondly, during the fieldwork, the methods of field observation, mapping and participatory mapping allowed to verify, compare and update the previously collected maps. We focused on the relation among the street pattern and the built environment together with the existing water infrastructure for the four categories of water services: supply, sanitation, drainage and storage. On the one side, in the case of Addis Ababa, the official maps provided by EiABC, were not up to date and in discordance with the most recent Google Satellite maps (December 2015), thus, we carried out a process of updating the existing maps. On the other side, in the case of Ankober, we could not collect any official cartographic information prior to our
fieldwork; thus, we redraw a map of the city based on the most recent Google Satellite maps (October 2013). On site, we gathered maps regarding the topography of Ankober and the future development plan, which allowed us to update our previous maps. For each case study, we verified the base maps (built environment, hydrography and topography) and elaborated new ones where the selected four components of the water cycle were ‘spatialised’. This operation was carried out via the continual interaction between researchers, students, local administration, NGOs, and inhabitants [fig. 1].

[fig. 1] Session of participatory mapping for the case study of Coca Cola slums in Addis Ababa. Source: Luisa Moretto

Under the objective to have an in-depth understanding of the existent situation of the water system, the operations of data collection and data representation occupied the whole period of the fieldwork. Programme and methodology were constantly changed and adapted to the numerous contingencies occurred during the fieldwork. Thus, because of time constraints, the results took the form of typology tables and maps representing the existing situation and no proposal for possible future improvements was elaborated. Nevertheless, the produced documentation is the essential basis for carrying out prospective spatial scenarios to overcome the challenges of the water system.
Critical and dynamic tools to understand urban water services and related practices.
CC Dobre, JF Pinet, L Moretto, M Ranzato

N-AERUS XVII
Göteborg, 16th – 19th November 2016

The data processing progressed interrelating the diverse elements of the water cycle (supply, storage, drainage and sanitation) and the four proposed entry points (access, management, uses, needs, limitations). Guided by the framework, we processed the data collected through the four main methods of investigation (documentation, interviews, observation and mapping) on three different urban tissues into a comprehensive view of the water system. [fig. 2] represents the complex interconnections implied by the open process carried out to investigate water services in three urban areas selected.

DATA PRESENTATION: THE CHALLENGES OF PROVIDING WATER SERVICES IN THREE DIFFERENT URBAN TISSUES IN ETHIOPIA

The World Bank (2006) report, “Ethiopia Managing Water Resources to Maximize Sustainable Growth”, mentions that the main pressures on water resources in Ethiopia are geopolitical, such as, the case of the Nile watershed, are related to the high variability of precipitation patterns and come from the small amount of water management plans concerning watershed protection or water storage. Nevertheless, the Ethiopian economy is highly reliable on water resources as the largest part of the country’s gross-domestic product comes from the agrarian sector without a compensating irrigation system (World Bank, 2006).

In Ethiopia, the gap between water services and the urban context is perceived in the constant low budget for investment in water infrastructure for supply, distribution, sanitation or drainage in comparison to the population growth and increasing rate of urbanisation (Johnston & McCartney, 2010). It is important to mention that Ethiopia does not have a tradition – and heritage – of urban development in close relation to waterways and less experience on enhancing the relationship between water and urban areas (Mamo, 2015). Nevertheless, the pressure on the current water system grows together with urbanisation, and several international programmes are offering assistance. For example, a programme developed by the World Bank and the Water and Sanitation Programme – Africa region (WSP-AF) and the European Union Water Initiative (EUWI) aimed to increase access to sanitation and supply in urban and rural areas in Ethiopia through building the capacity of stakeholders in the sector (World Bank, 2014). In addition, the WASH
(water, sanitation and hygiene) programme with the contribution of UNICEF and the World Health Organisation (WHO) continues to develop under the current Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) aiming to reach by 2030 full access to drinking and sanitation in urban and rural areas in Ethiopia (UNDP, 2016). Based on the joint monitoring programme of WHO and UNICEF (WHO – UNICEF 2015), drinking water supply and sanitation services are constantly improving, but the gap between urban and rural area maintains. Even though, this data provides important insights on the trends in access to water supply and sanitation, less information exists on storage, drainage facilities or the needs and problems at the local scale. During the fieldwork, we tried to overpass this lack by assuming a more localised approach.

We selected as case studies three urban tissues with different spatial configuration, specific to the current urban development in Ethiopia: the Lindeta condominiums and the Coca Cola slum, named after the nearby factory, both located in the Central Western part of Addis Ababa, and a small town facing the pressure of development, Ankober. Located between 2300 and 2800m altitude [fig. 3], the selected case studies are situated in the same climatic zones referred to as the highlands or ‘dega’. These highlands have high rates of precipitations during short periods of time and low temperatures. This results in high flow variability in the water streams and open-air reservoir, also the main sources for the water supply infrastructure (Mamo, 2015).

[fig. 3] Cases studies. Source: Jean-François Pinet, adaptation based on maps-for-free.com and Google earth. Source: Jean-François Pinet
THE SLUM AND THE CONDOMINIUMS

Addis Ababa is the capital city of Ethiopia with over 2 million inhabitants, 25% of the country’s total urban population, and predicted to reach 9 million by the year 2030 (CLUVA, 2012). Climate change affects the temperature variations and, in turn, leads to more intense rainfalls. Concurrently, it brings to an overall decrease of precipitation rates, frequent droughts and flooding events (Addis Ababa City Environmental Protection, 2011). In addition, these changes in precipitation and evapotranspiration patterns endanger the water resources of the city. On the one side, the city relies on open-air reservoirs and dams subject to evapotranspiration and therefore frequently affected by episodes of water shortages. On the other side, the reduced capacity of the centralised drainage system results in frequent floods with the consequent overflow of pollutants to the water reservoirs that causes water-related diseases (CLUVA, 2012).

The urban tissues selected as case studies are specific to the current urban development of the capital. In Addis Ababa, slums are composed by compounds of households built on owned plots that lack access to services, infrastructure provision and have a high population density (CLUVA, 2012). Considering the previous definition, the UN Habitat Ethiopian Urban Profile Report approximates that 80% of the city built up area is a slum (UN Habitat, 2008). Within the slums, the Ethiopian government carries out a programme of inventory of illegal possessions and constructions by comparing the existent situation with satellite imagery (CLUVA, 2012). A demolition process of informal settlements is attached to it. The land recovered from the demolition is undergoing a programme of densification made by building condominiums, apartments building of up to five floors high. The underpinning modernist urban design agenda aims to reduce by 50% the slum area in the city and concurrently to answer the large housing demand in the capital (UN-Habitat, 2011). Each apartment in the condominium is privately owned and the common parts are shared among the inhabitants and managed by the Condominium Association (Un-Habitat, 2011). Nevertheless, in contrast to the modernist approach in the Global North, the condominiums are part of the new state-driven urbanism, but shared by the inhabitants, resulting in ‘a demonstration of the common practice of place-making as a city-branding’ (Ejigu, 2014, p.290).

Supply

Regarding the water provision, both Coca Cola slum and Lindeta condominiums are connected to the main water distribution pipelines and, by gravity, to the city water reservoir. However, several differences emerge between the two urban systems. Firstly, regarding the type of connection. In the condominiums, each apartment block is directly and officially connected and dependent to the main system. In the slum, the water department provided just one main secondary connection to the main system and allowed individual connections per compound on demand. The compounds, bringing together several households, usually share the maintenance and cost of a private tap. The number and location of these secondary pipes are not mentioned in the official cartography of the water department. They can be approximated on the basis of numbers and position of the private taps.

Secondly, regarding the flow of water, although the slum is affected by high fluctuations of the water pressure, each private tap received water equally. Conversely, in the case of Lindeta condominiums, the gravitational system of water supply distribution does not guarantee an equal supply to all the inhabitants. Apartments located over the second floor are at a higher altitude level than the city’s highest water reservoir. The low pressure prevents the two distribution systems we encountered in the condominiums from
functioning regularly. In the first condominium case, each vertical water pipe reaching the apartments is direct connected to the main system. In the second condominium case, the water main system passes though a water tank located on the rooftop of the apartment block before being distributed to each apartment. The first system functions partially, while the second system does not function at all if the water pressure is not sufficient to reach the roof level. During an interview, the city water department confirmed that the problem of pressure is not quantitative, but is the result of lack of electric pumps for pressure stabilisation on the water distribution network. The solution envisaged but never implemented was that each condominium installs an electric pump and the ownership is shared among the landlords. Nevertheless, to overcome the malfunction of the centralised system, tenants were sorting to alternative solutions. People living in the condominiums are often buying water from water vendors transporting in jerricans water purchased in the nearby slums. In addition, in order for all the inhabitants to have access to water, taps on the condominium corridors were installed, directly connected to the main distribution pipeline [fig. 4].

[fig. 4] View from the top of the condominiums towards the neighbourhood slum. Two water storage tanks are visible on the roof of the next condominium. Source: Luisa Moretto.

Storage
Considering the irregular access to drinking water provided by the centralised system, water storage was an important part of the household organisation in both the Coca Cola slum and the Lindeta condominiums. Inhabitants store drinking water in jerricans or barrels for its later use. In the slum, storage of drinking water is the remedy to both the fluctuations affecting the service and the lack of a household service. In the condominium, drinking water storage is key especially to face the irregular supply.
Even though the irregularity of water supply, rainwater storage is not a major practice. Rainwater was usually harvested just for watering plants and rarely for other activities such as clothes washing or cleaning.

Sanitation and drainage
Sanitation is a highly sensitive aspect in the case of Coca Cola slums. Located in different parts of the slum, shared or public toilets with septic tanks are difficult to reach by the waste removal trucks because of the high density of buildings [fig. 3]. Alternatively, inhabitants built an informal sanitation pipeline to convey the wastewater directly to the nearby river. During storms, the piped system also performs drainage. The combined sanitation and drainage system ensure the protection against urban flooding and sanitation, but it is a dangerous source of river pollution affecting the downstream residential areas [fig. 5]. The water flows of Little Akaki River are severely polluted. The interrelation between sanitation and drainage appears clear also when the ephemeral surface drainage network is observed. The small linear depressions (linear holes, steps, etc.) tracing the slum and running through the houses towards the Little Akaki River, sometimes passes through the collective toilets before flowing into the river. The run off is literally ‘used’ to clean up the toilets [fig. 6].

[fig.5] View of the Little Akaki River. Source: Luisa Moretto
Lindeta condominiums are not yet connected to the centralised sewer network because the water department did not finalise the construction of the main infrastructure. The excrements flushed by the toilets located in the apartment buildings were conveyed to collective septic tanks located around the apartment block. A municipal truck frequently empties the septic tanks. We encountered a similar situation in the case of the drainage system. Concrete open-air ditches surround the apartment buildings and collect the rainwater from...
the gutters of the flat roofs. The ditches convey rainwater to the street drain. However, at this point, the system no longer functions because of the lack of connection to the main drainage system.

For the future development of the water infrastructure, in the case of the Coca Cola slum, its uncertain future lead to a blockage of investment in water services from the administration [fig. 7]. In Lindeta condominiums, the connection with the main infrastructure is still being finalised to ensure a feasible sanitation and drainage, however, the administration is not directing any funds towards the improvement of the low pressure of the water flow [fig. 8].

[fig. 7] Water supply, storage, drainage and sanitation in Coca Cola Slums. Resuming table. Source: Jean-François Pinet
Critical and dynamic tools to understand urban water services and related practices.

CC Dobre, JF Pinet, L Moretto, M Ranzato

N-AERUS XVII
Göteborg, 16th – 19th November 2016

THE SMALL TOWN

The third case study selected, Ankober, is a small city 170 km eastward of the capital city Addis Ababa. Located on the crest of the mountain, Ankober has a high rate of precipitations and constant fog conditions [fig. 6]. According to a study carried out by the regional government, the main challenges facing Ankober are: no coherent strategy of development, no institutional capacity to carry out the development, the need for water infrastructure expansion, low public participation, high unemployment rate and very tight urban-rural linkages (Anon n.d.). A new development plan, part of the national Ethiopian governmental programme for building or expanding small and medium cities, aims to relocate 5000 farms and to expand the city together with the road and water infrastructure. The farmers from the southern part of the city will be relocated in the northern part, downhill [fig. 9]. According to the interviews we carried out, the local administration no longer allocates budget for the improvement of the current water infrastructure, nor it allows new connection to the water distribution system. The blockage will last until the building of the new infrastructure that should follow the relocation plan.
Critical and dynamic tools to understand urban water services and related practices.

CC Dobre, JF Pinet, L Moretto, M Ranzato

N-AERUS XVII
Göteborg, 16th – 19th November 2016

[fig. 9] View of a residential area located on one of the slopes in Ankober. Source: Catalina C Dobre

In this context, the fieldwork aimed to achieve an accurate image of the town’s present water system (supply, storage, drainage and sanitation) and to understand the impacts of the new development plan [fig. 7].

Supply
During the beginning of the years 2000, a Catholic NGO built the current gravitational system of water supply, currently composed of two water reservoirs and a main distribution pipeline diverted in private taps per compounds and public fountains. The low capacity of the current water reservoirs considering the demand and the fluctuations of the precipitations rate reduces the efficiency of the system [fig. 10]. The access to drinking water is ensured through public fountains where inhabitants can fill in their storage devices in exchange for a fee per litre. In addition, several compounds are provided with private taps shared among the households, paid according to the consumption. Because of fluctuations in the precipitation patterns and low capacity of the water reservoirs, water flow is often not available at the public fountains or the private taps during two to three days. Nevertheless, the presence of two natural springs offers a free alternative to the inhabitants. However, the new development plan does not take into account the existence of the springs and, if implemented, will block the constant flow of water.
Critical and dynamic tools to understand urban water services and related practices.

CC Dobre, JF Pinet, L Moretto, M Ranzato

N-AERUS XVII
Göteborg, 16th – 19th November 2016

[fig. 10] Map of the water supply network in the main area of Ankober. Source: MA students participating to the fieldwork, Elsa Bouillot, Matthieu Champougy, Elise Merveille.
Storage
Storage capacity is highly important in these situations; inhabitants often store drinking water from the public or private taps and natural springs in pots, jerricans or barrels. Inhabitants rarely use the storage capacity to harvest rainwater. Accordingly to the interviews we carried out, the storage of rainwater is not a diffuse practice. Cultural constraints, rainwater pollution due to corroded iron roofs and a lack of storage space are among the major causes.

Drainage
A large area in Ankober does not have a drainage system. However, during the field observation, we encountered examples of vegetated stormwater drainage devices, such as ditches or rainwater gardens. The community built and maintain simple devices, which succeed to reintegrate stormwater in the natural water cycle through infiltration and retention. The devices integrate in the natural landscape by vegetation; they avoid soil erosion and are actively appropriated by the community through shared maintenance.

Sanitation
In comparison to the drainage system, the inhabitants responded differently to the lack of a centralised sanitation system. During the interviews, the inhabitants were often avoiding explaining their sanitation facilities. According to the local administration, a new low obliges the inhabitants to create a special area for sanitation within the compound, in the form of closed wooden shed with a dry toilet. The compounds not conforming to the law can receive a fee.

In terms of management of the current water system, the position of ETEGE association, a woman association, as one of the active actors partially contradicts the governmental report on the lack of public participation. ETEGE association is in charge of managing the public fountains and to collect the bills for the water usages of private taps. During the fieldwork, we mediated a round table between a representative of the association together with representatives from the local administration and technical supervisors. We observed that the local administration recognised ETEGE association as a key actor ensuring the management of the water system. Nevertheless, the communication between the association and the local administration is lacking a formal status and diminishes the expertise of the association when it comes to development plans [fig. 11].
Critical and dynamic tools to understand urban water services and related practices.
CC Dobre, JF Pinet, L Moretto, M Ranzato

DISCUSSION

This theoretical and empirical research has provided insights on the situation of water services at the local scale in terms of access, management, uses, needs and constraints in three different urban tissues in Ethiopia. Overall, the research revealed that each case study has a wide variety of everyday water practices resulted from a compromise between administration’s centralised infrastructure and community or individual initiatives. The wide variety of data collected, and emergent results have offered the opportunity to raise a series of questions as the basis for further research. Firstly, we have encountered forms of service coproduction arrangements between citizens and public authorities. Secondly, among the water practices, we have identified an incipient use of water ‘sensitive’ devices and behaviours produced by the users. Finally, the community developed local tactics for guaranteeing better services by addressing at the same time drinking water supply, storage, drainage, and sanitation.

EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND SERVICE COPRODUCTION

Some specific everyday practices in access and managing water service and resources can easily be explained as coproduction strategies. By coproduction we mean the ‘one way that synergy between what a government does and what citizens do can occur’ (Ostrom 1996, 1079). We also assume, in line with Bovaird and Loeffler (2012), that coproduction can be disaggregated into many different service activities such as co-planning, co-design, co-managing, co-delivery, and so on (see also Moretto & Ranzato, 2016). As per this literature, we can for instance describe the practice of installing secondary domiciliary drinking water connection in the slums, based on the agreement and technical support from public authorities, as a...
form of service co-planning and co-delivery. In the case of Ankober, service co-management can be found on the collaboration between the ETEGE association and the municipality, where the first manages the public water taps settled by the latter. These considerations and previous research on urban service coproduction (Moretto & Ranzato, 2016) have proved the importance of addressing both service provision systems and water resource management when trying to understand how water services work. Simultaneously considering, hence, accessibility and environmental sustainability constitute a sound theoretical framework to explore water services. Future research is necessary to further develop this theoretical framework and to build a consequent coherent methodological frame.

EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND WATER SENSITIVITY

Within the diversity of water practices developed as alternative from the shortcomings of centralised infrastructure, we argue that, among the diversity of the everyday water practices encountered during the fieldwork, some devices can be referred to as water sensitive. In this paper, we use the definition of water sensitivity as the capacity of a device to balance water quantity and quality, to integrate water into the urban landscape, to use water efficiently, to adapt to uncertainties and to result from an active involvement of the public (Hoyer et al., 2011). For example, in Ankober, the lack of centralised drainage system lead to a community or individual built projects such as vegetated ditches and rainwater gardens. Even though, not referred to them as such, the devices work similarly to water sensitive devices allowing the slow infiltration of rainwater through a vegetated depression in a unidirectional way (ditches) or round shape (rainwater gardens). These devices prevent the soil erosion and urban flooding, but the local administration does not recognise them as long-term solutions. In the new development plan of the city, the ditches will be replaced with underground pipes. Anyway, given that in Ethiopia, no policy incorporates the concept of ‘sensitivity’ into the current legislation for water resources and services, key questions for future research emerge: how the experience of local water sensitive devices in small cities can serve as an example for similar situations in Addis Ababa? (partly addressed by some ongoing research projects focusing on the possibility to integrate water sensitive devices in Addis Ababa, such as Water Resilient Green Cities for Africa; Breckan, 2014): what are the barriers preventing these experiences to become recognised by the administration as an alternative to the conventional underground system of drainage? How these experiences can become a basis for investigating similar situations in developing countries, considering that research on water ‘sensitive’ devices as a result of local practices is scarce (Jonasson et al., 2012; Mguni, 2015)?

EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND THE ‘WATER CYCLE’

The complete regard on the diverse components of the water cycle is instrumental to understand the situation and to catch the complexity. The discussion of the three cases under the lens of Integrated Water Management (Mitchel, 1990) might appear inappropriate, as access to water is scarce and struggled every

---

1 The concept of water sensitivity was first mentioned in the 1980’s in Australia with a particular focus on the effects of stormwater management in urban areas at the level of water balance, quality and consumption (Mouritz, 1996). The concept, found wide application in other countries under different terminologies such as low impact development in the United States of sustainable urban drainage systems in the United Kingdom (Fletcher et al., 2014). In the literature, water sensitive devices or water sensitive urban design (WSUD) are the result of a collaboration between engineering and environmental sciences leading to the inclusion of the entire water cycle into the built form at the level of the household, district or city through on-ground works such as swales, wetlands or vegetated ditches (Wong, 2007).
day\textsuperscript{2}. However, this operation allows us to go more in depth and understand what water flow trajectories is more problematic, to reveal potential virtuous flow relations or key missing links. For example, in the slum of Addis Ababa, drainage seems to function also as a way to ‘flush’ the human excrement. This contributes to affect the quality of the river water but probably is of great importance for the sanitation of the slum. Drainage and sewage in the Coca Cola slums cannot be considered apart. Moreover, the comprehensive observation reveals a socio-natural arrangement that appears controversial if observed only either from an environmental or a social standpoint. In Ankober, the near absence of rainwater storage practices seems paradoxical since water provision is scarce and in the area high rate precipitations are recorded. The interviews revealed that the pollution caused by the roofs is among the factors discouraging this practice. In this case, the integrated perspective on water suggests the exploration of possible alternative ways of facing the problem, albeit partially.

CONCLUSION

According to the two objectives of this paper, we can draw two main conclusions. With respect to the characterisation of everyday water practices in producing water services for ensuring environmental sustainability in developing countries, the investigation of supply, storage, sanitation and drainage allowed an integrated understanding of the water-related issues that each urban tissue encounters. However, the results of the current paper have been presented separately to allow the comparison among the three cases. Firstly, water access is unreliable in all cases. On the one hand, even if the households are connected to a centralised supply infrastructure, water shortages are frequent in all cases. This is caused by either the water flows’ variability, as result of the precipitations’ decrease, or by incomplete infrastructure, such as the lack of storage capacity or electric pumps for water pressure stabilisation. On the other hand, the centralised supply infrastructure is not directly available to all inhabitants, forcing them to explore alternative (networked or non-networked) solutions. Secondly, each case presents different alternative solutions to the water shortage, such as secondary informal connections in the slum, water exchange between the condominium and the slum or directly access to water streams in Ankober. Thirdly, drinking water storage capacity occupies a large part of the household organisation in terms of time and also space, however, we encountered just few examples of rainwater harvesting. Fourthly, in the three cases, sanitation is a critical point through the lack of facilities in Ankober, river pollution because of the informal infrastructure in the slums, and low water pressure for using the toilet flushing in the condominiums. Last, the risk of urban flooding is very high in the capital city and the slums are often the areas most severely touched. The inhabitants often built and maintain alternative solutions to the lack of centralised infrastructure, such as, the informal combined sanitation and drainage pipe in the slum, the common taps on the corridors or the informal commerce of water in the condominiums, and the ditches and rainwater gardens in Ankober.

With respect to the methodological approach, we developed a dynamic methodological framework through an open process based on several variables. We conducted our data processing by correlating a wider understanding of accessibility to water services (access, management, uses, needs and constraints), following a comprehensive view on the water cycle (supply, storage, sanitation and drainage), with different fieldwork

\textsuperscript{2} As stressed by Mitchell (1990), Integrated Water Management integrates the different dimensions of water and their interrelationships, the interactions between water, land and environmental systems, the interrelationships between water and socio-economic development in the long run.
methods of investigation (documentation, interviews, observation and mapping) on three urban tissues (slum, condominium and a small town). A process of knowledge coproduction completed and validated our results through the participation of inhabitants, technical advisers and representatives of local administrations and associations. We argue that this methodological process can serve as a basis for the investigation of urban water services also in industrialised countries, where, bottom-up initiatives are not recognised as valid alternative solutions to the failure of the conventional water system.

To conclude, the limitations and constraints in relation to the access, needs, usages and management of the water system allowed the development of a diverse spectrum of water practices. More than that, we argue that the incompatibility of the centralised system with the urban context lead to a diversity of everyday water practices as alternative solutions to the conventional water system. Derived from the paper’s main hypotheses, we draw three main conclusions from the variety of the water practices. Firstly, community water practices encountered in the case studies are forms of service coproduction such as co-planning, co-delivery and co-management. The existence of coproduction at different levels revealed the pertinence of investigating service provision systems and water resource management simultaneously. Secondly, the open-air ditches and the rainwater garden from Ankober are forms of water ‘sensitive’ devices even though not referred to in this way or created in this scope. This investigation opens up new directions of research in understanding water ‘sensitive’ devices developed from local practices in developing and developed countries. Last, an integrative perspective on the water cycle revealed the presence of interactions of flows among supply, storage sanitation and drainage allowing more alternative solutions to emerge.

The everyday practices often developed illegally or informally offer alternatives and contextualised solutions to the centralised infrastructure to ensure effective and equitable accessibility to water services. Each urban tissue offered different perspective on the drivers behind their development. However, the implication of diverse stakeholders, such as inhabitants, community-based associations and local administrations revealed increased capacity to contribute to raising the accessibility to water services.

REFERENCES

Anon, Gormebela town master plan revision study report. English translation EiABC MA students.


CLUVA (2012) *Base line scenarios for urban development of selected case study areas. CLimate change and Urban Vulnerability in Africa (CLUVA)*, Available at: http://www.alnap.org/resource/6625


Hoyer, J. et al. (2011) Sustainable Water Management in the City of the Future Water Sensitive Urban Design Principles and Inspiration for Sustainable Stormwater Management in the City of the Future -
Everyday practices meet best practices in housing planning
Chair: Luisa Moretto & Enrico Michelutti


Interrogating innovative practices in city planning and management: alternative approaches to housing and habitat in Medellin. H Smith, Heriot-Watt University, Soledad Garcia Ferrari, Helena Rivera, University of Edinburg.


Assumed qualities of compact cities: Divergences between the Global North and the Global South in the research discourse. Jaan-Henrik Kain, Jenny Stenberg, Marco Adelfio, Liane Thuvander, Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden, Michael Oloko, JOOUST University, Kenya
TWO CASES OF "BEST PRACTICES", TWO DIFFERENT RESULTS. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TWO SOCIAL HOUSING PROJECTS IN ARGENTINA.

Mariano Scheinsohn

1 Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y Instituto Superior de Urbanismo, Territorio y Ambiente. Facultad de Arquitectura, Diseño y Urbanismo. ISU-FADU-UBA.
marianoscheinsohn@yahoo.com.ar

ABSTRACT

Access to housing for the most vulnerable social groups is one of the most important problems in Argentina. Although the scale of this problem may be lower than in other Latin American countries (it affects between 7 and 10% of the population) in Argentina it is one of the main conditions of social vulnerability of the population with lower incomes.

There are numerous programs and social housing projects that have been implemented over the last few decades, however the problem at its scale and magnitude persists. In this sense many of these programs and policies have been inspired or promoted by multilateral agencies based on their own global agendas.

From this perspective, in this paper we propose a comparative analysis of two cases of social housing projects in the country that have been incorporated into the database of UN Habitat as "Best Practices" (http://www.worldhabitatawards.org/).

One is the "Proyecto Monteagudo" -made and managed by the Movimiento Territorial de Liberación MTL (Territorial Liberation Movement) - in the City of Buenos Aires and the other case is the social housing projects carried out by the Centro Experimental de Vivienda Económica y la Asociación de Vivienda Asequible CEVE / AVE (Experimental Center of Economical Housing and the Affordable Housing Association) in different provinces of the country. Both cases represent what the multilateral agencies label as "Best Practices", but these projects have produced diametrically different results on social-housing processes.

Therefore it is relevant to analyze these quantitative and qualitative differences in order to critically consider the realization (o materialization) on the ground of that which global agendas consider "Best Practices".

The critical evaluation of these completed projects provides the ability to understand more deeply their efficiencies and inefficiencies in order to observe not only the “best practices”, but also to look at and pay attention to those we could call “not so good practices”, those faults from which we can draw lessons and experience.
TWO CASES OF "BEST PRACTICES", TWO DIFFERENT RESULTS. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TWO SOCIAL HOUSING PROJECTS IN ARGENTINA

M. Scheinsohn

This kind of analysis allows us to understand some aspects of the persistence of certain social conditions and the need for their transformation.

KEY WORDS
Social Housing; Best Practices; Grass-root organizations; Comparative Analysis

INTRODUCTION. HOUSING CONDITIONS IN ARGENTINA. Trends and Issues

According to estimates by ECLAC in Latin America about 23% of the population lives in informal settlements, and only in Brazil, the population living in slums is about 45 million people. In Argentina these population proportions and amounts are considerably lower, however this problem tends to be concentrated in the major metropolitan areas.

The number of substandard housing is 1,880,875 representing nearly 17% of all inhabited houses. This proportion has been declining in recent decades since in 2001 the proportion of such housing was 21.5% and in 1991 was almost 25%.

The number comprises a wide range of problematic than represent the set of housing problems in the country. One quarter of this group corresponds to households with highest levels of impairment or (are) unrecoverable.

In order to sizing the most vulnerable segment within this group population it's necessary to focus on NBI Index. According to data from 2010, 9.1% of households and 12.5% of the population are affected by NBI showing a downward trend too, since according to the 2001 census the population that was in this situation was 17.7%.

In this index the incidence the problematic of habitat is important, since 78% of households with NBI are households living in inadequate housing or in critical overcrowded conditions.

In this sense, it may be noted that according to these data, the 7.1% of households in Argentina have unsatisfied basic needs especially regarding to the conditions of their habitat. (inappropriate houses and/or critical overcrowded housing conditions).

One of the principal manifestation of housing problematic is the grow of the informal settlements in recent decades. Among the information available in a research conducted by the NGO "Techo" Argentina have 1,834 informal settlements where is estimated living 532,800 households. This amount of households involves approximately two million and a half of people who represent about 10% of

---

1 Urban Sustainability in Latin America and the Caribbean CSTD 2012-2013 Inter-Sessional Panel, January 2013, Lima, Perú; Economic Comisión for Latin America and Caribbean. pp15

2 Houses Type B, at least one of the following conditions: no piped water supply inside the house; no toilet flushing water; It has soil floor or other precarious materials.

3 National Census 2010, INDEC, Argentina

4 NBI Necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas (Unsatisfied Basic Needs) done by INDEC on the 2010 census data. For further information: http://www.indec.mecon.ar/indicadores-sociodemograficos.asp

the study population (60% of total population). About one million are located in the Area Metropolitan Buenos Aires (AMBA) and 25% of this (according to different estimates) is located within the City of Buenos Aires.

The Argentina urban system presents a remarkable urban primacy of its main metropolitan region and this is the main reason why the AMBA is the region where this extreme homelessness is manifested considering its size, scale and complexity.

In AMBA the informal settlements occupy 2.3% of the territory and around 8% of the population lives there, which shows the high level of overcrowding.

In this region the population in slums and settlements is growing much faster than the total population, since between 1981 and 2006 the population in these habitat types grew 220% compared to 35% of population growth in the AMBA.

In general the main groups affected by this kind of housing conditions are from lower socioeconomic levels, due to their socio-demographic profile, these groups have a higher share of children than the rest of the population (having birth rates higher than average) and a younger age pyramid.

With regard to the immigration status of the affected population by precarious housing, it is possible to indicate that there is a higher proportion of migrant population especially of the bordering countries. In Buenos Aires, the percentage of foreigners from bordering countries (including Peru) is 8.4%, however the border migrants living in villas represent nearly 34% of all residents, and the proportion of migrants living in "inquilinatos", “hoteles-pensión” and squats is 26.3%.

This means that although the proportion of foreigners is notoriously higher than average in general, most of the population residing in this kind of habitat is not foreign. Occasionally in some slums and settlements, especially in the City of Buenos Aires and AMBA, there are some cases where a higher proportion of border migrants population is concentrated, such as in the case of “Villa 31 and 31bis” where they represent the 51%.

In these cases the migration issue is a relevant problem because a significant proportion of them do not have their residence status regularized.

**STATE AND POLICIES RESPONSES**

---

6 The population of the slums of Buenos Aires in 2006 was younger than the city average (24.4 years versus 38.7 years), and they had more children aged under 10 years (37.7 % vs. 17.5%). Arcidiácono, P. et al. (2009) Déficit habitacional y desalojos forzosos en la ciudad de Buenos Aires: apuntes sobre una política de expulsión y desresponsabilización, en Derechos Humanos en Argentina. Informe 2009, Centro de de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS), SXXI, Buenos Aires, Argentina, pp307

According to the Census of Villa 31 (2009), the average age of residents in Villa 31 is 23.3 years, almost 16 years younger than the average for the City. The dwellers under 30 years was almost a 68% of the population, while in the City this group represents less than 40%. Censo de Hogares y Población. Villas 31 y 31 bis, (2009), GCBA, pp7.

7 Censo de Hogares y Población. Villas 31 y 31 bis, (2009), GCBA, pp8

8 Particularly this is an issue that manifests in the most important slums of Buenos Aires (Villa 31, Villa 1-11-14 and Villa 20)
Until the end of the 1970s, social housing policy in Argentina – implemented through the Fondo Nacional de Vivienda (FONAVI)\(^9\) – was organized with the state as provider, construction firms being responsible for all construction work and lower-income communities merely the recipients. Since the late 1980s, and throughout the 1990s in particular, under policies financed by multilateral financial institutions, the state shifted its role to one of mediation between the construction firms and a diverse array of NGOs, professional associations and social organizations, whose participation paved the way for a wider range of housing interventions (such as infrastructure, urban upgrading, land tenure regularization).

Since the 1980s, popular housing production in Buenos Aires City has consisted mainly of self-construction processes (both spontaneous and planned) and, to a lesser extent, the application of focused social policies, usually financed by international organizations and the state. During this period, especially in Buenos Aires, housing conditions of the most vulnerable social sectors not only failed to improve but also deteriorated within a context of generalized impoverishment\(^2\).

During the 1990s, NGOs, cooperatives and grassroots associations were some of the principal leaders in the production of housing by non-state actors, and their activities evolved in response to changing circumstances.

In Argentina after the 2002 economic crisis, changes in the process of popular housing production began to be evident, framed within the context of overstretched public institutions, delegitimized political parties and the rise and consolidation of new social players.

Subsequent years saw the reinvigoration of the housing construction market, which became one of the key drivers of the economic revival. As a result, the state – at both the national and the local levels – repositioned itself by making relevant changes not only to housing-related public policies but also to the range of social actors involved in the social housing sector.

Some studies refer to the changes in the role of the state during this period as a “re-centralizing” of housing related public policies (Rodriguez et al., 2007)\(^10\).

This re-centralizing role assumed by the State from the year 2003 was reflected in the creation and development of various social programs for housing production nationwide. These programs have had a major scale until today, since according to the Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Urbano y Vivienda de la Nación (Undersecretariat of Housing and Urban Development's Office) from 2003 to 2015 about 900,000 housing solutions (social housing) have been produced benefiting nearly 4,000,000 people\(^11\).

\(^9\) Argentina’s National Housing Fund (Fondo Nacional de Vivienda – FONAVI) was created in 1972 as a revolving fund for financing the large-scale construction of new social housing. Within a centralized management structure, the National Secretariat of Housing and Urban Planning (Secretaría de Vivienda y Urbanismo de la Nación) set out the regulations and defined programs and general criteria for the targeting (selection of beneficiaries), while implementation was delegated to provincial agencies. For further information of the evolution of FONAVI, see Cuenva, B (2005), “Cambios, logros y conflictos en la política de vivienda en Argentina hacia fines del siglo XX”, Boletín Ciudades para un Futuro más Sostenible No 29/30, Departamento de Urbanística y de Ordenación del Territorio Escuela Técnica Superior de Arquitectura de Madrid, http://habitat.aq.upm.es/boletin/n29/abcue.html.


\(^11\) For further information: http://www.vivienda.gob.ar/
Despite the magnitude and scale of this government housing policy, its impact on the AMBA was limited because during this period the population in informal settlements increased substantially. In this context different kinds of social housing projects developed outside these programs was involved an array of diverse NGOs, professional associations and social organizations. The projects that critically analyzed in this paper are framed within this group.

One case is the social housing projects carried out by the Centro Experimental de Vivienda Económica y la Asociación de Vivienda Asequible CEVE / AVE (Experimental Center of Economical Housing and the Affordable Housing Association) in different provinces of the country and the other case is the social housing project "Proyecto Monteagudo" -made and managed by the Movimiento Territorial de Liberación MTL (Territorial Liberation Movement) - in the City of Buenos. Both cases represent what the multilateral agencies label as "Best Practices"12, but these projects have produced diametrically different results on social-housing processes.

Below, presents the analysis of each case.

**CASES**

**Centro Experimental de Vivienda Económica and the Asociación de Vivienda Asequible . CEVE / AVE**

The Centro Experimental de Vivienda Económica and the Asociación de Vivienda Asequible (experimental center affordable housing and affordable housing association) (CEVE / AVE) is a nongovernmental organization regulated by the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (National Council for Scientific and Technical Research) (CONICET), was established in the city of Córdoba 47 years ago (1967) face of increasing process of urbanization and the consequent housing deficit associated to the rural-urban migration, typical of that period in Argentina.

The CEVE is an executive unit of CONICET and AVE and has an interdisciplinary team of approximately 51 members. It focuses mainly on research and development of building technologies for social housing.

This center has developed a set of technical solutions for housing for low-income social sectors, including integrated and sustainable building systems and materials and components, produced by recycling processes. Furthermore, according to the documents analyzed, the CEVE has implemented some methods for community organization, participation and housing finance.

According to what its members say, the building technologies have been developed through a participatory process with local communities who provide information on the use and applicability of the technologies employed.

The transfer process of technology carried out by AVE/CEVE implies:

- Mobilizing local stakeholders.

---

12 These social housing projects have been incorporated into the database of UN Habitat as "Best Practices" ([http://www.worldhabitatawards.org/](http://www.worldhabitatawards.org/)).
Training activities on the building aspects of housing made primarily with local governments, national government agencies, academic and research organizations, and sometimes with local communities.

According to estimates by the CEVE approximately 140 organizations (housing cooperatives, NGOs, local governments and micro enterprises (from Argentina and Latin America) have worked up to date in association with the AVE / CEVE to transfer the technologies developed by the organization.

Funding for research projects at AVE / CEVE comes from CONICET, BID-SEPCyT, Agencia Nacional de Promoción Científica y Tecnológica (National Agency for Scientific and Technological Promotion), SSDUV, Agencia Córdoba Ciencia, Cooperación Internacional and consulting services offered by the Centre itself.

Eighteen percent of the annual institutional budget of AVE / CEVE (USD $ 600,000) is intended for the organization of the technology transfer program. The rest (82%) is used for research, development and application.

The CEVE is a research center with an academic and professional profile, which works mainly in contract and consultancies from different levels of government (national, local and international) and to a lesser extent in the private sector.

Most of the stakeholders who engage with the projects come from government and academic sectors. The target population of housing projects is considered by their familiar organization but not by their social organization.

The CEVE only promotes community organization during the construction of housing (the houses) and to support the necessary activities to self-construction process.

The CEVE develops projects starting from demands of the municipalities, provincial or national governments, to build small plans between 10 and 40 homes, which are usually funded by the state. Some of the projects have a wider scale, such as "Programa Litoral" (1998) which involved the construction of 315 homes in five towns in the provinces of Santa Fe, Chaco and Corrientes.

They consider people with NBI as the main target of their projects. The CEVE provides construction technologies, project design, and operative management with counterparts in local and provincial governments and considers the target population as a contributor of voluntary work in the construction process with local microenterprises.

In connection with the offer coming from local microenterprises, they establish some basic criteria for the incorporation of them into different projects of CEVE:

• the entrepreneur belonging to medium-low or low socio-economic sector.
• evaluation of their honesty background
• having specific knowledge in the construction activity
• their vocation and abilities to taking initiative, having autonomy and independence to lead activities

According to documents provided by the CEVE, since its inception (1967) until 2009, 5,475 homes have been built or improved using new construction techniques, new models of management and the development of specific governmental funding.

In one of the biggest projects developed by CEVE in recent decades the "Litoral Program" 315 houses were built in 1998.
The target population of this program were some parts of the Litoral Argentino (provinces of Santa Fe, Chaco, Corrientes, Entre Rios, Misiones and Formosa) that were affected by massive flooding that year, which entailed the evacuation and homelessness of about 150,000 families.

In one of the biggest projects developed by CEVE in recent decades the "Litoral Program" 315 houses were built in 1998. The project was intended only for 315 families of 5 different locations that had been evacuated by the flood.

According to available information, housing production in its different programs and construction systems during the last 10 years was as follows:

Table N° 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constructive System</th>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Province / Country</th>
<th>Houses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UMA System</td>
<td>San Carlos Minas</td>
<td>Córdoba</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Programa Litoral</td>
<td>Santa Fe, Chaco y Corrientes</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rio Cuarto</td>
<td>Córdoba</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Villa Allende</td>
<td>Córdoba</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENO System</td>
<td>Rafaela</td>
<td>Santa Fé</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Esperanza</td>
<td>Santa Fé</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC2</td>
<td>Proyectos en Uruguay</td>
<td>Sin datos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>San Esteban</td>
<td>Córdoba</td>
<td>6 cabañas for tourist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semilla System</td>
<td>Santa Fé</td>
<td>Santa Fé</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Montevideo</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>Córdoba</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: elaborated by the author

No information from studies or systematic researches have been found available related to the evaluation and the perception of the target population of these projects.

In some reports prepared by CEVE about the "Programa Litoral" there are some considerations about the achieved results. According to this information, the groups that benefit from the construction of housing are obliged to participate (are required to participate, they must) in the construction process by providing voluntary work (unpaid) but do not participate either in choosing the location of housing nor development plan or the design. This situation has brought about problems of adapting of the families to new location. These issues related to: problems between neighbors, remoteness of educational and health facilities and lack of investment in public services by the municipality (lighting and public space). As it is pointed in these reports "in some cases there has been resistance from some community members and workers who are not familiar with the new technologies."

They also indicate that "due to CEVE activities extend to the production of components for the construction of houses, many companies view AVE / CEVE as competitors rather than technology providers."
"PROYECTO MONTEAGUDO" - MTL

In Argentina since 2002 as part of the process of restoring social consensus and institutional legitimacy following the economic crisis, the State started to open up channels of dialogue with certain social movements that had become important during the period of turmoil, namely picket movements (piqueteros). These organizations, in creating a movement that began as a marginal, informal and delegitimized player, have taken on legitimacy and political importance alongside the very process in which the state has lost its legitimacy. The welfare programmes that emerged over this period to face the deepening of the social crisis turned out to be an effective means through which the state tried, on the one hand, to restore its legitimating capacity and on the other, to restrain the social movement that had already brimmed over and was seriously threatening the survival of the whole political structure (political parties, unions, etc.).

As a response to these welfare policies, the piquete organizations tended to differ regarding their tactics and strategies for confronting the state. Some of them, as described, became immersed in the public state sphere, both as beneficiaries and as privileged mediators of social policies. Other organizations turned to using state welfare resources as well as the public acknowledgement generated by these state policies to produce self-managing processes that sustained their political independence from the state.

Within this context, the Movimiento Territorial de Liberación (MTL) emerged in the city of Buenos Aires through the struggle and resistance of low-income residents facing eviction from buildings between 2000 and 2001; these were issues on which the state either had no explicit policies or had policies that were inadequate to the scale of the problem.

In the face of a growing social demand for housing as a result of the impoverishment of a large number of low-income people, and in the light of the greater openness of government institutions to public participation, organized social movements developed a range of different projects to produce housing, taking advantage of any available opportunities. Those social and political movements that were directly involved in the production of social housing, achieving an important public presence, became significant and strong organizations. The experiences of the MTL will be considered as exemplars of this new trend.

It is important to consider the implications of the evolution of these social movements towards particular approaches in urban habitat production.

The political dimension of their actions becomes key to understanding their efficiency in promoting urban housing for the most underprivileged sectors. However, these experiences do not represent a homogenous set of actions and practices.

The MTL decided to become involved in housing production, to which end it established a construction cooperative (EMETELE). In the beginning, the cooperative was considered by the MTL to be merely a bureaucratic requirement because the heart of the endeavour was the movement’s political–administrative structure itself.

This situation did not evolve smoothly; as Carlos “Chile” Huerta (a member of the MTL executive board) explained: “… we were ready to begin when some people from the institute (Institute for Social Housing- Buenos Aires City Government) turned up with the proposal of a construction company to carry out the work. We told them we were going to construct it on our own by undertaking it as a business company. They answered we were totally insane. […], that it would be impossible. They told us that we would not be able to cover everything in the construction of 326 dwellings and 10 retail stores overlooking the street. […] That was the moment of greatest struggle and many pressures. And
this is exactly what we are now doing. This is our responsibility and we are showing them that it is possible. And this way we know that in the purchase office nothing goes ‘under the counter’…”

The movement leaders had both the will and the express intention of creating an employment relationship, with members participating in the work, based on the grounds that in most cases, members of grassroots movements had no formal labour experience and therefore this could become good training towards incorporating them into the “work culture”, so as to finally allow them to become “working class”.

That is, it would be a way to reduce their “disaffiliation” levels. For this reason, the cooperative, formally, and the MTL, specifically, became the employer of the construction workers (all of them movement members) who worked at the site. Nowadays, there are 700 workers.

Another peculiar characteristic of this project is its large scale. It covers 18,000 square meters – almost two hectares – and the construction of 326 apartments in two- and three-storey buildings takes place inside a zone with compact and consolidated land use conditions.

The Monteagudo project design also includes a multiple-use room; a complex of 10 business premises for commercial and service microenterprises, with the intention of creating more jobs; a space for a child day care centre; a space for a public square – transferred to the city of Buenos Aires municipal government for its administration – and several open spaces destined for use by community residents.

It is important to point out that while the Monteagudo housing project is operationally “self-managed” by the social movement, it does not represent a self-construction process; rather, it undertakes a large scale construction project as a business enterprise, although under an autonomous social and political administration.

Funding for the Monteagudo Project carried out by MTL comes from a loan of Banco Ciudad (under the Buenos Aires city government administration). The financing terms offered by the Buenos Aires city government Housing Institute (IVC), is framed under the provisions of Law 964/02, which amended Law 341/00. MTL’s political guarantee regarding Buenos Aires city government has operated as the financial guarantee for the money lent to the movement by the Banco Ciudad; this financing represented the initial capital for carrying out the Monteagudo project.

Housing unit allocation to families was and is one of the most problematic aspects of the project. It is interesting to note that workers’ participation in the construction did not imply the allocation of a unit, as this is not a self-construction process, and workers are in an employment relationship with a salary paid by the cooperative. In short, two somewhat independent processes were established: construction and allocation.

As pointed out by some of the professionals in the technical support team, two basic indicators were taken into account when selecting the families: the degree of participation and commitment to the movement; and each family’s capacity for living in community with other families.

The allocation process took place through an assembly of all of its members (3,500 families). In the light of the financing terms offered by the Buenos Aires city government Housing Institute (IVC), it made sense for the units to be allocated as individual properties to each family.(14)

In short, the allocation process had to take multiple criteria into account: degree of political militancy; family structure; capacity to live together; degree of necessity; and ability to pay the mandatory installments to the Housing Institute over 30 years, the amount of which should not exceed 20 per cent of the family income.

---

14 For further information about Law 341 and its origins see Point C case MOI
The buildings had been structured as two linked condominiums, each corresponding to one of the two city blocks of the project layout.

An unusual characteristic relative to other popular housing projects is its location inside the central city rather than in an area more typical of a residential development of this kind. Its setting is that of a traditional working class (clase media trabajadora), residential neighborhood (barrio) – Parque Patricios – already consolidated since the mid-twentieth century.

Likewise, considering that the neighborhood of Parque Patricios has somewhat less than 38,000 inhabitants, it is possible to understand the strong impact of this project and its inhabitants which today involve something more than 5% of the total population of the district.15

Originally, this was an industrial neighborhood. A decline in activity from the 1970s left a considerable number of derelict or idle factories, warehouses and industrial buildings. It was always a lower-middle/working class residential neighborhood with a low-density population. For this reason, in recent decades there was sizeable demand for housing, both because of the lack of residential units and the low number of multifamily dwellings adequate for the new generations who wanted to live in the area.

The district is located in the southern sector of the city (this area has a lower level of development and quality of life than the northern sector) and is close to the main downtown area, with very good public transportation (metro), urban services and facilities.

The new enterprise is located four blocks away from a large park and the main commercial and transportation sectors. Its immediate surroundings consist of factories and warehouses fallen into disuse or with some degree of obsolescence. This was one reason why such an extensive plot of land was available within a consolidated residential zone16. This setting is not accidental but was explicitly intended by the MTL leaders.

As Carlos “Chile”, one of the more senior heads of this organization, points out:

“...what we wish for is that this complex (of dwellings) of Monteagudo Street be not transformed into a concentration of the poor. On the contrary, our aim is to incorporate it into the neighborhood, to put a lot of social life into it. The idea is that the people may be able not only to have access to housing but also to help change it throughout a process that, of course, […] is interrelated with the country’s realities.”

For this reason, the organization looked for an area in a neighbourhood or sector that was not typical for social housing but, rather, had a setting that from the beginning would stimulate the socially heterogeneous integration of the housing project’s future residents with the population of a traditional neighborhood of the city. Part of the development plan was to incorporate the opening up of a street (José C Paz) that divides the complex into two halves and preserves the continuity of the existing urban square, an essential condition for its integration, at least physically, with the rest of the neighborhood.

One of the ideas behind the project was that it should not be shut off from the neighborhood. On the contrary, it should contain and recreate public and community spaces as a way of integrating into the surroundings, to avoid the enclave mindset that usually prevails in popular housing complexes.

Housing unit allocation to families was and is one of the most problematic aspects of the project. It is interesting to note that workers’ participation in the construction did not imply the allocation of a unit,

16 This piece of land was formerly occupied by an abandoned paints factory associated with an important multinational corporation (Bunge & Born), which was discontinued some20 years ago.
as this is not a self-construction process, and workers are in an employment relationship with a salary paid by the cooperative. In short, two somewhat independent processes were established: construction and allocation.

As pointed out by some of the professionals in the technical support team, two basic indicators were taken into account when selecting the families: the degree of participation and commitment to the movement; and each family’s capacity for living in community with other families.

THE "BEST PRACTICES" ARE NOT ALWAYS BETTER SOLUTION
Comparative Analysis and Closing Remarks

Both cases represent what the multilateral agencies label as "Best Practices", but these projects have produced diametrically different results on social-housing processes. Therefore it is relevant to analyze these quantitative and qualitative differences in order to critically consider the realization (or materialization) on the ground of that which global agendas consider "Best Practices".

The critical evaluation of these completed projects provides the ability to understand more deeply their efficiencies and inefficiencies in order to observe not only the “best practices”, but also to look at and pay attention to those we could call “not so good practices”, those faults from which we can draw lessons and experience.

Below we present the comparative table.

Table Nº 2 - Analytical Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>CEVE Projects</th>
<th>Monteagudo Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>The research and production of (physical and social) technology for social housing</td>
<td>Housing as a mean of social integration into neighborhood. Not only access to housing but also to help change it throughout (labors capabilities, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process</td>
<td>Top-down</td>
<td>Bottom-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Organization</td>
<td>ONG and research center with an academic and professional profile, which works mainly in contract and consultancies from different levels of government (national, local and international)</td>
<td>Grass-root organization and Political Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and Political Impacts</td>
<td>Limited social impacts and, in some projects, negative impacts. Lack of political impacts</td>
<td>Strong social and political impacts into MTL members and in the neighborhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replicability</td>
<td>Just a very small scale and specific about housing construction technologies</td>
<td>Limited for the political and institutional arrangements (GRO-Local Authorities-Financial Institutions), and for necessity of grass-root organizations social-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TWO CASES OF "BEST PRACTICES", TWO DIFFERENT RESULTS. A comparative analysis of two social housing projects in Argentina

M. Scheinsohn

N-AERUS XVII
Göteborg, 16th – 19th November 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participatory and implication</th>
<th>political empowerment.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heteronomy - Individual and families level</td>
<td>Autonomy - Collective level and grass-root organization and political movement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: elaborated by the author

The CEVE has a long history in the research and production of technology for social housing (for more than 4 decades) and there are no many NGOs or academic centers with such history in the country. However, the impact of its production is of targeted interventions in small scale, where technological inquiry is prioritized.

It has not been found disaggregated information related to the evaluation of these projects over the years, making it difficult to assess whether there has been critical learning of the accumulated experiences to date.

Through the analyzed material, it is seen that the focus of their interventions and projects is the production of housing and components, while the accessibility and urban planning project conditions; as well as the environmental conditions and social problems associated with resettlement, receive little consideration.

From the analysis of the documents, it is not clear the efficient use of economic resources. For example in the "Programa Litoral" several teams of technicians and professionals are involved both from CEVE as from different local authorities, which would consume a significant amount of economic resources for research, advice and management, in relation to the number of households produced. Also the building components used are transported from the production site of CEVE in the City of Cordoba, at an average distance of 600 to 800 km from the towns where homes are built, without consider installing a production center of these components in the area where the project materializes or its replacement of local materials.

Do not have detailed information to quantitatively measure the efficiency of resource use (relative to the profits made on the amount of houses built) but the mentioned characteristics of some projects of CEVE probably have inefficient utilization conditions economic resources on this issue (the materialization of housing units).

Another critical aspect is that community participation is limited to individual members (depending on their skills) to participate in the process of building houses as contributors of unpaid work. While families obtain job training in this process, is not considered their participation in the whole design and housing, neither in the choice of location nor the distribution of the families in housing, which prevents them from building of neighborhood starting from preexisting affinities.

In the case of Monteagudo Project and MTL, the housing construction process and its impact on the neighborhood may be one of the most interesting aspects, located as it is in a traditional Buenos Aires neighborhood with a strong identity and a long history but with marked signs of decay in its physical stock and a very low density (sometimes only two or three families lived on a block). A series of interviews with neighbors and shopkeepers close to the project site showed that people who have been living in the area for several years have changed their perception of this undertaking since it began.
Remarkably, once the work was underway and the complex consolidated, some of the neighbours’ perceptions began to change. As a lady living across from the undertaking pointed out, she now thinks that: “… it is a good contribution to the neighbourhood, it lifted it, it has made it livelier, but it all depends on the people that come to live here...
The complex is nice – nearby houses are older – no new constructions had been made in the neighborhood for a long time.”
The fact that the project design had included the opening of a street, thus integrating the block consistently with the surroundings, and the construction of community facilities open to the neighborhood at large (such as the square on the intersection of Monteagudo and José C Paz streets, the child day care centre and the medical assistance centre) allowed the neighbors to consider the positive impact on the neighborhood’s dynamics.
In short, once the initial distrust was partially overcome, at least by some of the neighbors, the MTL was perceived as an organized political mediator not only between the new residents and the state but also for the people already living in the surroundings. The permanent surveillance carried out by group members around the housing complex is worth mentioning as a sign of organization and order by new neighbors that is positively valued by old established residents.
It is also interesting to note that expectations about the neighborhood’s future dynamics are highly optimistic. Some residents pointed out that the neighborhood “would improve”. “In the future, it might turn into another Palermo17 because Palermo used to be like this too, just houses and warehouses...”
So, while the strong capacity for dialogue with the state on the part of this politically organized social movement generates power inequalities with respect to old established neighbors, it also guarantees a certain level of control for all.
The implementation of these projects has the advantage of generating stronger loyalty among movement members (although not without conflict), because it links the expectation of improvement to staying in the organization.
As stated by one of MTL’s active members, who participated in the Monteagudo project and is now living in one of its units: “Before, I used to live in a slum, I was a slum dweller, I am not ashamed of that but after five years participating in the MTL, just see how much I have improved. Now I have a good house for my children, in a good area and they can go the neighborhood school.”
Similarly, it is not by chance that these projects go beyond the small scale, differing in this way from the self-construction modality.
MTL’s political guarantee regarding Buenos Aires city government has operated as the financial guarantee for the money lent to the movement by the Banco Ciudad (under the Buenos Aires city government administration); this financing represented the initial capital for carrying out the Monteagudo project.
The major difficulties encountered by these developments relate to bureaucratic constraints, red tape, financial choking and sharp increase in land prices currently put them in financial crisis.
With the assumption of the management that is in charge of Local Government from 2007 to present, the difficulties in the realization and progress of such projects has grown enormously, since the local

17 Palermo is a traditional Buenos Aires neighbourhood that fell into disrepair some decades ago and that in the last 20 or 30 years has gone through a renewal process (almost a gentrification process), becoming a site for specialized and sophisticated service activities linked to design and communications. This significantly important consumption node has been renamed by many as the “Buenos Aires Soho”.
executive has closed and paralyzed the program to new projects (since 2007), suffering the social movement financial constraints.

In this sense, the MTL has tried to develop new projects with the same mode and taking advantage of an already existing organizational structure, but they have been hampered or slowed down by various government agencies. Some of MTL members suggest that these barriers are due to political reasons. Another major difficulty is the derivative of the need to become a cooperative, which is a condition required by Act 341 in order to get public funding. Some members of MTL point out that taxes linked to this formal mode (cooperative), generate a financial choking to them, since they receive treatment virtually equal to any other construction company (which is organized as a cooperative) regardless of their social status and vulnerability.

The most serious consequence of this is that these social organizations end up in debt with the state treasury heavily restricting and hindering their continuity and promotion. Another remarkable benefit of this project is that after several years of operation is still maintained in very good condition and has not generated an enclave within the district, since it is well integrated with its surroundings. This situation along with its location allows its residents to benefit from using the facilities and services of the neighborhood (parks, schools, hospitals and public transit). The strong political profile of MTL allowed them to hold (not without some difficulty) the autonomy of the project throughout all stages of construction and occupancy. However, it is important to note that this kind of undertakings are limited or impeded if the bureaucratic and institutional arrangements needed to accompany and promote these processes are not developed by the state.

**CLOSING REMARKS**

The key methodological element of the present analysis is (as Robinson says) ‘rendering urban experiences comparable across a much wider range of contexts, and building research strategies’ which are adequate to the complex spatiality of urban practices (Robinson, 2006). This kind of analytical comparison is needed to build an open up reflexivity for urban social practices. I think this is the best practices. The critical evaluation of these completed projects provides the ability to understand more deeply their efficiencies and inefficiencies in order to observe not only the “best practices”, but also to look at and pay attention to those we could call “not so good practices”, those faults from which we can draw lessons and experience.

This kind of analysis allows us to understand some aspects of the persistence of certain social conditions and the need for their transformation.

**REFERENCES**


TWO CASES OF "BEST PRACTICES", TWO DIFFERENT RESULTS. A comparative analysis of two social housing projects in Argentina
M. Scheinsohn


Censo 2010 Resultados Definitivos (2012) Serie B N°2 Tomo 1, INDEC, Ministerio de Economía


Cosacov, Natalia et. al. (2011), Barrios al sur: Villa Lugano, Villa Riachuelo, Mataderos, Parque Patricios y Villa Soldati a través del tiempo, Documentos de Trabajo N°56, Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. UBA


Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, (2009). Censo de Hogares y Población. Villas 31 y 31 bis, GCBA,


Raspall T. et al. (2013), Expansión Urbana y desarrollo del hábitat popular en el Área Metropolitana de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Documentos de Trabajo N° 66, Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina.


17th N-AERUS CONFERENCE

“GOVERNING, PLANNING, AND MANAGING THE CITY IN AN UNCERTAIN WOLD. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON EVERYDAY PRACTICES”
17-19 November 2016
School of Public Administration, University of Gothenburg, Sweden

THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE AND URBAN REGULATION TOOLS IN BUENOS AIRES. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS FROM EVERYDAY PRACTICES.

Cecilia Cabrera (1), Mariano Scheinsohn (2)
Affiliation (1) Universidad de Buenos Aires, Instituto Superior de Urbanismo, Territorio y Ambiente. Facultad de Arquitectura, Diseño y Urbanismo. ISU-FADU-UBA
Affiliation (2) Universidad de Buenos Aires, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales e Instituto Superior de Urbanismo, Territorio y Ambiente. Facultad de Arquitectura, Diseño y Urbanismo. ISU-FADU-UBA

ABSTRACT

The daily dynamic of a city like Buenos Aires, involves formal and informal processes, which make its operation possible.
During the last decade, the intervention of speculative real estate capitals, involved the densification of several sectors of the city, both formal and informal.
We propose to relate the processes of production of space and the processes of production of urban regulation tools (URT), to overcome the dichotomous thinking about formal-informal categories in both processes.
From the analytical categories and perspective of Henri Lefebvre, we analyze two areas of the city: on the one hand, a middle-class "formal" neighborhood (Villa Urquiza) and the other an "informal" neighborhood (Villa 31). This comparison involves examining the daily practices of production of space, which are translated into URTs in the formal field, and the daily practices of collective and organized social-management, by establishing mechanisms of (self)regulation in the field of urban informality.
A densification process, triggered by the conditions of socio-economic scenario, has affected both barrios. The densification of Villa Urquiza (allowed by current law) occurred in search of greater
The Production of Space and Urban Regulation Tools in Buenos Aires.
A comparative analysis from everyday practices
C. Cabrera & M. Scheinsohn

production of urban surplus value, and in the case of Villa 31, in order to stop its densification and growth, an "urbanization law" was proposed. We propose a reflection on the social production of URTs, from the dialectical relationship between formal-informal, posing some questions: Is it possible to discuss about the city and / or its regulation without considering both components? Could we consider the logic of social production of space of both districts as homologous processes? Could the (self)regulation mechanisms be able to promote a multi-actoral production of the URTs?

KEY WORDS
Production of Space – Urban Regulation Tools – Formal/Informal- Everyday Practicies- Buenos Aires

1 - ESCENARIO ACTUAL Y TENDENCIAS RECIENTES

Entre los años 2003 y 2012, la recuperación económica posterior a la crisis en Argentina, estuvo acompañada con una amplia expansión y crecimiento del sector de la construcción, especialmente en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires. Este boom inmobiliario estuvo concentrado principalmente en la producción de vivienda residencial dirigida a sectores medios y medios altos.(Cabrera-Scheinsohn, 2013, 2015; Azuela y Cosacov, 2013)

Durante el período comprendido entre 2001 y 2010 la población de la Ciudad se incrementó en algo más de 4%, mientras que el stock de viviendas aumentó casi un 11%1. Este incremento del stock de viviendas por sobre el crecimiento de la población, junto con la lógica locacional que siguieron la mayor parte de los desarrollos inmobiliarios, constituyen claros indicadores de la consolidación y ampliación del mercado rentístico de la vivienda en Buenos Aires durante la década considerada. La mayor proporción de los metros cuadrados construidos entre 2004 y 2011 estuvieron localizados

---

fundamentalmente en los barrios socialmente medios y altos y de mejor estándar y calidad de vida; fundamentalmente el denominado Sector Norte de la Ciudad, Puerto Madero y los barrios de Caballito y Villa Urquiza.

En la CABA, el promedio de metros cuadrados solicitados por año entre el 2003 y el 2012, fue de más de 2.100.000m2. superando en más del 24% el promedio del pico de actividad de la construcción de la década de 1990 (1994-1998).

Este boom constructivo no solo se dio en el sector formal del mercado inmobiliario si no también en el sector informal. Según la información de los Censos Nacionales de 2001 y 2010 el aumento de la población de la Ciudad fue de algo más de 114.000 personas. De ese incremento casi el 52% corresponde al crecimiento de la población asentadas en villas miseria (localizadas dentro de la jurisdicción de la Ciudad) para ese mismo periodo. Es decir que un poco más de la mitad del crecimiento poblacional de la ciudad en esos diez años, se ha asentado en un tipo residencial informal. Mientras que alrededor de 55.000 habitantes es el crecimiento de la población en el ámbito residencial formal entre el 2001 y el 2010.

Entonces, si se considera la información indicada anteriormente respecto al crecimiento del stock de viviendas (formales) en ese periodo (139.495 viviendas), el aumento de habitantes por cada vivienda que se construyó en esos diez años es de 0.40 persona por cada unidad. Dicho de otra manera la Ciudad de Buenos Aires sumó más de dos viviendas y media (en el sector formal) por cada nuevo habitante que se sumo a la población.

El análisis de esta información pone en evidencia que gran parte del boom constructivo de este periodo no se relaciona directamente con la demanda residencial formal de nueva población, si no que fue predominantemente sostenido por determinados actores económicos que, mediante una lógica rentística y especulativa, promovieron y consolidaron el incremento del valor del suelo de la mayor parte de los barrios de la ciudad y por ende los consecuentes aumentos de densidades en determinados sectores urbanos.

Cabe señalar que este aumento de densidades también se produjo en la mayoría de las Villas Miseria de la Ciudad. Se estima que la superficie que ocupaban las villas en dicha jurisdicción en 2010 era de aproximadamente 260 hectáreas y en el 2001 las mismas ocupaban aproximadamente 292 hectáreas . Considerando este dato, las densidades medias de las villas miseria se han incrementado notablemente pasando de algo menos de 380 hab/ha en 2001 a más de 620 hab/ha en 2010, incrementándose en casi

---

2 Fuente: Cuadernos de Trabajo N°13, Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Metropolitano, Gobierno de la Ciudad de Bs As. Abril 2012
3 Fuente: Dirección General de Estadística y Censos (Ministerio de Hacienda GCBA) sobre la base de datos del Ministerio de Desarrollo Urbano. Dirección General de Registro de Obras y Catastro.
4 Según datos oficiales de los Censos entre 2001 y 2010 la población asentada en villas miseria (en la ciudad de Buenos Aires) creció en 56.165 habitantes llevando la población total de las villas a casi 163.600. Según estimaciones de ONG's y de distintas organizaciones y movimientos sociales la población total de las villas en 2015 superaría las 270.000 personas. Incluso la Secretaria de Habitat e Inclusión del GCBA estima que la población en villas actualmente alcanza a más de 275.000 personas. Fuente SECHI-GBCA
http://www.buenosaires.gob.ar/sites/gcaba/files/de_villa_a_barrio.pdf
5 Fuente: Dirección de Estadística GCBA
un 68%. Incluso si consideramos las estimaciones de la población actual en las villas la densidad media ya habría superado las 1000 hab/ha, representando un aumento de más del 160%.

### Cuadro No1 Proporción de inquilinos y propietarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TENENCIA</th>
<th>CENSO 2001</th>
<th>CENSO 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Propietario</td>
<td>68,9%</td>
<td>62,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inquilino</td>
<td>22,2%</td>
<td>29,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocupante por préstamo</td>
<td>4,4%</td>
<td>3,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocupante por trabajo</td>
<td>2,4%</td>
<td>2,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocupante irregular</td>
<td>1,9%</td>
<td>1,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fuente: Censos Nacionales 2001 y 2010 INDEC

El crecimiento de la densidad media se relaciona también con el surgimiento y consolidación de un submercado informal de alquileres en las villas miseria, que junto con lo señalado respecto del sector formal, ha provocado que la proporción de inquilinos respecto de propietarios en la ciudad, haya aumentado 8 puntos entre el 2001 y 2010 alcanzando al 30% de los residentes.

Desde este punto de vista es posible señalar que el crecimiento especulativo inmobiliario en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires estuvo correlacionado con el crecimiento y densificación del hábitat informal.

En definitiva, la dinámica del mercado inmobiliario en la última década -que ha tendido a reforzar y reconfigurar las desigualdades en los procesos de valorización del suelo- ha sido correlativa con transformaciones de las dinámicas socio-urbanas que tienden a sobredeterminar el aumento del valor del suelo urbano ya sea éste formal o informal. (Cabrera C. y Scheinsohn M., 2014 y 2015)

Desde esta perspectiva podríamos sostener que, paradójicamente, los procesos especulativos derivados de la expansión y fluidificación de los activos inmobiliarios urbanos centrales (vinculados a la expansión del capital global en las ciudades) traen aparejado un creciente aumento de la demanda de empleo de servicios precarizados (como sostén de las funciones mencionadas) que resulta cubierto por quienes se encuentran en la base de la pirámide social.

Uno de los principales efectos de tal situación es un aumento de los hábitat informales, en la medida en que, en estos sectores sociales, la demanda de empleo funciona como el principal atractor para su localización residencial. Considerando además que estos entornos urbanos son afectados por un creciente aumento del valor del suelo, la única alternativa que encuentran estos sectores (frente a la escasez de políticas públicas de vivienda) es habitar en alguna de las modalidades de vivienda informal (villas miseria, asentamientos, hoteles-pensión, ocupación de inmuebles, etc.).

Podemos estimar entonces, que en el caso de Buenos Aires, la lógica del proceso a través del cual tiende a valorizarse el suelo -especulativamente- en determinados sectores urbanos vinculados a la

---

6 Un indicio relevante de este fenómeno es el hecho de que las mayores densidades de las villas y asentamientos de la región se manifiestan en la ciudad central y en los municipios del corredor norte (con un promedio mayor a 250 hab/ha cuando el promedio general de este tipo de hábitat es de 164 hab/ha)(Cravino, 2008), mostrando una distribución de densidades que tiende a ser homóloga a las de la ciudad formal en relación con la distribución de sus densidades medias. (Scheinsohn y Cabrera, 2012)
localización del capital global, implica también un proceso de crecimiento y “valorización” de las distintas modalidades de apropiación del suelo informal.

En este escenario, podemos arriesgar que dicho proceso sería consecuencia de que la creciente demanda residencial de los sectores sociales que no pueden acceder al mercado formal de vivienda (en los barrios donde se localiza la mayor demanda de empleo precarizado), se transfiere hacia una creciente demanda de los hábitat informales, lo cual genera las condiciones para la valorización de los mismos.

Esto significa que tanto la aplicación de los diversos Instrumentos de Regulación Urbana (IRUs), como las propuestas de regulación (o regularización) que apunten específicamente al hábitat popular, son acciones que tienen consecuencias y efectos interdependientes en ambas lógicas residenciales (formal e informal), que pueden aumentar las desigualdades y acentuar la fragmentación socio-territorial, mediante una profundización de la diferenciación social interna.

En tal sentido, no es casual que los conflictos que tuvieron una mayor visibilidad en la opinión pública entre el 2004 y 2014 fueron tanto los relacionados con la resistencia de los habitantes de barrios tradicionales de clase media –debido al impacto que el capital especulativo inmobiliario generaba en su entorno y su calidad de vida a través del crecimiento de la densidad constructiva-, como aquellos que emergieron con el importante crecimiento de la ciudad informal (villas misería, asentamientos informales, ocupación de inmuebles, desalojos etc.).

2 - ANÁLISIS DE CASOS. REGULACIÓN Y AUTOREGLACIÓN.

Los dos sectores urbanos seleccionados para el análisis representan, cada uno en su carácter y modalidad específica, configuraciones residenciales prototípicas del desarrollo socio-urbano de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires en la última década.

Villa Urquiza

El Barrio de Villa Urquiza se localiza en la zona Noroeste de la Ciudad (Comuna 12) donde, según datos censales de 2010, habitan 212.518 personas, representando el 7,6% del total de la ciudad con una densidad de 124,5 hab. / ha., algo por debajo de la media general de la Ciudad que alcanza una cifra de

---

7 Un ejemplo de esta situación se encuentra en la aplicación del Plan de Urbanización en Villas y Barrios Carenciados que ha desarrollado el Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires en forma continua desde 1999, en el marco jurisdiccional de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, a través de la aplicación de un programa participativo con los objetivos de: regularización dominial, regularización del tejido, tendido de infraestructura y de equipamiento. Este plan actuó parcialmente en algunas de las villas centrales de la ciudad acentuando, a través de la apertura de calles y construcción de equipamiento, procesos de diferenciación social internos, reflejados en el aumento del precio de las viviendas informales (y por ende de su “rentabilidad”) en los entornos de las intervenciones.

8 En la Ciudad de Buenos Aires entre los años 2001 y 2010 (según los Censos Nacionales) se sumaron por mes unos 469 nuevos habitantes a las villas misería, es decir, 15 por día.
136,8 hab./ha.. Este sector urbano se conformó como un barrio residencial de baja densidad que creció alrededor de las estaciones de FFCC y los ejes principales de circulación vial. La producción de este espacio urbano fue conformando una configuración de viviendas alternadas con locales comerciales y de servicios de escala barrial, que atendían principalmente a la actividad residencial.

Entre los años 2000 y 2009 los permisos de construcción para la Comuna 12 abarcaron el 12% del total de los permisos de la Ciudad para un sector residencial que apenas alcanzaba el 7% de la población. Esta situación ha dado como resultado que, si bien la población del barrio aumentó entre 2001 y 2010 un 7%, el stock de viviendas en ese mismo período se incrementó en un 13,5%. Es decir que el crecimiento de las unidades residenciales casi duplicó el crecimiento de la población durante el mismo período. Teniendo en cuenta que en la ciudad entre el 2000 y 2009 se han construido en promedio 5,5 m2 por habitante, es posible observar que en la Comuna 12 casi duplica el promedio de la ciudad, al superar los 9,3 m2 por habitante.

Estos datos ilustran que Villa Urquiza9 ha sufrido un aumento de la construcción residencial en altura durante los últimos 10 años, con la consecuente conflictividad social emergente del boom inmobiliario que explotó al máximo las capacidades constructivas permitidas por la normativa urbana vigente10.

En este caso es posible observar y analizar las modalidades y modulaciones que adquiere tanto el proceso de fluidificación rentística de la propiedad urbana11 (Scheinsohn y Cabrera, 2012:6) como el proceso de legitimación social de los IRUs, a partir de su visibilización pública derivada de la concreción material de la capacidad constructiva de la regulación vigente a favor de la realización rentística.

En dicho proceso conflictivo surgieron y se consolidaron organizaciones sociales barriales conformadas mayormente por los vecinos (en general de clase media) que constituyeron un espacio de denuncia y reclamo ante el crecimiento de la construcción de edificios en altura, con un amplio repertorio y modalidades de protestas de marcada visibilidad pública y mediática. El proceso descripto en la última década en el barrio Villa Urquiza podría ser caracterizado, en términos de Lefebvre, como una urbanización desurbanizante (Lefebvre, 1973:36) en la medida en que el proceso de producción espacial (densificación) de este periodo implicó un quiebre y profundo cambio en las características del espacio cotidiano del barrio y en las interrelaciones de sus habitantes. Estos cambios se manifiestan entre otras cuestiones, en la intensificación del tránsito y la movilidad que transformó el carácter de las calles; el aumento de las densidades constructivas en desmedro de la

9 Según el Censo 2010 la población en el barrio de Caballito es de 197.226 personas. Existen en el mismo dos áreas diferenciadas en cuanto a la distribución de la densidad de población: una que concentra alta densidad de 350 hab/ha y otra en donde las densidades descenden a menos de la mitad alcanzando solamente los 150 hab/ha. En Villa Urquiza, según datos censales, habitan 212.518 personas con una densidad de 124,5 hab/ha., algo por debajo de la media general de la Ciudad que alcanza una cifra de 136,8 hab/ha.

10 Ley 449/2000 Boletín Oficial Nº 1044 Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires

11 Este concepto, de elaboración propia, remite específicamente a la idea de fluidificación (deslocalización e intercambiabilidad) de la propiedad urbana en el mercado capitalista global a partir de que la misma, en los sectores urbanos globalizados de las grandes ciudades, se transforma en un activo económico financiero estandarizado (socio-territorialmente) que produce las condiciones básicas para el desarrollo de un mercado del suelo urbano global regidos bajo las lógicas del capital financiero rentístico., Scheinsohn, M. y Cabrera, C. (2012) Resistencias y Luchas por la Justicia Espacial en Buenos Aires. Ponencia presentada en XIII N-AERUS Annual Conference, Paris, Francia, 22-24/11/2012

web site: http://n-aerus.net/web/sat/workshops/2012/PDF/N-AERUS%20XIII_Scheinsohn_Cabrera.pdf
residencia de baja densidad; la transformación y pérdida del comercio tradicional local a favor de la instalación de comercio corporativo y de cadenas internacionales. Esta dinámica, promovida por la aplicación de los IRU vigentes, resultó en ese proceso de urbanización desurbanizante que afectó la vida cotidiana de los habitantes, sus representaciones y su identidad, e implicó nuevas prácticas cotidianas asociadas a la nueva población (diferentes usos y apropiaciones del espacio público y privado).

Villa 31

La Villa 31 se encuentra entre las villas miseria con mayor incremento de población durante los últimos años, -ya que en promedio se asentaron allí 1.932 personas por año\textsuperscript{12} durante el período comprendido entre 2001 y 2009-, ocupando un área de 32 hectáreas con una densidad de 850 hab/ha\textsuperscript{13}. Cabe señalar que su intenso crecimiento poblacional es permanente, ya que según estimaciones de algunos de los delegados del barrio, en la actualidad contaría con más de 40.000 habitantes.(Cabrera C. y Scheinsohn M., 2015)

Se trata del asentamiento informal más emblemático de Argentina, debido a que siempre ha tenido gran visibilidad pública por haber sido objeto de numerosos intentos de desalojo que fueron resistidos por sus habitantes y sus organizaciones sociales a lo largo de un extenso historial de luchas y resistencias.

Durante los últimos 7 años se ha consolidado un proceso de valorización de suelo de la Villa 31 -correlativo con los aumentos de los valores del suelo formal-, debido a la alta demanda de residencia próxima al centro como consecuencia del crecimiento económico de la ciudad y a su localización estratégica (cercana al centro, a las fuentes de trabajo en el sector de servicios y a los principales nodos de transporte).

Hasta el año 2006 la Villa 31 no contaba con ningún plan o proyecto concreto de construcción “formal”, en sus casi siete décadas de historia este sector urbano se había conformado y sostenido en el tiempo a través de procesos de producción de espacio llevados adelante por los propios habitantes. La características y modalidades de las construcciones de las viviendas fueron cambiando a lo largo de los años\textsuperscript{14}.

En este contexto, durante este periodo (2007-2015) comenzó a configurarse un escenario particular en donde se consolidan y emergen nuevos actores, cuyas orientaciones, intereses y traducciones tienden a cambiar y complejizarse.


\textsuperscript{13} La densidad promedio de la ciudad es de 14.973 hab/km\textsuperscript{2} y la Comuna 1 (donde se encuentra ubicada la Villa 31) es de 11.409 hab/km\textsuperscript{2}. Además alrededor del 20\% de los hogares habita en construcciones de 2 pisos y más. Fuente Censo de Hogares y Población Villa 31 y 31 bis, GCBA, Marzo 2009

En ese marco emergió públicamente la Universidad de Buenos Aires como un actor estratégico en este conflicto. Históricamente la intervención de profesionales de la Universidad tanto en temas sociales, educativos, de salud y vivienda resultaba habitual, pero fue a partir del año 2002, cuando la Facultad de Arquitectura de la UBA propuso elaborar un Plan de Urbanización para la Villa 31 “Proyecto Barrio 31”\(^{15}\), elaborado a partir de un proceso participativo que incluyó a los habitantes.

A partir del Proyecto Barrio 31, a fines del año 2009, luego de un arduo debate en el Congreso de la Nación, se logró la promulgación de la Ley 3343 que disponía la urbanización del polígono que abarca la Villa 31 y 31 bis. Siguiendo los parámetros del mencionado Proyecto, establecía también la constitución de una Mesa de Trabajo\(^{16}\) integrada por representantes del gobierno local, nacional, instituciones académicas y organizaciones sociales.

Si bien a partir de la sanción de la Ley 3343 parecía que la materialización del Proyecto Barrio 31 (FADU-UBA) era solo una cuestión de tiempo, el mismo se fue postergando debido a los diversos conflictos que surgieron en las interacciones de los distintos actores sociales en el proceso de reglamentación de la Ley para lograr la materialización del proyecto\(^{17}\).

El proyecto quedó finalmente estancado en un limbo político y burocrático debido a que, por una parte, se complejizó el escenario político administrativo\(^{18}\), y por otra parte se fragmentaron los distintos intereses de las organizaciones sociales y políticas que conforman la trama social de la villa. Paralelamente, el permanente crecimiento en altura y la densificación poblacional no se detenían, lo que llevaba a un paulatino desajuste con la propuesta enunciada en el Proyecto Barrio 31.

A partir del cambio de orientación política del gobierno nacional en diciembre 2015 (coincidente con la orientación política del Gobierno Local), se conformó un nuevo escenario político-administrativo que posibilitaba la articulación de políticas entre los diversos niveles de gobierno que tienen incumbencia en este sector (tierras de jurisdicción nacional, regulación de orden local, etc.). En este contexto el GCBA propició la creación de instancias burocrático-administrativas específicas orientadas a concretar el “proceso de urbanización”.

Es decir, la Villa 31 se venía “autoconstruyendo” y creciendo al mismo ritmo que el resto de la ciudad en un proceso social de producción de espacio urbano desregulado, no controlado desde ningún organismo “formal” (ni académico ni gubernamental) mediante un proceso de producción social del espacio informal y autorregulado.

A partir del proyecto de urbanización (Ley 148, Proyecto Barrio 31 y Ley 3343) comenzaron a proponerse intervenciones orientadas a mejorar el proceso de producción espacial que los habitantes venían llevando adelante. Estas propuestas fueron capitalizadas por los habitantes como una forma estratégica de evitar la erradicación que constituía una amenaza permanente.

---

16 Mesa de Gestión y Planeamiento Multidisciplinaria y Participativa para la Urbanización de las Villas 31 y 31bis\(^{16}\) que funcionaría en el ámbito de la Legislatura porteña.
18 Hasta fines del año 2015 la orientación política del gobierno nacional difería de la del gobierno local, situación que complejizaba la gestión del Proyecto.
El escenario cambió, un proceso de producción del espacio que hasta entonces había sido llevado a cabo (obviamente de manera precaria) por los habitantes, comenzó a contar con la contribución de otros actores/sectores que aportaron propuestas para la producción de espacio y su regulación. Paralelamente, y hasta tanto se concretara la urbanización, el Gobierno Local, a través de una decisión judicial estableció la prohibición de ingresar materiales de construcción, pese a lo cual la villa siguió creciendo de manera informal. Algunas organizaciones sociales estiman que entre los años 2009 y 2015 la población creció en 15.000 habitantes.

En Diciembre de 2015 se creó la Secretaría de Integración Social y Urbana (SECISYU), dependiente de la Jefatura de Gabinete, dicho organismo estaría cargo de la ejecución y coordinación del “Plan de Integración de los Barrios 31 y 31 bis”, y cuyo objetivo principal “es poner en marcha una estrategia multisectorial e integral que combine inversiones en infraestructura y componentes sociales”. De esta manera se instaura una instancia formal burocrático-administrativa en el Gobierno Local, para la gestión específica del barrio.

El 27 de Setiembre de 2016, se aprobó un “Protocolo de ingreso de materiales de construcción” (SECISYU), que propone intervenir otorgando “permisos” de ingreso de materiales de construcción; impidiendo la construcción no regulada e imponiendo la tramitación de permisos de obra.

Como se ha señalado la Villa 31 se fue constituyendo, a lo largo de más de siete décadas, a partir de procesos colectivos y sociales de apropiación y autoconstrucción, tanto de espacios privados de habitación y residencia como de espacios comunitarios, públicos y de equipamiento. Por esta razón este proceso ha tenido siempre un importante carácter urbano y urbanizador ya que el crecimiento de la villa se fue consolidando no solo en términos materiales y constructivos si no también en términos de diferenciación social, en la complejización de su estructura interna y en la materialización simbólica de su identidad colectiva.

En tales términos es posible referirnos a este proceso histórico como un proceso de apropiación (colectiva) urbanizante (Lefebvre) ya que ha constituido un proceso colectivo autogenerado y resiliente que construyó urbanidad e identidad (de hecho diversos habitantes de la Villa rechazan la idea de que a la provisión de servicios o la regularización se la llame “urbanización”, porque consideran que la villa ya “es urbana”).

---

19 Cabrera, C et al, 2015
20 Creada por decreto Nº 363/15
21 http://www.buenosaires.gob.ar/secretaria-de-integracion-social-y-urbana/secretaria-de-integracion-social-y-urbana.
22 Diario La Nación 27 de Setiembre de 2016 “Villa 31: la Ciudad busca controlar el ingreso de materiales para obras” “A partir de hoy, en las villas 31 y 31 bis de Retiro ya no se podrá ingresar libremente con materiales para la construcción. Es la meta del gobierno porteño. Por eso, promoverá que quienes pretendan construir allí primero obtengan una autorización oficial. Según la Ciudad, estas limitaciones buscan que el proyecto de urbanización ejecutado en esos barrios se desarrolle con mayor eficiencia.” http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1941616-villa-31-la-ciudad-busca-controlar-el-ingreso-de-materiales-para-obras
23 Respecto de las luchas sobre la clasificaciones nos referiremos en el próximo apartado.
Desde esta perspectiva, vale la pena resaltar que, en este contexto las normas que en su momento (2008) se elaboraron con el objetivo de impedir el crecimiento de la Villa 31, son reactualizadas (2016) con el propósito de regularizar las construcciones a través de la creación de una unidad burocrático-administrativa y la exigencia de solicitud de permisos de obra.

Este nuevo protocolo implica necesariamente tramitaciones que exigen de los habitantes la incorporación de un *habitus* burocrático-administrativo para la producción del espacio, que implica además encuadrarse en instancias de control por parte de la autoridad pública para obtener una “*relativa formalidad*” sobre una actividad que se venía desarrollando de manera autoregulada (desde las localizaciones elegidas por las diversas comunidades que integran la población, la reserva de espacios libres para prácticas deportivas o la instalación de ferias comerciales, actividades culturales, etc.).

En este sentido, la aplicación de esta norma propiciaría un tipo de “integración” a partir de la estandarización y burocratización del proceso de producción del espacio en la Villa. En un proceso que pareciera estar más orientado a imponer el disciplinamiento y control de la *praxis* colectiva, que a una real inclusión social. Situación que podríamos encuadrar en lo que Lefebvre señala respecto a que “la burocracia burocratiza a los individuos mucho mejor que si los gobernara. Tiende a integrarlos convirtiéndolos en burócratas (y en consecuencia haciendo de ellos sus delegados en la gestión burocrática de su vida cotidiana”). (Lefebvre, 1972:194)

### 3 - MÁS ALLÁ DE LA DICOTOMÍA FORMAL - INFORMAL EN LOS PROCESOS DE REGULACIÓN

Según afirma Lefebvre “no hay sociedad sin orden, significado, perceptibilidad, legibilidad sobre el terreno. (…) Cada sector se define (en y a través de la conciencia de los habitantes) por relación al otro, por su contrariedad al otro.” (Lefebvre, 1973:36). En tal sentido para poder analizar los procesos sociales de producción de espacio y de instrumentos de regulación urbana, resulta necesario centrarse específicamente en la vinculación, interrelación e interdependencia entre los procesos “*formales*” e “*informales*”. Cualquier focalización en alguno de estos términos implicaría una interpretación sesgada y una distorsión del análisis.

Como se ha expuesto en los apartados anteriores a partir del análisis de los procesos de producción del espacio y de los Instrumentos de Regulación Urbana en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, es posible establecer que se presenta una relación dialéctica formal-informal, en un contexto de expansión constructiva y densificación, que tiende a acrecentar la fragmentación social polarizada y el aumento de las desigualdades.

---

24Diario Clarín 11 de Diciembre de 2008 “Villa 31: la Prefectura deberá evitar la entrada de materiales” “La medida fue dictada por la jueza federal subrogante Cecilia de Negre, quien el 28 de octubre, a pedido del Gobierno de la Ciudad, había ordenado al Poder Ejecutivo Nacional que impidiera la construcción de nuevas viviendas en las villas. Pero como la administración macrista denunció que esa medida no estaba siendo respetada, ahora la jueza decidió la intervención de Prefectura para ver si tiene más suerte” “El jefe de gabinete del ministerio de Espacio Público, Fabián Rodríguez Simón, dijo hace un par de semanas que son aproximadamente 600 las construcciones que deberían demolerse.”
En los procesos urbanos informales se han replicado los fenómenos producidos en la ciudad formal durante los últimos años, la densificación y la especulación inmobiliaria no son manifestaciones ajenas al sector informal. Aunque la tenencia del suelo sea precaria, quienes habitan en estos ámbitos se desenvuelven con las mismas lógicas de reproducción que los sectores formales, y en sus prácticas cotidianas producen y reproducen la ciudad al igual que lo hacen los sectores socialmente legitimados.

Por lo tanto la definición de la producción de ciudad en términos de “formal e informal” implica necesariamente un proceso social y político de categorización y clasificación (y de traducción) que en este sentido es parte de una lucha simbólica y material entre los diversos actores.

La diferenciación formal-informal es una clasificación, y como tal se encuentra afectada por los niveles de arbitrariedad que cualquier clasificación conlleva25. Se trata entonces, de una clasificación que únicamente refiere a una dimensión de la desigualdad, cuando ésta se presenta en múltiples, complejas y variadas dimensiones e interrelaciones.

Desde esta perspectiva, entendemos que esta clasificación formal-informal plantea una (falsa) dicotomía, porque ambos atributos constituyen en realidad los términos de una interrelación dialéctica. Aceptar la clasificación instituida, que plantea esta relación en términos dicotómicos26, podría inducir a pensar que formalizar lo informal, redundaría en una reducción de la desigualdad, sin tomar en cuenta las múltiples dimensiones de la misma, que se encuentran funcionalmente interrelacionadas.

Desde esta perspectiva, podríamos pensar que los procesos de “transformar” lo informal en formal o de formalizar/regularizar podrían resultar en herramientas legitimantes / “estabilizantes” de esa dicotomía formal-informal, reforzándola, ridigizando el escenario excluyente al cual la única manera de “ingresar” estaría constituida por la (pseudo)integración a través de la “formalidad” y la “regularización”. Dando inicio a un proceso que implicaría una primera etapa de (pseudo)inclusión para luego volver a expulsar (otorgamiento de títulos de propiedad que “apuesten” a una “renovación” de población-gentrificación). Tal tipo de “inclusión”, a través de la burocratización en un proceso de disciplinamiento y control, de alguna manera “retroalimenta” el mecanismo excluyente que plantea la dicotomía formal-informal. Debido principalmente a que la ciudad (y la sociedad) para su funcionamiento en el actual escenario requiere del trabajo precarizado, y quienes “no se avengan” a ingresar en el sector formal, continuarán operando en el sector informal (por las propias características de su reproducción) pero cada vez más excluidos, más precarizados y más alejados (lo que les implicará asumir mayores costos de su propia reproducción).

De manera análoga, los procesos de densificación constructiva especulativa que se dan en el mercado formal en los barrios de baja densidad, tienden a homogeneizar social y simbólicamente sectores urbanos de clase media. Estas operaciones también contribuyen a reproducir la lógica de una

25 “… el orden social debe en parte su permanencia a la imposición de esquemas de clasificación que, ajustadas a las clasificaciones objetivas, producen una forma de reconocimiento de este orden, forma que implica el desconocimiento de la arbitrariedad de sus fundamentos…” (Bourdieu, 1999:96)

26 “Captar a la vez lo que está instituido sin olvidar que se trata solamente de la resultante, en un momento dado del tiempo, de la lucha para hacer existir o “inexistir” lo que existe…” (Bourdieu, 1999:92)
producción del espacio urbano que tiende a acrecentar la fragmentación social polarizada y el aumento de las desigualdades. Debido principalmente a que, en estos sectores, restringe el acceso socialmente heterogéneo a la vivienda, privilegiando el carácter de consumo rentístico del suelo urbano. Estos procesos que caracterizamos como urbanización desurbanizante, atentan contra la supervivencia de sectores que históricamente han conformado la típica diversidad socio-espacial de una ciudad como Buenos Aires aportando particulares características identitarias.

CONSIDERACIONES FINALES

Ambos casos constituyen ejemplos de producción de espacialidad, pero con distintos orígenes: uno reconocido, regulado, jerarquizado y visibilizado y el otro espontáneo e invisibilizado para el resto de la sociedad.

En el caso de Villa Urquiza, la densificación promovida por los instrumentos de regulación durante los últimos años parece apuntar a consolidar una función de sub-centro residencial y comercial (a través de un modelo constructivo que refleja una standarización socio-territorial vinculada a su condición de activo económico-financiero) que altera su carácter de barrio residencial de baja densidad.

Paralelamente, la Villa 31, sin contar con una regulación específica ni haber sido planificada por especialistas, ha constituido desde su conformación un espacio de cohesión social e intercambio. Durante los últimos años, la actividad e identidad de la Villa se han visto fortalecidas a partir del proceso de su densificación, que fue consecuencia de la falta de políticas que atiendan las demandas de una población que dificilmente pueda acceder a la propiedad o alquiler a través del mercado formal.

Teniendo en cuenta estas cuestiones, consideramos que las intervenciones que se promueban con el objetivo de mejorar ambos barrios (y la ciudad en general), no necesariamente deberían procurar la manera de “formalizar” las actividades o espacios informales (ya que actividades económicas no formalizadas existen en todos los estratos sociales y la economía informal es parte funcional de las economías latinoamericanas) sino que deberían procurar, respetando la diversidad y los derechos de todos los sectores sociales urbanos, que ambas situaciones convivan de la mejor forma posible27. El desafío consistiría entonces en gestionar la producción del espacio urbano respetando la diversidad y teniendo en cuenta las desigualdades, sin estigmatizar a los sectores más vulnerables, ya que no puede haber una consistente cohesión social cuando solamente existe homogeneidad social.

Resulta necesario entonces trabajar en la interfase entre las acciones planificadas llevadas a cabo por el sector público y las acciones espontáneas legítimas que concreta la población. Para eso tal vez resulte interesante observar de qué manera, en un espacio informal, no legitimado, no regularizado, se

27 “En las ciudades del Tercer Mundo es la gente misma la que organiza y ayuda a construir la mayoría de las nuevas unidades de vivienda. (…) Ellos son los verdaderos constructores y diseñadores de las ciudades del Tercer Mundo. (…) El proceso por el cual ellos construyen define, en gran parte, la expansión física de la ciudad, y seguirá siendo así en el futuro. Es un proceso que, en muchos aspectos, evidencia un gran dinamismo y que realmente trae aparejadas considerables ventajas para los gobiernos y para la actividad económica de la ciudad…” (Hardoy, J. et al. 1987, p.19)
reproducen los usos y costumbres de la ciudad formal, pero conservando, protegiendo y defendiendo una identidad y pertenencia, y que en cierta medida está vinculada al funcionamiento cotidiano de la ciudad.

Transformando los procesos de urbanización desurbanizante que promueve el mercado inmobiliario en esos procesos de urbanización urbanizante que produce la población.

REFERENCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS


Bourdieu, Pierre (1999), Qué significa hablar?, Akal, Madrid.


The Production of Space and Urban Regulation Tools in Buenos Aires: A comparative analysis from everyday practices
C. Cabrera & M. Scheinsohn

N-AERUS XVII
Göteborg, 16th – 19th November 2016

Lefebvre, Henri. (1972), *La Vida Cotidiana en el Mundo Moderno*, Alianza, Madrid

Lefebvre, Henri. (1973), *El Derecho a la Ciudad*, Península, Barcelona


http://n-aerus.net/web/sat/workshops/2012/PDF/N-AERUS%20XII_Scheinsohn_Cabrera.pdf


ASSUMED QUALITIES OF COMPACT CITIES
DIVERGENCES BETWEEN THE GLOBAL NORTH AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH IN THE RESEARCH DISCOURSE

Jaan-Henrik Kain\textsuperscript{1*}, Jenny Stenberg\textsuperscript{2}, Marco Adelfio\textsuperscript{3}, Michael Oloko\textsuperscript{4} Liane Thuvander\textsuperscript{5}, Patrik Zapata\textsuperscript{6}, María José Zapata Campos\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{1}Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden
kain@chalmers.se

\textsuperscript{2}Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden
jenny.stenberg@chalmers.se

\textsuperscript{3}Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden
adelfio@chalmers.se

\textsuperscript{4}Jaramogi Oginga Odinga University of Science and Technology, Bondo, Kenya
moloko@jooust.ac.ke

\textsuperscript{5}Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden
liane.thuvander@chalmers.se

\textsuperscript{6}University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden
patrik.zapata@spa.gu.se

\textsuperscript{7}University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden
mj.zapata@handels.gu.se

* Corresponding author
ABSTRACT (Max. 300 words):
Compact cities are promoted widely in policy as a response to current societal challenges, but it is unclear or ambiguous what qualities or benefits a compact city is supposed to deliver. In research, the compact city concept is widely debated in the literature, and there are many arguments both for and against compact cities. However, many studies or reviews tend to apply a delimited approach, discussing a confined number of qualities or base the assessment on quite narrow empirical material. Research is also carried out from within a number of separate disciplines or “discourses”. An improved understanding of the wide spectrum of compact city qualities would support better planning, governance and management of cities. This paper therefore aims to provide an improved understanding of the wide spectrum of compact city qualities in support of better planning, governance and management of cities in the Global South. The objective is to present a review of current articles discussing the compact city to capture similarities and differences in the academic discourse between Global North and Global South contexts, and to outline a comprehensive compact city taxonomy. The analysis is based on literature searches in the Scopus database for 2012-2015, using the search term “compact city”. A quantitative assessment was carried out, sifting out what terms are used to label purported (or debated) qualities of compact cities. Papers are sorted into different categories according to geoeconomic context (i.e., Global North, BRICS, Global South). The outcome is an extended taxonomy of compact city qualities, including twelve categories. Weaknesses in compact city research aimed at cities in the Global South were identified, especially linked to nature, health, environment issues, quality of life, sociocultural aspects, justice and economy, as well as a significant lack of compact city research linked to urban adaptability and resilience.

KEY WORDS
Compact city; urban qualities; taxonomy; Global South; Global North
INTRODUCTION

The global population is estimated to grow to 9.3 billion by 2050 and as 6 billion of us will live in cities, global economy, cultures, politics and even ecology are growing increasingly urban (Brugmann, 2009). The greater part of this increase will take place in Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia, and Africa’s population is estimated to drastically increase from today’s 1 billion to 3.6 billion by 2100 (UN DESA, 2010). In Sub-Saharan Africa, urbanization pressures typically result in extensive and random growth of inequitable, low-density settlements (Arku, 2009). However, if managed properly, urbanization dynamics can be used as leverage for responding to critical social and environmental challenges by turning cities more resource efficient, liveable, lively and equitable (Hardoy et al., 2001; UN-HABITAT, 2012c).

The notion of compact cities has been promoted widely in global policy as a response to current societal challenges. In 2006, the European Environment Agency claimed that “Urban sprawl should rightly be regarded as one of the major common challenges facing urban Europe today” (2006: 5). The Leipzig Charter on Sustainable European Cities from 2007 claimed that cities are “centres of knowledge and sources of growth and innovation” (EU Ministers, 2007: 1) and argued that a compact settlement structure is “an important basis for efficient and sustainable use of resources” (EU Ministers, 2007: 4). More recently, the European Commission argues that compact cities are “an important basis for efficient and sustainable use of resources” (Commission, 2011: 42). In their World Development Report in 2009, the World Bank maintained that “density makes the difference” (2009: 211), here focusing on economic concentration, i.e., “the richer, the denser” (2009: 56). In their series on green growth studies, the OECD saw the compact city concept as a way to meet such green growth objectives since “it can enhance both the environmental and the economic sustainability of cities” (2012). The agencies behind these statement evidently have a Global North perspective but also various UN agencies are currently pushing compact city policies quite strongly. UN-Habitat argues that “Housing, employment, accessibility and safety (…) are strongly correlated to urban form” (2012c: 13) and also that good policies on density will bring benefits, such as prosperity and social cohesion, and minimize negative external impacts; they will deliver “good quality of life at the right price” (2012c: 13). Moreover, it is asserted that compact city policies “can positively enhance the life of the city dweller and support related strategies aimed at promoting a green economy and sustainable urban settlements” (UN-Habitat, 2012a: 81). Along the same lines, UNEP states that “compact, relatively densely populated cities, with mixed-use urban form, are the most resource-efficient settlement pattern” (UNEP, 2013: 6). Such compact city policies are also reflected in urban policy at national and local levels. For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, there are compact city policies in place, not only in large cities, such as Cape Town (City of Cape Town, 2012), but also in smaller regional centres, such as Kisumu in Kenya (Nodalis Conseil, 2013). Although some of the abovementioned...
policy documents concede that increased compactness “brings challenges as well as its opportunities” (UNEP, 2013: 44) and that it is not a “magic bullet” (UN-Habitat, 2012a: 1), compact city policies are seen as an applicable approach to improve the performance and quality of life in cities worldwide. Even so, it is often unclear or ambiguous what concrete qualities or benefits a compact city actually is supposed to deliver. Here, Nabielek argues that “the compact city model is necessary, but not sufficient for sustainable urban development” (2012: 3).

The academic debate is far more multi-faceted with a mix of positive, negative and inconclusive accounts. The literature on compact cities is extensive and can be tracked back to various origins. For example, as early as in the 1960s, Jacobs claimed that vibrant inner-city environments are “natural generators of diversity and prolific incubators of new enterprises and ideas of all kinds” (1965: 145). In the 1970s, Dantzig and Saaty (1973) presented a “compact city” ideal based on systems thinking and space—time efficiency. A few decades later, Newman and Kenworthy (1989) argued that the energy use for passenger transport is less in cities with higher densities. These two arguments in combination can be seen as a starting point for a vast literature on compact cities (Jenks et al., 1996), sustainable cities (Haughton, 1997), new urbanism (Calthorpe, 1993), transit-oriented development (Boarnet & Crane, 2001), smart growth (Burchell et al., 2000; Downs, 2005), urban resilience (Ahern, 2011) and others. Proximity and scale are said to promote resource efficiency and new technologies, less development on rural land, decreasing use of fossil fuels, improved accessibility, lower infrastructure cost, higher quality of life, more innovation and economic development, and social cohesion (e.g. Jenks et al., 1996; Keiner et al., 2004; Satterthwaite, 2010). Some argue that it is difficult to show wider impacts on energy use, travel, resource depletion and land use (Echenique et al., 2012). There are also arguments that inconsiderate implementation of more compact cities would infringe too much on individual choices of living and decrease urban liveability and satisfaction (Howley et al., 2009; Neuman, 2005). In both Global North and Global South contexts, compact cities may result in crowding, unaffordable housing, inequity, health problems, congestion, pollution, and loss of green space (Dave, 2011; Echenique et al., 2012).

The different approaches to the compact city concept reflect different points of view and each approach has its own set of proponents and opponents (Churchman, 1999). Holman et al. (2015) divides these arguments and counter-arguments into three main discourses: the discourse of conviction, sometimes ignoring the involved challenges and complexities; the discourse of suspicion, distrusting the agendas of both the state and market actors; and the discourse of pragmatism, focusing on the implementability and empirical evaluation of the compact city as a policy objective. The politicized nature of the compact city debate (Dijkink & Knippenberg, 2001) makes it hard to move beyond the selectivity of the convinced and the scepticism of the suspicious in support of pragmatists trying to bridge an implementation gap ridden by ideology and trade-offs (Holman et al., 2015). Nevertheless, there are attempts to avoid simplification and grapple with the full complexity of the compact city notion. In
ambition to clarify definitions and modes of calculation, as well as synergies and trade-offs with other aspects of the urban environments, Boyko and Cooper (2011) carried out an extensive review of the literature in this field with a focus on empirical research. They discuss different types of advantages and disadvantages of higher urban densities, as well as potential relationships between density and other variables, such as affordability, well-being, biodiversity, pollutants, energy use, economy and travel. Based on a selection of 75 papers on urban density from 1976 to 2011 the authors then clustered different types of urban density into a taxonomy of density covering five main themes:

- Natural form (e.g., forests, lakes, flora, fauna)
- Built form (e.g., dwellings, non-dwellings, infrastructure, other structures)
- Mobile material form (e.g., vehicles, by foot)
- Static form (e.g., waste, advertising, transit stops)
- People: a) individual and social (e.g., demography, household) b) organisational (e.g., economy)

The distribution of studies across these five themes reveals that “people” was in focus for 46.49% of the studies and “built form” 41.22%. The other three themes had received less interest: “natural form” 7.01%, “static form” 3.50% and “mobile material form” 1.75%. Boyko and Cooper (2011) note that this indicates that some areas are in need of more research, not least to understand relationship between density and other variables.

Based on discussions with experts on density and the built environment, Boyko and Cooper (2011) note that a number of density types are missing in the 75 papers: cropland (natural form); trains, airplanes, buses, bicycles (mobile material form); products, food, equipment, digital technology (static form); culture, lifestyle, health, spirituality (people – individual and social); governance, business, religion (people – organisational). This is seen as an indication that there are significant areas in need of future research.

This review is very helpful but, with a few exceptions (China, India, Nigeria), there is a predominantly Global North perspective represented in these 75 papers. Although the compact city concept is starting to appear also in literature on African cities (Arku, 2009; Du Plessis & Boonzaaier, 2014; Horn, 2015), the compact city agenda predominantly has been developed from a Global North perspective (Myers, 2011; Robinson, 2006) and there is a lack of knowledge on its relevance for informal settlements of the Global South. It can be questioned if increased density really is beneficial in those Global South cities that are already characterized by high densities (Kotharkar et al., 2014). In that context, increased compactness may result in improved access to services and facilities and to social cohesion, but also in health problems, pollution and low quality of living conditions (Dave 2011). There may therefore be other issues linked to urban compactness that are more important than just densifying the population, such as employment opportunities and the quality and affordability of housing and travel (Dewar, 2000), noise pollution and conflicts between different uses
Assumed Qualities of Compact Cities
J-H Kain, J Stenberg, M Adelfio, M Oloko, L Thuander, P Zapata, MJ Zapata Campos

(N-AERUS XVII
Göteborg, 16th – 19th November 2016

(Kotharkar et al., 2014), or the social and institutional dimensions of urban densification (Parnell et al., 2009; Watson, 2012). A primary objective of compact cities in the Global South is presumably to strengthen social and economic equity (Horn, 2015) but knowledge about social impacts of compact city policies in developmental contexts is not well developed (Dave, 2011).

There is thus a strong case against simply transplanting North urban growth policies, such as green belts, smart growth, polycentrism and smart cities (Horn, 2015; Lwasa & Kinuthia-Njenga, 2012; Prior & Raemaekers, 2007; Watson, 2009, 2015), especially since the implementation of such policies often is driven by various donor agencies or bodies, such as UN-Habitat (Parnell et al., 2009; Watson, 2002). As an example, UN-Habitat argues that “the promotion of the compact city as a sustainable urban form might be easier in the developing world because many cities are already quite dense” (2012a: 14) and that this spontaneously emerged compactness improves access to job opportunities, strengthens the local economy and leads to better accessibility on foot. On the other hand, compact city policies developed in the Global North can also be seen as a palette from which Global South cities can choose appropriate policy measures (Jenks, 2000a). Even so, depending on how cities of the South suffer from the extent and pace of urbanization processes, low per capita incomes, colonial legacies, inadequate governance arrangements, and how they are positioned in the global economy, prevalent “generic” notions of compact cities need to be translated into locally relevant and applicable planning principles to ensure justice, social cohesion, service delivery, economic development and access to ecosystem services (Arku, 2009; Horn, 2015). Instead of applying Global North blueprints, compact city theories and policies in the Global South need to be regionally adapted in order to best respond to an array of locally specific urban contexts and development needs, not least in relation to widespread informality (Horn, 2015; Jenks, 2000a).

Taking the above into consideration, a pertinent topic is whether the same taxonomy, the same types of density and the same emphases as presented by Boyko and Cooper (2011) would be as relevant in Global South contexts. As can be seen in their review, many studies tend to apply a delimited approach, discussing a restricted number of qualities or base the assessment on a narrow empirical material, and research is also carried out from within a number of separate disciplines or discourses. This paper therefore aims to provide an improved understanding of the wide spectrum of compact city qualities in support of better planning, governance and management of cities in the Global South. The objective is to present a review of more current articles discussing the compact city to capture similarities and differences in the academic discourse between Global North and Global South contexts, and to outline an extended compact city taxonomy.

The next section describes the methods used to carry out the review, followed by an account of the results of this review. The results are then further analysed and discussed and some conclusions are presented at the end of the paper.
METHOD

This article reviews research articles based on a distinction between texts focusing on the Global North and the Global South, respectively. One methodological difficulty is that the division of the world into the Global North and the Global South is not clear-cut. Additionally, cities in these two contexts have both similarities and differences (Jenks, 2000b). The same goes for cities located within the Global South, where e.g. population density means very different things for the quality of life depending on the quality of housing and infrastructure, where one city can be seen as efficient (e.g. Hong Kong) and the other as overcrowded (e.g. South African townships) (Jenks, 2000a). Acknowledging this caveat, it is still of interest to compare research by taking a North—South distinction into consideration.

In this study, the “DAC List of ODA Recipients” (OECD, 2014) is used to set a boundary around the Global South group of countries. All countries on this list are seen as part of the Global South. However, so-called BRICS countries listed as “Upper Middle Income Countries and Territories” (i.e. Brazil, China and South Africa) are separated out to facilitate sensitivity analysis, the argument being that their large economies possibly result in urban development patterns and interests similar to the Global North. However, as the BRIC country India is listed within the “Lower Middle Income Countries and Territories” category, it is seen as pertaining to the main group of Global South countries.

The study looks at the various types of qualities that compact city policies or compact city environments deliver – or are supposed to deliver. These qualities are also inferred from different types of challenges purportedly addressed by such compact city policies or environments. The study hence focuses on the substance of planning (Faludi, 1973) rather than the processes of planning that may deliver such qualities.

The analysis is based on a literature search in the Scopus database carried out 13 November 2015. The search term was “compact city” and the time period was set to 2014-2015. Journal articles discussing urban compactness only using other terms, such as “dense city”, “mixed-use city”, “liveable city”, “smart growth”, “smart city” or “resilient city” were therefore not captured. Even so, 85 articles were identified and a first scanning of their abstracts deemed them all being relevant for the study (see Appendix). For six articles, only the abstract was analysed due to language problems, the full text being in Japanese or French. Four articles were unavailable for different reasons. The first scan also revealed that quite few articles studied the Global South as defined above. An additional scan of articles from 2012-2013 using the same search term was therefore carried out to add more articles with an empirical focus on the Global South.
A review of all papers was carried out, sifting out what terms are used to label purported (or debated) qualities of compact cities, or conversely the challenges compact cites are seen to address. The number of “hits” for each term was registered and the terms were clustered into main categories to facilitate analysis. In this way, it was possible to calculate aggregated results for each such category with regard to number of “hits”. The articles were also sorted according to the geoeconomic context of the study (i.e., Global North, Global South or generic), as well as according to whether they were review papers or research papers (based on empirical studies). This was to support the comprehension of how the “hits” are distributed across different Global North and Global South contexts and understanding of whether the “hits” are based on theoretical (reviews or state of the art) or empirical studies.

RESULTS

All in all, 84 articles were reviewed, i.e. 81 articles from the period 2014-2015 and three additional Global South articles from the period 2012-2013. Out of these 84 articles, twelve has an empirical focus on countries on the Global South as defined above, i.e., Ecuador (1), India (3), Jordan (1), Malaysia (3), the Middle East (1), Serbia (1), Thailand (1), and Vietnam (1). Of these countries, all but two (India and Vietnam) are found within the “Upper Middle Income Countries and Territories” category. The three BRICS countries are covered by 14 articles: i.e., Brazil (1), China/Hong Kong (11), and South Africa (2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of urban qualities</th>
<th>Terms used in the articles</th>
<th>Occurrence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>Population density, Population size, Population growth or decline, and Population mix</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built Structures A:</td>
<td>Density in general, Building density (e.g. floor space index), Site coverage, Residential density, Residential floor area, Building heights, Number of public facilities, and Open land suitable for development</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings and Functions</td>
<td>Land use in general, Mixed land use, Intensification of activities, Regeneration and/or reuse of brownfields, less Land consumption for urbanization, and Efficient land use</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built Structures B:</td>
<td>Urban form in general, Monocentric, polycentric or corridor development, Non-sprawl, and Network density</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings and Functions</td>
<td>Mobility and accessibility, less Congestion, Short distances (walkability, bikability), Access to green space, Less cars, and Efficient public transport</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mix</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built Structures C:</td>
<td>Green/blue areas in general, smaller Ecological footprint, less Habitat fragmentation, more Green roofs/walls, and more Ecosystem services,</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connectivity, Morphology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built Structures D:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access, Transport</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Twelve main categories of compact city qualities are identified based on the clustering of the different terms used in the reviewed articles (see Table 1). This also means that all the “hits” in the articles for the different terms can be linked to these main categories to see which categories are emphasized in the articles. Figure 1 shows the distribution of terms for compact city qualities across the twelve main categories. This analysis is based on a quantitative aggregation of the number of “hits” found in the reviewed articles. It also includes a sensitivity analysis by shifting the BRICS countries Brazil, China and South Africa to the Global North.
Since the results shown in Figure 1 are based on both literature reviews/state of the art and empirical studies it is of interest to single out which compact city qualities are actually studied empirically in Global North and Global South contexts (see Figure 2).
[Figure. 2] Radar chart showing which compact city qualities were studied empirically, based on a quantitative analysis of number of “hits” in the reviewed articles. The BRICS countries Brazil, China and South Africa are shown separately. The BRIC country India is included among the Global South countries. Numbers are converted into a uniform scale for comparison and are therefore not numerically comparable.

**ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION**

Although the review results presented above are based on articles from a delimited time period, they can still serve as a starting point for a discussion around the concept of compact cities in relation to urban planning for the Global South.

A first observation from the review results presented above is that there are few articles discussing the compact city in Global South contexts. Although 26 out of 81 articles studied urban challenges in countries on the DAC list, only twelve of these articles can be seen as studying the Global South if the BRICS countries Brazil, China and South Africa are not seen as pertaining to the Global South. It is even more notable that only four papers are from poorer countries on the DAC list (i.e., “Lower Middle Income” or below): Vietnam and India. Out of the 194 identified articles in the “compact city” literature search from the years 2012-2015, only one article about poorer Global South contexts remains (Vietnam) if India, being a large and emerging economy, is put aside. Evidently, this is a poor reflection of the calls for a

Second, the review revealed twelve main categories of urban qualities, where some are clearly dominating the debate and studies in the reviewed articles (see Figure 1). Around half of all terms used in the articles pertain to different dimensions of built structures, while 1/4 to 1/3 are related to issues, such as health, liveability, social interaction and justice. Possibly, this is a consequence of the origins of the compact city notion from debates around transport efficiency (Newman & Kenworthy, 1989) and containment of urban growth (Hall, 1974). The little interest in urban adaptability linked to the compact city concept is surprising, since the diversity and complexity emphasized in many of the articles also are key aspects of the increased urban resilience (Ahern, 2011; Marshall, 2012) in dire need in many Global South cities to respond to pressures from climate change, migration and natural hazards.

When compared with the review by Boyko and Cooper (2011) presented above, the slim interest in urban nature can be seen in both studies: 7% in the Boyko and Cooper study versus 8% in the present study (see Table 1). Other categories are more difficult to compare since they are not very compatible. Still, the 19% share of “Built Structures D: Access, Transport” in this study is not at all matched by the 1.75% share of “mobile material form” in Boyko and Cooper, while Built Structures A, B & C in the present study (all in all 33%) is comparable with 41.22% “built form” of Boyko and Cooper, especially if some of the “Built Structures D” items possibly should go into this category. Boyko and Cooper’s “people” category (46.49%) is the most difficult to compare with the findings of the present study, since it appears to cover a number of our categories, i.e., “People”, “Health, Environment”, “Quality of Life”, “Socioculture” and “Economy” (all in all 36%). Aspects linked to “justice” and “adaptability” seems to be missing in the taxonomy proposed by Boyko and Cooper while the present study does not include the governance issues mentioned by Boyko and Cooper. All in all, the main difference between the two reviews seems to lie in an emphasis on social issues in the Boyko and Cooper’s review covering a selection of articles from 1976 to 2011, while the 2014-2015 articles reviewed in the present study have a stronger focus on built structures.

Third, Figure 1 also shows that the twelve categories are present in research on both Global North and Global South contexts. One interpretation could be that many terms used in articles linked to the Global North also are relevant for Global South contexts and vice versa; that they to some extent are generic. Another understanding might be that this instead reflects a remaining hegemony of Global North theories (Lwasa & Kinuthia-Njenga, 2012), leading to less appropriate or even obsolete theories dominating the debate around urban issues in the Global South. Either way, Figure 1 indicates that there are some differences between Global North and Global South contexts. The focus on built structures is less accentuated in Chart B (Global South including Brazil, China and South Africa) compared to Chart A (Global North) in favour of quality-of-life and sociocultural issues and justice.
When looking at Global South contexts excluding Brazil, China and South Africa (Chart D) this becomes even more evident and also health and environmental issues grow in importance, consistent with research emphasizing the need for justice, social cohesion and improved service delivery in Global South cities (Arku, 2009; Horn, 2015). In the reviewed Global South articles, important qualities mentioned in relation to health and environmental issues include improved public health (Abdullahi, Pradhan, Mansor, et al., 2015; Kotharkar et al., 2012), e.g. through less air and noise pollution and increased physical activity (Hermida et al., 2015; Kotharkar et al., 2014); less environmental degradation (Kotharkar et al., 2014; Wang, 2014); and mitigation of climate change, e.g. through less use of fossil fuels, especially for transport (Abdullahi, Pradhan, Mansor, et al., 2015; Kotharkar et al., 2014; Radulovic et al., 2015; Wang, 2014; Zhu, 2012) – all of these being as relevant for Global North or BRICS country contexts. However, the discussion around passive solar design (Kotharkar et al., 2012) and the need for direct sunlight as main source of light (Freewan et al., 2014) may be extra relevant for informal settlements in the Global South. Also the availability of open space to alleviate effects of disasters (Zhu, 2012) may be of particular importance in Global South neighbourhoods with high plot coverage ratios.

In terms of quality of life, functional and attractive open space is mentioned in Global South articles (Bardhan et al., 2015; Hermida et al., 2015) as well as identity versus anonymity and isolation (Kotharkar et al., 2012), crowding (Kotharkar et al., 2012; Zhu, 2012) and correspondence with the preferences of inhabitants (Shirazi & Falahat, 2012). Of the sociocultural qualities, social relations, social cohesion, diversity and vibrancy are mentioned by many of the Global South authors (Hermida et al., 2015; Kotharkar et al., 2012; Kotharkar et al., 2014; Zhu, 2012) but again, these urban qualities are as relevant for Global North cities. Still, processes of gentrification (Wang, 2014) is can be especially fierce in low-income cities and, in times of increasing migration, social equity between current and new residents (Zhu, 2012) becomes critical in Global South cities. In the area of urban justice, inequality in general and unequal access to mobility and services are listed in relation to Global South contexts (Hermida et al., 2015; Kotharkar et al., 2012; Shirazi & Falahat, 2012) but not emphasized to the extent expected in relation to the literature in general (Arku, 2009; Horn, 2015; Murillo, 2001). Surprisingly, the need for economic development in cities of the Global South (Horn, 2015) is not matched in the Global South articles through an emphasis on how compact city policies impact on the urban economy. Research on Global North and Global South cities have similar levels of interest in the economic aspects of compact cities, e.g. for expenditures, vitalization, workplace densities, property values and tenure costs. Still, some particular Global South qualities are discussed, such as poverty, availability of banking facilities (Bardhan et al., 2015).

Moreover, the interest in urban nature is alarmingly low in Chart D, indicating poor impact of concepts, such as urban ecosystem services (TEEB, 2011) on ongoing urban research in the Global South. Looking more closely on the qualities mentioned in Global South articles in relation to urban nature, most of them seem quite generic, such as short distances and access
to urban green areas and green hinterlands (Kotharkar et al., 2012; Radulovic et al., 2015) and the preservation of green space for supply of ecosystem services and support of biodiversity (Hermida et al., 2015; Kotharkar et al., 2012). Promoting urban nature as part of the preservation of open space to improve urban light conditions (Freewan et al., 2014) can be seen as more specific to Global South settlement conditions, when characterized by high plot coverage ratios. Surprisingly, only one Global South article mentions urban agriculture (Kotharkar et al., 2012), which is generally seen as vital for food security in the Global South (UN-Habitat, 2012b).

Fourth, Figure 1 indicates a 50-50 balance between qualities linked to Built Structures on the one hand and other qualities on the other. However, when looking more closely at the empirical focus of the 84 reviewed articles (see Figure 2), the empirical studies do not reflect such a balance. It seems like urban qualities linked to Health/Environment, Quality of Life, Socioculture and Justice are mentioned in the articles (i.e., in the state of the art) but are not studied empirically. This pattern can be seen in all three groups of studies (Global North, Brazil/China/South Africa and Global South). Also, when looking at the empirical studies, the differences between Global North, Brazil/China/South Africa and Global South research contexts become more evident (see Figure 2). Global North articles have a strong focus on demography (People), mixed use (Built Structures B) and mobility and accessibility (Built Structures D), closely followed by land use (Built Structures A), morphology (Built Structures C), wellbeing (Health, Environment) and financial issues (Economy). The BRICS country studies (Brazil, China and South Africa) share the interest in the built environment (Built Structures) and especially mobility/accessibility (Built Structures D) but place less importance on social issues (Health, Environment, Quality of Life, Socioculture and Justice). However, urban greenery (Nature) stands out as a key issue in these studies.

As can be seen in Figure 2, the empirical studies of the Global South articles strongly emphasize mixed use (Built Structures B), where some of the qualities seems fairly generic, such as “land use diversity” (Abdullahi & Pradhan, 2015: 27), “mixed use land composition” (Kotharkar et al., 2014: 4253), containment of urban growth and share of open space (Hermida et al., 2015), and “availability of workplaces” and “availability of housing” (Bardhan et al., 2015: 60). Other qualities may have particular relevance for Global South settings, e.g., how “individual households encroach upon the open space” (Zhu, 2012: 82); the importance of “public attraction point (…) such as mega malls, markets, and places of worship” (Abdullahi, Pradhan, Mansor, et al., 2015: 22), and “light penetration at street and ground level” (Freewan et al., 2014: 39). The Global South articles also studies mobility/accessibility (Built Structures D) widely (see Figure 2). Urban qualities of importance for the urban poor include proximity to various urban areas (residential, commercial, industrial) and functions (community and recreational facilities), and to roads, infrastructure and public transportation (Abdullahi & Pradhan, 2015; Abdullahi, Pradhan, & Jebur, 2015; Abdullahi, Pradhan, Mansor, et al., 2015; Kotharkar et al., 2012), all of these potentially leading to improved walkability (Kotharkar et al., 2014: 4253). Other issues of
Global South relevance include “congestion” (Kotharkar et al., 2014: 4253) and “public transport availability” (Bardhan et al., 2015: 60) or “accessibility” (Kotharkar et al., 2014: 4253).

Global South empirical studies are as indifferent to urban green (Nature) as the Global North articles (see Figure 2), which is surprising in relation to critically important urban food security issues (UN-Habitat, 2012b). However, one article examines distance to agricultural fields (Abdullahi & Pradhan, 2015) and another article highlights the importance of “how open and green spaces can be created to enhance biodiversity” (Zhu, 2012: 78).

When looking at empirical studies of wellbeing (Health, Environment), liveability (Quality of Life) and social issues (Socioculture), there are surprisingly few of these in Global South contexts whereas there is a slight peak on urban equity (Justice) (see Figure 2). There is also a significantly smaller share of studies of health and environment aspects of urban development than found in the Global North and Brazil/China/South Africa articles. This is, once again, unforeseen when taking into account the burden of disease in low and middle income cities (Rydin et al., 2012). The reviewed articles focus on different types of pollution, such as how to improve air quality (Bardhan et al., 2015; Kotharkar et al., 2012) for example through improved air ventilation through dense informal neighbourhoods (Zhu, 2012), lower noise levels (Kotharkar et al., 2012), less waste (Kotharkar et al., 2012), and reduction of heat island effects (Radulovic et al., 2015). When it comes to quality of life, a number of issues with direct relevance for Global South contexts are listed in the empirical studies: effects on the existence of slums, crowding, provision of drinking water and drainage, and provision of healthcare and education (Bardhan et al., 2015; Kotharkar et al., 2012). Socioculture was studied empirically in Global South contexts in relation to “social interconnectivity” (Bardhan et al., 2015: 60) and “autonomous micro-communities” (Shirazi & Falahat, 2012: 251), where the latter may be especially relevant for informal settlements.

Even if Justice has a slight increase for Global South studies in Figure 2, any comparison with existing disparities in Global South cities would deem the current extent of empirical studies as highly inadequate. Still, the one article sees “social equity” (Zhu, 2012: 86) as a key quality of compact cities, defined as adequate supply of housing to increase affordability in combination with clear land rights and another study has investigated urban justice in terms of “percentage of area of slums in a ward” (Bardhan et al., 2015: 60). Urban economy is closely linked to urban justice since “more economic benefits than costs are present in high-density areas, especially in less developed countries” (UN-Habitat, n.d.: 3), although market failures and unjust policies may shift those benefits towards the wealthier segments of the population. Economic aspects are therefore critical components of compact city qualities, but again, comparably few of the empirical Global South studies deal with this important topic (see Figure 2). In the limited studies, the share of dwellings having electricity or upgrading to better cooking fuels is seen as a key issue in informal settlements (Bardhan et al., 2015). Also,
“residential land parcels (…) equipped with infrastructure and facilities should be efficiently utilized to maximize the provision of housing” (Zhu, 2012: 85).

Finally, although climate change, migration, economic crises and disasters are high on global policy agendas (UN-Habitat, 2015; World Bank & GFDRR, 2015) there is very little empirical interest in urban resilience (Adaptability) in all three research contexts (see Figure 2). Only one of the Global South articles studies resilience at all, and then quite tangentially in the form of market and state failures (Zhu, 2012).

CONCLUSION

This paper presents an extended taxonomy of compact city qualities, including twelve categories: People; Built Structures A (Buildings and Functions Density); Built Structures B: (Buildings and Functions Mix); Built Structures C: (Connectivity, Morphology); Built Structures D: (Access, Transport); Nature; Health/Environment; Quality of Life; Socioculture; Justice; Economy; and Adaptability. Since this taxonomy revealed gaps and weaknesses in the current research agendas linked to Global South cities, it appears to be a valuable addition to earlier taxonomies.

Moreover, based on the findings in this literature review of compact city articles from 2012-2015 it seems evident that compact city research aimed at cities in the Global South should focus more on qualities linked to Nature, Health/Environment, Quality of Life, Socioculture, Justice and Economy (see Figure 3). There is a significant field of empirical studies in need of further research to balance up the current focus on research linked to built structures of different kinds. Of course, research on built structures in Global South contexts need to continue and expand, but is possible to argue that there is a need to shift focus from generic compact city qualities to qualities more directly linked to urban qualities relevant for compact cities in the Global South.

Compact city qualities linked to urban Adaptability appear to have been even more neglected in recent compact city research. This is highly alarming since increased urban resilience is crucial to prepare cities for imminent and growing challenges linked to adaptation to climate change, natural disasters, economic crises, as well as to mounting migration due to conflicts, climate change, natural catastrophes and poverty.

Finally, it may also be reason to take the findings of this review as a motive for revisiting Holman et al. (2015) and their division of compact city discourses into those of conviction, suspicion and pragmatism. Dominant discourses of conviction and suspicion from the Global North may well have influenced compact city research agendas globally to inflict the imbalances observed in the review presented above. A more reality-based (and pragmatic)
approach to the definition of research tasks would potentially orientate Global South urban research towards a better response to critical and endemic socioeconomic and equity challenges.

[Figure. 3] Radar chart showing the need for a broadening of empirical Global South research into a number of compact city qualities: Nature, Health/Environment, Quality of Life, Socioculture, Justice and Economy.

REFERENCES


Jenks, Mike (2000a) 'Conclusion: The Appropriateness of Compact City Concepts to Developing Countries', In Mike Jenks & Rod Burgess (Eds.), *Compact Cities: Sustainable Urban Forms for Developing Countries*, (pp. 343-350). London, Spon Press.

Jenks, Mike (2000b) 'Introduction: Sustainable Urban Form in Concepts to Developing Countries?', In Mike Jenks & Rod Burgess (Eds.), *Compact Cities: Sustainable Urban Forms for Developing Countries*, (pp. 1-6). London, Spon Press.


Satterthwaite, David (2010) *The Role of Cities in Sustainable Development*


UN-Habitat (2012b) *Urban Patterns for a Green Economy: Working With Nature*

UN-HABITAT (2012c) *Urban Planning for City Leaders*, Nairobi, UN HABITAT.


APPENDIX

Assumed Qualities of Compact Cities
N-AERUS XVII
Göteborg, 16th – 19th November 2016
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A33</td>
<td>Improving the performance of light weight multi-residential buildings: Nourishing compact sustainable urban form</td>
<td>Sustainable Cities and Society</td>
<td>Empirical</td>
<td>Architecture, urban design, regional planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A34</td>
<td>Creation of future urban form: In future urban form: In future urban form: In future urban form: In future urban form: In future urban form: In future urban form: In future urban form: In future urban form: In future urban form: In future urban form:</td>
<td>Journal of Environmental Engineering (Japan)</td>
<td>Empirical</td>
<td>Energy efficiency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- **Assumed Qualities of Compact Cities**
- **J-H Kain, J Stenberg, M Adelfio, M Oloko, L Thuander, P Zapata, MJ Zapata Campos**
- **N-AERUS XVII**
- **Göteborg, 16th – 19th November 2016**
### Assumed Qualities of Compact Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Conference/Event</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Keywords</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Additional Papers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Conference/Event</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Keywords</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Building the city from below: bodies and everyday practices of security, livelihood and morality
Chair: Adolfsson & Marie Thynell

The Ideals and Realities of Urbanization: The Ghettoization and Abjection of Sex Workers in the Mumbai Industrial Agglomeration. Rajat Shubhro Mukherjee, University of Nottingham

Unboxing the urban sociability and the political common sense in Colombia. A geographical ethnography for peace building in a deeply divided society. Luis Berneth Peña, Universidad Externado de Colombia.

Disjunctive infrastructures and fractured subjectivities in Maputo’s periphery. Ilda Lindell, Dpmt of Human Geography, Stockholm University.

The Ideals and Realities of Urbanization

The Ghettoization and Abjection of Sex Workers in Mumbai

Rajat Shubhro Mukherjee

Graduate Student Master of Public Administration
University of Nottingham
lqxrsm@nottingham.ac.uk
rajat.shubhro.mukherjee@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

In a perfect world, development speaks of a progressive movement beneficial equitably to all sections of the society. However, in reality it has been seen that the process of urbanization and inclusive urban development, as a practice of city planning and management, do not accrue equitably and justly to all the stakeholders. A process of Abjection takes root exists together with the progress that urban development purports. What thence form are ghettos that serve as moral spaces within a geographical parlance and house such actors who are integral, yet a segregated population working within the Urban Centres which are perceived as growth engines. The practices here reveal the fulfilment of the aspirations of a certain class of actors within the urban space who are perceived as politically active, while overlooking and overshadowing the moral spaces which consist of such other players who are trapped within those semi-permeable urban “Moral Bubbles”, as a result of planning and governance practices.

This paper discusses the existence and growth of such ‘bubbles’ in the rapid urbanization of Mumbai and its surroundings, taking specifically in context the spatial existence of Commercial Sex Workers, inquired through a cultural and socioeconomic study of them within their habitat. Places like Thane, Bhiwandi around Mumbai are industrialized urban and peri-urban spaces that have seen quick economic growth but an equally quick abjection and oppression of the commercial sex workers who are now relegated to spaces which are evidently morally labelled and hence developmentally marginalized compared to the rest of the city.

KEY WORDS:
Commercial Sex Worker, Trafficking, Morality, Space, Moral Bubble, Segregation,

INTRODUCTION:

Morality and Space:

Spaces are produced as a population interacts with the physical world around them, carrying with themselves a burden of collective experiences, social and spatial practices, and the perception of reality, reality of daily life and the built life around them. The interaction, as according to Lefebvre, is dialectical (Lefebvre, 1991). What is being proposed here is that in the growth and evolution of
civilisation the interaction, one of conflict or cooperation, of human beings with their existing space creates the means to produce further spaces around them. This progress can be loosely charted by understanding the cultural roots of a civilisation and the change in their daily and built lives, or what Lefebvre calls, Daily Realities (of Routines) and Urban Realities (the routes and networks that link places for work, pleasure, and private interactions) (Lefebvre, 1991). This evolution of space is closely tied with the collective thought process of the civilization, bearing stark colours of their ideals. Like the Great Bath of the Indus Valley Civilization gave a glimpse of the practice of both congregation and segregation in the cultural and spatial practices of the people. Similarly, even till today, the conception of space, especially the urban space, reflects deeply the cultural, social, and political shades of the civilization.

"Wer mit Ungeheuern kämpft, mag zusehn, dass er nicht dabei zum Ungeheuer wird. Und wenn du lange in einen Abgrund blickst, blickt der Abgrund auch in dich hinein" – Aphorism 146 (Nietzsche, 1886). It loosely translates to, “He who fights with monsters might take care lest he thereby become a monster. And when you gaze long into an abyss the abyss also gazes into you”. Perhaps Spaces are such monsters of human civilizations.

These spaces are a looking glass for morality as these spaces are built by and in return, shape further moral values. Representational Space, are spaces that symbolize the ‘inhabitant’ and the ‘user’, and the depiction of such spaces, as art, or stories, or ideals by artists, authors, and philosophers (Lefebvre, 1991). These symbols bear signs of a simultaneous process of experience and conception of space, overlaying the physicality of the space, by those who exist, temporarily or permanently, in such spaces. However, a question thus arises, what is the concept of morality in this context? In a descriptive sense, Morality is a bare form of codes and rules governing existence within a society. This definition allows for the existence of an individual’s interpretation of morality and moral values and also existence of the individual’s morality under the larger form of morality. In the normative sense, morality bears a qualifying condition that all rational persons, under certain specified conditions, would endorse the norms laid down by that code (Gert & Gert Joshua, 2016). The idea here is that human experience as a result of their interaction with each other and with their spaces, create codes of social conduct, which then help replicate similar experiences of human and space in the future. The process of creation of resultant spatial and human experience also reflect the change in human experiences in the past, if that past bore incidents of enough gravity to bring about paradigm shifts in moral values (like war, disease, etc.). Although such a fundamental entanglement between morality and space reflects evolutionarily, the effect of both moral progression and regression from existing standards magnify with time, the extrapolation of changes to cultural practices. So, what might begin as a process of quarantine, might take the shape of ghettoization in future. Or, what may begin as a revolution might become a norm or a routine in future. History is replete with such examples of intertemporal escalation of incidents to belief systems. One such example is of the creation of a morality around Prostitution or Commercial Sex Work (CSW) and how their space has evolved. This study looks at the spatial experiences of Commercial Sex Workers in Mumbai, and the Mumbai Industrial Agglomeration which includes Thane. The morality not only shapes or shaped the region vis-à-vis the city, but created social stratification within the locality itself, especially in Kamathipura, which is Mumbai’s oldest and Asia second largest brothel area.
Morality and the Urban Growth of Mumbai:

The Journey from “Bombaim” to Mumbai is an eventful one, which has changed the way the city behaves and recreates itself. A tussle amongst the Portuguese, the British, and the Dutch and later Mughals and the Marathas laid the foundation of the Mumbai we know today. A competition of sorts, the city of Mumbai is a testament to the “spirit altering the city and the city altering the spirit” cycle. After changing hands from one regime to another, it was lastly shaped by the East India Company in 1668. Bombay (as it was called then) was a deep water port which made it ideal for large vessels to dock and be a natural point for sea-trade. However, it needed fortification, garrisoning, and reconstruction, to create a larger trading area, the foreplay of City creation. Within 20 years the city was transformed into a bustling trading zone and docking area with Silk and Cotton being sent off from the ports at an ever increasing rate (British Library, 2006). It was still finding it difficult to compete with Surat, port city in the state of Gujarat, which held an important position in the history of trade of western India. Surat was the direct link of the Mughal Empire with the Safavid and the Ottoman empires in the west. With the Mughal siege of Bombay, the subsequent peace deal in Delhi left Bombay in shambles. So much so that lord Cornwallis even suggested demoting Bombay to the level of a Factory city. It took Bombay the beginning of the 18th century to recover from the damage. It took the underbelly of the massive Opium trade from East and West India to fix Bombay, and the sheer volume of trade, the burgeoning trade and commerce, and the growing aspiration of the city itself saw a sprawl rarely witnessed in the history of cities (Farooqui, 2006). This underbelly came with its own moral murk. Urban Sprawl, the uncontrolled spread of a city, a function of expanding population, economic growth, and better human networks across spaces, has been seen as a problem, for both the built and daily realities. The image of Urban Sprawl is that of a growing monster gobbling up things of existential and aesthetical importance, for example agricultural land, forest habitat, and open spaces which benefit the environment and the people. The over consumption of resources to support the sprawl is inconsistent with what is required for sustainable human existence. Moreover, it is considered detrimental to the environment (more the sprawl, more the distance needed to be travelled to reach business centres, hence more pollution) and also the built space as the sprawl happens at the periphery while the incentive to redevelop within the city itself diminishes over time (Brueckner, 2000). On the other hand capping sprawl would disproportionately affect the demand and supply of space in a city, inflating housing cost, especially in cities like Mumbai where the income inequality is immense and the housing costs are constantly expanding. This is inequitable and unrestful. So a policy measure here is a double edged sword.

However, what is interesting in all this is how the sprawl is not simply expansion of the city boundaries, or stratification within the city system. It is also an evolution of the collective mind of the city. But with sprawl and the lack of incentive to redevelop, and the rising cost of town maintenance, older cities suffer a sort of psycho-physical erosion. Dilapidated sites are not only
places of physical demise, but have psychological and social effects. Sometimes, the sites do not need to be dilapidated. A particular outlook in the city can be attributed to many things that shape perceptions. Influences of the power elites, policy makers, or institutions greatly shape how opinions in a spatial context are formed. For Mumbai the case of slums and of the red light district has been a similar story. Like the hatred of the high-rises of the Bandra Kurla Complex against the macabre of Dharavi, Asia’s largest slum. The formation of Dharavi is actually a good reflection of how spatial growth of Mumbai has added to the morality of spaces. What began as a settlement for rejects of the expulsion of factories and workers from the peninsular region of Bombay grew as a safe haven for those migrating into the city and looking for subsistence level housing. But it was not just a demand side issue, the demand of space. It is also a supply side issue, where the supplier of space (the society, the government, the power elite) defines who gets to stay and where (Nijman, 2009). For a city like Mumbai, the growth prompted the inflow of migrants getting pulled by the promise of a better pay. People searching for low cost shelters thronged in such holes in a bustling city. As the land prices soared and rent seeking became a norm, such holes in the city became ghettos of sorts.

The morality builds itself from the bias that the Middle Class Mumbai citizen holds against the Ghetto dwellers. Owing to a strong correlation between urban inequality/poverty and delinquency, the crimes perpetrated by the ghetto dwellers were attributed to their socioeconomic and cultural identity (Blau & Blau, 1982). Very soon the Ghettos, including Slums, Red Light districts, migrant labour camps, etc. were seen as centre for fostering crime, delinquency, and immorality. The ghettoization began as a result of spatial production and a non-inclusive outlook of policy makers. On the other hand, it is the same space that segregates them and creates a semipermeable bubble. The “inhabitants” of the semipermeable moral space bear a permanent mark of the moral stigma, while the “users” can shed the stigma once they dissociate from that space. This spatial stigma has far reaching effects, including a difference in access to public amenities, to health, to environment, to even the fundamental rights as guaranteed under the Indian Constitution. The history and the present of Mumbai and other megacities are replete with examples of such stigmatization, segregation, and oppression. An apt example of this would be the Kandapara brothel in Tangail district of Dhaka division. It is the largest district by area and the second largest by population. Kandapara is a legal brothel in a country with very low human development, large scale poverty, and dismal levels of education. The stigmatization, therefore, is very palpable and visible. The brothel is bound by walls separating it from the rest of the city. The compound also houses its own market system for commodities owing to the stigma of the location (Next Shark, 2016). As per reports by photojournalist Sandra Hoyn, the premises act as a separate sovereign entity. The women are denied rights that people outside the walls enjoy. They do not even have access to the same market forces as the outside world does. Their stigmatization is exploited by the local traders and retailers to bump up prices as they know the women cannot go out freely. This has been especially observed in the red light district of Mumbai. The spatial, moral, and social microcosm created within the walls of Kandapara is not only dismissive of the life inside; it also defines how the interaction happens between “inhabitants” and “users”. The following image shows the built space of Kandapara.
Methodology of the Study:

The study at hand uses both primary and secondary data sources to build the arguments presented here. Interviews were conducted at Kamathipura and Hanuman Tekri Brothel areas in Mumbai and Bhiwandi respectively. The questionnaire was open ended. The groups interviewed for the study were outreach workers in NGOs and other social workers, sex workers, and experts working for the development of sex workers in Mumbai and Maharashtra. The sampling method employed was non-probability purposive sampling, or expert sampling. The biggest challenge to the study was the availability of expressive sex workers in their own habitat.

THE DEVELOPMENT CONUNDRUM: THE NEXUS OF URBANIZATION AND MORALITY:

Urbanization as a Quarantine Tool and the Context of Mumbai:

This discussion must begin with an understanding of how the female commercial sex worker is viewed in the world, in other words, what is the symbolism behind prostitution. The Scarlet Woman, the Street Walker, or with whatever name she might be addressed, the nomenclature is deeply linked with a sense of degeneracy, contagious malady, and a source of licentiousness for the rest of
the society (namely cultured men) to fall prey to, quite the bourgeois outlook. On the other hand, criminalization and eventual persecution are seen as the just and moral stance of the state as it promotes moral sanctity to a constructive social existence (Hubbard & Sanders, 2003). The irony here is that the same society’s demands create the supply for sex work. In short, the brothel space is created from and produced by a strong relationship between the lives of sex workers and the “spatial strategies” adopted by the state, the judicial system, and ultimately by the society and community itself, through various groups (Hubbard & Sanders, 2003). What Hubbard and Sanders attempt to say here is that policy making and the morality attributed to commercial sex work together produce and shape the space. Consecutively, once the space has been created, morality and the space together govern how policy is shaped for that region. With morality as a pivot policy (or development) and urbanization keep changing sides.

Taking a leaf from Michel de Certeau’s seminal work of differentiating between tactics and strategies in the everyday life in a city, we can see how strategies are used to define normal and deviant behaviour and are used to bring order and discipline within the moral and immoral spaces (corresponding to the definition of normal and deviant). On the other hand, tactics are the actions of those who are trying to evade such distinctions and the consequent action. This evasion or this tactic uses space to the evader’s end, hence creating spatial identities and prospects (de Certeau, 1984). This is a segue to understanding what Lefebvre means when he exclaims that space is created by the society, where every society, and every epoch produces a space that allows their own reproduction (Lefebvre, 1991). Hubbard and Sanders, while referring to Lefebvre’s idea of space and morality, continue to draw a relationship between the ‘ordered spaces’ of the capitalist society and state and the ‘lived’ spaces of commercial sex workers, or as Lefebvre refers to them as the ‘inhabitants’ (Hubbard & Sanders, 2003). This need for order and the popular condoning it enjoys has become a mechanism for state control of commercial sex workers, based on a kind of social contract. The contract here prevents the population from the unwanted influence of the morally delinquent sex workers, while they give legitimacy to any state action to curtail their existence.

In the 1920s, a doctor, K.S. Patel, working on venereal diseases in the erstwhile Bombay had suggested residential segregation of sex workers with regular health check-up (a control mechanism) to prevent the flowing out of diseases. A similar sentiment still exists, in the 2000s when health policy experts and doctors are calling for physical segregating and monitoring of health conditions of sex workers, providing zones and licenses, keeping the outside world clean and undefiled. Ashwini Tambe recalls how one, Dr Gilada suggested the idea of zoning in 2004, surrendering to an idea to which even Dr Patel had surrendered, that men always need to vent their putative sexual drive (Tambe, 2009). This helplessness and the eventual recourse to segregation have been used time and again, mentioning how the demand for sex workers in this masculine world is inevitable. And every now and then the act of segregation is legitimized by a sort of fear mongering. Like in the 1930s the news of brothels masquerading as massage parlours and invading the city, led to mass panic and eventual segregation of European call girls, similarly, in the 2000s the brouhaha about Dance Bars in Mumbai being used to traffic women for sex caused stricter crackdown on Dance Bars, ironically forcing bar dancers to opt for commercial sex work as they were now as ‘malign’ in the society as sex workers themselves were. After the dance ban in the August of 2005 (on India’s Independence
Day) through the Bombay Police (Amendment) Bill, 2005, there was a mass exodus of almost 70,000 women into India’s unregulated sex industry. Most of these women were actually never a part of the flesh trade in Mumbai, but as ironies go, the reason why dance bars were banned became the last resort for those who lost their livelihoods (Mukherjee & Thomas, 2014). These periodic upheavals are common, in a way to refurbish the appearance of adherence to a strict moral code of civil existence. On the other hand, the same police are like a de-facto security system for the running of a smooth business environment in Kamathipura. The police and the ‘inhabitants’ of Kamathipura, who create the symbol of the Red Light District, live in this uncomfortable symbiosis, where the illegality of a brothel is overlooked, while the constables on patrol make an extra buck, while preventing street brawls from breaking out (Kundu & Satija, 2016). When segregation began in the 1930s, it pursued two main objectives, spatial segregation of sex workers from the rest of the world, as a strict moral code, and segregating the white or European sex workers from the brown or racially inferior sex workers, clearly demarcating where which race must go (Tambe, 2009). Ultimately the question arises as to how this moral segregation affects the community, the newly converted ‘inhabitants’ of the morally decrepit space in the city? Ideally the segregation was supposed separate out the potential pathogens (of both immorality and venereal diseases) and keeps them where they can be controlled. However, as it always happens in Darwinian evolutionary theory, what begins as a random mutation in one gene becomes a characteristic feature by diminishing all other features, this segregation became into a perception, and perceptions travel radially in all directions in the society, starting from the lowest strata of the society to the political system of the country judging the sex workers based on such prevalent opinions and therefore reacting to the situation in equal measure.

Development Approach to Commercial Sex Workers – A Spatial, Moral, and Economic Context:

There is a political and policy dichotomy to how development must happen in the red light districts in India, especially Mumbai. The dilapidation of an agreed upon moral code of conduct in these red light districts is more palpable than any other metaphor. The hypothesis here is that the perception that the red light districts bear and promulgate has caused these red light districts to suffer physically, as infrastructure, living standards, human right violations, and crimes within these areas are, on an average, starker and graver than the rest of the city. The people living inside these spaces (including past, present, and future generations of commercial workers) have a different future for them, no matter what course they take, unless the universes within and without meet constructively. This intergenerational transference of fate, due to an overarching moral branding of the population within the confines of these spaces now bears a multidimensional aspect. The issue is now political, medical, economic, anthropological, epidemiological, and ultimately psychological.

At the first glance, Mumbai is a city is many urban problems, like garbage, dilapidated buildings, sanitation problems, drainage problems, etc. As one steps into the urban ghettos like Kamathipura, and especially the bustling red light areas of Kamathipura, or Dharavi, there is a heightened sense of these graphic aspects of Mumbai. The buildings are rickety, almost on the verge of collapsing,
garbage and people are equally strewn around in the area, indistinguishable from one another. Usually in Mumbai, areas of commerce and trading are very dirty, owing to the large scale business and less incentive to invest in cleaning, however the residential places of the middle class or even the lower middle class is relatively cleaner than such places. The reality quickly changes when one enters into the ghettos of Mumbai, where abjection and the resultant malady are rampant. These ghettos resemble trading areas or small scale factories which churn human beings into some form of commodity, to be fed to other humans, very reminiscent of the famous line from the 1973, Richard Fleischer’s masterpiece Soylent Green, “Soylent Green is people”.

In the developmental context there surely is a major gap to be filled by the policy mechanism. As observations have been made time and again about the dilapidation of human life and infrastructure, it becomes clearer with time that this degeneration is caused by the way policy makers look at this particular area, and it is true for all red light districts, wherever commercial sex work becomes a means of subsistence and trafficking thrives. Western countries have, in the most part, become aware of problems, especially as the 20th century waned away. Countries like Netherlands, England, and other such progressive Western nations have set a way to achieve the unthinkable for a country like India or Bangladesh. In part the sheer number of sex workers is to be held responsible. On the other hand the extreme poverty and lack of skill building education together with livelihoods opportunities seem to add to the knot of issues here. As was seen with places like Balsall in Birmingham which suffered a similar situation in the late 19th and early to mid-20th century, red light districts, infamous as they can get, become marginal spaces, with limited scope of a deemed normal urban life and urban amenities (Hubbard & Sanders, 2003).

When the space of Kamathipura was conceived and created it was for the Kamathis, or wage labourers from Andhra Pradesh. As the dwelling area was both peripheral and near to the fort area it was of great convenience to create cheap housing systems with very less focus on comfort as it was meant to be for a class not deemed to enjoy similar luxuries of the White British natives or even the higher class Indians. With the outlook towards Kamathipura already of that of a closed system meant for people carrying contagions and diseases, it became more and more neglected. The moral erosion towards the region culminated into a physical erosion of the space, something that we see even today (Kundu & Satija, 2016). It is a popular belief, voiced by many NGOs that the place does not deserve the kind of growth and prosperity enjoyed by the rest of the city as it houses the contagion of immorality. In recent time, though, Kamathipura has seen a steady decline in sex work. It is akin to a grand demise of something that has existed for almost 200 years.
Kamathipura, besides being an area for pleasure, housing the White Courtesans, meant for the connoisseurs, was also a satellite region for the nearby affluent areas which were more known for their upright morality. The vagaries of those living in these affluent areas were assuaged in places like Kamathipura. The South Asian women were more or less concentrated in Mill areas which were slightly dirtier and less frequented by the affluence of the uptown man (Kundu & Satija, 2016). As India stepped into the postcolonial era, the Ghettoization increased, as the power elite wanted to regulate morality more rigorously. As India declared prostitution as illegal and remained extremely ambiguous about it in the statutes, Kamathipura grew and resulted in further ghettoization as it was seen a necessary evil (Kundu & Satija, 2016). It was a tolerated zone, but pegged on a meta-equilibrium of sorts.
The demise of Kamathipura can be attributed to something that once originated from Africa and quickly became the longest running pandemic in the world, HIV/AIDS. With AIDS breaking free and sex workers dying by the hundreds government and international focus shifted towards Kamathipura and other smaller brothels in the region. With NGOs thronging the place, it became a redevelopment petri-dish (Mukherjee & Thomas, 2014). This began in the 1980s, which also saw the death of the Mumbai textile mills, at the hands of mechanization. This great pandemonium, of the Bombay Mill Strike in 1982-83, the following unemployment, economic, political and social chaos, and the son-of-soil rioting in Mumbai, caused Kamathipura to lose its sheen and give way to abjection and further ghettoization as the well paying customers were replaced by the lower rungs in the class tussle of Mumbai (Kundu & Satija, 2016).
As more and more women were trafficking into Kamathipura, and Kamathipura was being surrounded by more and more redevelopment quests by builders, a 60 year period did not see much change in the living space of sex workers, except that it was converging and collapsing onto them. The feeling, one can assume, was the weighing in of skyscrapers of morality and concrete on the head of women (Mukherjee & Thomas, 2014). It went into a decline though. Rehabilitation and interventionist ideologies of NGOs made sure that Kamathipura lost its morally lascivious population of sex workers. However, what remained back suffered the worst of the ghettoization and abjection which shall be discussed in the next chapter. With burgeoning drug and alcohol problems and the looming demon of HIV/AIDS posed a great concern for the government arising out of Mumbai’s red light districts. Moreover the eye of the western NGO world turned towards the future generations inside these red light districts resulting in greater scrutiny and therefore greater victimization of the commercial sex workers (Mukherjee & Thomas, 2014). Even though, the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act, 1956 does not explicitly calls the sex worker a criminal, the moral outlook of the general populace deemed them such and with police crackdown imminent, it thwarted women to remain in the area. Even in adjoining brothels in towns like Bhiwandi and Turbhe, due to the inflow of minors from Bangladesh and also because of the cleansing drive of the government, women were being driven out of the business.
The greatest jolt to the whole discourse of ghettoization and abjection of commercial sex workers in Kamathipura and Mumbai as a whole was from a larger economic issue, rather than the usual social, legal, and moral aspects. It was not the AIDS or the drugs or even the future of the children of sex workers that led to the abjection and ghettoization. When closely observed, the ‘Property Regime’ was what that hit the last nail. With a space crunch in the coveted region of ‘South Bombay’, more and more developers and politicians were eager and more than willing to grab the undeveloped land in South Bombay. With high rises coming in right on the door step of the brothels it further led to the thinning down of good paying customers (Lewis, 2009). Most of the investment from the state went into redevelopment initiatives and passing on the land to private developers to build high rises and selling apartments at a premium to the growing middle class of Mumbai. Sex workers began living under more and more stress of making ends meet. It also became clear that the underlying fungible nature of government expenditure on development allowed many foreign NGOs, mostly faith based ones, to fund development initiatives, but with ulterior motives (Jha & Swaroop, 1999). The interventionist and abolitionist regime of these foreign aid messiahs caused the already inflammable situation to combust but burn on a low flame. Women were left hapless after being ‘rescued’ as they had no skills and convincing them to leave their addiction and affliction behind was difficult. Those who managed to stay back and muster the courage to return, returned to a world far more constricted and hostile (Mukherjee & Thomas, 2014).

NGOs like Apne Aap Women’s Collective (AAWC) and government programs like the National Rural livelihoods Mission began looking at an alternative to abolitionism. A discourse was made on a participatory, process driven method of development, which was a workable initiative as it did not end the existing work of the sex workers but motivated them to build skills, in order to prevent them from becoming traffickers themselves when they aged out. These flagbearers of change were also supposed to prevent the future generations to enter into this realm of darkness. The only problem was that this was not a popular method, and the results had a long gestation period (Mukherjee & Thomas, 2014). While skills were being imparted and best practices of the sex workers who actively gave up on sex work were being advertised, a lesser known work was going on the Kamathipura region. AAWC was working on giving a voice to the sex workers in the urban space they were living in. The developmental conundrum here is that the positive feedback loop of morality only thickens the quagmire. Banks refuse service to the sex workers, they do not get access to good schools or any public or for-public institutions outside their spatial constraints, and all this magnifies the problem of ghettoization and abjection in the contemporary city life. AAWC is engaged in allowing the sex workers to be a part of the formal financial institution, provides an outlet to the children of the sex workers to get educated and be able to access to the outside world. They are also working in placing sex workers, sometimes even anonymously as household workers, floor employees in local factories, etc. This is ideally the realm of the government, however, the government, quite like the faith based NGOs prefers cleansing the so-called murk than resolving the human problem. Gayatri Spivak famously said, “The subaltern cannot speak”, and it was visible here how Spivak’s idea resonated deeply as sex workers did not find voice in the development discourse of the new India. Their voices were misappropriated by the academia and the scholarly needs of feminists and otherwise who have grown distance from the actual needs and voices of the subalterns of the Mumbai’s urban space (Spivak, 1988).
THE MORAL BUBBLES OF MUMBAI’S IMMORAL SPACES: CONCLUDING REMARKS

Morality and space are unspoken yet strictly followed covenants of the city that has been built over a history of haste, opulence, and stark inequities. Debauchery of the paid kind was looked down upon, yet practices with impunity and aplomb. The duality of morality stems from a Foucauldian idea of sexuality which is nothing but the preoccupation of the bourgeoisie with furthering their bloodline representing a divinity, purity, and sanctity behind the idea (Mukherjee & Thomas, 2014). The Victorian bourgeois values were thrust upon women and their sexuality and it was considered necessary to keep it in a shackles. It is important to mention Foucault’s Apparatus of Sexuality which is characterized by four distinct elements, namely: 1) the Hysterization of Women’s body, where the women’s body was seen as replete with sexuality and essential in securing reproduction, 2) the Pedagogization of children’s sexual inquisitiveness, i.e. controlling their sexual urges through education, 3) the Socialization of procreation where procreative behaviour was introduced through economic incitement and restrictions, and 4) the Psychiatrization of perverse sexual behaviour which deems sexual debauchery as a pathological condition of the mind, hence labelling it as deviant and delinquent (Pollis, 1987). What was thus conceived was a semi-permeable moral bubbles characterized by spatial as well moral boundaries. There were a few things that would always remain inside the walls of the bubble, like the stigmatization of sex work and sexual debauchery of women, the inability of a sex worker to lead the kind of life people outside the bubble lived till the time she slept inside the bubble, and finally her economic freedom. Even though it would be unjust to call a sex worker economically free within the confines of a moral bubble, it is seen that most sex workers seldom survive outside the premises of the red light district, especially the ‘rescued’ ones (Mukherjee & Thomas, 2014). They neither make enough money nor so readily as they have in their profession inside the bubble itself. This is a characteristic property of the moral bubble. On the other side resides Lefebvre’s ‘user’ who carries the brunt of the stigma when he enters and remains within the bubble. Unless exposed publicly, none of the users carry back the stigma, albeit the ethical burden is unknown. Moreover, the entry and exit of the ‘inhabitants’ of the bubbles is also restrictive. Many sex workers who are trafficked into the business are usually paying of some sort of a debt of theirs or their families. The existence of this debt makes their movement in and out of the bubble involuntary for them. Once a certain period is spent inside the bubble the likelihood that the sex worker would come out is reduced exponentially as she is now trapped by various afflictions, like drugs, alcohol, and most importantly poverty, and many a times with the burden of a child born out of a professional mishap. Outreach workers have mentioned that many of these women sell their children even before they are born as most of the children that are born in the brothels are unwanted. It is a common occurrence that the daughter (or son) might live across the street but the mother does not visit as she has sold her daughter (or son). The fathers of these unwanted children do not carry the burden outside the bubbles semi-permeable walls.

During interviews many sex workers have expressed how they have to elevated cost of water, beds, and food, so much so that they might have to go without these basic needs for days. The day care centre run by NGOs is sometimes stormed by drunken sex workers demanding their daughters or sons to accompany then to their professional exploits. These children have to make a trade off, of
either staying with their mothers in the bubble or exploiting the semi-permeability of it and move out, but leave behind their lives. There are several success stories of mother and daughters making out of the business and the red light confines unscathed, however, they aren’t abundant. Sexual and emotional security is brought into the bubble, but seldom generated inside. Many of these sex workers have partners, or lovers, who are usually regular customers professing some kind of emotional connection with the sex workers. Many outreach and sex workers have said that these partners actively impregnate the sex workers as it allows them to have physical control on the women. Women allow this as they have to rely on these partners to experience a sense of emotional, financial, and to some extent physical security. Within the moral bubbles law and order also breakdown, giving the moral make-up of the world primacy over ethical and humane understanding of the same. The concept of rape in brothels is practically non-existent. The law treats the sex workers differently, denying them the basic human rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution. Constitutional ethics cannot permeate into an amoral or immoral zone, while making sure the walls of the bubbles thicken so that the debauchery and ill effects of what lies within the walls of the bubbles does not spill out to contaminate the already questionable morality of the middle class urban population. Women, with their children have to stay in rooms with one bed, either sleeping over the bed or under the bed depending on their ability to pay. With women getting paid, at times, even less than a Dollar for their services it is difficult to maintain a subsistence level existence. Even the sex workers in their early or mid-twenties do not find it easy to earn money as they used to earlier. As it was revealed in interviews at Hanuman Tekri in Bhiwandi, with the inflow of girls in their early or mid-teens, customers were moving towards them, making even the younger adult sex workers scrape for a living. The moral bubble also works as a cloak for the rest of the society to the inhumane conditions inside the brothels. These moral bubbles are barriers for perception, action, and even vision. The un-individuated class of people living inside the moral bubbles, be it the ghettos of the red light district, or migrant labour camps, or even the slums, are merely fuel to the growth of the city. Moral bubbles hence disembodify the humans within them to feed the tangible and intangible growth of humanity, while keeping the individuality, identity, and body of the ‘users’ intact. This alienation of the individual from body and identity is characteristic property of the moral bubble.

[fig.5 & 6] The commodity on display and the discontent of the moralistic population
Image Source: (Kundu & Satija, 2016)
The question therefore is what must be done? Should the government step in? Should a special plan be developed for the sex workers for social integration? Should the society outside the bubble be sensitized through education and outreach that the immorality is merely made-up? The society in which the sex workers reside does not consider discussing sex in general, as a very upright thing to do. Then how can we expect that they shall be get sensitized on the matter of Commercial Sex Work? Slowly, with education, the younger generation is getting sensitised towards the injustices of the business and also the fact that the business cannot be abolished cold turkey. However, the education is building a saviour complex within the generations, bolstering the semi-permeability of the moral bubble, that self-determination of the sex worker’s body, or access to human rights or civil amenities cannot be generated within the bubble itself and that the sex workers need a messiah from outside the bubble to come save the day for them. An armchair solution hence is not possible or even advisable. The destruction of the bubble must precede any attempt towards amends.

Bibliography


http://www.bl.uk/learning/histcitizen/trading/bombay/history.html


http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/


Unboxing the urban sociability and the political common sense in Colombia. A geographical ethnography for peace building in a deeply dived society.

Luis Berneth Peña
PhD in Social Geography
Universidad Externado de Colombia
lberneth@gmail.com

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to analyse the urban sociability in Bogota, a city marked for the insecurity and political sectarism. By using a tool research called “clocks of everyday practices” and interviews, the paper shows the socio-spatial dimension of this sociability. The first part introduces the concept of securonormativity, a term that designates a series of informal regulations that the surveillance practices print in the everyday interactions. These regulations are expressed in the spatio-temporal appropriation of the city, the speech acts, the body postures and the use of objects. The second section, presents the concept of “securitarian common sense” that serves to characterize the everyday philosophy of people about the security problems. Four features compose the securitarian common sense: a) strong anti-leftist postures; b) moral disengagement; c) interpretation of the “State” as permissive with the crime and; d) a geopolitical representation of the security problems. In the conclusion, we emphasise the challenges that the securonormativity and securitarian common sense impose for the peacebuilding. The study is useful to understand similar contexts in the Global South.

key words
Practices of surveillance; securonormativity; securitarian common sense, urban sociability.

Introduction

Which form adopts the interaction between the people, what Georg Simmel termed the urban sociability, in a city marked for the insecurity and political sectarism? How to grasp the socio-spatial dimension of this sociability in order to contribute to the peacebuilding process? Which ones are the challenges that face the conflict resolution in this context? These are the main questions that aims to debate this paper focusing on Bogota’s case. Due to the failure of the popular countersignature of the agreement between the FARC guerrilla and the government through a plebiscite, these issues become more relevant. The electoral abstentions, the manipulation of fears and the social apathy in the urban areas, were some of the main reasons of this result. In this context turn out to be imperative to describe critically
The urban sociability and the political common sense in the urban spaces in highly divided societies.

In order to treat these themes, we organize the paper in three parts. The first one introduces the concept of **securonormativity**, which we use to define the sociability that emerges from following informal rules of surveillance and protection. Such a sociability is recognizable in the spatial practices, corporal postures, verbal language, use of objects and in gender relations. The primary data of the everyday practices of security were collected with a tool that we called "clocks of everyday spatial practices" which we designed to report the exercised and received surveillance. This instrument allowed us to describe the relation between surveillance, fears and appropriations of space and time (see Figure, sample of a clock of everyday practices).

This tool, inspired by the time-geography (Dirksmeier and Helbrecht, 2008; Hägerstrand, 1985), is a clock made up of four concentric rings representing for domains: the first ring is the time expressed in hours from 0-24; the second represents the frequented places for one person; the third ring contains the exerted surveillance and the fourth one refers to the received surveillance. The exercise started by asking the people to list and draw the places in which they spend time regularly and how long they stay there on a day of regular activities. From this procedure resulted the recurring scenarios of interaction of one person on which people began to describe the exerted and received surveillance. We got 125 clocks which were treated in Atlas.ti. From the coding procedure we got a database of the practices of surveillance to which we applied different filters, thinking in intersectional terms.

The reading of clock’s database, led us to discover five jointures between the securitization practices and the appropriation of the space-time and, hence, the construction of the urban sociability. The themes are: a) the surveillance as transhabitus or superhabitus; b) the differentiated burden of surveillance on men and women; c) the public presentation of the body; d) the performativity of securitization practices d) the objects as actants in the strategies of securitization.

The second part introduces the concept of **securitarian common sense** which was the result of a series of interviews with inhabitants of four low income districts in Bogota. The semi-structured interviews revolved around the question of which ones are the sources of insecurity, how to deal the insecurity problems and who is responsible of providing security. The answers allowed us to characterized the people’s everyday philosophy about security, the state and violence, as well as to understand the social intolerance and the moral disengagement in a deeply divided society.

---

1 Unboxing is a term that is more and more frequently used in the social theory influenced in the sociology of associations or translations, the Actor-Network-Theory and the nonrepresentational theories. (Adolf, 2015; Callon, 1984; Latour, 2005; Ost and Nyberg, 2013; Thrift, 2008)
The third part discusses how the analysis of the securonormativity and the securitarian common sense are key issues for the deactivation of the mechanisms of political sectarianism and building peace in Colombia and similar contexts.

The securonormativity.
The securonormativity is a concept that we introduce to characterize an urban sociability in which suspicion and defensiveness are the hallmark of everyday of people’s interactions. This concept resulted from an analysis of surveillance practices in which we detail the spatial routines, the corporal postures, the gender differences, the use of objects and acts speech. In order to avoid the “obligatory use of Foucault’s arguments” (Pickett, 2005), that frequently overlooks the particularity of socio-political context and lacks of innovative tools to grasp the peoples’ experiences of securitization, we starting by analyzing what people actually do in everyday life using a methodology that we called clocks of everyday practices of surveillance. This methodology allowed us to detected how the individuals actively deploy strategies of security (exercise surveillance) and how these are also subjects to external controls and inspection (received surveillance) in diverse social scenarios such as home, work, street, public transport, bars, restaurants, banks, etc. The informal rules that give live to the surveillance and fear is what we called “the securonormativity”. As follows we present its main features, using the case of Bogota, Colombia. Nevertheless, some findings and specially the methodology may be useful for the characterization of securonormativity in other cities, especially, in the Global South.

**Surveillance and security state**

Living in a city like Bogota entails to incorporate a series of securitization practices that exhibit a pervasive intention of protection and surveillance associated with the fear of being a victim of crime or aggression. The clocks of spatial practices show that this *security intentionality* is incorporated in almost all social scenarios. Going out, staying at home, shopping after work or in the weekend, leaving the work late, the care of children, going on vacation, the public transport use or cycling, are all activities that involve an aware reflection about which protection strategy to deploy. The surveillance skills are, using Latour’s metaphor (Latour, 2005), "plug-ins" or complements learned and updated constantly in the interactions. In fact, there are as much surveillance “plug-ins” as interaction setting. These complements serve to dictate which is the appropriate behavior in every situation: which corporal attitude to adopt, the walking speed, the appropriate clothes to wear in a certain place, which is the best place to be sit down or stand up in the bus, etc. In spatial terms, the use of these skills intent not just to avoid threatening places, situations and people but to allow a fluid transit and a comfortable stay in the interaction scenarios.

Nevertheless, the surveillance practices and appropriation of space is not an unidirectional relationship (Küller, 1976; Nyman, 1999; Relph, 1976; Tuan, 1976). We found that the surveillance practices are embedded in the daily activities of people but at the same time, we found the possibility of perform surveillance strategies sometimes determines the decision of
carrying out an activity in a given place. Lofland, discovered something similar in his researchers on the publics spaces (Lofland, 1989a, 1989b, 1985)

The existence of multiple practices of securitization results in what Cindi Katz (2008) has called the “security state” composed of actions that, far from being banal individual acts related just with “to be careful” or “to be alert”, indicates how are embodied the fears that give life to a social and political regime. In the same vein, the extension of surveillance allows us to speak of the creation of a sort of securitarian "superhabitus" or "transhabitus" in the sense that the everlasting intention of surveillance permeates every interaction exceeding a specific field social life. Thus, the extent and amount of vigilant subjects and scenarios have become the securitarian practices a normal and enduring state of being.

**Patriarchal patterns in surveillance practices.**

The analysis of spatial practices of surveillance, shows that strategies of protection adopted for women express and reinforce the established frameworks of a patriarchal society in which women’s autonomy and freedom is poor. This is an issue that has recently begun to take interest in the Colombian academy and that runs parallel with the interest of distinguish the forms of insecurity and violence that women undergo in the city such as sexual harassment, rape and various forms of symbolic violence related to the social acceptance aggression against women, etc. (Corporación Sisma Mujer, 2013)

Women’s strategy of protection and surveillance have to do mainly with to be accompanied. Women say things like: “*You have to go out and come back escorted and with a triple blessing of your parents, who fears that the taxi driver makes you the millionaire walk²*(P23 Clock: M 11); “*I'm fed up of being paranoiac on walking in the streets*” (P12 Clock: M5); “*I try to go out always with a male friend to be relaxed and enjoy*”(P13 Clock: M6); or “*I always go out with a group of friends and I'm always alert of not separate myself of them*” (P65: M 25).

For a woman, do not be in company of someone translates into “*walk fast*” (Clock P22: H9), “*do not look at anyone*” (P96 Clock: M 29), “*not call the attention*” (P97 Clock: M 30), “*do not use the sidewalks but walk in the avenue to avoid people*” (P31 Clock: M30), “*give bad looks*” (P109 Clock: M32), “*make a face of bad temper*” (P31 Clock: M13), “*do not show fear*” (Clock P 1: M1), “*warning my parents where I am*” (P97 Clock: M 30).

---

² Translation of Paseo Millonario is an express kidnap modality.
³ This quotation corresponds to the information that clocks contents. For example, P23 clock:M11, means: person number 23, clock: M11, women number eleven.
In all cases, the message seems to be the same: a woman alone is "exposed" and her presence in public space needs to be endorse by the company of a man. As in other circumstances of the patriarchal regime, women require man’s company to be worthy of respect. This is expressed, among other things, in sexual harassment in the street, the permanent objectification that make many men of women. “I would like to be in place where I can walk without afraid of being looked with dirty eyes” (P65 Clock: M 25), “I feel that men look at me nasty” (P62 Clock: M 23), are some women’s expressions that we found in the clocks of practices. That confirms what a women organization states:

“for a woman to walk alone on the street in Bogota has become an experience of socially accepted sexual harassment. Indeed, sexual harassment on the streets is marked by the use of physical power, verbal aggression, the objectification of women's bodies and the absolute tolerance of passersby. People look so natural this kind of behavior that sometimes may even deemed as funny or like a form of flattery when actually it is a violent act” (Corporación Sisma Mujer, 2013, p. 51)

In this context of limited freedoms, women feel themselves more watched than men in their most familiar places like the house or the neighborhood. They talk about the close watch of thieves – “thieves are always lurking whom get distracted" (P100 Clock: M31) -, acquaintances – “I feel that the neighbors are observing me” (P65 Clock: M 25) and the families. The men’s discomfort with the received surveillance has to be of being viewed as potential aggressors and the frequent requisitioning and inspection of personal belongings. Some women, meanwhile, deem the received surveillance as an offense but at the same time, they can feel relieved by the surveillance. “At night when I do not feel vigilance, I worry about because it is a very insecure and lonely place with little police. I am relieved to hear the private security or the police on the street because I know that someone is taking care of me” (P100 Clock: M31), say a woman.

This tension between relief and discomfort produced for the surveillance, replicates what women experience before the presence of strangers. While to be alone on a site can produce fear and to be accompanied could be a source of relief, the presence of others requires distance and civil or polite inattention in order to be perceived as pleasant.

**Body postures: acting as a threatening and being irrelevant.**

According to the clocks of practices, the constant intension of protection drives people to personify a variety of body attitudes. At one extreme, a person can pursue to appear as defiant before the others in order to communicate that he or she is not afraid, deserves respect and,
in some cases, that she or he is a threat. Interestingly, that means that some people use negative labeling as a defense and protection strategy by adopting a threatening body attitude. This is an inadvertent dimension by Frank Tannenbaum, one of the fathers of the labeling theory, who noted in his classic book *Crime and Community*, that the way to break the spiral of crime was refusing to play the evil role (Tannenbaum, 1938). That attitude shows that the division between "bad" and "good" hide important interaction dimensions and that the embodiment of a particular attitude can be more complex.

At the other side, we found that people make all possible to pass unnoticed and become invisible for the imagined or real aggressors and before the potential watchers’ eyes as well. The purpose of this body attitude, the most common, is to be irrelevant by using active forms of surveillance averting. The function of this strategy is to camouflage oneself as just another one and becoming some kind of "gray mouse". The “embodiment of a gray mouse” translates into the adjustment of body (gestures, dress, haircut, etc.) to the dominant social patterns otherwise the person risk to become a target of the police, the private security, of the criminal organizations and offenders. This type of securitization strategy is especially based on the assumption that the offender is always watching. People say that "the thief is always observing to take advantage of any inattention". One woman held, “when the thieves watch someone distracted from outside of the bus, they get in to mug” (P97 Clock: M 30). At any time and place there are offenders that is why a man said to refer to that belief: “I can feel that the only one that surveil me is the thief” (P31 Clock: M13), said a person.

The invisibility strategy is revealed in attitudes, just mention few, such as “walk where there are many people” (P65 Clock: M 25); “preferring crowded places” (P11 Clock: H 4); “do not talk to anyone on the street and never do favors to strangers” (P97 Clock: M30); “walk fast without paying attention to the others’ problems” (P51 Clock: M20); “do not stop when someone approaches to ask for information on the street”, “ignore greetings” (P17 Clock: M8); "do not answer questions to strangers” (Clock P 3: H1); “do not wear skirt” (P62 Clock: M 23); “no use jewels” (P16 Clock: H6), “do not use cellphone in the street” (P56 Clock: M22), “do not use electronic devices and carry the bag in the front, not in the back” ( watch P21: M 10), “to have coins in the pockets in case a homeless ask you for money, do not sleep on the bus and never leave in view valuable things (P97 Clock: M 30).

The clocks analysis shows that the body is the primary means by which the everyday space-time is appropriated. Nevertheless, this appropriation is not always the reproduction of social patterns but there are practices to contest it. The women, for example, do no experience the space passively but actively produce it, define it and appropriate it. The daily and conscious use of protective strategies shows that women domesticate the urban space with courage and audacity. They have several skills to management the risk, to read the signs of threat and to use the scenarios of the city. They constantly seek to build autonomy and, more importantly,
by pursuing that they make the urban space "available" for other women. "Spatial confidence" of women can be interpreted as, have shown feminist geographers in other contexts, a manifestation of power that is socially reinforced when women go out and reclaim public space instead of staying at home (Koskela, 1997; Koskela & Pain, 2000; Wilson & Little, 2008).

Objects matters. Surveillance and actants

It is impossible to elude the relevance of objects and things in surveillance practices. As the clocks of everyday practices show, the presence or absence of certain things drive the people implicitly or explicitly to raises questions such as:

a) Do I have to protect this thing? How can I protect it?
b) Does this object help me in my protection strategy? How could I incorporate it in my security practice?
c) Does this object bother me or intimidates me? How do I avoid it and if I cannot evade it what can I do to manage the discomfort of its presence?
d) Serves this thing to observe and control? Should I ignore it?

The answer of these questions are actions or inactions such as: answering the phone in the street or on public transport, do not go to certain place because there is no illumination, wait for the bus at a specific location because there are no surveillance cameras, to be dressed in a particular way, the definition of meeting points with friends, to choose a transport mean, decide at what time come back home if one have taken the laptop, etc. That means that the objects are an active participant of the micro-regulations involved in the appropriation of urban space.

We return here to Latour because he has shown that objects are essential to understand the durability and reproduction of social interactions. He states that the social theory explains the durability of social ties by appealing to the “society”, or “social norm”, or “social laws”, or “structures”, or “social customs”, or “culture”, or “rules” and by supposing that these abstracts realities have enough steel in them to account for the way in which social ties are composed. “It is, indeed, a convenient solution but does not explain where the ‘steely’ quality of social ties comes from”. He argues that without taking into account the objects’ role, the social theory reproduces tautological explanations in which society is hold literally without nothing or for magical forces. Things, in terms of Latour and actor-network theory are

4 We refer to all sorts of things and objects used to display specific surveillance strategies. In all the scenarios of interaction, people make mention of security cameras; car alarms, homes, places of work; bars; bolts; keys; fetishes of good luck and prosperity (aloë vera plants, laurel grain, horseshoes, bible, religious images, altars); broken glass bottles embedded in the top of the walls; motion detector lights; chairs in public transport; chairs in restaurants, bars, lounges; the window on the bus; Transmilenio; taxi; bicycle; car; the exit of passengers; trained dogs and dogs in general; electronic devices; iPod; laptop; projectors; cell phones; portfolios; backpacks; lockers; curtains; emergency exit; clothes; shoes, jacket, trousers; skirt; pockets; jewelry; doorbells; guard post; money; street; sidewalk; police stations; motorcycles; bus stops; safety glass; desk drawers; entry card; computer; wallet; closed rooms; open rooms; list of emergency telephone numbers; closed set; helicopters; knives; parking lots; pepper spray, hand sanitizer, etc.
actants, that is, these are mindless participants in the action without which social actions would be in the air. (Latour, 2005)

This is coherent with what we found in the clocks of everyday surveillance practices, in which, for example, the protection of objects (cell phone, laptop, car, bicycle, house, land, personal stuffs in general) activates practices, forms of relationship with others and, of course, produce a particular landscape. In fact, Bogota’s scenery is composed of a wide range of actants settled to deter crime: grilled stores warning that there are few opportunities to steal there, barking dogs in the streets and on the houses rooftops alerting the presence of strangers, walls with embedded broken glasses; lampposts crowned with speakers and sirens to warn when something happens in the neighborhood; sentinel and surveillance sites, etc. All these are actants amid a network of associated objects targeting to promote safety.

**Performativity, speech acts and spatiotemporal appropriations in surveillance.**

One dimension that emerged from the analysis of clocks, is the relationship between the spatiotemporal practices of securization with the verbal expressions that people use to talk about how to be safe. In fact, in every single action or ordinary plan (to say hello and goodbye, talking about criminality and violence, in the recommendations to the children, the alerts given to the visitors, in conversations before bedtime, in the plans for the next day, etc.) persons often pronounce expressions, comments and warnings about how to be protected and elude the dangers of the city. These expressions can be understood as speech acts that may have several purposes like describe something, convey socially accepted meanings and regulate actions.

These speech acts play a central role in the creation of realities due to the fact that the peoples’ actions are founded, among others things, on the constantly repetition or quotation of verbal expressions or utterances. That has been studied from John Austin (1962) to Judith Butler (1997, 1993) by way of Guatari and Deleuze (1988) and Derrida (1977), whom have termed such a capacity of language to produce realities as the performativity of language. For Judith Butler, the performative speech acts take place in the framework of a regime of truth. She understands that the performativity is not an individual act in which one single person creates the reality by naming objects but, rather, as a social interaction grounded on the repetition of verbal speech that, under certain circumstances, reinforces and reproduces subjectivities and ways of acting. The performative power of speech acts, then, is derived from the ritualized repetition of the norms within a regimen of representations and power relationships, which seeks to reproduce, in the case of Butler interest, a body, sex and genre regime that she terms heteronormativity.
Among the expressions found in the clock of practices, the most common speech act was “to give papaya” (“he gives papaya”, “we do not give papaya”) that means giving opportunity that something negative happens. Although the use of this expression is widespread in everyday language and is used for multiple circumstances, one of its main uses is related to personal safety. When someone "gives papaya" means that this person is neglecting the basic "rules" of behavior that avoid her becoming a victim of an assault, a robbery or burglary. “Give papaya” is an expression that has several possible translations: allow something to happens as a result of negligence, carelessness, make blunders, overconfidence or because oneself exposed unnecessarily to the risk.

This expression has a power of “explanation” and justification of the occurrence of something wrong. People say, just to mention a few examples: "He was mugged because gave papaya", "I have never been assaulted because I never give papaya" (P98 Clock: H27). "At the beginning I was several times mugged in the street but now I do not feel any afraid because I give not papaya to the homeless, street vendors and beggars” (P19 Clock: M9). This use of the term creates a representation according to which there are many sources of danger.

By using this utterance (“It was stolen because you gave papaya”, is normal answer given even for the police when people denounced a theft) the individuals are explaining in a simplistic but effective way the insecurity. This kind of expression prevents the person to take distance from the insecurity problems and makes she think about the phenomena (subjects committing criminal acts) as the explainers of insecurity instead of thinking about the processes and relationships (economic, social, political, cultural ones, etc.) that are behind the constitution of insecurity.

Additionally, this expression serves to re-victimize somebody who have been subjected to an aggression. Indeed, to say that a person was assaulted or raped because she gave papaya, means that the victim is guilty because its inability to warn the danger or because it put itself in a favorable situation for the attackers. The skirt was very short, he walked alone in a dark place, she was sitting in the wrong seat on the bus, they did not put the backpack in a safe site, he forgot to lock the door, you forgot to activate the alarm, she put the money in the same pocket, etc, are expressions aiming to lay the blame on who has been the victim. Thus, the “explanatory” power of give papaya leads to reinforce the idea that it is not possible to appropriate in an alternative way the urban space otherwise one is invoking the dangers. Any alternative practice of appropriation means “tempting fate”, “put yourself on a silver platter”, "poking your nose where it doesn't belong.”

These utterances are twinned with other expressions that are referred to using distrust as attitudinal principle of spatiotemporal appropriation and interpersonal relationships. “The best defense is distrusting other people” (RelojP118: H 31), stated a respondent in clock of
practices. In a context plagued by expressions about what means "to give papaya" and a highly mediatization of insecurity events, the constant distrust is essential because “there are thieves who do not look like thieves” (P103 Clock: H30) or because “all are suspects” (Clock P 9: M3). That attitude is not just among the ordinary people but especially amid those who have as job to be distrustful, i.e., the guards, watchmen, policemen, janitors, etc. In all cases, distrust implies that people is asking directly or surreptitiously for "credentials" of good person to other who they interact.

Moreover, the attitude of permanent distrust is linked with the acceptance of vigilance, especially, amongst those who consider themselves as good citizens. They accept that mechanisms of surveillance as normal and deem an unguarded place as unsafe. The logic of this acquiescent attitude is that the surveillance mantle everyone and that is good because it includes those who are actually dangerous. The common utterance “if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear” serves to reproduce and justify the favorability toward surveillance.

This all utterances seems to be mere constatives speech acts intended to describe what people do when they are in every place of interaction. However, these speech acts show the solidification and approbation of surveillance showing precisely the kinds of effects of the repetition of utterance with a regulatory content and a meaning. That is precisely what the performativity of language signifies. Butler says “performativity must be understood not as a singular or deliberate "act," but, rather, as the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names. (Butler, 1993, p. 13).

Reassembling the securonormativity.

We introduced the term securonormativity to designate a dimension of the urban sociability in which the surveillance practices play a central role in the social interactions. We understand these practices of surveillance as the expression of a series informal regulations which permeates the scenarios of everyday life and that, thanks to the repetition and acceptance, give live to a form of being in the city. To use Simmel’s definition of sociability, we can say that the regulation incarnated in the everyday practices of surveillances give life to "the form taken by the play of associations of people". Simmel, moreover, proposed the following categories: a) with-one-another, in which prevails mutual cooperation; b) for-one-another, in which predominates the altruism and the feel of responsible and care for others; c) in-one-another in which people predominates the apathy or the blame of other; d) against-one-another in which there is an active attitude of mistrust and suspicion towards others; e) through-one-another ruled for the selfishness, the ambition and the competition between the people (Simmel, 1949 p 254).
But of what kind of association we are talking about? According to the clocks of practices, the securonormativity is composed at least of five intertwined or associated dimensions: surveillance intentionality, spatiotemporal appropriations, body performaces, speech acts and the use of objects. None of these dimensions of action comes before the other but rather they are a whole that shows the complexity of the regulation of which the securonormativity is made of. There is nothing in this set of dimensions that could be considered the central one or the excludable one without risking that the whole set of associations lose sense.

In the context of securonormativity, the intentionality -just to start somewhere in this association- consist of a permanent search of protection and an attitude of defense. This intentionality of surveillance sets up subjectivities founded in mistrust and indifference that are, at the same time, the negation of other social skills and ways of behaving like the cooperation and solidarity. The surveillance intentionality is reinforced and materialized in the individual spatial practices which are not just movements between sites but rather practices accompanied of speech acts without which the sense of action is not understandable. These speech acts, a far cry from being strictly individual, are regular quotations that guaranties the acceptance and reproduction of the surveillance rules. Together with the spatial practices, the intentionality and the speech acts, the secunormativity is composed of a corporal dimension. It comprises diverse body performances or ways of appears before the others that people execute seeking to accomplish a strategy of surveillance. Completing the web of relationships that make up the securonormativity, we have the objects and things without which it is not possible to known, thought or even talk about the surveillance. This is not a banal dimension of the securonormativity because, in a context of a high rate of thefts, people’s actions are related with the protection of something and with the use objects to apply surveillance strategies.

The securonormativity favors the mistrust and suspicion towards others, what undermines the solidarity and making the presence of the others a source of discomfort. Additionally, the securonormativity triggers a sort of vicious circle of technical and social inventions intended to extent the surveillance and monitoring making them a normal part in the functioning of all spaces. Hence the securonormativity is a major challenge for building positive sense of place in a city like Bogota.

In the next section we explore briefly how can be related the securonormativity with the political positions of the people.
The securitarian political common sense

As we said in the introduction, unboxing the urban sociability in the context of highly divided society entails to discuss the political ideas that people have about the security. For that purpose, we conducted a series of interviews in four low income districts of Bogota about three main themes: a) which are the sources of insecurity; b) how to manage them and; c) how is the responsible to tackle with this kind of problems. The treatment of this material allowed us to discover a social knowledge about the security that we called the securitarian political common sense. This notion of political common sense, comes from the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci, who understood it as the everyday philosophy of ordinary people, expressing the filtration of worldviews that shape practices, indicates the moral individuality, help to organize inter-relations between persons, justify acts and legitimize the social order (Gramsci, 1971, p. 125). This political sense affects the dimension of feelings and affections making people to defend or to attack actions which match with the prevailing believes and values. (Tapia, 2008, p. 103).

Before starting with the brief exposition of the four features of the securitarian common sense, it is important to mention that the people’s discourse about security issues was grounded in very elaborated notions coming from the mediatized political disputes. In that sense we found how the people adopted and adapted a prevailing narrative reproduced in the radio and television to their particular experiences of insecurity. As follow we describe such the features of this political common sense.

The first feature that we found in the interviews was that the interpretation of about the security problems and social conflict as a dispute between left and right political perspectives. People account their closer security problems as something instigated by "the left" that they understand, in short, as an ally of all type criminality. This is not a new interpretation due to fact that the internal armed conflict and a fierce National Security Doctrine, have managed to install the idea that communism is an enemy that lurks inside and outside the country (Aranguren 2009). The Democratic Security Policy of Uribe Velez (2002-2010) succeeded to use that thinking pattern to renovate the political sectarism.

We found anti-leftist positions which attribute the problems of insecurity -and the problems of the whole city and the country- to "the left," a term associated not only with political parties but with human rights NGOs, trade unions, public university students, groups of hip-hop, graffiti artists and local social organizations. In the anti-leftist opinions, this heterogeneous group are allies or members of the guerrilla which is the major source of insecurity. They understand that these groups that make up the "left" are always in the side
of criminality and are seeking to impose a regime, presumably, system based on immorality and corruption.

Some people, for example, blame the “left” of the existence of sale drugs sites. A person stated that this sites “were the idea of the leftist Carlos Gaviria (judge of the Constitutional Court) who defended the decriminalization of personal dose and the free development of personality. This people are evil! Thanks to this father land and his wonderful ideas, we are full of drug dealers” (A. Guzman, respondent, Ciudad Bolivar, 2011)

The second feature of securitarian political common sense is the social intolerance. In the reply to the question about how to do to deal with insecurity, we found answers openly advocating authoritarian measures as "social cleansing". This kind of views are grounded in a division between good and bad citizens and the dehumanization and moral disengagement, as well (Bandura, 2002; McAlister et al., 2006). We found a narrative that use a disinfection language, the manipulation of comparisons, the denial or attribution of responsibility over others, minimizing the harmful effects of the actions of some, at the same time, maximizing the blame of others.

This following statement exemplify this kind of posture. The respondent is talking about the thieves and drug addicted.

“Well, my opinion is that only a minority can be rehabilitated. I don’t want to sound fascist, but I think the ideal is the persecution and eradication of those lost in drugs. In botany and zoology, when a community becomes infected, individuals receive treatment; if this treatment is ineffective, they have to be separated from the rest. If that’s useless, specimens are sacrificed to save the rest. After that, you can work in the social, education and bla, bla, bla. For now, it is useless to do that with all these rats. Homelessness and crime must be punished and extirpated. We pray someone like Uribe can help us to exterminated this dregs of society once and for all” (F. Botia, activity is not declared, 25 years old, 2011).

A third aspect within the securitarian common sense is that the people considers the system of justice and the rule of law as a procurer of crime or as a barrier to obtain rapid and effective security. In this logic of thought, "the State" is considered as weak or constrained actor because of the laws and groups that within the vey State defend the human rights protection. This idea reinforces the previous feature that deem plausible the use of own hand or vigilante justice. Additionally, some people mentioned the police corruption as one of the reason because the insecurity is a pervasive problem.
Some people believe that the insecurity is the “result of a "whore justice" which wants to convert all crimes in non-jailable offense and that is not able to separate the criminals of the society”. This same person stated that the city would need someone like the ex-president Uribe to solve the security problems.

“If you do not pray for an exemplary solution for the insecurity, the city will be soon a big site for sale drug. Let’s throw all of which cannon be regenerated ... I think that now we need that Uribe use their best men to give us a hand with this problem” (D. Martinez, merchant 2011).

The testimony is interesting because it shows that the former head of government is perceived as someone trained to solve a security problem because his capacity to break the law and using "best men" in order to make a violent campaign against the insecurity as if it were an avenger.

The last feature of the securitarian political common sense is that it includes a spatial representation of the external policy configuration and the relationship with neighboring countries. While references are mainly national, the effectiveness of this everyday political philosophy derives from the possibility of extend the classifications, such as friend or enemy, to other countries. That is why we can say that a political common sense is composed, as well as, of a geopolitical common sense. Interestingly during the Uribe administration this common sense arose as a capitalism-communism confrontation. The people expressed it as the existence of an apparent alliance between the local left with the international left (Cuba, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua).

“Behind the drug sites in the city are FARC militias. They control the drug production in the country and the domestic market. The rest they sent it to their partners in Venezuela, Ecuador and Nicaragua” (Chinchilla, 2011 Storekeeper Location Candelaria).

Other respondent stated, “the left has ruined the city... that is the sign of socialist governments. Looks at Bogota. All these sons of bitch politicians that have let the insecurity grow are raised in Cuba (R. Montoya, Merchant Ciudad Bolivar, 2011).

These references are clearly a reproduction of the idea that has been built in the last decade in which leftist governments in Latin America are enemies of Colombia, and that they have been allies of the left administrations of the city. A synthesis of this idea is that leftist political leaders at local and regional level constitute a kind of axis of evil regional aims harm
Colombia and promote social project of the FARC. This notion, as simplistic as it sounds, is consistent with the hemispheric security doctrine which coalesced, since the early 1990s, the issues of drug trafficking and guerrillas in a single subject (Maihold, 2003).

It is important to mention that such a securitarian political common sense, while is the most frequent, is not a unanimous perspective. In other research, we found precisely a network of around 200 social organizations promoting alternative viewpoints about the security issues and developing political innovations on behalf of a non-authoritarian practices of the security (Peña, 2014).

Conclusion. The securonormativity and the securitarian common sense: a challenge for the peacebuilding.

In the current discussion about the peace building process in Colombia, the problem of the urban sociability is absent. In fact, when the political analysts try to answer the question of why the people voted against the peace agreement between the government and the FARC, they mention, for example, the political apathy and the lack of strategies to encourage the participation in the plebiscite. Nevertheless, is little known what constitutes the political apathy or from where the opposition toward a peace agreement comes. We think that the study of the securonormativity and the securitarian common sense contributes to answer in some extent these questions. Moreover, the transformation of the securonormativity and the securitarian common sense are plausible objectives in the perspective of building peace in a given society.

We show that the securonormativity represents a crucial challenge in the way in which the social interactions take form in the city, not just because this form of sociability blocks the possibility that the city can be an enjoyable space, but also because the securonormativity triggers the saturation of monitoring practices-technologies and the extensions of fears. In this sense, the securonormativity is a specific regime of sociability grounded in the surveillance but it is, at the same time, a source of the political subjectivation and a sense of place based on the fear.

Hence, the de-escalation of the securonormativity can contributes, not just to make the city and the encounter with the others a pleasant experience, but also to avoid that the fear becomes the fashioner of the political subjects. The task of de-escalate the securonormativity depends, of course, of reducing the criminality because this is the main source of fears and worries among people. But, as the analysis has shown, the inundation of surveillance is a kind of vicious circle that could be contested by permitting alternative appropriations of the space, way of talking about the security problems and, of course, alternative ways of acting
before the others. This is an exercise of resistance that can be found in women’s practices when they decide to defeat the rules of securonormativity by using the city in an unusual form: wearing what they want to wear, going out when they want to, claiming that they do not need a man to be respected in the public space. Their message, as a graffiti stated, “we [the women] want to be free and not brave in our way back home”

As for the securitarian common sense, it is a clear dimension of the political subjectivation that affects both the urban sociability and the possibilities of a peacebuilding process. The mark of these specific political common sense, as we showed it, is the political sectarism and the moral disengagement. These two features, which are deeply rooted in the political costumes, were exacerbated during the period of the Democratic Security Policy of Uribe Velez (2002-2010) and are fully operating so far. This political common sense is so present, that the campaign to vote against the agreement between the FARC and the government the 2nd October 2016, was based on the same ideas that we found in the interviews: the anti-leftism; the language that divides society between good and evil or bad and liberators; the idea of an international alliance to establish an immoral and communist regime in Colombia.

This securitarian common sense has been a normative process in which certain political figures have intentionally fed the fears and the prejudices on which are based much of the violence in Colombia. The interviews showed that people reproduce the discourses pronounced for public figures, what make them responsible of the conflicts derived of such a postures. Nevertheless, the study of political common and the securonormativity, by exhibiting the traits that compose the urban sociability in a highly divided society, can help to build strategies for counteract the mechanisms of its functioning useful for individual, social organizations and public policies intended to promote the peace.

The study has driven us to recognize that the strategy of building a new urban sociability should be based on knowledge, power and ethics axis. In the axis of knowledge because it is necessary to make circulate new notion of security in order to contest the common statement on which is founded the concepts, objects, understandings, representations of it and the surveillance. Rather than being the cause or originator of securonormativity and securitarian common sense, the personal practices are the effects of a given discursive practice or a group of statement that this study has detailed.

The task of building a new urban sociability has to do with the power axis because the securonormativity and the political common sense refers -like the power- to the manifold practices, rules, and relations which govern the human beings (Clifford, 1992). The practices of a person are an effect of power relation and that entails to recognize and question how
diverse institutions and the control apparatuses are reproducing the securonormativity and the securitarian common sense by establishing what is the permissible from the forbidden in the construction of a space of security. In this power axis is fundamental to show that this kind of sociability is also an effect of the dynamics and contradictions of the capitalist society.

Finally, the axis of ethics, in which individuals give form to their selves, to their lives, by forming the identity of themselves, is a fundamental part in the construction of a new urban sociability. In fact, securonormativity and the political common sense are essential dimensions of people’s identity because these helps to configure what individual says about “what is important” or “how to act” by following a kind of moral obligations or simply a norm, a series of rules. This study has precisely shown what kind of rules organizes the mode of subjivation resulting from the permanent surveillance.

Bibliography


Securonormativity and political common sense: unboxing urban sociability in a deeply divided society
L. Peña

Nyman, K., 1999. Activities in space-appropriation or use?

Interviews

Sanchez, Oscar. Interview, 2010. 12/19/2010- 15:34.
Building the city from below: grassroots movements Chair: Harry Smith & María José Zapata

*Insurgent urbanism in a colonial town.* Heidi Moksnes, Department of Social Anthropology, Stockholm University, Sweden.

*Trapped in another field: Mission drift when expanding a social initiative into a new city.* Ester Barinaga, Copenhagen Business School. Denmark.

*Urban commons in the neoliberal global order: commoning as counteraction.* Henrietta Palmer Chalmers Technological University, Gothenburg, Solano da Silva, BITS-Pilani, K K Birla Goa Campus, Iain Low, University of Cape Town.
INSURGENT URBANISM IN A COLONIAL TOWN
HIGHLAND MAYA AND THE CLAIMS FOR THE CITY

Heidi Moksnes

Affiliation
Department of Social Anthropology, Stockholm University
Heidi.Moksnes@socant.su.se

ABSTRACT
The colonial town of San Cristóbal de las Casas in the southern state of Chiapas in Mexico has the last decades experienced a rapid urbanization by Maya men and women from surrounding rural communities searching livelihoods. In different ways, the new settlers have been politicized by regional waves of indigenous mobilization, most notably the Zapatista movement, and share a critical gaze of the continued mestizo domination of town politics. The new shanty neighborhoods employ a deliberate informality, using and even expanding what Yiftachel calls the “gray spaces” of the city, and reject much of city authorities and structures. However, there are also marked differences between the strategies employed by the indigenous settlers to improve their marginalized position.

Some have established officially recognized forms for interaction between their neighborhoods and the municipal authorities to process the slow distribution of social services, and offer their political loyalty to the ruling party. Others, criticizing this strategy as “clientelist”, strive to exert political pressure through independent political organizations in order to be conceded rights. And some neighborhoods have taken an “autonomous” position in order not to be subsumed to what the inhabitants define as paternalist municipal politics, refusing to regularize their land holdings. Thereby not eligible for communal services, the inhabitants construct their own streets, sewage systems etc through pooled money and labor. In my paper, based on interviews with indigenous settlers of different positions, I explore these varying strategies, and in dialogue with authors such as Amin, Chatterje and Bhambra discuss the potentials and limitations of insurgent urbanism in relation to a highly differentiated sense of belonging and citizenship.

KEY WORDS
insurgent urbanism; citizenship; clientilism; rights; indigenous movement; autonomy; Maya; San Cristóbal; Chiapas
INTRODUCTION
In the present paper, I explore the rapid and massive urbanization by members an ethnic group which is highly marginalized, but where many hold extensive political experiences. To what extent are they able to affect their position as urban members; do they manage to alter their historically prescribed subordinated position?

In a recent article, Sheppard et al (2015) examine the current ‘urban century’ in terms of three revolutions. The second of these is of interest here (ibid: 1949):

Revolutions from below refer to the multifaceted contestations of global urbanism that take place in and around cities. The most visible of these are actions subverting urban spaces for subaltern purposes, transforming them into venues for popular unrest, resistance and revolution.

They further explain these subversive actions as “the quotidian actions of those pursuing politics and livelihoods that subvert the norms of mainstream global urbanism” (ibid: 1947). These are the type of actions I address in this paper, focusing on the actions by highland Mayas that within a short time period migrated to the central highland town San Cristóbal de las Casas in the southern state of Chiapas, Mexico. This urbanization lead to dramatic changes of the town, where the migrants are not just “adjusting” to urban structures but actively reshaping them, altering economic and social structures as well as, importantly, the ethnic composition of the town.

THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE OF SAN CRISTÓBAL URBANIZATION
Urbanization came extraordinary late to the state of Chiapas, a fact that has been attributed to “the state’s externally organized, export economy; the fact that its communications networks were always oriented outward; and its cycles of boom and bust in which no region or town became dominant until late in the twentieth century” (Rus & Morquecho, 2015: 23 note 4, referring to Viqueira, 2009). The town of this study, San Cristóbal de las Casas, lies at the center of the highland part of the state and was still in 1970 a small town of some 30,000 inhabitants of which principally all were mestizos. In the highland region around the town lives a rural indigenous, Maya, population in largely self-governed municipalities, each consisting of many small villages scattered over the hill-sides and an administrative and ceremonial center. The inhabitants of each municipality hold a distinct ethnic identity marked by their handwoven dress, that today principally the women wear, and their dialectical variation of one of the state’s seven Maya languages.

For centuries and up to the last decades, San Cristóbal has been a center for colonially structured mestizo control and use of these surrounding indigenous communities. The town had a central function for the role which the state of Chiapas played in national political economic, Chiapas’ economy organized around the nation’s demand for export products, produced on plantations with access to cheap indigenous labor from the state’s highland Maya communities. San Cristóbal was an important node for the conscription of Mayas for such work with private contractors. For many of the Maya men, seasonal plantation work had become a necessity to complement the families’ yields on their own small and meager plots. In 1970, as estimated by anthropologist and historian Jan Rus (2010: 6), “some 100,000 indigenous men – approximately 80 percent of the state’s entire adult male indigenous population – were migrating around Chiapas each year to serve on the lowland plantations.” Highland Mayas also came to San Cristóbal to sell their agricultural products, either at the state institutions designed to provide low but steady minimal prices for eg corn, or at the open market, as well as to buy merchandize they could not produce themselves. With the presence from the 1950s of various national institutions aimed at “developing” and “assimilating” Mayas into the Mexican nation-
state, and an explicit doctrine of regulating this process through bilingual indigenous middle-men as leaders of the Maya municipalities, San Cristóbal served also as a center for political control of the indigenous communities.

During this period, mestizos claimed and assured their exclusive right to San Cristóbal. The town was dominated by a group of influential families who in large controlled the economic, political and judicial affairs. Indigenous men and, more rarely, women, came to town for the economic reasons outlined above, to present errands and petitions at the offices of the national institutions, and to visit medical clinics. The presence of indigenous persons in town was highly restricted, first by law, and when abolished through national institutions from the 1950s, by local custom. Still in the 1960s, “indigenous people who found themselves in San Cristóbal at nightfall tried to get off of the streets and find a secure place – a church courtyard or the open patio of a patron – until morning or run the risk of being jailed for the night” (Rus & Morquecho, 2015: 82). Thus, the authors conclude, “the city maintained a strict ethnic exclusion of indigenous people, almost a kind of apartheid” (ibid). When I myself first came to the town in 1985-86, indigenous persons had to still step aside for mestizos on sidewalks, and were served after mestizo customers in stores.

THE INDIGENOUS URBANIZATION WAVES

The indigenous urbanization process did not begin until Chiapas was hit by a rural crisis starting in the 1970s when the plantation economy began to decline, which gradually forced Mayas to search for other means for income. From that decade, there is an increasing trend of Maya people from the highland rural communities moving to San Cristóbal, as well as to other towns in the state. In San Cristóbal, this indigenous urbanization is possible to distinguish into three separate waves. The first took place in the mid-1970s, when families who were religious-political dissidents were expelled by the leaders of their respective municipalities – where opposition was emerging against the by now highly dominant bilingual middle men who had gained unsurpassed economic and political wealth — and sought shelter and the base for new lives in San Cristóbal. Their arrival was accepted by the mestizos in town, the expulsions seen as unique incidences and the families as victims with nowhere to go (Rus & Morquecho, 2015).

The second wave of urbanization began in the early 1980s, as an effect of the crash of the Mexican financial system and the subsequent austerity program which was imposed as a condition for the renegotiated debts by the International Monetary Fund and the U.S. Treasury (Rus, 2010: 49). For a period, the oil boom in the 1970s had buffered the decline of the plantation work for Maya men who instead, to a certain degree, found jobs in the related construction and service industry. When also these jobs waned, San Cristóbal, where a tourist boom was slowly growing, became an option for many families; “For better or worse, acquaintances and relatives who had been 10 years living in the city had managed and seemed in better condition than when they had lived in the villages and communities. Almost all colonies [indigenous neighborhoods] that emerged after 1982 were established on land bought by indigenous entrepreneurs already living in the city” (Cañas, 2014: 350, referring to Rus 2009: 187).

The third wave of urbanization, however, was the largest, and started with the Zapatista uprising in 1994 which ignited indigenous mobilization by also by a broad range of indigenous and peasant organization as well as the followers of the Catholic liberation theological church of the region and, one could say, created a broad wave of indigenous courage throughout the state. Indigenous unrest had slowly developed since the 1970s among Maya villagers who were discontent with national politics, the continued poverty in spite of the promises of “development,” and the increased scarcity of land due to population increase and the diminishing possibilities to find alternative means for livelihood. A
broad range of indigenous organizations claimed now end to “paternalist” national politics, recognition of their ethnic, political and economic marginalization, and a range of rights, as indigenous peoples and as full citizens of the Mexican state. With the rebellion of the Zapatistas (EZLN), the protests became globally known and received wide support, which further increased the assertive confidence of all Mayas in rebellion. The uprising also sparked a series of land invasions of peripheral areas in San Cristóbal by different indigenous groups from the highland communities, first principally Zapatista followers, but also a range of other affiliates. The invaded tracts of land were commonly “unused” or used only for pasture, owned by the municipality or individual mestizos. On these lands, a large number of indigenous neighborhoods were formed, who today constitute the majority of all indigenous neighborhoods in San Cristóbal. To a significant degree, this third – and to some extent still ongoing – wave has influenced the overall indigenous life in San Cristóbal, and, as we will see, the way indigenous inhabitants approach their urban presence.

With the indigenous waves of urbanization, San Cristóbal has grown dramatically and is today a city of about 200,000 people (Rus & Morquecho, 2015). It has also transformed the ethnic composition of the town, from being almost exclusively mestizo to a situation where Mayas today constitute half of its inhabitants, probably more (ibid). The majority of the indigenous migrants still live in neighborhoods called colonias; “shanty town” neighborhoods around the city center, with none or only partial access to water, sewages systems, or electricity, and with limited presence of schools, health clinics and other facilities of public service.

HIGHLAND MAYA URBANIZATION: AUTONOMOUS AND POLITICIZED

Although the urbanization process from rural areas is exceptionally recent in Chiapas, the urban newcomers are no newcomers to politics. The perceptions these urban migrants are evolving of the social and political conditions in town are highly shaped by their long-term rural political experiences, whether in organized form or from every-day life.

In different ways, the new settlers have been politicized by regional waves of indigenous mobilization, most notably the Zapatista movement, and share overall a critical gaze of the continued mestizo domination of town politics, whether they politically sided with the Zapatistas, the various indigenous organizations, or the federal government and its succession of ruling parties. Most have direct experiences of a former patronizing state that many no longer regard as trustworthy, even defined as oppressor, and hold years of debating and developing different various strategies to resist such oppression and promote political change. Apart from a broadly shared criticism of the general government policies, the experience of many years of a corporatist, authoritarian national regime has bred deep distrust of representatives of the Mexican state. One such concern is the long-standing endeavors to create patron-client bonds among the indigenous poor, exchanging state resources for political loyalty with the ruling party. Many Maya residents in San Cristóbal express continue to suspect such strategies of municipal authorities and party leaders, making them unwilling to address them with their concerns. Another concern is the relationship that may evolve in any interaction between indigenous leaders and the state. This, likewise, is based on decades of state co-optation of indigenous municipal authorities, where these leaders were turned into caciques, local bosses who were no longer loyal toward their own villagers and sometimes amassed great political and economic power.

The invading groups of Mayas in the 1990s were usually constituted by people from different rural communities, but held, within each urban subgroup, shared political or religious adherences, commonly Zapatista, of course, but also non-Zapatista Catholics or Pentecostals (Rus & Vigil, 2007). Thus, the neighborhoods they formed on the occupied lands were characterized by these adherences.
Also the earlier waves of Maya settlers have commonly shared affiliations, primarily with different Evangelical churches. Thus, the indigenous neighborhoods were constituted by Mayas from different municipalities and linguistic groups but commonly formed quite cohesive communities, with a shared faith or political ideology. When this was not possible, they created translocal political or religious communities with adherents from a range of Maya neighborhoods, meeting regularly for church service or organizational meetings.

Commonly, they have also created communal forms for organizing their neighborhood that to a significant degree draw on their shared references of Maya village life, coming, as they do, from quite similar societies, both regarding socio-cultural contexts and economic circumstances. With long traditions from self-governed communities within self-governed municipalities, communal organization continues to play an important role also in urban indigenous life. Communal rural life commonly involved a strong emphasis of cohesion and similarity – contrasted with a mestizo outside world seen as repressive – and a political organization that both involved village assemblies for communal decisions making and the appointment of higher level leaders for shared municipal concerns; a memory of a cohesive past with shared religious ceremonies to assure the well-being of all, a past that sometimes is idealized (Moksnes 2012). Most, however, do also hold experiences of decades of intense political and religious factionalism and strife, dividing villages and families. This has implied that many lack trust vis-à-vis the political or religious positions of other indigenous groups.

The most central role for urban Maya life, however, is that of ethnicity – of being indigenous or mestizo, as two distinct groups where one is controlling the city since centuries, and the other arriving recently, and in increasing numbers, struggling to make ends meet. Overall, Maya urban residents share a strong sense of being different from mestizos, and, especially, of being regarded as different by these. They are used to being looked down upon by mestizos and treated unfairly by them, whether by officials, such as politicians and state personnel, or by merchants and employers, although many also hold experiences of individual exceptions. However, in contrast with the parental generations, many of the younger generations of urban Maya no longer regard a condescending approach by mestizos as something “given”, but criticize this in various degrees and forms. While their parents customary looked down when facing a mestizo, averting eye contact, they hold their eyes up and meet the gaze. Furthermore, urban life implies that many learn to speak Spanish rather well, even Maya women who in their rural communities rarely were exposed to the language, and develop greater ease in dealing with urban affairs and bureaucracies, as well as with street life and the continuous encounters with mestizos.

In consequence with all this, Maya residents of San Cristóbal have taken on urban life with an assertive stance, although sometimes in seemingly non-overt expressions. Through these different strategies and practice, Mayas are embarking on a gradual appropriation of the city, which is met by varying responses by mestizos and municipal authorities.

IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT MANIFESTATIONS OF INDIGENOUS CLAIMS ON THE CITY

To a significant degree, Maya city residents employ a deliberate informality, using and even expanding what Yiftachel (2009) calls the “gray spaces” of the city. Drawing on the sense of being defined ethnically as marginal outsiders, a general mistrust of municipal policies and regulations as being not in their favor, and a reliance on autonomous, self-constructed solutions, they have frequently organized things on their own, without checking with municipal authorities. This, then, constitutes a ‘politics of the urban everyday’ where the practices create ‘infrastructures of oppositional action’ (Sheppard et al, 2015: 1951-52, referring to Ismail, 2014).
A primary example of this is of course the invasion of land to construct residential houses and communally organized neighborhoods, invasions initiated with the political uprising in 1994 but which have continued in periods throughout the subsequent years (Rus & Morquecho 2015). As our interviews indicated, Mayas may also tap into municipal water pipes and power lines, either when their own neighborhoods still have not been granted the service, or when they consider the demanded price to be too high (cf Rus and Vigil 2007).

Furthermore, Maya street vendors have regularly seized urban space, whether sections of town squares, parks, sidewalks or streets, to sell their merchandize. This can be handicraft sold by women and children, food products such as vegetables or more processed food, sold by both women and men at areas commonly in extension of more formalized market areas, or a broad range of other items, produced or bought by the vendors.

From 1994, when the requests by aspiring Mayas to hold taxicab licenses were rejected by the state, a rapidly growing number of indigenous men began to buy cars and run them as taxis without formal authorizations. As described by Rus and Vigil (2007), there were 100 taxis in San Cristóbal in the early 1990s, all owned by mestizos, while less than ten years later, there were more than 1,000 taxis, most run by Mayas and without permits.

Since many of the indigenous cab drivers decided to carry weapons to protects themselves against the frequent attempts of robberies, and were interconnected by CB radio, they came in addition to serve as a form of indigenous police force for Maya neighborhoods as well as for Maya individuals being anywhere in the city, responding to their calls for assistance. Indigenous taxi drivers also protected invasions of market spaces made by other members of the same union – which are one of several indigenous unions of San Cristóbal that have emerged to protect the interests of their members (Rus & Morquecho, 2015).

These examples of oppositional urban action have been paralleled and strengthened by the evolvement of strong communal structures within the indigenous neighborhoods, especially initially, and of indigenous unions and organizations among especially vendors and taxi drivers. These have enabled the possibility to present communal voices and present collective demands to municipal authorities.

Furthermore, the assertion of indigenous interests has been advanced by the election of indigenous representatives for state assembly and municipal government, which until recently was solely composed by and representing mestizo interests. In 1994, Mayas in San Cristóbal assured with their votes that the founder of an organization among the first wave of urban migrants was elected for the state legislature (Rus & Morquecho 2015). The first indigenous member ever of the municipal government was elected in 1998, and thereafter, all candidates for the municipal governments had at least one indigenous representative on their list of candidates (ibid).

In spite of these assertive claims for the city, however, indigenous residents continue to hold a marginalized urban position, politically, economically and socially. This is apparent for all Mayas when they strive to assure their daily incomes through different forms of labor, and when they after their work go their homes to rest.

DIFFERENT NEIGHBORHOOD STRATEGIES FOR CLAIMING MUNICIPAL SERVICES

Most indigenous neighborhoods in San Cristóbal are, as stated above, multilingual and multicultural Maya communities. They share a basic social organization, each with an elected leadership in the form of a board whose members hold a variety of duties, headed by a so-called representative. The neighborhoods also practice assembly-based decision-making, through meetings organized by the board, and hold certain shared communal responsibilities, such as contributing with a small amount of
money for the funeral when an inhabitant have died. There are furthermore some efforts to control and defend themselves from crimes and other disturbances – such as calling for the indigenous taxi-“police” described above. However, there are also marked differences between the neighborhoods concerning the strategies employed to improve their marginalized position.

The inhabitants in most indigenous neighborhoods share, it seems, a profound skepticism towards municipal government and its political agenda. Consistent in our interviews, regardless of the political or strategic position of the person, is a strong notion of citizen rights, and an equally strong recognition that these rights are not granted in practice: people expressed a deep mistrust in official political structures and laws, and held that political mobilization and strong pressure is needed for anything to be achieved. Many also held a strong sense of indigenous urban identity and that indigenous inhabitants are politically and economically marginalized in the city. They described the urban mestizos, in contrast, especially those holding power, as dominant, arrogant and excluding. However, the inhabitants of the indigenous neighborhoods have taken a spectrum of positions on how to deal with their marginalized position within a spectrum between cooperating with municipal authorities to achieve improved living conditions, and emphasizing the need to be autonomous and independent from these authorities. To show on the variety, I will here describe three positions along this spectrum.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL COOPERATION WITH MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES

Some indigenous neighborhoods in San Cristóbal have established officially recognized forms for interaction between their neighborhoods and the municipal authorities to process the slow distribution of social services. The most consolidated form for such collaboration is held by forty-five indigenous neighborhoods in the northern part of the city which together have formed the so-called Colonia de Zona Norte. It emerged already in 1986 among only a few neighborhoods, and was still a small organization in the 1990s. In the beginning of the 2000s, however, it began to grow drastically to today consisting of 45 neighborhoods, in total perhaps, we were told, 30-40 000 people. The former representative of one of the neighborhoods described how this growth was enabled by actively recruiting neighborhoods.

We began to invite them; ‘We will get together, we will unite. Notice that we don’t have tubed water, we don’t have electricity, there is no sewage, there is a lot missing in your neighborhoods, they haven’t yet paved the streets. Because of this we have to unite.’ So I told the other neighborhoods.¹

In regular meetings between representatives of the neighborhoods of Zona Norte, it is decided which neighborhood is in turn to petition for municipal services, such pavement of its streets. This abides to the terms set up by the municipal government that the neighborhoods cannot present their demands simultaneously but have to take turns, presenting one demand at a time. While some of these neighborhoods were among the first to be formed by Mayas in the city, others were more recently created. Although the development of their neighborhoods are slow and tedious, many of the neighborhoods are today among the most developed of indigenous San Cristóbal.

Another of the representatives expressed that is it very hard to receive what the neighborhoods solicit by the municipal presidency, but a process that pays off:

¹ Interview in January 25, 2009.
It has been possible because we ask all of us together. The representatives are united within the 45 neighborhoods of the Zona Norte. It has been possible because of this unity. Even though of course all of it is not received in one year, but we take turns. He who’s turn it was first will wait for his next turn until later, until we all have had our turns. Then we begin again and that’s how we’re doing this. Some representatives are never absent at the meetings, others are sometimes, because they get bored and these sometimes miss their turn. Those who don’t get bored, they always get their turn, because of the effort they make. They’re always at the meetings, as if they’re always by the door, knocking, until the other get tired of hearing this and gives. That’s how it is.2

As an expression of their cooperation and political loyalty, most of the inhabitants of these neighborhoods, one of the leaders told us, vote for the party PRI in the municipal elections, the party that for 70 years ruled Mexico and all the indigenous municipalities in Chiapas. He described, how they at one time decided to support a candidate who used to belong to PRI but went to the municipal elections as candidate for the new party PAS.

An agreement was made in a big meeting, there they said ‘we’ll support Enoc.’ So all the people went with Enoc and voted for the party PAS, all those of PRI, PAN, the Green Ecologist Party, PT, all went with the party PAS. Why? It was with the intention to improve San Cristóbal, improve the streets that were in bad conditions, this, Enoc said in his campaign ‘When I become municipal president; I am poor, my parents are poor, I suffer like you suffer, and we will understand each other very well.” So he said, Enoc. But when he came into position, it was worse, he didn’t respect us. That’s how people returned to the official party. This made us reflect that it’s not the party that is bad, it’s the persons, the people, with their ideas. Although they start out poor, they are rich at the end, because of all the money they have robbed. They rob money from the people, the money that we turn over to pay our taxes.3

OPPOSITIONAL MOBILIZATION

Other indigenous groups, criticizing this strategy as being politically co-opted, strive to exert political pressure through independent political neighborhood organizations in order to be conceded rights. One such organization is COCIDEP - the Citizens' Committee for the Defense of the People (Comité Ciudadano para la Defensa Popular), which was formed in 1994 in the wake of the Zapatista uprising and have been part of various civil formations in support of the Zapatista demands. With members in both Maya and mestizo neighborhoods throughout San Cristóbal, COCIDEP holds regular meetings at both neighborhood and municipal level where the members discuss aims and strategies.

COCIDEP, we were told in our interviews, was formed to address the problems with the basic neighborhood services, primarily water, which resulted in an agreement with the municipal water agency SAPAM to offer a reduced price of water for those colonias’ who’s inhabitants, in exchange, clean the green areas of their neighborhood. The organization has furthermore struggled against the tariffs of electricity, considered too high, and the actuation of municipal authorities, as well to support the regularization of the poor indigenous neighborhoods still lacking formal recognitions. Like several other organizations, they have also protested against the planned privatization of Mexican oil and

2 Interview on June 24, 2008.
3 Interview on January 25, 2009.
other plans of both the municipal and federal governments, representatives participating in protest manifestations in various parts of the state and even country.

One of the neighborhood representatives of COCIDEP told us that they had mobilized people to join the organization by explaining that “it is only by being organized and united that we can demand things from the authorities, otherwise they won’t attend to our demands.”⁴ In this vein, the organization uses public manifestations like demonstrations, petitions and communiqués to exert pressure on the municipal authorities. The same representative explained to us the effect this has on the municipal authorities:

[They think] “with this group I need to be careful, because these come to shout at me, even though I’m an authority. Now they know their rights, now they know certain things. If I don’t fulfill, they’ll come and shout at me. And I won’t wait until they come shouting, it’s better I fulfill.” They halfway stop the conflicts and give some alternatives for solution […] This is the idea, but it has a lot to do with the pressure. Not so much by just being a group. It depends on the capacity to organize.

In contrast with Zona Norte, COCIDEP does not ally with political parties looking for supportive voters for the municipal elections, another representative told us:

In our organization, when they come and promise things, and then don’t fulfill this, we say in our organization that “how will we vote for those”? Because really there’s quiete a few who only promise and don’t fulfill. In our organization, some have gone to PRD, but in the actual organization, there is no religion, not political party, instead one is independent.⁵

A regular COCIDEP member told us that this position of independence vis-à-vis the political parties is important, and, she said, is highly different from the posture taken by the leaders of Zona Norte:

But they are the caciques, as we call them, they are those that sell themselves, to be bought by the parties. For example, the [party] leaders come to speak to them directly, “listen, I want to do this with you.” A candidate from PRI or PRD, they contact themselves directly with those of Zona Norte and those of Zona Norte pressure their people, “listen, we have to vote for this, they will give us metal sheets [for house roofs], they will give us this and…” whatever the candidate wants to give. So from there the pressure comes, and the people who then receive things, they say “well, we have to respect him because he gave us things and now we will give our votes.” There the pressure come from these guys [laughs]. Therefore we can say that they are caciques.⁶

AUTONOMOUS RESISTANCE

A third position, finally, is that of the colonias deciding that refuse any kind of exchange with municipal authorities, taking an “autonomous” position in order not to be subsumed to what the inhabitants define as paternalist municipal politics. Most of these colonias are composed by Zapatista

⁴ Interview on September 23, 2008.
⁵ Interview on August 12, 2008.
sympathizers, but some are not, instead for example liberation theological Catholics. They demand the right to the city – to take part of the urban residential as well as broader public and commercial space – and define access to water, electricity and other social services as their definite rights as Mexican citizens. However, they chose not to process these rights through what they consider corrupt and cooptive municipal mechanisms.

Thus, they refuse to regularize their land holdings, and are thereby not eligible to apply for communal services. Instead, they create their own, independent – “autonomous” – neighborhoods, and construct their own streets or sewage system through pooled money and labor. Sometimes they tap into existing nearby electrical wiring or water pipes. Some refer to such water as “autonomous water” in Zapatista style language, which, although ironic, contains a strong claim of having the right to such water, not accepting the tapping to be defined as a crime.

These neighborhoods are commonly the most politicized, and the most communally cohesive, with a strong internal social and political organization. Similarly to all indigenous neighborhoods in San Cristóbal, the inhabitants have an elected board whose members hold a variety of duties. However, the autonomous neighborhoods commonly hold frequent meetings for all inhabitants to discuss shared concerns, commonly every month or even more often, and often, these meetings have obligatory attendance: they impose fine – *multa* – on those who do not attend. The meetings decide, among other things, over the many communal labor tasks required to construct their own streets etc. This unity is further maintained by the fact that with the land “unregularized,” the inhabitants cannot sell their individual lots to outsiders, and therefore the neighborhoods will not receive new inhabitants with a range of political or religious adherences, or even mestizos who are considered to show lacking respect.

However, to construct the colonia’s infrastructure by themselves is very costly and requires much work, and it is slow in progress. Therefore, independent, unregularized colonias are notably in poorer shape than others. Also the houses are scantier. Without a land title, there is no legal protection of a family’s land claim that makes it worthwhile to invest in improvements of their house. The municipality maintains eviction as a constant threat over these colonias, although seldom implemented.

And eventually, most autonomous colonias appear to resign and initiate the process of regularization. The elected representative of one of these neighborhoods explained that the position as autonomous in the city was not possible to maintain in the long run:

> We are within San Cristóbal, and in one or another way we will fall into the hands of the city council, the [municipal] presidency. […] This colonia is not like the colonias that you find outside the city, like the ejidos. Those can be managed, because they have their unity. It’s different here. Here, when you want to do something, they attack you, the [municipal] president wants to rule, in one or another way they fuck you over.7

Thus, eventually also this neighborhood initiated a process of regularizing the land and to start petitioning for public services. But, the same man stated, the authorities give nothing without pressure, and this pressure requires organization:

> There are other neighborhoods that have advanced either, they have nothing, among these the neighborhood in front of this one. They can have nothing because they don’t organize themselves. The authority might pay attention if you arrive like a small ant, if not, it doesn’t pay attention. The authorities don’t just react, not without pressure. It

---

7 Interview in May 19, 2008.
is with pressure that you will receive attention. With no pressure they won’t attend to you.  

**THE POSSIBILITIES OF INSURGENT MAYA URBANISM**

The different strategies by the indigenous neighborhoods, as well as those by indigenous vendors and taxi drivers, could be described as examples of “insurgent planning” (Miraftab 2009), a counter-politics by the poor that take place in urban neighborhoods on all continents. It is a process that is partially controlled by the inhabitants themselves, recreating the urban space, contesting its uses, definitions and design, as well as the basis and forms for urban membership and participation (eg Roy 2009, Lindell 2010).

These indigenous claims on the city during these years have been met with varying attempts to control and limit the urban space that Mayas use. In periods, the municipal governments have used repression and control, for example evicting vendors from their selling areas, and sometimes, but more rarely, evicting those who have invaded land for residential purposes. Other periods have been characterized by a relative openness and a more “reconciling” attitude by the authorities, for example constructing new indoor markets for indigenous vendors, or creating so-called neighborhood councils that are to deal directly with the municipal authorities in order to “plan” and oversee the development of their neighborhoods.

Notwithstanding, the municipal response to the indigenous demands has been persistently slow and seemingly sporadic, difficult to predict and impossible to depend on, as our interviews gave many examples of. The interviewees furthermore testified that the municipal authorities and officials do not concede to indigenous demands without a lot and constant pressure from these, and that there are considerable risks involved with the different tactics that can be employed; risks of being used by political parties to serve their own electoral strategies with the promises forgotten after the elections; or the residents becoming tied to this party, obliged to show continued support and loyalty to assure the continued revenues, however slow, i.e. a continuation of former clientelist politics.

However, as Ash Amin (2013) emphasizes, to make the urban poor carry the burden of assuring the development of their living conditions is to leave those with actual power outside the balance:

> Insurgent or concessionary urbanism, depending on your point of view, involves an immense amount of effort, skill and commitment that the poor barely possess to secure ultimately sporadic, piecemeal and rudimentary rights and services. Most importantly, it speaks no truth to power, moved to act only at will under moral or political pressure (Amin 2013: 485-86).

In San Cristóbal, the lack of adequate response by the municipal authorities consistently hold Maya inhabitants wavering in a position between exclusion and inclusion of the realm of fully recognized urban citizens with the right to claim rights. Thereby, they are stuck in the “political society” described by Partha Chatterje:

> In my book The Politics of the Governed, I have described the form of governmental regulation of population groups such as street vendors, illegal squatters and others, whose habitation or livelihood verge on the margins of legality, as political society. In political society, I have argued, people are not regarded by the state as proper citizens possessing rights and belonging to the properly constituted civil society. Rather, they

---

8 op.cit.
are seen to belong to particular population groups, with specific empirically established and statistically described characteristics, which are targets of particular governmental policies. […] All of this makes the claims of people in political society a matter of constant political negotiation and the results are never secure or permanent. Their entitlements, even when recognised, never quite become rights. (Chatterje 2008: 58).

The continual trend by municipal authorities to treat indigenous city residents as marginal to the urban domain is related to how Mayas are perceived by the dominant mestizo population. Mayas are commonly not regarded as “innate” citizens of Mexico with the right to claim the same rights as “ordinary,” mestizo, citizens, but as a separate kind of national members in need to enter the sphere of citizens by showing their ability to handle what is required (literacy, certain behavior, etc.), and by their abandoning their “markers” as ethnic others; dress, language primacy, and major customs that distinguish them as non-mestizo.

This, then, is an expressions of the exclusionary character of citizenship, not just in relation to members of other nation-states, but also, sometimes, in relation to members of the same nation-state (Bhambra, 2015). This Bhambra argues, is “predicated upon a deeper, racialized structuring of the social world (ibid: 102).

However, with their different political methods, and, importantly, with a rather remarkable assertion of autonomy and agency, Maya city members have come to, in practice, stake out city claims, making the city increasingly theirs, independently of municipal authorities and resisting mestizo inhabitants.

REFERENCES


Cañas, Sandra (2014) Between Enchanted Town and Multicultural City: Citizenship Formations among the Mayas in San Cristobal de Las Casas, Chiapas, Mexico, PhD Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin


Trapped in another field

Mission-drift in a social venture engaged in a public partnership

Ester Barinaga1

Copenhagen Business School
eb.mpp@cbs.dk

ABSTRACT (Max. 300 words):
“I’m going to give you a memory blank” says the tall and coloured young neighbour in a threatening tone. To my “tough, hey?” he answers, “do you think that I don’t beat women?” A few minutes later, that same young man, together with a few others from the gang, are throwing stones onto Frida Kahlo Mural Art Centre’s large windows, breaking one of them. It is a sunny day in the beginning of June 2012 and Förorten i Centrum (FiC), the social initiative running Frida Kahlo, has been trying to get established in Seved (Malmö, Sweden) for the previous three months.

Förorten i Centrum is a social entrepreneurial venture started in Stockholm in 2010. Through collective mural art processes, the organisation engages in community-building efforts in order to nuance the defamed prevalent image of the stigmatised suburbs and their residents. By visualising in major outdoor walls alternative stories of the suburbs, FiC aims to counter the territorial stigmatisation of some of our most vulnerable urban suburbs (Wacquant, 2007). Through the collective production of large murals in public spaces, residents are organised and given a platform to raise up their voices. From its origins in 2010 till that summer of 2012, the organisation had successfully carried eight community murals in the Swedish capital alone. Expansion to Sweden’s southern city of Malmö proved more difficult though. Initially hopeful by the adamant support from the City of Malmö’s Administration, FiC did not realise that it had been co-opted by the field of City Management into addressing a social problem for which it did not have the resources nor the knowledge and which was beyond its original mission.

Taking FiC’s efforts as the starting point, the essay paper the potential risky life of social initiatives expanding to different cities. It uses Bourdieu’s notion of ‘field’ to analyse the varied stakes and differing logics of the actors involved in Seved’s conflict. Mission-drift will thus be considered as the result of the co-optation of the non-profit organisation by the field of city management, a field whose actors’ stakes differ from those of the non-profit. The analysis shows that the structure of the collaborating fields is particular to each context (the city of Malmö in this case) and thus, FiC’s expansion to Malmö is a reminder of the importance of understanding contextual forces and interests for expanding social initiatives to new urban contexts, even when these are in the same country.

KEY WORDS
Social venture, city suburb, public partnership, mission-drift
Trapped in another field

Mission-drift in a social venture engaged in a public partnership

“I’m going to give you a memory blank” says the tall and coloured young neighbour in a threatening tone. To my “tough, hey?” he answers, “do you think that I don’t beat women?” A few minutes later, that same young man, together with a few others from the gang, are throwing stones onto Frida Kahlo Mural Art Centre’s large windows, breaking one of them. It is a sunny day in the beginning of June 2012 and Förorten i Centrum (FiC), the social entrepreneurial initiative running Frida Kahlo, has been trying to get established in Seved (Malmö, Sweden) for the previous three months.

Förorten i Centrum is a social entrepreneurial venture started in Stockholm in 2010. Through collective mural art processes, the organisation engages in community-building efforts in order to nuance the defamed prevalent image of the stigmatised suburbs and their residents. By visualising in major outdoor walls alternative stories of the suburbs, FiC aims to counter territorial stigmatisation (Wacquant, 2007). Through the collective production of large murals in public spaces, residents are organised and given a platform to raise up their voices. From its origins in 2010 till that summer of 2012, the organisation had successfully carried eight community murals in the Swedish capital alone. Expansion to Sweden’s southern city of Malmö proved more difficult though. Initially hopeful by the adamant support from the City of Malmö’s Administration, FiC did not realise that it had been co-opted by the field of City Management into addressing a social problem for which it did not have the resources nor the knowledge and which was beyond its original mission.

Indeed, the City of Malmö had rapidly agreed to support FiC economically and administratively and it had resolutely asked the organisation to open a community centre in what later showed up to be the city’s most dangerous street corner. From March 2012, when FiC opened the Mural Art Centre, the organisation shared the corner made by Rasmus Street and Sofia Lane with a gang of young men who engaged in drug-dealing in broad day light. Unsurprisingly, the gang did not like to share the street corner with the community arts non-profit. That is, the threats and violence the organisation’s employees were experiencing were more than simply sign of spiralling violence in Seved, the neighbourhood where FiC had decided to establish in Malmö. Direct violence was the immediate, most visible aspect of the more complex problem the organisation was confronted with. In its efforts to scale-up by expanding into a new city, the non-profit had drifted away from its original mission. Seemingly inconsequential, the difference in goals and priorities between the non-profit’s new external stakeholders (the City of Malmö Administration) and the non-profit’s management team put the organisation into a course which was not the one it had set out to work with.

Taking FiC’s efforts to expand into a new city as starting point, the essay discusses the potential risky life of social entrepreneurial initiatives engaging in partnerships with the public sector. It uses Bourdieus’s notion of ‘field’ to analyse the varied stakes and differing logics of the actors involved in Seved’s conflict as well as in the public-private partnership. Mission-drift will thus be considered as the result of the co-optation of the non-profit organisation by the field of city management, a field which actors pursue interests and have stakes other than those of the non-profit. The analysis shows that the structure of the collaborating fields is particular to each context (the city of Malmö in this case) and thus, FiC:s expansion to Malmö is a reminder of the importance of understanding contextual forces and interests for the establishment and work of social entrepreneurial initiatives.
THE STATE AND THE CIVIL SECTOR: A SHIFTING MARRIAGE?

In the midst of one of the worst financial, economic and social crises in post-war history an ideological disagreement has come to dominate the debate in the West. On the one hand, right wing inclined observers regard the State at best as an outdated way of meeting needs and generating demand; at worst as deterrent to business initiative, efficient service delivery and citizen action. On the other side of the spectrum, left wing inclined analysts consider the State to be a central actor in providing welfare services, supporting the business sector, developing citizen capacity and strengthening civil society. That is, the “Big Society debate” – as it has been dubbed in the UK – is largely an ideological debate on the role to be played by the State in our societies in general and in alleviating the current crisis in particular. It is, too, a debate on the consequent role to be played by civil society at large, and the non-profit sector in particular.

In this vein, non-profit organisation scholars offer theoretical elaborations and empirical descriptions of the challenges faced by the civil society sector due to the rise of a neo-liberal rationality (Lemke, 2007) and the retrenchment of the welfare state. These scholars highlight that the restructuring of the state has resulted in the growth of the voluntary sector, which is increasingly taking over the provision of social services. As such, the third sector is being referred to as the “shadow state” (Mitchell, 2001; Wolch, 1989). Accordingly, these analysts have increasingly focused on the relationship between service provider (the non-profit organisation or private initiative) and service commissioner (often, local government), the sector’s ability to consistently generate sufficient resources, its tendency to focus on particular population groups leading to gaps in service coverage and duplication of services, its traditionally non-professional approach to coping with social and welfare problems, and the consequences of the growing significance of voluntarism in the provision of welfare services.

Such studies shed light on the implications of shifting the burden of welfare service provision from the state to the non-profit sector (Hall and Reed, 1998). Decentralization and privatization of welfare service provision has led to the emergence of complex institutional arrangements in which the nonprofit sector has been enrolled in the government of pre-defined population groups. Within the increased neo-liberal trend, that is, the nonprofit sector contributes to expand power well beyond the State (Rose and Miller, 1992). Insightful as these studies are, they suffer, however, from their original interest on welfare service provision which leads them to overlook that much of the recent growth in the sector is driven by a distinct ambition to achieve social change. Studying non-profits’ provision of social services moves the focus away from the way in which these initiatives challenge (or reproduce) the very structures at the root of the social problem they serve.

Students and practitioners of social entrepreneurship, on the other hand, stress the belief that introducing market rationalities and modes of operation into the civil society sector will make that sector more effective thus bringing democracy, social progress and social change (Prahalad, 2005; Fowler, 2000). Telling of the entrenchment of this belief is the actual choice of term – “social entrepreneurship” – often reformulating traditional civil society initiatives – from women’s groups and ethnic minorities’ associations to initiatives for the homeless – into “the business of doing good.” Some have denounced the consequent increased marketization of the non-profit sector (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004) that results in foundations introducing market-based criteria – such as return on investment and the potential to scale up – to decide what initiative to fund, enforcing competition and closely supervising the organisation supported (John, 2006).
Distinct as they are, both lines of research share a common starting point. Both research strands subsume to the dualist logic structuring the right- vs. left-wing debate. Either the market is the silver bullet that is to solve the crisis of the welfare state, or it is a safe way to further marginalise social groups that are not profitable; either public-private/civil collaborations are a way to enrol the civic sector in the provision of welfare, or they effectively expand the reach of government; either vulnerable social groups are met with the care and empathy only possible from a bottom-up approach, or coverage is limited to social groups for which funding or a market exists.

Although both positions in the debate do have arguments worth considering when discussing the shifting public-private relationship, both ignore that the public sphere and the sphere of private and non-profit initiatives cannot be separated. The central question is not what role should one or the other play, but rather how do both actors relate to each other. What are the relations of force that structure their everyday practices in local communities? How do political struggles internal to one actor influence the terms of the relationship? How is the particular social issue framed differently by actors’ diverging logics and how are such differences negotiated? That is, we need to look at the power dimensions organising interaction between state, private, and civil society actors.

This essay is an effort to nuance the debate. By looking at a particular collaboration between a local state actor, a private organisation and a non-profit initiative, the chapter sheds light on the tortuous and shifting nature of everyday interactions between local state actors and particular non-profit organisations in which welfare goals are ongoingly produced, interpreted and negotiated and through which non-profit organisations resist becoming part of an extended government apparatus.

FÖRORTEN I CENTRUM: A CASE STUDY AND A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

Aware of the founding violence of the “immigrant” category and driven by a will to overcome the stigma befallen on the ethnic other, I started the non-profit organisation Förorten i Centrum in the spring of 2010. The organisation works with residents of all ethnic backgrounds, gender and age profiles. Using the process of collectively producing mural paintings in outdoor walls, Förorten i Centrum brings together established middle-class young Swedes living in the city center with the stigmatized youth of immigrant background from the suburbs. By this doing, we hope to contribute at countering the socio-economic split at the root of categorical dichotomies distinguishing and separating between the ‘have’ and ‘have-nots’, the ‘techie’ and the ‘non-techie’, the ‘Swede’ and the ‘non-Swede’, the ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Barinaga, 2010). For, as Loïc Wacquant argues, independently of the objective reality behind those categories, the prejudicial belief that such categories imply “suffices to set off socially noxious consequences” (Wacquant, 2007).

For the first two years, the organisation successfully carried over eight collective murals in Stockholm. As a result, Förorten i Centrum was granted funding to further expand to the Swedish southern city of Malmö in the spring of 2012. But Förorten i Centrum will in this paper be not only an empirical case from which to learn the various challenges faced by social entrepreneurial initiatives. Since the paper follows the community-engaged social entrepreneurial initiative that I founded and continue to chair, Förorten i Centrum will also be expression of a methodological approach: that of engaged scholarship.
Engaged scholarship is a practice that stresses the critical and transformational importance of co-constructed research involving both academics and the communities we work with. Finding fault in the current relation between the universe of the university and that of its surrounding community, Ernest L. Boyer, former president of the Carnegie Foundation, urged us to “connect the rich resources of the university to our most pressing social, civic, and ethical problems, to our children, to our schools, to our teachers and to our cities...” (Boyer, 1996). Particularly in North America, Boyer’s plead sparked a movement of scholarly efforts to engage with the most disenfranchised communities beyond university campuses.

Practically, engaged scholarship implies reciprocal, collaborative relations with the public that aim at the amelioration of communities, the co-production of knowledge, and the articulation of university practices embedded in the localities outside the campus. Through dialogue, community service, civic engagement, advocacy, mobilization or community building – that is, through participation in the organisation of civic forces –, scholars are part of progressive efforts to carve spaces for political engagement.

Epistemologically, efforts at involvement on equal terms have added nuance to discussions on representation. Acting simultaneously as activists and researchers, engaged scholars travel the “blurred boundary when Other becomes researcher, narrated becomes narrator, translated becomes translator, native becomes anthropologist” (Noblit et al., 2004, p. 166). Overcoming the objective, neutral observer of traditional ethnography, and moving beyond the individual, subjective selves of phenomenology and postmodern ethnography, activist researchers are forced to critically reflect on how one’s subjectivity continuously informs and is informed by one’s relation with and representation of the Other (Madison, 2004). In that reflection, these activist researchers use Haraway’s (1988) notion of positionality to move beyond understandings of objectivity and subjectivity. “A doctrine of embodied objectivity”, positionality in the communities she studies and participates in allows the activist researcher to engage in manufacturing situated knowledges – “partial, locatable, critical knowledges sustaining the possibility of webs of connections called solidarity in politics and shared conversations in epistemology” (Haraway, 1988:584).

A PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP: COLLABORATING ACROSS BOURDIEUIAN FIELDS
Seved is a district within Malmö’s Sofielund City Borough. Along with Herrgård in Rosengård, Holma and Lindängen, Seved is a priority in the city’s work to reduce street criminality, improve its social work and reach to the most socio-economic vulnerable families. Indeed, unemployment in Seved is well above the national average (47% had a job, cpr. to 64% for Malmö), social welfare dependency is among the highest in Sweden, and only 75% of the youth completed school. Less visible in the statistics though more important for city managers was that organised drug-dealing ruled street life in Seved, with some of the district’s teenagers being involved in it. Seved had in fact been central to the increasing defamation in the media of the City of Malmö based on its alleged inability to manage its population of immigrant background. Increasing the number of social workers active in the district, setting up a community centre open to all residents, strengthening youth houses as well as other associational life, initiating broad collaborations between the school, museums and other city institutions, and starting summer job programs for the youth, everyone with an administrative responsibility in the Sofielund City Borough had been given the mandate to see what they could do to
address poverty and vulnerability in Seved. Thus, Anders Malmquist’s (at the time Director for Sofielund City Borough) eagerness to collaborate with FiC was not surprising.

In fact, the social enterprise’s collaboration with the City Borough’s Administration proved instrumental in getting access to paint legally in outdoor walls. During autumn 2011 I met city administrators and civil servants in Seved, among which, Hjalmar Falck. Hjalmar was “Seved’s co-ordinator”, the Borough’s man in the field or, as they put it, “the spider in the net, that co-ordinates all activities, networks and actors in Seved” – from social workers, the school, and the police to private property owners, local non-profits and youth houses. Seeing the potential of having FiC in Seved, Hjalmar organised a meeting between five property owners, two social workers and me already in October 2011. That is, the field of City Management quickly mobilised its bureaucratic and social capital and offered it to FiC. As a result, before the organisation had even opened its doors in the city, and thanks to public officials’ mediation, four property owners were offering their walls for the non-profit to paint on, a preliminary timeline had been discussed, and other actors to involve (such as the local school) were being invited to collaborate. It was the quick accessibility to walls and partnerships in Seved that decided the neighbourhood FiC was going to start working with. Yet, as Bourdieu reminds us, “decisions are merely choices among possibles, defined, in their limits, by the structure of the field” (Bourdieu, 2005, p.197). Far from being a decision taken by free well informed civil society agents with a wide spectrum of options, FiC (and I with it) chose to expand to Seved for that was the option the field of City Management, with which FiC was collaborating, prioritised.

Further, by March 2012, a deal was struck between FiC, a private property owner and the City of Malmö. Lars Andersson Properties, who owned several dwellings in Seved, formally agreed to let FiC both outdoors walls to paint on and premises where to open a mural centre. Lars Andersson had been unable to rent the premises for the previous couple of years and, as he put it when letting them to FiC, “it cannot get worse, it can only get better.” The City of Malmö would pay the first six months of rent of the mural centre. In other words, an alliance between the public field of City administration, the private field of property owners and the civil society sector was building up in Seved. FiC naively engaged in the triadic partnership, ignorant that stakes and priorities to be satisfied with the collaboration were structured differently in each field:

City of Malmö as a Bourdieuan field – Often defamed for its organised criminality and high level of unemployment among its population of immigrant background, Herrgård in Rosengård, Holma and Lindängen, as well as Seved had become central in the City’s struggle for recognition of its city management abilities. For those civil administrators working at Sofielund City Borough, Seved’s development was pegged, to a certain extent, to their own legitimacy in the field of city management. This was particularly exacerbated by the discussions, going on at that moment, of re-organising the City’s administrative boroughs from ten to five. Such a re-organisation would have very direct consequences on Anders Malmqvist’s position as the borough he directed was to be merged with the neighbouring borough. His continuation as a borough director was thus at risk. As he would admit a few months later, on November 2012, “for us, it is a matter of doing things in Seved. I have a strong political pressure put on me.” Collaborating with FiC was thus a means to calm down the situation in Seved, to answer to the political struggles within the City of Malmö, and to achieve recognition within the field of city management in Malmö.
Private property owners as a field – One of the consequences of street criminality had been the property owner’s inability to rent out the property located in the derided street corner. Governed by the economic logic that structures the field of property owners, Lars Andersson saw in FiC a partner in improving the atmosphere in the street and hopefully, at a later stage, rent out his premises.

Civil society sector as a field – Solving Seved’s street violence was far from the objectives of the non-profit organisations present in Seved (from FiC, to the allotment gardens association or the Somalian association). These organisations’ goals were focused in mobilising the community/residents (in general for FiC and the gardens association, residents with Somali background for the Somalian association). Guided by a community logic, FiC’s stakes were committed to raising the voices of the residents and thus representing (in both senses of the term, visualising and acting as spokes-agent) the community.

In sum, the actors involved in Seved did not play in the same field, the game in each field characterized by the field’s unique logic and specific stakes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>Logic of the particular field</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Management</td>
<td>Pacify the street</td>
<td>State/bureaucratic logic (top-down approach). Actors’ recognition lies in the way Seved is reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local private business</td>
<td>Rent out their premises (for which pacification of street was necessary)</td>
<td>Economic logic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society (FiC in particular)</td>
<td>Re-frame Seved (change the general image of Seved through raising the voices of those silenced/stigmatized).</td>
<td>Community-engagement logic (bottom-up approach). Their legitimacy/recognition lies on the extent to which residents support, and are involved in, FiC’s community-based mural processes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The problem FiC faced in Seved was thus not only a problem of neighbourhood violence. What at first sight seemed a problem of employees’ security due to increased community violence is, at a closer look, a more complex problem of conflict of logics between, on the one side, the field of City Management (Sofielland City Borough) and to a lesser extent Lars Andersson’s Properties and, on the other side, FiC and civil society organisations in general. Embedded in their own fields (city management and the local economic field), these actors had welcome FiC to serve their interests in the struggles in their own fields. Thus, City managers quickly embraced FiC for what it could contribute to manage and pacify a criminal area. Similarly, property owners appreciated FiC work to the extent it could ameliorate its economic prospects.

In the battle over the definition of the collaboration, its goals and its future, logics and ways of working need not be entirely exclusive, partial combinations of work methods are not to be left out. Yet, as we will see in the next section, the non-profit, being the smallest and weakest actor, risks being co-opted by the struggles of a field that is not its own, leading the organisation to drift away from its original mission.
MISSION-DRIFT: CO-OPTED BY THE FIELD OF CITY MANAGEMENT

Indeed, as FiC’s team set out to renovate the run-down premises that were to become Frida Kahlo Mural Centre, the organisation became aware of the conflict of interests inherent to the triadic collaboration. In April 2012, FiC’s Malmö team realised it was sharing the street corner with an organised drug-dealing gang. It was a core group of six to eight young men that ruled the street and some twenty other that saw up to them. Although most of them lived in Seved, a couple came from the neighbouring borough of Rosengård. Several of them had been detained and held under custody for aggressive behaviour, street vandalism, and violent threats, although none had served sentence yet.

It needs to be mentioned that they were the sons, brothers, cousins, friends and neighbours of those FiC wanted to work with, thus residents’ ambiguous attitudes towards them. On the one hand, neighbours often complained of having their windows broken, not daring to walk past the street corner, and night’s frequent racket and quarrels. Yet, on the other hand, residents in Seved readily defended “our kids for it is society that has never given them any chance.” “It’s jobs they need, yet nobody ever offers them one. All they do is to send the police to Seved.” What’s more, at times, residents expressed exasperation with established actors who they saw unwilling to truly solve Seved’s conflict. “They would loose their jobs were they to solve Seved’s problem.”

In mid-May growing agitation started to become noticeable. In an effort to end drug-dealing in the open street, the police in collaboration with Hjalmar Falck had given Ziyad’s Groceries two months notice to close down his business. The small grocery store was located some 50 meters from the infamous street corner and much of the drug dealing was carried in the little shop under the owner’s blind eye. According to Hjalmar and the police, Ziyad’s closure was connected to the young men’s increased anxiety, which was expressed in more threats to neighbours, more stones thrown to residents’ windows and more night brawls. A couple of neighbours even reported seeing them in the inner yards making Molotov cocktails. Attacking Frida Kahlo Mural Centre as well was only a matter of time.

To be sure, one of FiC’s team members was verbally abused on May 18 and physically attacked on May 25 when she was closing Frida for the day. A few days later, on Monday, June 11, the FiC’s Malmö team in its entirety was verbally attacked and physically threatened while they held a meeting inside Frida Kahlo Mural Centre. One of Frida’s windows was, for the second time in the last three weeks, broken, fixed on the afternoon that same day, only to be broken again the day after.

Spiraling violence in Seved was not merely the capricious actions of a gang of men high on drugs. It emerges from the interactions, actions and reactions of actors in various fields, actors’ whose approaches to Seved are given by the logic in their respective fields. Related to the conflict of field logics described in the previous section, we find those actors defined the problem in Seved differently, each definition corresponding to the way in which each field can address the problem so defined and thus achieve political gain in their own fields. Accordingly, city managers saw the problem as one of increased violence, residents as one of lack of jobs, FiC as one of lack of power.

Residents – On the one hand, neighbors often complained of having their windows broken, not daring to walk past the street corner, and night’s frequent racket and quarrels. Yet, on the other hand, residents in Seved readily defended “our kids for it is society that has never given them any chance.” “It’s jobs they need, yet nobody ever offers them one. All they do is to send the police to Seved.”
Residents moved Seved’s problem from the individual level of the criminal activities of a few residents to the structural level of lack of jobs and (implicitly) ethnic bias/segregation.

FiC’s original mission was receptive to the bias of the establishment implied in the comments from the residents. Indeed, the very reason to start FiC was to address residents’ frustration and discontent with the prevalent image of their suburb and its dwellers of immigrant background. This, the biased public debate of those classified as “immigrants”, the stigma befallen the areas where they lived, was the core of the problem the non-profit organisation had set out to address. This was in line with residents’ structural definition of the problem. Thus, the solution FiC offered was raising a collective voice that could resist dominant discourse/stigma.

City managers – Theirs is an individualist definition of the problem, in which a group of young male residents intimidate all other residents in the neighborhood. Thus, the solutions they offered were all addressed to pacify the area by removing individual felons from the street and by closing down those places where they carried their criminal activities. It is in this light that one can understand why FiC was offered to open the Mural Centre in the most conflictive corner of the neighborhood. In a way, FiC was used as a human shield in a war that was not the one FiC had set out to fight. That is, FiC was co-opted for a conflict other than its own. While FiC’s mission was to raise the voices of the stigmatised residents, the non-profit had been used as a tool to pacify the neighbourhood.

Further, the management of the incidents of June 2012 by the various actors also evidenced the police’s stakes in the borough. For instance, the police filed two police reports when only I had made one. Concerned for their families’ security, the rest of FiC’s Malmö team had declined making any report when the police took testimony immediately after the aggressions. It took one of FiC’s team members several phone calls and a couple of visits to the police station to take his report (supposedly the second one) down. In a further move, the police tipped Sydsvenskan, the biggest regional daily newspaper, on the happenings of June 11. FiC’s Malmö-team suspected that what the police was after was to increase the number of reports and get media attention in order to increase the budget assigned to them for Seved.

Diagram summarising the stakes actors had, not in Seved, but in FiC

While residents and FiC board’s related to social change concerning participation of the suburbs in the public debate, the City of Malmö’s, Sofielund City Borough’s and the police’s interests was to pacify...
Seved. Attending to the later did not necessarily conduct to the interest of the former. Indeed, as the article in Sydsvenska is an example of, FiC was contributing to Seved being further derided in the public debate. The Malmö team of FiC that is, had been made captive to the interests of the apparatus within the autonomous field of city managers.

**DISCUSSION**

An important lesson from the case at hand is that agreeing on methods is not equivalent to agreeing on goals. Public agencies and small non-profit organisations struggle in different fields and have different stakes. The logic of the field of city administrators differs to that of the non-profit sector. Performance in each field is rewarded differently. Thus, although actors in each field may share target group and agree on working methods, their belonging to fields with different logics can easily result in different interpretations of what initially seemed a shared goal. The different institutional logics as well as the different power dynamics in each field resulted in disagreement concerning the ultimate goal of intervention. A small, still fragile, start-up collaborating with a established public agency may unawarely see its organisation being co-opted for the satisfaction of political interests other than those of the start-up. Further, its economic sustainability being dependent on collaborations with the pubic sector, may incline the non-for-profit organisation to accept the public agency’s translation of its goal thus leading it to drift further away from its original mission.

That is, the pressure to expand (and build partnerships with new stakeholders immersed in different power/field struggles) may come at the cost of drifting away from the organisational mission. An analysis of the structure of the field of city agents (police, borough administrators – the new stakeholders) and the logic governing the struggles in that field is thus central to understand the extent to which the non-profit initiative had been co-opted by its new partners in the pursuit of their own political gain. Mission-drift can thus be considered as the result of the co-optation of the organisation by city officials pursuing other interests than those of the non-profit. This invites a discussion of a non-profit’s selection of partners when scaling-up.

**REFERENCES**


URBAN COMMONS IN THE NEOLIBERAL GLOBAL ORDER: 
COMMONING AS COUNTERACTION

Henrietta Palmer¹, Solano da Silva², Iain Low ³

1. Chalmers Technological University, Gothenburg 
Henrietta.palmer@chalmers.se

2. BITS-Pilani, K K Birla Goa Campus 
solanodasilva@gmail.com

3. University of Cape Town, Cape Town 
iain.low@uct.ac.za

ABSTRACT:
The proposition of this paper presents Urban Commoning as a counteraction to the current global trend of capitalism and its neo-liberal urbanism. In the face of radical dispossession and marginalisation that is accompanying global urbanisation, we are experiencing the negative logic of 'privatisation' with its public appropriations of exclusionary and disposessive 'fencing off' of 'new urban enclosures'. The resultant calls to replace the extractive and exclusionary logic of the city with a generative and inclusive ordering has been responded to in the notion of the commons and complementary practices of commoning as counter to this conflict.

The urban commons is posited as a means of transforming the urban. By expanding the notion of the commons a new inclusiveness and normative approach can be established. However, in order to understand the commons as a possible just and inclusive urban order, we view it as inhabiting the intermediate space between imposed and popular change. We attempt to excavate from real life urban commons valuable lessons from their emergence, maintenance and transference; contributing toward a new urban episteme.

These explorations are grounded in the case of Cape Town, South Africa and the experience of capitalism’s different phases – early colonial, apartheid and post-apartheid – demonstrating consistently reproduced patterns of spatial segregation for the vast majority of its ‘non-white’ population. Urban commoning has historically existed in different forms but recently found renewed emergence in response to urban enclosures.

Located within this context and re-conceptualised through a more inclusive notion of the commons, this essay identifies background details of the empirical case by describing the legacy of capitalist exclusion and enclosures in Cape Town, followed by an account of historical commoning practices in the city. The essay concludes by locating some main findings from the real life cases of emergent communing, reflecting on the transformative potential of urban commons.

KEY WORDS
Urban Commons; Commons; Commoning; Exclusion; Enclosure; Language of the Becoming City; Cape Town; South Africa.
INTRODUCTION

Capitalist and particularly neo-liberal urbanism, through its logic of ‘privatisation’ by appropriating from the public and ‘fencing off’ by dispossessing and excluding large sections of the public (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Blomley, 2008), has led to the creation of what has been termed as ‘new urban enclosures’ (Hodkinson, 2012). This sits paradoxically alongside the spread of democracy and the expansion – at least formally – of equal rights to citizens. In the face of this there have been repeated calls to replace the extractive and exclusionary logic of the city with a generative and inclusive ordering. A number of authors have suggested that it is in the notion of the commons and the practice of commoning that we may find a way forward (Linebaugh, 2008; Harvey, 2012; Bollier, 2016; Chatterton, 2016).

How could the urban commons transform the urban? We argue that we have to first expand the notion of the commons to allow for inclusiveness in an ever dynamic urban context, one that needs to embrace large numbers of migrant movements, to prevent it becoming another form of enclosure. Through this, urban commons might expand its normative appeal. Second, in order to understand the commons as having the possibility of an alternative, just and inclusive urban order, we locate urban commons as inhabiting the intermediate space between imposed (top) and popular (below) change. Finally, we need to excavate from real life urban commons valuable lessons such as how/why they emerged, how they are maintained and how they are transferred. This exercise is useful if we intend to contribute in developing a new urban episteme.

We ground these explorations by looking at the empirical case of Cape Town in South Africa to show how the experience of capitalism through its various phases – early colonial, during apartheid and post-apartheid – has consistently reproduced patterns of spatial segregation and non-accessibility to the city for the vast majority of the ‘non-white’ population. In response to the urban enclosures the phenomena of urban commoning has existed in different forms and founded renewed emergence in order to address the various urban enclosures that have arisen.

In the first section we locate the emergence of the urban commons within a theoretical context. We then make a case for a re-conceptualised and more inclusive notion of the commons. The essay then moves on to describe background details of the empirical case by first describing the legacy of capitalist exclusion and enclosures in Cape Town which is followed by an account of historical commoning practices in the city. The essay then discusses the main findings from the real life cases of commoning and concludes with some reflections on the transformative potential of urban commons.

1 This text is based on a week-long workshop, Commons in Cape Town, that took place in Cape Town in June 2016. The workshop was one out of four organised workshops within the larger project The Language of the Becoming City, financed by the Swedish Research Council.
URBAN COMMONS

There have been growing apprehensions that many resources are becoming enclosed as a result of the implementation of political and economic policies which privilege private ownership and management regimes. This has resulted in calls to enlist a variety of resources as commons implying their shared ownership and management. A mapping of these ‘new commons’ has been carried out by Charlotte Hess (2008). The renewal of interest in the commons has also emerged as a result of the work of Elinor Ostrom who has demonstrated that within a defined community a commons would prosper (1990).

In the urban context, a similar set of apprehensions has emerged as rising urban populations have been accompanied by very uneven outcomes in terms of spatial ordering and their access to urban services and opportunities. It is argued that the joint rise of the private and public sectors have facilitated the marketisation of almost all urban resources (Susser & Tonnelat, 2013: 107). The implementation of neo-liberal forms of urban governance has led to various forms of urban enclosures such as shrinking public services and spaces and the creation of gated enclaves of privilege and consumption resulting in cities becoming “spaces of political inequity, social and economic deprivation and sources of environmental damage” (Brenner & Theodore 2002; Hodkinson 2012; Susser & Tonnelat, 2013: 106). This has revitalised discussions on the commons and elevated the concept to the urban setting.

Hardt and Negri have used the argument that cities have been produced by the collective action of labour in order to claim that cities should be viewed as vast commons and to thereby also make the claim that all possess the right to the city (2009). Bollier refers to many resources as commons in order to forward the claim that citizens are the primary stakeholders of resources over and above investors, and that common interests are not for sale (2007: 29). Many draw the distinction between public goods – supplied by urban administrations and seen as productive assets – and the urban commons (Harvey, 2012: 73–74; Tonnelat, 2013; Bollier, 2016: 34–37). This is intended to identify and re-appropriate a variety of urban services and spaces as public goods and spaces and thereafter to reframe them as commons. This commonification of urban goods marks limits to the logic of market exchange and market valuations (Harvey, 2012: 73) and allows for the possibility of shifting towards a ‘generative paradigm’ (Bollier & Helfrich, 2012: xvii–xviii) or a ‘commons based approach to asset management or public services’ (Benjamin Coriat in Bollier, 2016: 34) which aims to be ecologically regenerative and socially benign ensuring the ongoing flows of value creation. Susser and Tonnelat identify three specific components each of which would need to be reframed as ‘commons’ if everyone is to have a right to the city. The first would be the right to everyday life which is associated with production, consumption and use of public services. The second constitutes the right to simultaneity comprising public spaces of mobility and encounter and finally, the right to creative activity through which collective and alternative visions of the city could emerge (Susser & Tonnelat, 2013). Harvey suggest that the way forward to bring about a commoning of the city would be a two pronged attack where the state is forced to supply more and more public goods for public services, along with self-organisation of entire populations to appropriate, use and supplement those goods in
ways that extend and enhance the qualities of the non-commodified reproductive and environmental commons (Harvey, 2012: 87–88).

**RECONCEPTUALISING THE COMMONS FOR A NEW URBANITY**

If commons are to have the potential to transform urbanity we argue that the notion of the commons needs to first be expanded and be located within the intermediate space of imposed and popular urban change, and finally we need to draw lessons from actually existing urban commons. To do this we rely heavily from the work of the architectural theorist Stavros Stavrides, as elaborated below.

Commons are conceptualised as constituting three aspects: a resource which is held and managed as a commons, a community of commoners who share the resource and, social processes or practices which reproduce the commons and are referred to as commoning² (De Angelis in An Architektur, 2010: 2). In Stavrides conceptualisation there is an expansion of the notion of the commons which is useful in order to develop commons in the contemporary urban context. Stavrides contrasts the traditional notion of the community – as including a well-defined set of commoners who are separated from ‘outsiders’ – to propose instead the commons as a porous world “where social relations are dynamic in terms of its corresponding group or community” (Stavrides, 2013: 49). Drawing from Jacques Rancière he states that the commons is more than a ‘shared ethos’ and ‘shared abode’ – as traditionally emphasised – but “is always a polemical distribution of modes of being and ‘occupations’ in a space of possibilities” (Rancière, 2006: 42 quoted in Stavrides, 2015: 11). In this way the communal constituent of the commons is reconfigured to being not necessarily a homogenous community that seeks to secure its reproduction by identity, imposing enclaves but also “attempts to enrich its exchange with other communities as between members” (Stavrides, 2015: 11). This framing marks a departure from enclave commons allowing instead for an alternative imagining of a heterogeneous ever expanding community of commoners coexisting as different lives in mutual respect (Stavrides in An Architektur, 2010: 12). Further Stavrides explains that the community of commoners do not exist a priori but take shape or emerge through commoning – the practices of producing common ‘goods’ – and that such communities do not only produce goods but also produce opinions, agreements and collective actions (2013:42). Stavrides clarifies that a common cause may be originally evoked – such as the protection of a resource or the struggle for political rights – but this does not become the unifying core for the commons but rather an activating source and this can give rise to a community of commoners (Stavrides 2013:41). This re-conceptualisation of the commons is important if the ideal is to have normative appeal in the urban context in order to accommodate diverse and ever moving urban populations and to respond to complex urban issues to create a common urbanity.

Commons have the potential to transform the urban and become change dynamics because commoners usually inhabit an intermediary position between imposed mainstream urban visions and more popular incremental urban desires. In this way they inhabit what Stavrides refers to as a liminal space where

---

² De Angelis uses the verb ‘to common’.
they have lost their previous social identity but have not yet acquired a new one, and because of which they linger on the threshold of change (Stavrides, 2015: 12). This liminality or threshold has a transformative potential because in this shared condition previous differences may now seem arbitrary, giving rise to an equalising potential “the opportunity to share a common world in the making”. Through their subsequent acts, the people involved construct a community of equals because they choose to define at least a part of their lives autonomously in common (Stavrides, 2015: 12). This liminality can also aid the notion of a heterogeneous and expanding membership to the commons. For commoning to remain a force, they have to overstep the boundaries of established community by always being open to “newcomers and by becoming newcomers themselves” (Rancière, 2010: 59–60 quoted in Stavrides, 2015: 13).

Finally, if we are to develop the notion of the commons as constituting a transformative episteme for urbanity then in addition to the earlier two positions, it is necessary to also draw lessons from actually existing urban commons. For the purpose of this we propose a framework to understand the dynamics of how the commons emerged and are recognized, followed by how they were maintained and managed, and finally how they spread and came to be adopted and translated to other contexts (Palmer, 2014). Each one of these steps needs it support, in terms of a language, in terms of knowledge but also as we shall see, in terms of space.

**APARTHEID AND POST-APARTHEID URBAN EXCLUSION**

**THE LEGACY OF THE COLONIAL CITY**

It was the geographical location of Cape Town, in between Europe and the East, with three months sailing from each one of the destinations, and with natural freshwaters streams running down the Table Mountain, that spurred the establishment of De Kaap as a point for replenishment of its ships for the Dutch East India Company, rather than the intention of a colonial trading city. As such the non-profit making colony acted as a ‘production-unit’ organised around the large Company gardens, where imported slaves constituted the workforce together with the non-enslaved indigenous Khoikhoi population, until the abolishment of slavery in 1838. The slaves living in slave quarters in the yards of the trading points houses soon outnumbered the White settlers, hence regulations were performed to control movements and communication, as well as any informal economy and production beyond the Company’s. Consequently, most homes were turned into illegal and informal shops, controlled by the women, and the access to the city, as a resource for the enslaved and free slaves, ultimately came down to the city fringes where the natural commons of the mountain side and the beach offered firewood and fishing for subsistence and space for cultural practices such as burial grounds.3

After the South African mineral revolution in the second half of the 1800, Cape Town became known as a vibrant and liberal cosmopolitan place and the most racially mixed city of South Africa. Although

---

3 From professor Nigel Penn, in a lecture at Cape Town University in June 2016, as part of the workshop Commons in Cape Town.
men, no matter what race could vote, it was in reality ‘a prejudiced society where institutions became segregated, not through regulations but through customs.’ But also, as James Western writes in *Outcast Cape Town* “…the authorities had already – long before the word apartheid became current – imposed elements of active, de jure residential segregation.” Since the end of the 1800, with the legal enactment of residential segregation for Black Africans, a continuous movement and migration towards the edges of the city marked the fate of the Black population. “Each time Cape Town grew out and enveloped their previously distanced ‘locations’, the Black Africans were moved.” (1981: 42–46) In parallel, as the Non-white population became pushed towards the edges or ‘ghettofied’ in overcrowded neighbourhood pockets, internal passport (dompas) or restrictions for entering or for being in the city were introduced. The first internal pass-ports in 1797 prevented natives from entering the Cape colony, and with the rise of the mining sector in 1880s, pass laws were introduced broadly in the South African Republic to control the mobility of the workers. With the Native Urban Areas Act no 21, or Pass Law, of 1923 all Black adult men were required to carry a permission to be present in the urban areas.

**SPACE AND DOMINATION**

Western gives us an analysis of the social and spatial domination through apartheid and the relationship of space and social identities, where he suggests that a space which is transformed into a new form also transforms the identity of its inhabitants. His argument is visualised with the apartheid planning of Cape Town. As the Non-white population started to outnumbered Whites in Cape Town in the 1920s, and as the class divisions created through industrialisation threatened the supremacy of the White workers, apartheid was realized as a planning practice to organise and to control labour and their access to the city as an economic resource and entity. Race and Class became aligned through spatial planning techniques and Western demonstrates how within the continuous restructuring of the city, the pre-apartheid legacy of evictions becomes a guiding mechanism for planning a permanent condition of enacting enclosures or for *enclosuring* the city as a resource. With the Group Area Acts no. 41 of 1950 this segregating logic was solidified in the spatial logic of apartheid, organising the city as a well-oiled mechanism for the economy of the industrial state, whilst avoiding ‘friction’ between the different fractions of a racially divided labour force. Where *petty apartheid* expressed psychological and emotional domination of the White race through social distance, the purpose of *grand apartheid* was the territorial dominance through spatial distance. From the notion of the city as an entity divided by group areas sectors, the creation of so called *ethno-cities* (Black home lands or Bantustans) made it possible to resettle 1.5 million Black Africans, to maintain a profitable industrial production while sustaining the security of the White South Africa. In tandem with the Pass laws of the early 50s, which prohibited any Black adult to stay longer than 72 hours in an urban area, the *legal fiction* of the ‘autonomy’ of these *ethno-cities* imposed on the Black citizens of Cape Town the identity as a non-South African, a foreigner and a *gastarbeiter*5 (Western 1981: 68).

---

4 From professor Nigel Penn, in a lecture at Cape Town University in June 2016, as part of the workshop *Commons in Cape Town*.

5 Gastarbeiter – term used for migrant worker.
“The most effective plan for societal control by spatial manipulation in apartheid is that of continual removal,” writes Western and continues, “As an African National Congress leader expressed it in the 1950s, the experience of the Black African was ‘forever hamba’⁶, forever moved on.” (1981: 46)

Following Western’s initial argument of the relation of space and identity, we could argue that apartheid physical planning, in conjunction with its pass laws and other apartheid legislation, constituted a condition of continuous restructuring and transition in which the Non-white worker became identified as in ‘permanent migration’ and consequently the Non-white citizen as a ‘permanent migrant’ within his and her native domain. This is a condition which has subsequently been favoured by current neo-liberal politics, preferring a fragmented workforce and a politically disconnected subject, to a socially situated and connected one.

**SPATIAL LEGACY OF APARTHEID**

The 27th of April 1994⁷ marks the date of the transfer of power from the ‘colonial’ apartheid regime to the new African National Party (ANC) led government. Heralding a new age of democracy, this event secured the rights of all South Africans to participate in and benefit from an egalitarian society. Prior to this advent of ‘freedom’ many apartheid laws had been repealed, laying the ground for transformation and the construction of a more equal society.

The 10th clause of the Freedom Charter, the 1955 struggle manifesto, and from which the Constitution of South Africa was formulated, states; ‘There shall be Houses, Security and Comfort’⁸. Social justice and spatial equity formed significant pillars of the transformation agenda in the new South Africa. Housing and urban infrastructure, as both social and physical phenomenon, has contributed toward this provision. The Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) was presented as an election manifesto of the ANC, and it outlined a strategy for tackling the task of societal transformation. However, whereas it has been comparatively easy to repeal legislation, the spatial separation has remained an enduring legacy of the apartheid era, sustaining racial segregation and prevented social cohesion across peoples of different ethnic origin.⁹

As an example of this structural difficulty, the post-apartheid National Development Plan 2030 (NDP 2012) tabled recently, is the first to address spatial integration. This implies that the planners have been required to work with apartheid planning frameworks for almost 20 years after liberation. Further, the current goals of promoting global cities and urban regeneration are creating spatial divides into the same way as apartheid did.¹⁰ Given the scope and extent of the apartheid spatial legacy, the limitations of the state’s ability to deliver and the unwillingness of current neo-liberal preferences to

---

⁶ hamba – in Zulu; to move, to travel, to leave, to proceed (Wikipedia).
⁷ This day has become named as Freedom Day and features as a public holiday in the national calendar of the Republic.
¹⁰ From professor Vanessa Watsson, in a lecture at Cape Town University in June 2016, as part of the workshop *Commons in Cape Town*. 
change the condition for the citizenship as a migrant identity, has provided ground for significant forms of protest. These have become both more vocal and physical as the country enters its third decade of democratic governance and are emblematic of the fragile relationship between the public and the private in the so-called new South Africa.

MIGRATION AND GLOBALISATION POST-APARTHEID
Following the logic of Western, we are hence arguing that an identity of ‘permanent migration’, would be residing with the sustained spatial practice of apartheid as well. The fall of apartheid came with the advent of globalisation and neo-liberalisation, which consequently increased the migration in the new South Africa. Internally this has taken on a number of forms, where some are enhancing the migration pattern of ‘a workforce’, inherent in the colonial city and fully performed by the apartheid city, while other forms are new to the city. Within each one of these migration patterns, where old and new citizens are searching for access to a city of an extant and rigid apartheid construct, follows confrontations as well as inventive practices. The case studies that formed base for our workshop all somehow integrate into these migration patterns:

(a) **Foreign migration.** In recognition of the support given to the ‘struggle movement’ by other African states, a more-or-less open policy on in-migration was assumed. This has resulted in the influx of both political and economic refugees into South Africa, possibly accounting for between 3-5 million persons, or five to ten percent of the overall population. Xenophobic confrontations have led to the establishment of local social infrastructures to support sometimes violent exclusion of migrants. (b) **Urban migration**, in particularly into the major economic city centres. The concomitant collapse of rural life has brought tradition and modernity into interesting confrontation in the urban areas. Emerging contestations have resulted in a need for new forms of local socio-political formations. (c) **Cross migration**, within towns and cities. Upward mobility has seen the relocation of an emerging Black middle class into the better off White neighbourhoods, in search of both the opportunity and amenities afforded by those neighbourhoods. (d) **Daily migration**, as thousands of workers commute between outlaying places of residence on the periphery and their more centralised work places. This has contributed towards the existence of significant flows of people, with intense implications for transport and public services.

Associated with these partly new movements of people, has been the emergence of new public cultures. Most recently, in parallel with global tendencies, these have been people generated and established new communities of association. Not necessarily place bound, they are more reliant on the establishment of ‘people as infrastructure’ (Simone, 2004) than of the concrete building of space. Where space eventually emerges, the existence of new communal associations between people of difference will prefigures place making. Frequently these initiatives are ephemeral and relate to responses of highly specific immediate needs. However, most of the innovative practices in the South African context emerge from community based organisations in response to the failures of the State to meet the needs of people.
THE LEGACY OF COMMONING PRACTICES IN THE CITY

COLONIAL AND APARTHEID COMMONING
In the face of twin phenomena; of an inadequate colonial and apartheid state government coupled with an adversely discriminating environment through its sustained violence and extensive forms of dispossession of Black people, what is identified, is the evidence of commoning practices in order to achieve everyday and longer term societal necessities.

Historical accounts inform us that the Non-white population of the colonial past depended on the city fringes and the home. Two spatial positions where the control mechanisms of the dominant group were less effective, and where a certain degree of freedom from different kinds of repressions could be practiced by the suppressed individuals or groups. Western also tells us how during apartheid, Black citizens came to settle on the unplanned fringes, to consciously be outside of the spatial ‘labour machinery’, and outside of the control of the dominating minority (1981). The history of spatial push and control of the Non-white citizens compelled activities of sharing and commoning for subsistence and resource distribution. Practices designed to benefit the group have been in existence in Black culture during the apartheid era, such as organised savings in form of stockvels11 as informal savings groups designed to assist with funerals, education and emergency need.

One of the significant characteristics of traditional culture in Africa is its capacity for collective action, for sharing and general inclusivity seen in the indigenous notion of Ubuntu, predicated on the premise that we each exist because of others. In the absence of revolution, the practice of ubuntu helps facilitate commoning and offers a counter response to the established and dominant ruling class narrative. It stands in the face of the splitting mechanisms of apartheid, as well as of the individualism propagated by capitalism; apartheid representing the systematic exploitation of capitalism, whereby race and class are exploitatively segregated, to the sole benefit of a minority.

COMMONING DURING POST-APARTHEID PERIOD
During the first two decades of democratic governance, South Africa has sought to address the needs of its historically disenfranchised communities. Constitutional promises of “… houses, security and comfort…” have been met with rising expectations of immediate redress from the people. However, the envisaged promises are more apparent in the legal system than in the spatio-material context, as a result of the scale and depth of apartheid’s effects, but also increasingly as the result of an incompetent and corrupt collusion between state and business.

One significant dimension arising from this phenomenon has been an increasing re-activation of communities across the country. Despite having been marginalized by the ANC-led government in the post 1994 period, Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) have begun to re-emerge, affording a vital infrastructure in contributing toward mediating the gap between the State and communities. Under certain circumstances this has given rise to urban

11 The stokvel represents a form of collective savings scheme, originated to benefit a group with a clear shared social agenda.
commoning, or the practice whereby collective activities, shared by both traditional and modern cultures, find common cause. These have emerged both from within government and more potently from within civil society. The latter has taken on the form of ‘shadow governance’, for example around issues of health and education, as well as within the core of communities themselves, around most notably housing, water, sanitation, electricity and security – as basic needs. Whilst some of these practices might emerge from the cultural tradition of ubuntu, they might also be constructed as resistance practices, not only devised in the face of a corrupt and uncaring South African state, but also towards the ‘neo-liberal city’ as a construction for organisation of labour, and therefore with no real incentives to restructure the spatial legacy of colonialism and apartheid.

From our collective experience from the workshop in Cape Town, it would seem that in the context of spatial design, the conjunction of service delivery with community building through urban commoning has emerged as a productive ground, capable of effectively both confronting and in addressing contemporary problems of the neoliberal city, and potentially suggesting a new order for the post-capitalistic city. That the building of community should pre-figure any spatial investment speaks directly to indigenous pre-modern practices and to the value and necessity of human infrastructure (Simone, 2004) in the production of a sustainable transformed urban condition.

From the above we can discern the emergence of distinctly local commons. This commoning is first and foremost African – it is one that is situated at the nexus of the North and the South, of the colonial and the liberated, of the rural and the urban, and of tradition in context of modernity. Commoning in Africa is may be recognised as associated with leveraging human agency toward advancing conditions of denial, whether by state intention or neglect and corruption. It follows a tradition of resistance established by NGOs such as PlanAct and DAG, professional service organisations operating in the apartheid's days.

CAPE TOWN'S SITUATED COMMONING

EMERGENCE, MANAGEMENT AND TRANSLATION

With this paper we would like to propose (or understand whether we can propose) a grammar for urban processes that possibly could provide us with a new and coherent language. Intended not as a resistance movement, but to re-populate a mainstream currently inhabited by neo-liberal practices, incapable and unwilling to replace the spatial legacy of colonialism and apartheid. Our belief is that pre-existent commoning practices can provide us with parts of such grammar. To do this we will try to understand the commoning practices from the framework developed from a language of the commons,

---

12 For example, in the form of more accommodating community based government policy.
13 Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) around Aids, HIV and anti-retroviral; Equal Education (EE) around issues of schooling, teaching and learning and most recently the Ndifuna Ukwazi ("I want to know") (NU), a community based organization researching and supporting the struggle for land and housing in the Western Cape.
as in the language of establishing an origin (emergence), the language of rules, routines and operations (maintenance) and the ways by which it becomes inclusive, spreads and becomes adoptable (translatability) (Palmer, 2014). We will employ this framework to draw lessons from urban commons that have arisen from three types of actions and in each we identify their relationship to supporting structures and highlight significant outcomes of the same.

From our case studies in Cape Town, we have understood three different causal factors or drivers behind the urban commons establishing ground for their emergence. These drivers we have defined as grounded social movements, constructed social movements and, as referred to by Asef Bayat, quiet encroachments (1997). As discussed earlier we believe commons represent a change dynamic which is situated in-between formally and incrementally guided changes. The support structures of these dynamics are to be found within this realm as well; either in the form of NGOs, as different partnerships of public and civil society actors, or as physical assets such as land formally attributed to informal appropriation and self-organisation. The supports of the commoning processes, are on one hand these institutional arrangements, and on the other hand the support structures that eventually are created by the commoning process itself – in terms of identity, knowledge and space – as deliverable outcomes of each step of its liminal progression.

GROUNDED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
What we have defined as grounded social movements are characterized by struggles around conditions of migrancy, identity and belonging, in relation to shelter and livelihood. They are directly informed by the intersection between race, gender and class, as in the case study of the Victoria Mxenge Settlement evolved through what is called a People’s Housing Process (PHP).14

The social movement initiated by the Victoria Mxenge women (the VM women) is researched and studied through a pedagogic framework by Salma Ismail who has also been our guide to this group of women, to their history and to their small community in Philippi some 20 km east of the central city of Cape Town [fig. 1]. Ismail describes how, towards the end of apartheid, the women arrived from the rural Eastern Cape, to find and join their migrant-worker husbands. As a result, the women found themselves defined as illegal settlers and radically marginalized in the informal settlement of Crossroads, then on the extreme periphery of Cape Town. Drawing on traditional practices of ubuntu, their shared struggle for inclusion revolved around the basic need for shelter as the means to enter the city in two ways; to have a proper house for themselves and their families and to become an emancipated urban citizen. Hence, this particular group of rural women, as the poorest of the poor, also needed to transform their own identities to get access to power in the urban context (Ismail, 2003, 2009 & 2015).

14 Thanks to Salma Ismail, associate professor at the School of Education, UCT, who lectured about the Victoria Mxenge women as a social movement, as part of the workshop Commons in Cape Town, and who together with architect Shawn Cuff guided us to the Victoria Mxenge Housing project, in June 2016. Thank you also to Rose Maseo and the other VM women who presented their work for us on site.
The ability of this form of urban commoning arises from a direct and extreme need for survival. In the absence of a (skilled) community these situations promote self-organisation and self-learning. However, organization and growth seem directly linked and dependent on certain informed individuals with a capacity to translate knowledge. In this case 13 women came together in 1992 as a saving group, under the initiative of one individual, who had come to know about saving schemes to build houses from a grass-root conference where the Slum Dwellers International (SDI) presented their Indian experiences. From that meeting two organisations were formed, the South African Homeless People’s Federation (Federation), connecting and supporting saving schemes across South Africa, and the NGO People’s Dialogue on Land and Shelter (PD) as an affiliation of SDI. The women’s saving group was formed under the umbrella of PD, and as the savings evolved the achieved experiences and skills became a platform from which to develop further skills and to mobilise to access land. In using the surveys and documentation from their collective work as a visual and written outcome of their emergence as a capable community, land was eventually given to them from an estate in Philippi and they could enter into the second phase, the management of their community – as evolving through the building process. PD further supported the facilitation of the building processes with technical and political support, as well as with fundraising (Ismail, 2015).

The methods and tools for savings are well established and known through SDI, as enumerations, account saving books and scheduled weekly meetings, and we will not describe these further here. But in the moment of management, which we can read as coinciding with the building process, a number of methods to support the process were tried out to on one hand push the building process towards its outcome of houses, and on the other hand, to develop the women as ‘informal intellectuals’ (Ismail 2015). Some of these were facilitated by an invited expert architect, in learning how to imagine and re-envision space and how to make cost calculations. Others were facilitated by an artisan or by government officials teaching construction. Further skills, such as knowledge of governance, organisation and representation, came through the women themselves through their reciprocal approach of establishing routines of sharing skills and taking turns in meeting with each other and with outside stakeholders. As one of the most significant learning and management processes, we can identify the rotating leadership a strategy which enables shared knowledge transfer whilst resisting separated expertise and entrenched power (Ismail 2015). Stavrides has referred to this kind of rotating strategy in relation to the Zapatista movement: ‘The rotation system effectively prevents any form of accumulation of individual power. This system might not be the most effective in terms of administration but it is effective in terms of building and sustaining this idea of a community of negotiation and mutual respect.’ (Stavrides in An Architektur, 2010: 12).

The VM women were aware of the importance of organising on a wider scale to reach societal impact. As part of the Federation they were nominated to advocate their philosophy of PD development, and to transmit and transfer their skills into peer-learning of self-help to a social movement beyond their own community. Ismail tells us, “They were aware the importance of using experience, traditional and local knowledge, and participatory methods to mobilise others…” In translation of knowledge they used sensory communication brought with them from their rural origin, such as dances, songs, marches and slogans and mass-meetings inspired by religious and political movements, as well as the
achieved method of experiencing life size model houses. In this manner they approached translation through duplication of their own process, via modes of communication that were speaking to their peers through tradition, context and sensual experiences.

The tangible outcome of the VM women’s commoning is evidently the houses, and the community they built for themselves, but from the very beginning it was clear that the process was also a process of emancipation and informal learning, and hence achieved skills became a support for the continuing process and not merely an outcome. In this way we can understand the interlaced and symbiotic relationship of support and outcome, as a spiralling circular movement where the first outcome of skills and spaces support the second turn of the circle, which outcomes eventually support a third, and so on. In this way commoning presents itself not as a process towards an end-result, but towards a transformation and an open end. The commoning of the VM women – building knowledge, space, community and social movement in parallel – illustrates commoning as a process of generating rather than of extracting resources (Bollier, 2012) and its ‘threshold’ capacity (Stavrides in An Architektur, 2010: 16) to move from one condition to the next, to eventually transform society.

CONSTRUCTED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

As Constructed social movements, we define movements which are emerging around an evoked cause, identified and initiated by the facilitation of an external agency. They are designed through particular instruments to enable capacity building within distressed communities, intentionally bridging the State and community. Here our example is the development approach called Violence Protection through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) emerging from Khayelitsha and later translated to other townships of Cape Town.15

With its app. 500.000 inhabitants Khayelitsha is one of the fastest growing areas in Cape Town, with the majority of the population initially arriving from the Eastern Cape (Levy & Poswa, 2006). As the last Black apartheid township to be constructed prior to the advent of democracy in 1994, its physical implementation lacks the incorporation of social infrastructure and economic opportunities that would elevate it beyond a dormitory. The resultant poverty, inequality and unemployment have dire effects on the social life of the communities, to the extent that violence and crime have become defining attributes. In the absence of a viable socius, the retrospective delivery of services, public places and amenities results in them not being ‘owned’ by their user communities. With the VPUU programme, service delivery in Khayelitsha has been reconceptualised around safety as a public good, and through the necessity to build community in parallel with actually building public space and management as ‘communalisation’, to construct a sense of belonging.

The VPUU is defined as a systematic area-based development approach aiming to create safe environments through prevention, cohesion and protection, whereas physical planning,

15 Thanks to Michael Krause, director of SUN, and Dr. Kathryn Ewing, urban designer, and the local VPUU team and community, who lectured about and guided us to the VPUU initiatives on site in Khayelitsha and Lotus Park in June 2016.
implementation and management of spatial infrastructure is regarded as one of four fundamental change agents alongside, with social and institutional development and the increase of community participation. The methodology assumes three partners: the Community, the Municipality and the Intermediary driver and negotiator. In 2005 The City of Cape Town, together with the German Development Bank formed a partnership with Khayelitsha Development Forum for a VPUU-approach to be implemented by SUN Development. Later, the process came to include further partners and funders, both locally and internationally (Krause, 2015).

One outcome of the emergence of VPUU as a constructed social movement are the short and long term interventions formulated as a Community Action Plan (CAP), a document based on surveys and visioning exercises to overcome five modes of exclusion: social, institutional, cultural, economic and spatial (Krause, 2015). From the CAP, certain ‘actions’ are emerging where the spatial ones are on an infrastructural scale, targeting movement patterns that induce frequent violence. The most significant spatial implementation to this point, includes the transformation of a long cross-section of a public passage, through the centre of Harare, connecting Monwabisi Park, an informal settlement on the southern fringe, with a public transport node some 4 km further north. Along this important passage, the daily walk for most commuters, a number of public assets have been implemented, such as sports activities, a library, community facilities and specifically invented typologies, providing a 24-hour human presence to enhance public safety.

Another example of an infrastructural spatial ‘action’, is the Emthonjeni project in the informal settings of Monwabisi Park. Emthonjeni is a Zulu word meaning at the water source, as was explained to us, at the riverbed. Foremost the word emthonjeni evokes the notion of a dynamic place where people of a community socialised, as washing was being done and linen getting dry. As such, it has a deep linguistic and phenomenal connotation to the original sense of the commons as a commonly managed land or site. The public water-taps in Monwabisi Park were identified as gathering points, around which small spatial adjustments could be expanded into micro semi-public spaces for pre-school child-care and play. With the frequent presence of the children, and the need for their safe walk-ways to the emthonjenis, these interventions start to engage with the place beyond its functionality of water provision, and to transform the neighbourhood on a structural and social level from the perspective of children’s safety (Ewing, 2015).

Besides the actions’ outcome and the partnership structure, voluntarism is key development principle. It implies local residents to get access to services in exchange for skill development thereby promoting the notion of a citizen or a community engaged in the sake of a general good. From our visit we heard that the skill training as part of the exchange had some ‘problems’ with individuals not necessarily wanting to leave the training programmes when completed. Instead of reading this as a failure, one could rather understand this as an attribute of wanting to belong to a new identity of solidarity, and as such, a true result of building ownership not only to new assets and services but to the transformative process itself.
Foregrounding community need and local capacitation as a precondition for all action, has here served to invert the Community/State relationship, thereby providing a means for intersecting belonging with ownership and establishing sustainable means of self-management. Commoning processes under the scale and scope of these conditions seems to require the support of an intermediator to nurture ‘community building’. A negotiated, yet precise, critical distance privileges the autonomy of community above that of the State, to effect redistributive practices with direct consequence for local economies, spatial configuration and ‘professional’ practice. In this manner engagement maybe expedited beyond the scale of a discrete community or neighbourhood, and a translation with a multiplier effect can take place, that engages civil society and ‘citiness’ within the local. The collective experience of individuals engaged binds them within a horizon of interconnectivity, one that is probably sustainable beyond the life of a project’s implementation period. Urban commoning, here as an institutional practice, elevates the potential for the social and the physical to be co-produced as parallel processes, in the interest of a resilient socius. The VPUU approach’s capacity for translation is shown through replication via modification and adaptation to multiple situations, across scales, together with communities of marginalization in the Cape townships. It is demonstrative of the resilience of urban commoning when co-produced as collectivized actions across different contexts.

QUIET ENCROACHMENTS
The third movement identified, which at the same time is elusive and difficult to discuss with the little experience from our workshop, are the ‘un-intentional’ social movements of quiet encroachments of the ordinary. According to Asaf Bayat, the deviser of this concept, there are two major goals for the quiet encroachers; first the redistribution of social goods and opportunities for survival (in terms assets and favourable locations), and second to attain autonomy – cultural and political – from regulations, institutions and discipline imposed by the state (Bayat, 1997: 59). With this definition, we can again understand the informal settlement that emerged during apartheid, not only as attempts to access the city, but also as deliberate moves to escape control. Stavrides argues that the contemporary city is the enclaved city of urban enclosures where within recognizable boundaries specific protocols of use is performed. Spatial ordering in these enclaves is therefore connected with behaviour normalisation, as within an enclaved urban island any exception can be acted out as normal (Stavrides, 2016:18). Hence, the quiet encroachments outside of the ‘enclaved city’ are not only attempts to access the city as a resource, but also to escape the normalisation mechanisms assigned by the state or the market. As Bayat suggests, the quiet encroachments are not a conscious movement of the poor, but they rather form a ‘passive network’, in which individuals recognize each other within a certain space, and acting accordingly as if united. For this reason, the spatial dimensions of the urban become manifest, as it is within the space of ‘the street’, ‘the square’, ‘the pavement’, such recognition becomes possible.

Our visit to Delft with Fadly Isaacs, architect and lecturer at UCT, lifted these discussions. Delft was established in 1989 to be one of the first racially mixed townships (i.e. Coloureds and Blacks), again on the very outskirts of Cape Town. As Delft consists of neighbourhoods of public housing, as well as of infamous and minimal shelters for migrants from outside of South Africa (Blikkiesdorp), it is a strategic planning incentive to zone the main road of central Delft as SR 2-Incremental Housing (CoCT 2007), thereby permitting primary residential uses and additional rights permitting informal
trade, B & Bs etc. plus consent use for functions such as religious institutions and restaurants i.a..
What we witnessed, with the assistance of Isaacs’ research experience\textsuperscript{16}, was that within this central stretch a number of rules are being negotiated by encroachers for reason to organise economic activities. Here, the support structure for these commoning processes, is on the one hand the road itself, as a physical space, but foremost the planning regulation, stating the road to remain ‘unplanned’.

The Delft main street is obviously a space in transformation; pavement disappearing, new shops and related structures emerging. The management of this space is that of negotiation and safeguarding. Once an asset is achieved, negotiation for its protection is started. As a commoning process, the routines are insecure, with likewise insecure supports and outcomes. Maybe a grounded social movement will emerge from a particular group which will identify itself as being left out of the negotiations and protections, or a constructed social movement will facilitate a transformation process around a particular cause if recognized by community or government. By nature, the passive networks as commoning processes are difficult to imagine as translated. Their members recognize each other through their similarities within a certain terrain as opposed to through a common and verbalised cause. Their reluctances to governmental control and to normalisation, gives them a role similar to that of an un-organised resistance movement. However, their translation into other contexts, might not be other than the continuous emergence of quiet encroachments in an excluding and controlled city environment.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper proposes that there is real transformative potential in the urban commons, Further it suggests that a grammar for an alternate urbanity, other than the current neo-liberal one, can evolve out of the practice of commoning. Recognising grammar as a structure of language, we have attempted to understand the structure of commoning in the context of Cape Town. Primarily we have observed how commoning emerges out of permanent conditions of exclusion. Commoners have come to access the city and citizenship, through the transformation of both space and identity in parallel production. Furthermore, both of these achievements are engaged in a continuous and intertwined movement of support and outcome. When this is maintained in a reciprocal and generative process, in terms of power distribution and learning, it affords structure to a process of contributing positive alterations of the city, and to new participatory ways of how to be in the city.

In recognising social justice as resource redistribution and identity recognition, then commoning achieves both – that is it gives access to resources, such as spatial resources, which were previously non-existent or inaccessible – thereby creating identities, such as non-migrant citizenship, which were not accessible either. Concurring with Nancy Fraser, we can also claim that commoning produces a

\textsuperscript{16} Thanks to Fadly Isaacs, lecturer at the Architecture, Planning and Geomatics Department, UCT, who lectured to us about Delft and guided us on site. Thanks also to Delft community members, who showed us around in Delft.
third aspect of social justice; that of representation through participation (Fraser, 2011). The VM women did not only become citizens, they also became political subjects; a ‘we’, as in ‘we the people’ (Tarrizo, 2012), representing a larger social movement. In this manner commoning produces not only transformative spaces for the city, but also new political subjects and contributes directly toward societal transformation.

Finally, we must pose the question; are these spaces then radically different? In the context of Cape Town, where violence predominates marking its presence in walls with broken glass, with iron bars and barbed-wire, the Victoria Mxenge settlement is strikingly peaceful and renounces those attributes. Violence is an enduring feature of domination and exclusion, both on a structural and interpersonal level. Since the colonial, the apartheid and the capitalist city, are spatially organised according to these two drivers, violence is intrinsic to their functional orders. In contrast, commoning for accessibility, emancipation and participation, by necessity, resists violence. Non-violent spaces, such as in VM or as VPUU are striving for in Khayelitsha, must consequently be seen to offer viable spaces and alternative order, in contrast to the current predominant trajectory of neo-liberal globalising cities.

![fig. 1] Victoria Mxenge

The VM women’s self-built houses with the community pre-school playground in the foreground.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The workshop Commons in Cape Town was organised by professor Iain Low in dialogue with professor Henrietta Palmer. We like to thank you all the contributors to this workshop mentioned in this paper. Thanks also to architect Carin Smuts and researcher Vanya Gastrow, who presented their work to us. Finally, thank you to our fellow colleagues of the workshop and of the project The Language of the Becoming City; adjugated professor in Urban anthropology Mariana Cavalcante Rio de Janeiro State University, architect Yvan Ikhlef and senior lecturer and artist Katarina Nitsch, Royal Institute of Art.
REFERENCES


Harvey, D. (2012) Rebel cities. From the right to the city to the right to the urban revolution, Verso, London.

Hess, C. (2008) Mapping the New Commons Mapping the New Commons. In Governing Shared Resources: Connecting Local Experience to Global Challenges; the 12th Biennial Conference of the
International Association for the Study of the Commons, University of Gloucestershire, Cheltenham, England. pp. 1–75.


Tarrizo, D. (2012) What is a Political Subject, Política común, Volume 1. Available at: http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/pc/12322227.0001.001?view=text;rgn=main


Everyday practices in planning transportation and bottom-up practices
Chair: Marie Thynell & Michael Oloko

Everyday practices and policies in Nairobi’s public transport. Nadine Appelhans, TU Dortmund University

Understanding transport exclusion in the Global South: The case of cycling in Kisumu, Kenya
Walter Alando, Technische Universität Dortmund, Faculty of Spatial Planning, Department of Transport Planning

SYSTEM OF URBAN PUBLIC OPEN SPACES: A PROPOSAL FOR TAMBAUZINHO, EXPEDICIONÁRIOS AND MIRAMAR SECTOR IN THE CITY OF JOÃO PESSOA, PARAÍBA, BRAZIL.

Rebeca Maria Ramos Tabosa¹, Filipe Valentim Afonso², José Augusto Ribeiro da Silveira³, Milena Dutra Silva⁴

(1) Graduate student in Architecture and Urbanism (Federal University of Paraíba -UFPB). Brazil rebeca.mrt@gmail.com

(2) Graduate student in Architecture and Urbanism (Federal University of Paraíba -UFPB). Brazil valentim.filipe@gmail.com

(3) Architect (BR), Master in Urban Development (Federal University of Pernambuco –UFPE, 1997) and Doctor in Urban Development (Federal University of Pernambuco –UFPE, 2004), Lecturer at Federal University of Paraiba- UFPB. ct.laurbe@gmail.com

(4) Biologist (BR), Master in Botanic (Federal University Rural of Pernambuco – UFRPE, 2008), Doctor in Geography (Federal University of Pernambuco –UFPE, 2012) and PhD in Urbanism/ Environmental and Urban Planning (Federal University of Paraiba –UFPB, 2015), Lecturer at Federal University of Alagoas –UFAL. dutra_ms@gmail.com

ABSTRACT
This article is the result of a research conducted in the Urban Design V discipline of the Architecture and Urbanism course at UFPB in 2015. The city of João Pessoa, capital of Paraiba, is aligned to the brazilian context regarding the lack of an integrated urban planning and long-lasting improvements to the urban environment. Thus, this work aims to study the current situation of the sector formed by the neighborhoods of Tambaúzinho, Expedicionários and part of Miramar, proposing integrated and sustainable solutions. The choice of the sector was motivated mainly by its location in the city, having relevance in the relations between the road system and the current use of soil, being privileged by their access. It was identified urban planning actions that benefits more private vehicle than pedestrians, a restricted internal feeding system and underutilized urban voids with great urban potential. From the diagnostic, it was developed a few urban planning scenarios, resulting in a proposal set by the review and mix of the strengths of each scenario. It is proposed the enlargement of the cycling network and its integration to the new bus lines suggested, and also a new network of public open spaces, distributed from the underutilized urban lots. This work contributed by creating a theoretical basis for viable proposals regarding urban planning, emphasizing principles such as sustainability, urban mobility and accessibility, as well as updating the database of the sector. It is with the integration of non-motorized...
and public transport networks, as from public open spaces systems, that more sustainable and efficient cities, regarding mobility and urban accessibility, can be reached.

**KEY WORDS**

Urban planning, Public transport, Public open spaces.
INTRODUCTION

The absence of an integrated urban planning and policies capable of absorbing the rapid urbanization of Brazilian cities were features which were and still are present in the history of urban development of the country, resulting in the worsening of social inequality and contributing to a vicious cycle of urban problems, as it is stated by Figueiredo (2010):

The growth and consolidation of several Brazilian cities over the past two decades was just not random or disorganized. It has obeyed, predominantly, a logical production of architectural typologies, space and transport systems which favour a few ways of life at the expense of all others. The Brazilian 'desurbanism' has efficient feedback loops that amplify and reproduce the effects while creating restrictions to other ways of life, producing a spiral of new 'disurban' trends. (FIGUEIREDO, 2010: 10)

According to the reality of Brazilian medium sized cities, João Pessoa, capital of Paraíba, a state located in the Northeast of Brazil (figure 1) experienced in recent years an accelerated process of urbanization and urban sprawl. Thus, it can be observed the sprawling phenomenon and intense process of change of land use and occupation, creating numerous problems of urban mobility and accessibility due to the low quality of transport systems.

[Fig. 1] Schematic maps of Brazil, State of Paraíba and city of João Pessoa, as shown respectively. Source: Afonso, Silva and Tabosa, 2015.

According to Brito (2012) in the way the urban system of João Pessoa is configured today the road system and traffic vehicles become disruptive elements to the city. These elements contribute to the deterioration of environmental quality and alienate citizens from common urban living areas, adversely affecting the quality of life. Thus, there is a need for organization of the system by criteria that prioritize public spaces for people, promoting the improvement of quality of life.

The neighbourhoods of Tambauzinho, Expedicionários and Miramar define a sector which had an important role in the expansion of João Pessoa during the second half of the twentieth century. In
addition, this sector can reflect much of the current problems faced by the city, which means they suffer from the lack of an efficient public transport and public open space systems and are also affected by the lack of cycle routes facilities and fully appropriate sidewalks for pedestrian walkability, which interferes in urban mobility.

Therefore, this paper aims to study the current situation set by the sector which encompasses the neighbourhoods of Tambauzinho, Expedicionários and part of Miramar, proposing integrated and sustainable solutions to urban planning according to local reality, treating the followed axes of intervention circulation, connectivity, identity and permanence as themes for the development of the proposal.

RECOGNIZING THE OBJECT OF STUDY

The sector to be studied inside of the city of João Pessoa encompasses the neighbourhoods of Tambauzinho (1), Expedicionários (2) and part of Miramar (3), as it's shown in figure 2. Besides, it is bounded north and south by two street corridors which runs axially from the city Centre: Epitácio Pessoa Avenue Corridor (A) and Minister Jose Américo de Almeida Avenue, named Beira Rio Corridor (B), respectively. These avenues are considered to be two of the most important routes of the city, due to its large confluence of flows and to its role as a direct link between the central and the coastal neighbourhoods. The south also has a geographical boundary defined by the Jaguaribe River (C). Moreover, the sector is cut by an arterial road called BR-230 (D), a highway which as to its position can be classified as annular.
The sector was chosen mainly because of its privileged position regarding its access, valued location in the city and relevance in daily life, once it has large institutional and cultural facilities, such as the 'Espaço Cultural José Lins do Rego' (E), and it is used as an alternative to relieve the corridors that define it. Moreover, it lacks a better internal feeding system that value urban mobility and accessibility within the neighbourhood.

In regard with the legislation, the Master Plan of João Pessoa (PMJP, 2009) indicates that these three neighbourhoods are classified within zoning as Priority Zone of Densifying (ZAP), which means this area has availability of basic infrastructure, and its road network and environment allow the intensification of land use and occupation. The sector also includes the Jaguaribe River, whose surroundings fit within the Environmental Mitigation Sector (SAA) and Environmental Protection Area (ZPA).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Sustainability in urban planning is a relatively current theme and it has been widely studied around the world. Therefore the theoretical framework of this research followed recent references and it was based on authors that discuss the importance of sustainable urban planning for the city, mentioning...
some definitions of what would represent the scope of an urban sustainability to the local reality studied.

Rabello & Rodrigues (2013) explain that urban planning in the town must be able to think strategically the city, ensuring a permanent process of discussion and analysis of urban issues and contradictions. Because of this, planning is a key element to understand the production and organization of urban space, since it expresses the interests of coexisting segments in the city and can justify or not their actions, as it is emphasized by Cruz (2011).

In a globalized world, human needs of contemporary life for typically urban populations have an inseparable dependence on urban infrastructure, for example, the access to public transport, green areas or public open spaces. In this sense, according to Bernard et al. (2014) the achievement of a sustainable urban planning can contribute to a re-evaluation of human activities in cities, either at regional or municipal level, or even at a neighborhood scale, which are most noticeable in the daily activities of most part of the population.

There are numerous issues addressed when trying to conceptualize urban sustainability. Farr (2008) states that the most basic principles of sustainable urban planning are a good public transport system combined with the possibility of an efficient walkability integrated with buildings and high-performance infrastructure. In addition, the density and human access to nature also occupies central values this definition.

Farr (2008) also points out that the promotion of opportunities for people to walk and cycle are key elements of connectivity, as well as the access to a good public transport service to the adjacent neighborhoods and other destinations. This concept can be considered an antidote to car dependence, as it promotes mobility opportunities to people within your neighborhood and corridor.

A key principle of sustainable urban development is its commitment to strongly integrate transport technology – metro, tram, bus – with density and distribution of adjacent soil uses; an essential urban standard to a car independent lifestyle. (FARR, 2008: 34)

Gehl (2010), in its turn, points out that the public open spaces are a key point in urban planning and that they ensure the development of a city "where recreational and social activities are mixed with room for necessary pedestrian traffic as well as the opportunity to participate in urban life" (p. 63). This idea can be the starting point for holistic planning which makes a safe, sustainable and healthy city.
Still on this line of thought, De Bois (2014) quote connectivity, identity and vivacity as three urban sustainability factors in the discussion of public spaces, covering aspects such as accessibility, hierarchy, connection and routes for connectivity; mixed use, density and uniqueness to vivacity; and social interaction, authenticity and heterogeneity for identity. These same concepts, if carried to the scale of the neighbourhood, may also be analysis factors for urban sustainability, as sustainable urbanism promotes the idea of humanized streets, active facades and good urban infrastructure. In addition, it generates a sense of identity and belonging to the place.

The essence of a vital city comes down to the fit between the system of moving and residing, between the physical system that, by its connection functions as a good urban frame of anchor points and patterns. (De Bois, 2014: 268)

Therefore, this research tried to follow the concepts reasoned so far, such as connectivity, vivacity and identity, addressing public transport and systems of public open spaces as key elements of urban planning in the range of sustainable urban solutions to the scale and local reality studied.

**METHODOLOGY**

It was divided in two parts (figure 3): i) the first one features a diagnostic of the sector, organized in steps such as place's perception, legislation research, photographic survey and the making of thematic maps; ii) the second one is the definition of a proposal of a system of public open spaces, for which the procedures were the creation of scenarios and intervention themes, and finally the proposition of subspaces to the system's articulation.

![Diagram of methodology. Source: Elaborated by the authors, 2016.](image)

The diagnostic started in an empirical way by visiting and touring the sector, which contributed to an apprehension and identification of the elements that create urban landscape (Cullen, 1971). However it wasn't made the serial vision proposed by Cullen; instead it was intended to capture the existing
dialogue between the environment and the user expressed in paving types, the shading and the sensations obtained in the streets, sidewalks and enclosures, and so on. This perception, which was influenced by scales and materiality, led to a preview of the problems and qualities of the place. It can be highlighted the role of the 'Espaço Cultural ' in the sector – a cultural equipment that can be understood as an "urban surprise" (figure 4a) – and the insecurity and impersonality of certain areas surrounding this large building (figure 4b).

After this step it was made a legislation research which took as main references documents such as the Master Plan and the Urban Code of the city, in which are indicated the city zones as well as their rules of occupation. Besides, certain areas of the sector were photographed in different days and hours aiming to create a record of the dynamic of space. This material was organized in conceptual diagrams and thematic maps: map of hierarchy of streets, map of land use and occupation, schematic map of distribution of building's height and map of bike paths and bus lines.

These data supported the creation of three different scenarios which indicated bike, bus and car networks going through alternative streets that could enrich new urban voids and create a system of open public spaces. The final proposal was made by the bond of the best concepts of the scenarios, for which it was taken in consideration twelve criteria (table 1) inspired by Cullen (1971), Del Rio (1990), Lynch (1997) and Gehl (2010):

|---------------------|--------------------|--------------|---------------|-----------------|------------|----------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|----------------|

[Table 1]. Criteria analyzed in scenarios. Source: Elaborated by the authors, 2016.
The characterization of scenarios and its analysis considering those criteria helped in the definition of guidelines that can also be understood as themes for urban intervention, which are: Circulation; Connectivity; Permanence and Identity. Thereafter it was selected a few areas of the sector that could have an important role in the system's articulation for having potential voids to insert intermodal and permanence spaces.

THE REALITY & THE POSSIBILITIES

DIAGNOSTIC: problems and opportunities

The sector has several activities related to daily life of people once it comprehends cultural, healthy and sportive equipment's that have impact in the city scale. Therefore, through the city's experience it was possible to individually test and identify the problems, obstacles and qualities of the public sphere.

However, the first perception of the place can be improved and widen up by a technical approach. The map of full and empty spaces can show, for example, the densification of the sector, which features full detached buildings and just a few voids. The lack of open spaces can be justified because of the intense process of residential occupation which occurred in the last decades, promoted by the sector's localization: it's almost equidistant of important areas of the city such as the City's Centre (Old Town) and the coast.

The prevalence of residential use can be shown clearly in the map of use and occupation (figure 5). It also demonstrates some trade activities located in the main and collector's streets (figure 6). This map indicates the presence of the equipments mentioned previously and a few others: two public schools (A, B), several religious institutions of different sizes and a public market (C), in the Miramar portion of the sector.
Based on the users perception the sector features several urban and social problems like insecurity, items from the public sphere with poor quality and lack of planning, especially regarding its walkability. In the urban design aspect it can be seen two mainly problems: lack of connections and several obstacles to pedestrians. Because of this, the areas that are the most densely populated and the main avenues – which are more connected with the rest of the city and carry a bigger amount of people – are segregated from the places considered as attractive poles.

It is noteworthy in the sector the lack of transversal lines connecting Epitácio Pessoa Avenue and Beira Rio. Besides, the BR-230 highway, which runs through the Tambauzinho neighbourhood in a lower level, contributes to narrow Jader Medeiros Street width, making it less friendly to walk (fig. 7).
Besides those problems, it also exists others barriers: throughout the sector there are some conflicting crossings that complicate pedestrian routes; near to 'Espaço Cultural' is evident the lack of richer connections with main avenues; the surroundings of schools and religious institutions has no hierarchy of land use, so those places become empty for several moments of the day, discouraging pedestrians and users of public space.

However, all these problems can be analyzed considering a more optimistic approach, for which the quality of the sector's localization, the topography of the soil and the amount of diverse equipments can be used as a way to leverage the area, what is considered by Gehl (2010) as "urban opportunities". This means that the place has many potential elements which are underestimated and underused, but can (possibly) attract and congregate people, emphasize the identity of the place and valorize it even more.

Based on the categories described by Gehl (2010), it was possible to identify in the sector the main following opportunities (table 2):
Opportunities in the sector Tambauzinho, Expedicionários and Miramar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Where?</th>
<th>Why?</th>
<th>How?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visual opportunities</td>
<td>Surroundings of Beira Rio Avenue.</td>
<td>Declivity and considerable number of underused open places.</td>
<td>Viewpoints; Landscaping.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walkability</td>
<td>Local and collectors streets between equipment’s.</td>
<td>Local streets have many trees and are shaded; equipment’s are placed in a radius around 500 and 1000 meters.</td>
<td>Cycle lanes and paths; improvement of paving; pedestrianization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanence</td>
<td>Big void in Beira Rio; Small voids sparsely found in residential areas</td>
<td>These voids can be molded according to the necessities of each area and articulate a system of open spaces.</td>
<td>Design of squares and parks; creation of pocket parks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Synthesis of the main urban opportunities found in the sector. Source: Elaborated by the authors, 2016.

PROPOSAL: THEMES FOR URBAN PLANNING

In face of the diagnosis presented in a summarized way, the proposal was based on three axes of intervention, key points to promote the transformation of space and articulate a public open spaces system, which would lead to the improvement of the opportunities and solution of the conflicts identified: a) circulation, solutions to the public transport and cycle track system; b) connectivity, recovery solutions of the connections between the main parallel streets; c) permanence and identity, solutions to fill the empty voids and generate more spaces of permanence.

a) CIRCULATION

It was proposed changes in the public transport system of the sector leading to a better internal distribution of the bus lines to the neighbourhoods, based on the change of the directions of some collector streets, generating a binary between them, and then relieving congested streets. Some adjacent subspaces to streets which would be a part of the new path of the bus were pedestrianized and re-qualified, such as the streets bordering the 'Espaço Cultural', which will have its traffic reduced and environmental discomfort ameliorated.

The cycle track system, which is currently non-existent, was thought considering aspects such as continuity, connectivity, security, topography, economic viability, environmental comfort and travel time (ANTP, 2007). The proposal considered the 'Espaço Cultural' as an attractor pole, not only for the sector, as well for the city. It was invested in the creation of paths for cyclists according to a hierarchy: cycle tracks on major avenues; cycle routes together with bus lanes on collector streets; and bike lanes organized in two rings, which are connected to the other lines of the system (see figure 8).
b) CONNECTIVITY

The main measure of this intervention axis is the valorization and humanization of Jader Medeiros Street, treated as the main connection to pedestrian and cyclists between the avenues Epitácio Pessoa and Beira Rio. It was thought three points of support on that path (figure 9), one in the meeting with Epitácio Pessoa Avenue, endowing it with a bike rack, encouraging intermodality (A); the second section, close to the 'Espaço Cultural'; the Public School José Vieira and to the Sanctuary of Our Lady of Immaculate Conception, integrating different audiences attracted by those equipment’s (B); and the third section, in the meeting with Beira Rio, creating city views (C).

It is also proposed the urbanization of the stretch against Antonio Gama Street and Beira Rio, involving again intermodality bus / bike and also proposing a solution to the informal surrounding settlements, relocating the resident families on site to a nearby empty lot. The goal is to generate new housing and create public spaces with sportive, permanence and leisure areas, serving all residents of the neighborhood, including those from low-income families.
c) PERMANENCE AND IDENTITY

It is proposed thematic pocket parks in the neighbourhood aiming to strengthen the cultural identity of the sector, which is currently centred by the 'Espaço Cultural', and stimulate the belonging relationship of the residents of the sector with the new public spaces available in the area.

These pocket parks have as cultural themes literature, performing arts and gastronomy expressed in street furniture and equipment’s, "connecting culture" through the streets of the sector. Therefore, it is proposed, for example, small squares with station books, with grandstands and spaces for food festivals. These spaces were distributed according to the identification of empty lots and the analysis of the environment sector, for instance, it was thought to value gastronomy in lots near markets and trade / services uses; as for the "performing arts", they are located in an areas close to poor communities and residential use; finally, the books station is located near schools and also housing.
CONCLUSION

It is believed to have contributed with the purpose to study the current situation of the sector formed by the neighbourhoods of Tambauzinho, Expedicionários and part of Miramar. In addition, this study has proposed, as far as possible, sustainable and integrated solutions of urban planning according to local reality, addressing circulation, connectivity, identity and permanence as axes of intervention.

The research proved to be of great importance not only to understand the problems and opportunities of the neighborhoods in question, but also to generate two forms of subsidies which can help future interventions: a) a theoretical basis regarding urban planning, focusing on principles such as sustainability, urban mobility and accessibility; b) an updated database of the sector and the record of the current situation of the same.

Insecurity; lack of accessibility and intermodality; lack of adequate paths in the pedestrian scale; lack of public open spaces: these problems are a few problems which are found in the sector that can also be seen in other areas of the city of João Pessoa, as well as in medium-sized brazilian cities. Thus, the solutions to the proposed areas of intervention in this research collaborate to improve the sector and
the city in question. Besides, it also indicates paths to be followed in urban planning in other municipalities of the country.

Finally, it can be concluded that it is with the integration of non-motorized and public transport networks such as the use of bicycles and the valorization of pedestrian walkability, as well as a systems of public open spaces which takes advantage of urban voids and underutilized lots, that more sustainable and efficient cities regarding urban mobility and accessibility can be achieved.

REFERENCES


